Age, Race, Self-Interest and Financing Public Schools Through Referenda

Kent L. Tedin

Richard E. Matland

Gregory R. Weiher

University of Houston

JOP Submission 8/28/99

Financing public schools in the United States over the next several decades seems destined to be one of the most contentious issues facing local government. In states such as California, Texas, Arizona, Florida, North Carolina and Massachusetts the Department of Education (DOE) projects a 20 percent or more student enrollment increase over the next decade. To cope with this influx, a DOE report says about 6,000 additional schools need to be built (Olson and Hendrie 1998). School districts across the country are, however, hard pressed to simply maintain existing schools, let alone build new ones. It has been estimated that for the 50 largest school districts there is a backlog of more than 13.3 billion dollars in deferred maintenance and repairs (Council of the Great City Schools 1994). The standard method used by school districts to maintain and improve capital stock is to issue general revenue bonds, which are paid for by an increase in property taxes. In most school districts, these bonds (and the tax increase) must be approved by the voters in a referendum. This approval has been difficult to get in recent years. A survey by the National Association of School Boards found that one-fourth of the school districts responding had experienced the rejection of a bond proposal over a recent four year period (Olson and Hendrie 1998). Commonly advanced as a reason for the difficulty in passing school bonds is the intersection of two demographic trends--
the increasingly large minority population in the public schools and the aging of the population as baby-boomers move through the life-cycle.

The combination of white flight, immigration and high birth rates among some minorities has resulted in virtually all large metropolitan school districts being overwhelmingly minority. This pattern is as true in northern, predominately white, cities such as Minneapolis (61% nonwhite student enrollment), Denver (71%), Milwaukee (75%) and Kansas City (76%) as it is in high-
growth cities in the Southwest such as Houston (89% nonwhite), Dallas (88%), Phoenix (70%), and Los Angeles (88%) (Jerald and Curran 1998, 56-57). On the other hand, the electorates in these cities have either a majority or a plurality of white voters. An important question is whether white voters will approve bond referendums in school districts where the student population is majority-
minority. If not, is there a race-based explanation or does the explanation lie elsewhere?

A second demographic trend with implications for school bond elections is the aging of the population. The Census Bureau estimates that in 1998 13% of the population was 65 and over, which will increase to 20% by the year 2030 (Pressley 1998). The elderly percentage of the voting population will be even higher. Older citizens are unlikely to have children in the public schools. We might, therefore, expect this population to vote in its own self-interest--that is against school bonds to keep property taxes low. Evidence from many previous studies lends support to this hypothesis (for dated reviews see Piele and Hall 1973; Hamilton and Cohen 1974). More recently, MacManus (1996) found the "yes" vote in a Florida school bond election was 30 points lower among those over 50 than those under 50. Studies by Button (1993) and Preston (1984) yield the same conclusion.

It is common to find anti-tax sentiment among older citizens to be a major predictor of a negative vote on bond referenda (Cataldo and Holm 1983; Lowery and Sigelman 1981). The concern about self-interested voting among the 65 and over population has led many school districts to include an exemption from property tax increases for this group should a bond issue pass. Most research shows the tactic is ineffective (Rubinfeld 1977; Bergstrom et al. 1982; Fisher and Rasche 1984; for an exception see Brokaw, Gale and Merz 1990). These findings, however, predominately reference the white population or populations where minority subgroups are too small to be broken out for separate analysis.

A large body of literature beginning with Sears and Kinder (1971) argues that self-interest among whites will be a minor determinant of preferences on policy issues with a racial component. Rather, they argue preferences on these sorts of issues will mostly be determined by symbolic values. Another literature, however, stresses that one area where self-interest effects frequently occur is over taxes. Those who must pay the taxes usually oppose them (Sears and Citrin 1985; Green and Gerken 1989). A third literature emphasizes sociotropic (public regarding) influences on voting. If the national economy is doing well, citizens will vote for the incumbent party regardless of their own personal fortunes (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981; Kiewiet 1983). Translated to our case, if respondents perceive the school district as performing its job effectively, they will vote for the bond regardless of how it affects their pocketbook. In addition, a major theme of the bond campaign was that substantial school overcrowding prevented the district from properly educating its students. From a sociotropic perspective, we hypothesize that those who share this view would vote for the bond regardless of how the bond issue affected them personally. Thus, there is a mix of quite plausible motives as explanations for the direction of the bond vote–symbolic values, self-interest, and a sociotropic evaluation. It is also plausible that whites and nonwhites may bring a different mix of these motives to the voting booth.

There are a limited number of studies that look at differences between black and white respondents on race-targeted dependent variables (for examples, see Bobo and Krueger 1993; Kinder and Sanders 1996), and fewer yet that consider white, black and Hispanic respondents simultaneously (one example is Alvarez and Butterfield 1998). Our purpose in this paper is to analyze the effects of symbolic values, racial resentment, age-related self-interest factors and sociotropic factors among whites, blacks and Hispanics as determinants of support for or opposition to the passage of a school revenue bond. Of course, in any election there may be idiosyncratic and local factors that will influence the vote..1 Given the demographic trends in large metropolitan school districts, however, almost every school bond election will activate predispositions regarding partisanship and ideology, race, the collective good, and considerations about whether one should or should not vote to increase one's own taxes.

The data for our study come from a post-election survey of 623 persons who voted in a bond referendum held in the spring of 1996 is a large, southwestern, urban school district.1 A comparison group of 320 nonvoters were also interviewed. Respondents were sampled from the poll list, so we are certain they either voted or did not. The voter sample was then weighted (for the descriptive analysis) to reflect the known age and ethnic distribution of the voters.2 The school bond issue was the only item on the ballot, so there is no ambiguity about motive in going to the polls. Our focus in this analysis is on voters, with reference to nonvoters only to illustrate descriptive points.

In the spring of 1996 the district school board requested a property tax increase of 6.6 cents per $100 in assessed value to pay for a 390 million dollar capital improvement program. The request for the bond issue was brought on by a dramatic increase in the student population. In the eight years between 1988 and 1995 the number of students in the school district had increased by 17,000. The plan called for 15 new schools to be built, with the majority going to predominately Hispanic neighborhoods where the enrollment increase had been most pronounced. But some new schools were targeted for predominately African-American and white neighborhoods as well, and a sizable expenditure of the bond dollars was earmarked for the repair and upgrade of existing facilities. The proposed bond and tax increase was defeated by 53% to 47%. While turnout was low, just under 10 percent, it does not appear the outcome of the balloting would have been much different had all registered voters cast their ballots. Among the sample of nonvoters, 36% favored passage of the bond, 25% were undecided and 39% were opposed to its passage.

