

# Interaction effects in econometrics

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## Interaction effects in econometrics

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**Abstract** We provide practical advice for applied economists regarding robust specification and interpretation of linear regression models with interaction terms. We replicate a number of prominently published results using interaction effects and examine if they are robust to reasonable specification permutations.

**Keywords** Non-linear regression · Interaction terms

**JEL Classification** C12 · C13

### 1 Introduction

A country may consider a reform that would strengthen the financial sector. Would this help economic growth and development? This basic question is frustratingly hard to answer by empirical data because economic development itself spawns financial development; so, while economic and financial developments are positively correlated, this does not answer the question asked. In a highly influential paper, [Rajan and](#)

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Zingales (1998) provide convincing evidence that financial development is important for economic development by examining if industrial sectors that are more dependent on external finance grow relatively faster in countries with a high level of development. This question involves *interactions* between financial development and dependency on external finance. Since the publication of Rajan and Zingales' study, the estimation of models with interaction effects have become common in applied economics.

Many articles applying interaction terms are motivated in an intuitive fashion, similar to the story we just outlined, which makes robustness analysis particularly important. Robustness analysis with respect to variables included besides the main variable(s) of interest is now routinely performed in most empirical articles. However, it is our view that robustness analysis with respect to the functional form should be standard when one uses non-linear specifications, in particular those involving interactions which we focus on here.<sup>1</sup> This article discusses the case where the true specification, which we will also refer to as the true data generating process (DGP), is not precisely known.

If the DGP is not pinned down by theory, the standard linear specification can be seen as a first order Taylor series expansion. If one wants to examine the role of, say,  $x * z$  in a relation  $y = f(x, z)$ , then we argue that it is reasonable to examine if the interaction term may be picking up other left-out components in the second order expansion of  $f$ . Further, we believe that it is often informative to consider the interaction of, say,  $x$  and  $z$  after these have been transformed to be orthogonal to other variables. For example, if  $z$  is, say, financial openness, and one is interested in how financial openness affects the impact of  $x$  on  $y$  one would include  $x * z$ . But,  $z$  may be correlated with other variables and including linear terms of those will not prevent  $x * z$  from spuriously picking up the effect of the interaction of some of those variables with  $x$ . However, if one orthogonalizes  $z$  to other variables, this will not happen. This is, of course, what ordinary least squares (OLS) does automatically in a linear regression, but in non-linear specifications the researcher needs to explicitly consider this. In our experience, this form of robustness analysis is rarely performed and this article calls for this to become as standard as other typical robustness checks. We further point out a few issues of interpretation and very briefly discuss the choice of instruments when interaction terms are included.

We replicate parts of five influential articles, starting with Rajan and Zingales (1998), checking if their results are robust. The second paper is also written by Rajan and Zingales (2003) who examined if the number of listed firms in a country is affected by openness and the historical (1913) level of industrialization. The third article, by Castro et al. (2004), hypothesizes that strengthening of property rights is beneficial for growth and more so when restrictions on capital transactions (capital flows) are weaker. The fourth article, Caprio et al. (2007), examines if bank valuations (relative to book values) are higher where owners have stronger rights. The fifth and last replication examines Spilimbergo (2009) who studies if countries that send a large number of students abroad have better democracies. We find that most of these papers, if not Spilimbergo's, are robust to our suggested robustness tests and, for several of these,

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<sup>1</sup> In the case where the specification of the empirical model is tightly pinned down by theory, "robustness analysis" is rather a test of the underlying theory.

some of our alternative specifications strengthen the authors' cases. The specification from the Spilimbergo article which we examine is one of many that he employs and our results are better seen as illustrating our suggestions than as a serious criticism of his conclusions.

In Sect. 2, we discuss some practical issues related to the specification of regressions with interaction effects, illustrate our recommendations with Monte Carlo simulations, and make recommendations for practitioners. In Sect. 3, we revisit some prominent applied papers where interaction effects figure prominently, including [Rajan and Zingales \(1998\)](#) and examine if the published results are robust. Section 4 concludes.

## 2 Linear regression with interaction effects

Many econometric issues related to models with interaction effects are very simple and we illustrate our discussion for OLS estimation. Often applied papers use more complicated methods involving, say, Generalized Method of Moments, clustered standards errors, etc., but the points we are making typically carry over to such settings with little modification.

