David Charles on Teleological Explanation in Aristotle


Reference: David Charles, "Teleological Causation in the Physics," in Lindsay Judson, ed., Aristotle's Physics: A Collection of Essays (Oxford, 1991), pp. 101-28).

Charles argues that Aristotle's discussion is neutral or ambiguous between, and in fact runs the risk of conflating, two models of teleological causation:

Purposive Agency Model

Example: Socrates walks after dinner to achieve healthy digestion.

  • (i) A values G (or, G is a good for A);
  • (ii) M is a means to G; and
  • (iii) A chooses M because M is a means to G.

    So:

  • (i) Socrates values healthy digestion;
  • (ii) Walking after dinner is a means to (causes) healthy digestion;
  • (iii) Socrates chooses to walk because he accepts (ii).

    Note the role of conscious valuation or perception by the agent in (i) and (iii).

    Functional Model

    Example:

    Camels have multiple stomachs in order to digest their thorny food.

    Natural entity N has organ O for the sake of the function (natural end or goal) F iff:

    Note there is no role for choice or the agent's perception of a good in this analysis.



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