I. Hypothesis Tests

In testing our hypotheses, we begin with a model that includes demographics and symbolic values, and then add to the equation self-interest variables followed by sociotropic variables. The initial model includes the standard demographics used in most analyses of electoral data, as well as the symbolic values of political ideology, partisanship, political trust, equalitarianism and racial resentment. Based on past research (Alexander and Bass 1973; Cataldo and Holm 1983; Chew et al. 1991; Hamilton and Cohen 1974; Piele and Hall 1973), we hypothesize that younger voters, renters, women, and those with high incomes and educations will be most likely to support the bond. The bivariate relationships are reported in Table 1 (see Appendix A for the question wording).

Table 1 About Here

Despite the near consensus that older citizens vote "no" on school bond issues, the relationship is limited to whites. It is whites 65 and over that were most opposed to the bond (only 28% voted "yes")–much as popular lore would predict. Support increases slightly among whites between 50 and 64 (32% voted yes). Once we drop below 50, a majority of white respondents (66%) supported the bond. On the other hand, the age coefficients for African-Americans and Hispanics have the wrong sign. Among blacks, 65% of those 65 and over voted for the bond compared to 59% of those 64 and under. Blacks 65 and over belong to the "civil rights" generation, and through this experience may be uniquely influenced to think in terms of group interest. Among Hispanics, 56% of those 65 and over voted for the bond, compared to 55% for those under 65. Whatever the reason, only white voters fit the conventional wisdom concerning age and voting on school bonds.

Among whites, both education and income have significant positive coefficients, meaning the higher the income and education the more likely a positive vote, again consistent with most past research. These relationships, however, are near zero for blacks and Hispanics. Among Hispanics the coefficient for gender is significant.1 The initial model also includes partisanship, which is significant for whites and Hispanics in the expected fashion, but not for blacks, and political ideology, which is significant for whites and blacks, but not for Hispanics. Consistent with the work of others on referenda (Magleby 1984), the relationships for political ideology and party identification are not as strong as commonly seen in partisan elections.

II. Measurement of Racial and Other Symbolic Values

Many racial attitudes fall into the general category of "symbolic values." These are broad ranging predispositions learned early in life. Later in life these orientations are a consideration in the way citizens respond to current political issues (Sears and Funk 1991, 13). A good deal of research has shown that measures of modern or symbolic racism--a combination of antiblack affect and traditional American values--are effective predictors of policy issues with a racial component (Sears, Van Lear, Carrillo and Kosterman 1997; Hughes 1997). In particular, Alvarez and Brehm (1997, 362) found symbolic racism had the strongest effect of all variables across a wide variety of race-based dependent redistributive policies. Racial resentment in our survey is measured with two agree-disagree items measuring symbolic racism taken from the 1986 NES (Kinder and Sanders 1996),2 and with an item asking respondents if they favor or oppose providing free education to the children of immigrants who are in the United States illegally.3

We hypothesize that high levels of racial resentment among whites will predict a negative vote on the school bond, which Table 1 shows is clearly the case. For Hispanics, the coefficient has the right sign but is insignificant. The item concerning public funding of education for illegal immigrants is significant for whites and blacks, but the coefficients are lower for the latter group.1

Of course, there are other explanations for why attitudes about race might affect voting in a bond referendum for an overwhelmingly minority school district. One approach holds that overt racial prejudice is a consideration among many whites when responding to policies that benefit racial minorities (Gilens 1995; Kuklinski et al. 1997; Peffley et al. 1997). But Alvarez and Brehm (1997) found anti-black stereotyping had virtually no predictive power for dependent variables with a racial component, even when the modern racism variable was removed from the equation. Table 1 shows those whites giving higher ratings to blacks and Hispanics are more likely to vote for the bond, although the feeling thermometers are weaker than either of the two symbolic racism measures for whites. On the other hand, the coefficients for black and Hispanic respondents on the zero-to-ten rating scales are nonsignificant.2

Racial attitudes can also be affected by evaluations of competing group interests. Bobo (1983) argues that realistic group conflict occurs when whites resist policies which benefit other racial or ethnic groups because they sense their collective interest is threatened (see also Giles and Buckner 1993 and Giles and Hertz 1994). While some political scientists have emphasized the possibilities that viewing policy outcomes from a group perspective may lead to tension, others have emphasized group identification may lead to evaluation of public policies in terms of group benefits. Kinder and Sanders (1996), for example, hypothesize that support for race targeted policies among blacks will be driven by perceptions of a collective gain.

Until the mid-1960s, the life opportunities for black Americans were decisively determined by race. Although "decisively" may no longer be the proper adverb, many blacks still find it more efficient in political matters to determine what is good for their racial group than to determine their own personal self-interest. Dawson (1994) calls this perspective the black utility heuristic. He suggests that as long as race plays a major role in defining life chances, it is rational for African-
Americans to follow group cues in coming to political decisions. This perspective is likely to be especially true of older generations of African-Americans who were politically socialized in a time period when life opportunities were decisively determined by race. The black utility heuristic hypothesis is, however, often difficult to directly test. Bobo and Kluegel, for example, concluded for race-targeted policies there exist substantial group interests among blacks. They based this conclusion on a residual rather than on direct observation. That is, they ruled out other explanations and were left with the group-interest alternative (Bobo and Kluegel 1993, 459). We will use much the same strategy. Breaking down the vote by race/ethnicity shows 41% of whites voted for the bond, 61% of blacks and 56% of Hispanics.

Two points here are relevant. First, a plausible explanation for this difference is a realistic assessment of group benefits. Second, having said that much, there is greater variation in the black vote than one would normally expect. In most partisan elections the black vote usually approaches 90% Democratic. In other referenda with racial implications, such as California's Proposition 209, the black vote was 82% against (Alvarez and Butterfield 1998). In this bond election, there is variation to explain among African-Americans that we do not always encounter.

Other Symbolic Values. A consistent theme in the literature on tax referenda is that a principle source of "no" votes come from those alienated from government (Lowery and Sigelman 1981; Sears and Citrin 1985). We include, therefore, a measure of political trust. Unlike age, Table 1 shows that political trust has a significant coefficient for all three racial/ethnic groups--the greater the distrust of the government in Washington, the more likely a vote against the bond issue. Not unexpectedly, whites had lower trust scores than blacks and Hispanics. What is somewhat surprising, however, is the stronger effect among nonwhites than whites.1 Distrusting blacks and distrusting Hispanics were more likely to vote against the bond than were distrusting whites. It is quite clear that the bond issue attracted a number of minority voters disenchanted with government who manifested that disenchantment by voting against the school bond. Since many bond issues in urban districts are decided by close margins, the translation of alienation from government into a negative vote among a constituency with a substantial group interest in a positive outcome is a finding of some potential consequence.

Finally, we constructed a scale for equalitarianism using items from the 1992 NES (Kinder and Sanders 1996). We hypothesize that those most committed to equalitarianism would favor the bond, given the role education plays in promoting the equality of opportunity. Others have found equalitarianism to be a strong predictor of policies with racial implications (Hurwitz and Pleffley 1992; Tedin 1994; Sears, Van Lear, Carrillo, and Kosterman 1997). These data, however, show only a weak positive relationship for whites, and no significant relationship for blacks and Hispanics (but see the multivariate analysis).

III. Measurement of Self-Interest

An issue affects one's personal self-interest when it impacts directly upon one's individual, material well-being in the here and now (Barry 1965; Sears et al. 1979). At the theoretical level, it is widely understood that the motives leading to a policy preference have important implications. Both classical republican theory and liberal theory hold that virtuous citizens set aside their private interests and judge the performance of government based on the public good (Burtt 1993; Mansbridge 1980). Most modern political thinkers dismiss this model of civic virtue as highly implausible. Self-interest is part of human nature. Beyond the trivial level, widespread self-
sacrifice is not to be expected. Virtuous citizens exist only to the extent that the collective interest and self-interest happen to coincide (Monroe 1991).

At the empirical level, considerable research shows that personal self-interest is often a minor or nonexistent determinant of preferences in the political arena. It is argued by some that people compartmentalize their thinking on public and private matters (Lane 1962). They tend not to link their own personal fortunes to the actions of government. There have been many demonstrations of nonrelationships between self-interest and a variety of policy preferences such as busing, affirmative action, gender issues, guaranteed jobs, welfare programs, national heath insurance and immigration policy (see Citrin and Green 1991 for a review). Most of these nonrelationships for self-interest, however, used attitudes rather than behavior as a dependent variable. While self-interest does not predict attitudes about busing, it does predict behavior (Green and Cowdon 1992). One area where self-interest demonstrates a consistent effect is for clearly targeted tax increases. Those who must pay the tax usually oppose it (Sears and Citrin 1985; Green and Gerken 1989). Since we are investigating a fairly demanding behavior (vote direction in a referendum where turnout was only 10%), and a tax issue, we anticipate self-interest effects.

Numerous studies analyze the effect racial attitudes, symbolic attitudes and self-interest on race-related dependent variables. These studies are, however, almost entirely limited to the white population, as the racial component in these models is conceptualized as racial resentment among whites. The consequence is that much of what we know about self-interest is what we know about self-interest among whites. For a school district where 89% of the students are nonwhite and close to 50% of the eligible voters are nonwhite, it would seem essential to include the nonwhite population in the analysis. The self-interest variables are operationalized as follows:

SI-1. If the respondent has children currently attending school in the district, we hypothesize a positive vote on the bond.

SI-2. If the bond had passed, does the respondent believe a new school will be built in his or her neighborhood. If yes, we hypothesize a positive vote.

SI-3. We asked what effect passing the bond would have on property taxes--would passage result in a large increase, a moderate increase, a small increase or no increase? We hypothesize that the smaller the perceived increase, the more likely a positive vote.

SI-4. If a respondent is over 65, and knows about the property tax exemption for those over 65, we hypothesize an increase in the probability of a positive vote when compared to those who do not know about the exemption.

As Table 1 indicates, self-interest was clearly correlated with vote intention. Having children in the public school district was only significant for white voters (but see the multivariate analysis for blacks and Hispanics). In addition, the expectation that the tax increase would be significant was strongly correlated with the vote for all three groups. We can further test for self-
interest by looking at the effects of knowing about the tax exemption if the voter is over 65. The school district has a local option to exempt those 65 and over from any increase in property taxes resulting from passage of a revenue bond. Respondents 65 and over were asked if they knew whether the school district had exercised this option (it had). Among seniors who knew about the tax break, 45% voted for the bond. Among those who did not, only 32% voted to approve. The evidence implies a self-interest consideration, as those who were unaware of the tax exemption, and therefore believed there would be a significant personal cost, were likely to vote against the bond.

When one disaggregates by race/ethnicity, however, there is no statistically significant difference among whites (30% who knew about the tax break voted yes, versus 27% who did not). There is, however, a large differences for blacks and Hispanics. Among blacks, 91% of those who knew about the tax break voted "yes," versus 45% who did not know about the tax break. Among Hispanics, 73% who knew about the tax break voted "yes," versus 42% who did not know about the tax break. These results provide a cautionary tale that extrapolating results from earlier studies of predominantly white voters to all voters may lead to the wrong conclusions. As we noted earlier, the literature on bond referenda and tax abatements has generally found these abatements are ineffective. For our sample we find that generalization is true only for white voters. For blacks and Hispanics, the consequence of the abatement is a substantial increase in support for the bond. In a close election, a tax abatement may spell the difference between winning and losing.

IV. Sociotropic Voting.

There have been several demonstrations of "public regarding" or "sociotropic" voting, where political behavior seems driven by a collective evaluation rather than personal gain. When people are asked directly why they cast their vote as they did, collective motives are the most frequent explanation (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995: 118). So it certainly conceivable that one motive for voting "yes" in a school bond election is a concern for the public good. Beyond potential self-
serving recall, however, the evidence for public regarding motives is ambiguous. Studies of sociotropic voting (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981; Lewis-Beck 1988) show only that respondents rely on sociotropic information in making decisions, not whether the motive for decisions is based on self-
interest or societal interest (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981).

Note that evaluating the school bond referendum sociotropically does not automatically mean a yes vote on election day. Rather it means the voter considers whether the bond is a wise investment of the public's resources from the perspective of the whole society. We test the sociotropic hypothesis with an item that asks the respondent to grade the performance of the school district (see Appendix A for the question). If the respondent gives the school district a positive job rating for the past performance we expect the voter to see the school bond as money well spent and hypothesize a "yes" vote on bond; if the job rating is negative we expect the voter to see the school bond as a poor use of public resources and hypothesize a "no" vote. In addition, we asked if student overcrowding in the district posed a substantial problem. Overcrowding was the major theme driving supporters of the bond. We hypothesize that if respondents believed overcrowding is a "substantial problem" they will vote for the bond, regardless of how the bond might affect their personal self-interest. As much as any institution in America, public schools under stress should elicit a collectivist response among at least some elements of the electorate. We can see in Table 1 that those who give the school district a positive job evaluation tended to vote for the bond, and those who gave it a negative evaluation tended to vote against (although the relationship is weak for blacks). Those who thought there was substantial overcrowding in the schools also tended to vote for the bond.

V. Multivariate Analysis

Our purpose in this section is to assess the various hypotheses with a multivariate model, and probe the material motivations and other psychological processes that predict whether a positive or negative vote was cast in the school bond referendum. The statistical method used is logistic regression. In addition to the regression coefficients, we also present the first differences--
the change in probability of casting a positive vote which results from changing the values of an independent variable (Kaufman 1996). The data are unweighted, as in a multivariate analysis weighting can distort coefficients (Brehm 1993, 117-120). The strategy for analysis is to begin with an initial model consisting of demographics and symbolic values. We then sequentially introduce categories of predictors into successive equations based on the theoretical concerns discussed above, and determine which coefficients are significant with statistical controls. Our goal is to make inferences about the causal underpinning of the vote preference. In doing so, we estimate separate equations for each racial-ethnic group.1 If we combine these smaller groups with a white majority, we risk missing the motivations unique to each group.2

We begin with an analysis of Model I presented in Tables 2, 3 and 4, which consists of the demographic and symbolic items. The demographics are dummies for age (50-64, and 65 and over, with 49 and under the excluded category), gender, education, income, martial status (with married excluded) and owner-renter status. The symbolic values are dummies for partisanship and ideology (the middle categories are excluded). For racial resentment, in the case of whites, the variable is redefined to include "publicly financed education for illegal aliens" along with the other two items in the scale.3 For blacks, only "publicly financed education for illegal aliens" is used, and for Hispanics only the two-item NES symbolic racism scale is used. The other two symbolic values are political trust and equalitarianism (see Appendix A for the wording). Since these indicators use a continuous scale, we will evaluate changes of one and two standard deviations. The coefficients for whites are presented in Table 2, for blacks in Table 3 and Hispanics in Table 4 As noted earlier, since significance levels are a function of sample size, coefficients significant at p.< .10 are reported for Blacks and Hispanics.

Our initial model shows some stark demographic differences among the three groups. For whites, three demographics with self-interest overtones are the most important predictors. Age shows the strongest effect with the change in probability for a "yes" vote being .-.36 for those between 50 and 64, and -.37 for those over 65 when compared to those 49 and under (the excluded category).1 As hypothesized, age is a critical factor. But in this initial specification it is being white and 50 and over that separates supporters from opponents, not having reached conventional retirement age. For blacks and Hispanics, age has no effect in this first model. For whites, being a renter rather than a home owner means a .27 greater probability of voting for the bond, and whites who have never married have a -.47 lower probability of casting a "yes" vote than those who are married. None of the demographics are of consequence for blacks. For Hispanics, females are .35 more likely to vote for the bond, and divorced respondents are .39 more likely to vote for the bond than those who are married.

For the symbolic items, neither partisanship nor political ideology is significant among white respondents. This result stands in sharp relief to most research using public policy dependent variables with racial/ethnic overtones and white respondents (Sears and Funk 1990; Citrin and Green 1991; Hughes 1997). In contrast, being conservative and being Republican is significant among African-American respondents, and being a Democrat is significant among Hispanic respondents. For all three groups, political trust is significant. The more one trusts the government in Washington to do the right thing, the more likely one is to vote for the bond. With demographics and partisanship/ideology controlled, trusting the government in Washington results in a substantial increase in the probability of a "yes" vote. This finding is an interesting extension of recent research on trust (Hetherington 1998), in that trusting the government in Washington extends all the way down to what is perhaps the most local of political decisions–those regarding public education. Based on past research, we would expect a translation of alienation from government into a "no" vote among whites. That same translation also occurs among minorities–in the face of some fairly strong group interest incentives. Equalitarianism is significant only among blacks–not surprising given the historic battle African-Americans have fought for equal opportunity. Finally, we look at the effect of racial resentment. Table 2 shows for whites that changes of one and two standard deviations lower the probability of a "yes" vote by -.15 and -.28, respectively. For blacks, our measure (opposing publicly funded education for illegal immigrants) is significant (p. < .05), but not quite as strong with the change in probability being -.10 and -.20, and for Hispanics the variable is insignificant.

For our initial specification, we see among whites that demographic factors with self-interest implications have the greatest effect on the vote. Political trust is significant, but not as important as it is for blacks and Hispanics. The one symbolic item which distinguishes whites is racial resentment. Those scoring high on this measure are more likely to vote "no" on the bond. It is clear in general that symbolic values are more important for blacks and Hispanics than for whites, and demographics measuring latent self-interest are more important for whites. It may be that for minorities some symbolic values are proxies for group interests–such as equalitarianism among blacks.

In Model II we add four directly measured self-interest items. Having children in a district school is an acid test, as it is a direct and immediate indicator of self-interest. For all three groups this item yields significant coefficients, but the magnitude is not as great as might be expected. For whites, those with children in a district school are .23 more likely to vote for the bond than those without. For blacks, the change in probability is .29, and for Hispanics, the change in probability is .50. If these coefficients were not significant, it would cast serious doubt on even conditional models of self-interest and the vote.

One consistent finding from the writing on self-interest is that clear financial benefits or penalties lead to self-interested behavior (Sears and Citrin 1985; Green and Gerkin 1989). Before the vote, the location of proposed new schools funded by bond was widely publicized. One argument bond proponents made was that these new schools would increase neighborhood property values. It is interesting to note for whites not only was the possibility of getting a new school statistically significant, but it had a more powerful effec than having children attending a district school. For blacks and Hispanics, on the other hand, getting a new school is not significant. This finding may reflect the reality that a new school would likely do more to raise property values in middle-class white areas, which have more desirable locations, than in black or Hispanic neighborhoods, which have less desirable locations. The data support the conventional wisdom regarding campaign tactics in multi-race school districts-- appeal to white self-interest by convincing them that passing a school revenue bond will protect or increase their property values.

For the tax increase issue, dummies were created for none/small, moderate and large. The excluded category is 14% who said "unsure." For all groups, perceptions that passing the bond would lead to a "large" tax increase resulted in -.51 to -.74 decrease in the probability of voting for the bond (when compared to the unsure). Among whites, 14% thought there would be a "large" tax increase. For blacks it was 16% and for Hispanics it was 22% (weighted data). Only a belief that the increase would be "large" had an effect. This finding is consistent with the general thrust of other research on self-interest, where it is argued that self-interest considerations come into play only when the benefit or penalty is "certain and large" (Citrin and Green, 1991). In addition, unlike some variables, certain and large tax penalties have consistent effects across all three racial/ethnic groups.

Once directly measured self-interest factors are controlled, we see some provocative age relationships emerge in Model II for being 65 and over, and knowing about the exemption from a property tax increase should the bond get a majority vote. For white respondents, the variable is insignificant. White voters aware of the exemption are no more or less likely to vote for the bond than those not aware. But the awareness coefficient is large and significant for both blacks and Hispanics and in exactly the opposite direction that is the overall pattern for whites. In Model II, blacks 65 and over, who know about the tax break, are .77 more likely to vote for the bond than are all other black respondents. In Model II, Hispanics 65 and over, who know about the tax break are .78 more likely to vote for the bond than all other Hispanics.

The interesting question is why does knowing about the tax exemption have such a powerful effect on blacks and Hispanics, but have no effect in the case of whites? The most likely explanation for is that once the self-interest consideration of higher taxes is removed for blacks and Hispanics, they vote their group interest. Once the tax penalty is factored out, minorities vote to support a funding increase for a school district that is 89% minority. White voters do not have that group interest incentive. As a consequence, other considerations (perhaps some generic opposition to any tax increase) are more important.

Finally, the sociotropic items are included in the equation (Model III). An evaluation of the district's job performance (graded A through F) is added along with the agree-unsure-disagree Likert item on school overcrowding. For whites and African-Americans the coefficient for the retrospective evaluation yields nontrivial changes in the likelihood of supporting the bond. Changes of one and two standard deviations result in an increased probability of a "yes' vote by .24 and .48 for whites and by .13 and .27 for blacks. The item is not significant for Hispanics. Whites with low trust in government tend to give the school district low marks on job performance. Consequently, once the job performance variable is entered in Model III, trust becomes insignificant. It seems clear, however, that low trust in government lowers the job evaluation given the school district which directly affects the vote. Blacks and whites (but not Hispanics) who believe there is substantial overcrowding in the schools are slightly more likely to vote for the bond, but the coefficients are small. Nevertheless, there is at least some evidence of public regarding considerations on the part of the voters in this election (see Appendix B for a discussion of possible endogeneity in these preference items).

V. Discussion and Conclusion

In this paper we explored the underpinnings of a positive or negative vote for a 390 million dollar bond to improve capital facilities in a large, metropolitan school district. We tested for the effects of racial resentment, self-interest and sociotropic voting. What we found, for a real dispute involving actual behavior, differs in some fundamental aspects from other research in this area. Symbolic values were of little consequence for whites, but of greater consequence for minorities. All groups showed substantial self-interest effects. Sociotropic considerations had a nontrival impact on the voting decision of whites and blacks (but not Hispanics). The analysis shows that in a multi-ethnic school district, whites, blacks and Hispanics have a core of common interests which increase or decrease the probability of a "yes" vote, but there are also a set of considerations that vary in their impact among the racial/ethnic groups.

For whites, the final model shows several demographic characteristics with close self-
interest elements, including age, being a renter, and being never married have almost the same (large) coefficients as in Model I. In the case of age, it appears that there are variables not directly measured that increased the probability of a "no" vote on the bond among those 50 and over. In contrast to other studies of white respondents on race-targeted dependent variables, symbolic values were of little consequence. Only racial resentment is significant in Model III, and its effect was not large. There are substantial self-interest effects. Those with children in a district school, and those who thought their neighborhood was more likely to get a new school had a greater probability of voting for the bond. Like all groups, those who thought the bond would result in a "large" property tax increase were more likely to vote against it, but vote choice was not affected by a belief that the tax raise would be moderate or small. Exempting whites 65 and over from the property tax increase does not increase the probability of a positive vote. There are, however, significant sociotropic effects, with those giving the school district a positive rating, and those believing there exists substantial overcrowding tending to vote for the bond.

The final model for African-Americans showed an age effect we don't see for whites. That is, blacks 65 and over who were aware of the tax abatement were strongly predisposed to vote for the bond. Remove the self-interest tax penalty and senior blacks seem clearly inclined to vote their group interest. Symbolic values also played a substantial role for blacks, unlike the case for whites. Not being Republican and being equalitarian increased the probability of a "yes" vote. Blacks voted their self-interest in that respondents with children were more likely to vote for the bond and those who thought passing the bond would result in a large tax increase were more likely to vote against it. Like whites, the data for blacks shows the same effect for sociotropic considerations. A positive job evaluation and a belief the schools are overcrowded predicts a positive vote.

The Model III results for Hispanics shows that if a voter was female or divorced the probability of a "yes" vote increased. These demographics were not of consequence for either blacks or whites. Like blacks, being 65 and over and aware of the tax abatement resulted in a considerable increase in the probability of a "yes" vote. Symbolic values were important. Being a Democrat and trusting in government meant a greater probability of a "yes" vote. Like blacks and whites, the self-interest variables of having children in a district school and a belief that passing the bond means a "large" tax hike were also significant. The sociotropic items were not significant.

Although this bond proposal lost, large bond issues in urban areas certainly can and do succeed. After an initial loss, voters in Los Angeles approved a 2.4 billion dollar bond proposal--
the largest spending package to date approved by voters. Ironically, the same happened for this school district. A $678 million dollar school bond issue was passed with 72% approval in the November 1998 general election. Four factors were major contributors to this reversal. First, shortly following the defeat of the bond, the roof in an elementary school collapsed. The school in question had been targeted for repairs had the 1996 bond passed. Second, a very strong local economy dampened the anti-tax sentiment. Third, the school district engaged in a highly effective public relations campaign to demonstrate its responsiveness to recommendations made in a performance audit done two years previous by the state Comptroller. The Comptroller, for his part, gave the district high marks for improvement. Given the impact of negative retrospective job performance evaluations, this strategy probably turned around some white voters. Fourth, the district ran a much better funded, more sophisticated, campaign. Like most bond elections, there was almost no visible campaign on the other side, but the pro-bond forces ran a much superior campaign to that run in 1996.

While the marginals clearly shifted, an exit poll showed the basic relationships described in this paper still held. Among whites, 59% voted yes compared to 79% among Hispanics and 90% among blacks. Only 40% of whites over 60 voted "yes" compared to 66% of those under 60. There was no age relationship with vote among minorities. White renters gave 10% more of their vote to the bond than did white homeowners. Even though the bond issue was on the November general election ballot, turnout was only 25%. Thus, it does not seem likely that mobilization is the sole explanation for the favorable outcome in 1998.

Based on this research, we reach two general conclusions. First, unlike most other research on social-welfare policies with a racial-ethnic component, racial resentment, while relevant, is not likely to drive voter decisions in elections of this type. There can, of course be exceptions, most notably if the environment is racially charged. While it may seem an obvious point, these data show the electorate can express its self-interest through the mechanism of elections. This demonstration is important both practically and theoretically, and is a useful corrective to the thrust of a large body of research which emphasizes the role of symbolic values.

Second, while our research shows that many factors function similarly across racial and ethnic groups, some factors function in dramatically different manners. Because of this, research and policy recommendations that extrapolate from predominately white samples to mixed race samples run a considerable danger of making misleading and incorrect assertions. Two places where our study found dramatic differences across racial and ethnic groups are the effect of age and the effect of property tax exemptions. When we limited our analysis to the white portion of the sample we found results perfectly consistent with standard wisdom in the field and previous research findings. Elderly white voters voted at significantly lower rates for school bonds than younger whites and knowledge of a property tax exemption had little influence on the vote of elderly whites. When we analyzed these same questions looking at the minority population, however, we found dramatic differences. Elderly black and Hispanic voters were in fact more likely to vote for school bonds than younger blacks and Hispanics and knowledge of a property tax exemption had a substantial positive influence on their vote for the bond. These dramatic differences are not only significant for theoretical reasons they also have important practical implications as they will be especially important precisely for school bond issues in large urban areas where the voting population is likely to have a considerably larger proportion of minority voters than the country as a whole.

Table 1: Correlations (Polychoric) between Vote Direction and Independent Variables

Race/Ethnicity

(N=623) (N=380) (N=143) (N=100)

All Whites Blacks Hispanics

% Voted for Bond 47% 41% 61% 55%

Demographics

All Whites Blacks Hispanics

Age	- .19**	- .30**	.06	.04

Income	.04	.18**	- .01	- .07

Education	.07	.19**	.04	- .09

Own/rent	.10	.15**	.00	- .02

Gender	.07	.04	.10.	.24**

Racial Items

All Whites Blacks Hispanics

Racial Resentment	- .23**	- .26** .---	- .10	.

Illegal Immigrant Education	- .28**	- .32**	- .19*	.---

Rate Blacks	.09	.17**	.---	- .05

Rate Hispanics	.11**	.14**	.00	.---

Symbolic Values

All Whites Blacks Hispanics

Party Identification	.24**	.17**	.14	.29**

Political Ideology	.23**	.22**	.18*	.09

Equalitarianism	.18**	.15**	.09	.05	.

Political Trust	.35*	.37**	.41**	.28*

Self-Interest Items

All Whites Blacks Hispanics

Child in HISD	.20**	.26*	.10	.09

New school in neighborhood .21*	.24*	.20*	.39**

How large tax increase	- .38**	- .37*	- .41** -.39**

65 +/Aware of Tax Rebate .14 .03 .48** .31*

Socio-tropic Items

All Whites Blacks Hispanics

Rate Job Performance .34** .40** .14* .28**

School Overcrowding .24** .28** .24** .13*

*p. < .10

**p. < .05

Table 2. Logistic Regression for Effects of Symbolic Values, Personal Self-Interest and Socio-tropic Factors on Support for School Bond (Whites Only)

Model I Model II Model III

Coef- Change in Coef- Change in Coef- Change in

icient Probabilitya icient Probability icient Probability

Intercept	1.15 0.42 - 3.68**

(1.15) (1.34) (1.66)

Age 50-64	-1.56** -.36 -1.23** -.29 -1.35** -.33

(.38) (.43) (.46)

Age 65 +	-1.66** -.37 -1.36** -.33 -1.46** -.35

(.36) (.48) (.51)

Gender	0.30 0.24 0.22

(.25) (.28) (.30)

Income	0.07 -0.01 -0.01

(.09) (.10) (.11)

Education	0.03 0.07 0.09

(.10) (.11) (.12)

Own/Rent	1.19** .27 1.61** .38 1.63** .38

(.42) (.49) (.53)

Democrat 0.43 0.47 0.38

(.35) (.38) (.41)

Republican 0.44 0.51 0.61* .18

(.30) (.34) (.36)

Cons. -0.17 -0.29 -0.21

(.29) (.32) (.34)

Liberal 0.12 0.46 0.60

(.45) (.50) (.55)

Widowed -0.29 -0.36 -0.46

(.40) (.44) (.49)

Divorced -0.37 -0.13 0.03

(.45) (.49) (.53)

Never Married -2.13** -.47 -2.18** -.49 -2.35** -.52

(.56) (.64) (.69)

Racial Resentment	-0 .22** -.15/-.28 -0.20** -.13/-.28 -0.15* -.11/-.21

(.06) (.06) (.07)

Equalitarianism -0.05 -0.06 -0.08

(.06) (.07) (.07)

Trust 0.38* .09/.16 0.36* .08/.15 0.27

(.16) (.19)* (.20)

Have children in 1.02** .23 0.84* .20

district school (.40) (.43)

New school in neighborhood 1.48** .35 1.48** .35

(.31) (.33)

Tax raise none/small 0.62 0.44 (.42) (.44)

Tax raise moderate -0.21 -0.27

(.43) (.46)

Large Tax Increase -2.27** -.51 -2.23** -.51

(.74) (.75)

over 65/know about 0.11 0.19

tax break (.39) (.41)

Retrospective job per- 1.12** .20/.48

formance evaluaton (.23)

School Overcrowding .38* .09/.16

(.23)

Model 1: N=380 Model 2: N=380 Model 3: N=380 X2=110.7 (p. < .01) X2=176.1 (p. < .01) X2=206.5 (p. < .01) correctly classified: 71% correctly classified: 77% correctly classified: 80%

Reduction in error: 53% Reduction in error: 61% Reduction in error: 65%

*p. < .05 (one tailed test)

**p. < .01 (one tailed test)

aFor dummy variables, the coefficient indicates the change in probability from .5 if the variable goes from zero to one. For continuous variables, the coefficient indicates the change in probability from .5 if the variable changes by one and two standard deviations. The same applies to Tables 3 and 4.

Table 3. Logistic Regression for Effects of Symbolic Values, Personal Self-Interest and Socio-tropic Factors on Support for School Bond (Blacks Only)

Model I Model II Model III

Coef- Change in Coef- Change in Coef- Change in

icient Probability icient Probability icient Probability

Intercept	-1.17 -0.88 -4.16*

(1.65) (2.08) (2.70)

Age 50-64	-0.43 0.18 0.27

(.56) (.65) (.67)

Age 65 +	0.06 -0.43 -0.43

(.55) (.77) (.81)

Gender	0.37) 0.35 0.27

(.43) (.51) (.54)

Income	0.11 -0.18 0.27

(.15) (.18) (.54)

Education	0.09 0.43** .16/.29 0.48** .17/.32

(.16) (.22) (.23)

Own/Rent	0.06 -0.21 -0.34

(.62) (.70) (.74)

Democrat 0.60 0.56 0.42

(.49) (.63) (.67)

Republican -2.77** -.56 -3.96** -.79 -3.92** -.79

(1.58) (1.99) (2.01)

Cons. -0.69* -.15 -0.77* -.18 -0.53

(.53) (.65) (.70)

Liberal 0.16 0.24 0.35

(.49) (.58) (.62)

Widowed 0.51 1.09 0.75

(.79) (.96) (.99)

Divorced -0.29 -0.65 -0.58 (.68) (.80) (.82)

N/Married -0.48 -0.63 -0.82 (.63) (.75) (.78) Education for -0.37** -.10/-.20 -0.13 -0.04

Illegal Aliens (.18) (.22) (.23)

Equalitarianism 0.21* .08/.17 0.36** .14/.28 0.33** .13/.26

(.13) (.18) (.20)

Trust 0.89** .17/.31 0.49* 0.44

(.28) (.33) (.35)

Have children in 1.29** .29 1.41** .34 district school (.68) (.70)

New school in neighborhood 0.01 -0.11 (.81) (.85)

Tax raise none/small 1.58* .36 1.10 (1.07) (1.13)

Tax raise moderate -0.19) -0.73

(.93) (1.02)

Large Tax Increase -2.58** -.55 -3.30** -.66

(1.21) (1.30)

over 65/know about 3.86** .77 3.86** .77

tax break (1.32) 1.41

Retrospective job per- 0.72** .13/.27

formance evaluaton (.36)

School Overcrowding 0.58* .10/.20

(.44)

Model 1: N=143 Model 2: N=143 Model 3: N=143 X2=26.8 (p. < .01) X2=65.6 (p. < .01) X2=71.2 (p. < .01)

correctly classified: 79% correctly classified: 86% correctly classified: 85%

Reduction in error: 46% Reduction in error: 64% Reduction in error: 64%

*p. < .10 (one tailed test)

**p. < .05 (one tailed test)

Table 4 Logistic Regression for Effects of Symbolic Values, Personal Self-Interest and Sociotropic Factors on Support for School Bond (Hispanics Only)

Model I Model II Model III

Coef- Change in Coef- Change in Coef- Change in

icient Probability icient Probability icient Probability

Intercept	-5.03** -5.46** -7.58**

(2.23) (3.29) (4.11)

Age 50-64	0.85 1.57 1.69

(.75) (1.21) (1.23)

Age 65 +	-0.06 -0.08 0.12

(.67) (1.14) (1.17)

Gender	1.46** .35 1.65** .39 1.60** .39

(.59) (.88) (.88)

Income	0.11 0.09 0.13

(.21) (.28) (.29)

Education	(.02) -0.09 -0.13

(.24) (.31) (.32)

Own/Rent	-0.63 -0.58 -0.47

(.70) (.87) (.87)

Democrat 1.04** .27 0.87 0.79

(.57) (.76) (.77)

Republican -1.63 -1.17 -0.90

(1.29) (1.99) (2.07)

Cons. -0.26 -0.56 -0.58

(.74) (.91) (.94)

Liberal -0.13 0.16 0.13

(.70) (1.08) (1.07)

Widowed 1.02 -2.07 -1.95

(1.16) (1.78) (1.77)

Divorced 1.67* .39 3.37** .68 3.35** .68

(1.10) (1.60) (1.69)

N/Married 0.51 1.60 1.47

(1.28) (1.87) (1.81)

S/Racism -0.22 -0.33 -0.30

(.15) (.24) (.23)

Equalitarianism 0.08 0.10 0.11

(.16) (.21) (.24)

Trust 1.33** .24/.47 1.64** .28/.53 1.60** .28/.53

(.42) (.59) (.59)

Have children in 2.35** .50 2.10** .47

district school (1.12) (1.14)

New school in neighborhood 0.85 0.90

(.89) (.91)

Tax raise none/small -0.36 -0.36 (1.18) (1.21)

Tax raise moderate -1.25 -1.09

(1.16) (1.17)

Large Tax Increase -3.77** -.74 -3.59** -.70

(1.34) (1.36)

over 65/know about 3.95** .78 3.52** .70

tax break (1.94) (1.94)

Retrospective job per- 0.42

formance evaluaton (.55)

School Overcrowding 0.29

(.61)

Model 1: N=100 Model 2: N=100 Model 3: N=100 X2=32.5 (p. < .01 ) X2=64.5 (p. < .01) X2=65.4 (p. < .01)

correctly classified: 76% correctly classified: 84% correctly classified: 84%

Reduction in error: 47% Reduction in error: 64% Reduction in error: 66%

*p. < .10 (one tailed test)

**p. < .05 (one tailed test)

Appendix A: Question Wording

________________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________________

Racial Resentment (agree-disagree)

- Generations of slavery have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.

- Most blacks who receive money from welfare programs could get along without it if they tried.

Public education for children of illegal immigrants

- Do you favor or oppose providing free public education to children of immigrants who are in the United States illegally?

Equalitarianism (stg. agree-stg. disagree)

- One of the big problems in this country is that we don't give everyone an equal chance.

- If people were treated more equally in this country, we would have fewer problems

Political Trust

- How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do the right thing–most of the time, some of the time, a little, or not at all?

Tax Increase

- If the bond issue had passed, do you think it would have caused an increase in property taxes? [IF YES] Do you think that increase would have been small, moderate or large?

Over 65 Tax Break

- State law allows school districts the option of giving homeowners who are over 65 a break by not requiring them to pay increased property taxes resulting from school bonds. Would or would not those over 65 have gotten this tax break if the [school district] bond proposal had passed?

New School in Neighborhood

- If the May 28th bond issue had passed, would [the school district] have built a new school that children in your neighborhood would attend?

Overcrowding in Schools (stg. agree-stg. disagree)

- There is no substantial problem of student overcrowding in [the school district]

Retrospective Rating of School District

- Students are often given grades of A, B, C, D, and Failing to denote the quality of their work. If you were to rate the [school district] what grade would you give the [school district] overall?

Party Identification

- Generally speaking, do you consider yourself a Democrat, a Republican, an Independent, or what?

Political Ideology

- In politics, do you consider yourself a strong conservative, conservative, middle-of-the-road, a liberal or a strong liberal?

Appendix B: Tests for Endogeneity of Preferences

______________________________________________________________________________

In studies of voting behavior using cross-sectional data, variables such as age or education do not cause estimation problems as age is not a matter of choice, and choices such as education have been made so far in the past that they can be treated as exogenous. However, preferences that are more proximate to the dependent variable, such as the retrospective evaluation of job done by the school district may be jointly determined along with the dependent variable. If that were the case, coefficients from single equation solutions will be biased upward (Berndt 1995: 375-381). We employ a method developed by Rivers and Vuong (1988) to test for endogeneity (see also Alvarez 1997; Alvarez and Glasgow 1999). The test determines if a set of unobserved variables are a common cause of the dependent variable as well as proximate preferences.

Four preferences are candidates for possible endogeneity–the belief there will be a property tax increase, the belief that a new school would be built in the respondent's neighborhood, the retrospective job evaluation of the school district, and the belief that classrooms are overcrowded. We were unable to find suitable instruments for the first two, so no tests are conducted.

To test for endogeneity, we used a two-stage conditional maximum likelihood estimation method (2SCML). We used OLS to estimate a reduced form equation for the retrospective evaluation of the school district and a belief the schools are substantially overcrowded, as both are continuous. These estimates are made from the exogenous variables in the full model plus additional variables excluded from the full model, which are associated with the variables suspected of endogeneity.

For the retrospective job evaluation of the school district the additional variables used in the first stage estimation are (1) a 10 point scale asking respondents to evaluate the teaching of moral values in the school district. Respondents who rate moral instruction positively will likely give a school district a higher grade than who rate moral instruction negatively, (2) a Likert item stating "I would like to see a larger government that provides its citizens with more services." Those who endorse this statement should also tend to give high grades to a large government organization that provides an important service, (3) support or opposition for school vouchers. Those who favor school vouchers should tend to give the school district a lower grade than those who oppose school vouchers.

For the belief in substantial school overcrowding the excluded variables used in the first stage are (1) a Likert item stating "If the [school district] built a new school in my neighborhood, it would lead lots of kids who weren't from my neighborhood coming here." The item suggests the overflow from crowded schools would end up in the respondent's neighborhood, (2) support for a school voucher program. Given that substantial school overcrowding was the overriding theme of the campaign, those favoring a voucher program may see it as a solution to overcrowding, as well other problems afflicting the public schools. The first stage coefficients are reported below for blacks and whites separately, but not for Hispanics as neither item was significant in the full model for Hispanics.

The explained variance is 21% for the job evaluation model for whites and 13% for the job evaluation model for blacks. When the residuals from the first stage OLS are added to the full equation the job evaluation b is -.72 and the standard error is .51, yielding a t-statistic of 1.45. We therefore accept the null hypothesis of no endogeneity. For blacks, when the job evaluation residuals are added to the full model, b is -1.18 and the standard error is 1.38. We accept the null hypothesis of no endogeneity.

The explained variance for the first stage equations for a belief there is substantial school overcrowding is 13% for whites and 10% for blacks. Thus we do not have much confidence in the proxy variables. When the residual is entered into the full model for whites, b is -.89 and the standard error is 1.13. For blacks b is 3.62 and the standard error is 4.99. Since the standard errors exceed the regression coefficients, we accept the null hypothesis of no endogeneity.

Our conclusion is not that the error terms for these variables and the dependent variable are completely uncorrelated. Rather, a more defensible conclusion is that endogeneity does not undermine the basic conclusions we reach in this paper–even though we do not have instruments for two of the preference items. The most likely candidate for endogeneity is the retrospective evaluation of the school district job performance. A negative evaluation of job performance and a "no" vote could well have a common cause (such as an anti-government/anti tax ideology). The fact that we accept the null hypothesis for this item gives us some small confidence that the other preference items for which we lack instruments do not suffer from endogeneity problems so serious it undermines confidence in our results. In addition, the tax increase results are consistent with a good deal of previous research, which adds to our confidence in that finding. In the case of knowing or not knowing if a new school would be built in one's neighborhood if the bond passed, there was considerable information about the school district's plans on this matter. It does not seem likely that some unmeasured variable would be a common cause of correct knowledge on this matter and the vote direction.

Table 1-A. First Stage OLS Estimates for District Job Evaluation and Belief in Substantial School Overcrowding

____________________________________________________________________________________________

Job Evaluation Substantial Overcrowding

Whites Blacks Whites Blacks

b S.E. b S.E. b S.E b S.E. Exogeneous variables from full model

Age 50-64	-.10	.10	-.05	.17	-.46**	.15	-.04	.24

Age 65 and over	-.09	.10	.24	.17*	-.74**	.15	-.40**	.23

Income	.01	.03	.05	.05	.21**	.10	.13	.06

Education	.01	.03	.00	.04	.05	.04	.03**	.07

Owner/renter	.23**	.12	.17	.19	-.04	.18 .35*	.26

Widowed	.10	.12	.37	.21**	-.24	.17	.06	.29

Divorced	-.11	.14	-.16	.20	-.30	.20	.14	.27

Never Married	-.32**	.14 .19	.20	-.24	.20	.08	.27

Gender	-.09	.07	.16	.13	.21**	.11	.16	.18

Democrat	-.01	.10	-.06	.13	.14	.14	.46**	.20

Republican	-.08	.08	-.35	.40	.00	.12	.64	.56

Additional Variables

Rate Teaching Moral Values	.13**	.02	.10**	.03*

Favor larger gov't/services	.07**	.04	-.03	.05

Favor School Vouchers	.10**	.03	.05	.05 .09**	.05	.04. .08

New school/Brings kids	.08**	.04	-.04	.08

Constant	3.54	.44	2.34**	.30	3.35**	.39	3.14*	.54

N of cases	380	143	380	143

Adjusted R2	.21	.16	.13	.10

F-ratio	8.18**	2.89**	5.51**	2.14**

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