Let  $Y$  be a dependent variable, such as growth of an industrial sector, and  $X_1$  and  $X_2$  be independent variables that may impact on growth, such as the dependency on external finance and financial development. Applied econometricians have typically allowed for interaction effects between two independent variables,  $X_1$  and  $X_2$ , by estimating a multiple regression model of the form:

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_1 X_2 + \epsilon, \quad (1)$$

where  $X_1 X_2$  refers to a variable calculated as the simple observation-by-observation product of  $X_1$  and  $X_2$ . In the example of [Rajan and Zingales \(1998\)](#), the interest centers around the coefficient  $\beta_3$ —a significant positive coefficient implies that sectors that are more dependent on external finance grow faster following financial development. We refer to the independent terms  $X_1$  and  $X_2$  as “*main terms*” and the product of the main terms,  $X_1 X_2$ , as the “*interaction term*.” This brings us to our first basic observations.

### 2.1 Interpreting the $t$ statistics on the main terms

1. The partial derivative of  $Y$  with respect to  $X_1$  is  $\beta_1 + \beta_3 X_2$ . The interpretation of  $\beta_1$  is the partial derivative of  $Y$  with respect to  $X_1$  when  $X_2 = 0$ . A  $t$  test for  $\beta_1 = 0$  is, therefore, a test of the null of no effect of  $X_1$  when  $X_2 = 0$ . To test for no effect of  $X_1$ , one needs to test if  $(\beta_1, \beta_3) = (0, 0)$  by, for example, an  $F$  test.

In applied papers, the non-interacted regression

$$Y = \lambda_0 + \lambda_1 X_1 + \lambda_2 X_2 + \nu, \quad (2)$$

is often estimated before the interacted regression. In this regression,  $\lambda_1 = \partial Y / \partial X_1$  is the partial derivative of  $Y$  with respect to  $X_1$ , implicitly evaluated at  $X_2 = \bar{X}_2$  (the mean value of  $X_2$ ).<sup>2</sup> The estimated  $\beta_1$ -coefficient in (1) is typically close to  $\hat{\lambda}_1 - \hat{\beta}_3 \bar{X}_2$ .

2. Estimating the interacted regression in the form

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 (X_1 - \bar{X}_1)(X_2 - \bar{X}_2) + \epsilon, \tag{3}$$

results in the exact same fit as Eq. (1) and the exact same coefficient  $\hat{\beta}_3$  and is nothing but a renormalization.  $\hat{\beta}_1$  will typically be close to  $\hat{\lambda}_1$  estimated from Eq. (2) because  $\beta_1 = \partial Y / \partial X_1$  is the partial derivative of  $Y$  with respect to  $X_1$ , evaluated at  $X_2 = \bar{X}_2$ . If a researcher reports results from (2) and wants to keep the interpretation of the coefficient to the main terms similar, it is usually preferable to report results of the regression (3) with demeaned interaction terms even if it is the same statistical model in a different parameterization.<sup>3</sup>

2.1.1 Monte carlo simulation

We first illustrate how the specification of the interaction term affects the interpretation of the main terms although we are not the first to make this point. We generate a dependent variable,  $Y$ , as  $Y = 3X_1 + 5X_2 + 8X_1X_2 + \epsilon$ , where  $X_1 = 1 + \epsilon_1$  and  $X_2 = 1 + \epsilon_2$ ,  $\epsilon_i \sim N(0, 1)$ , for all  $i$ , and  $\epsilon \sim N(0, 100)$ . We estimate model (2) without an interaction term (that model is mis-specified) because it is often natural to start by estimating Eq. (2) when it is not priori obvious if an interaction effect should be included. Next, we allow for an interaction term that is either demeaned or not. The latter specifications are both correctly specified. In column (1) of Table 1, the results for the model without an interaction term are presented and, in columns (2) and (3), the correctly specified model is estimated. In column (2), we see how the coefficient to  $X_1$  changes from about 11 to about 3 when the regressors are not demeaned before they are interacted—a change is close to the predicted size of  $\beta_3 E\{X_2\}$ . The large change in the coefficient to the main term is not due to mis-specification, but it reflects that the coefficient to  $X_1$  is to be interpreted as the marginal effect of  $X_1$  when  $X_2$  is zero. In column (3), we estimate model (3) where the terms in the interaction are demeaned and the coefficient to the interaction term is unchanged from column (2), while the coefficients of main terms are very close to the ones in column (1)—with the same interpretation.

<sup>2</sup> Some social scientists suggest that the interaction term undermines the interpretation of the regression coefficients associated with  $X_1$  and  $X_2$  (e.g., Allison 1977; Althausen 1971; Smith and Sasaki 1979; Braumoeller 2004). The point is simply that researchers sometimes do not notice the change in the interpretation of the coefficient estimate for the main terms when the interaction term is added.

<sup>3</sup> Because  $\beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 (X_1 - \bar{X}_1)(X_2 - \bar{X}_2) = (\beta_0 + \beta_3 \bar{X}_1 \bar{X}_2) + (\beta_1 - \beta_3 \bar{X}_2) X_1 + (\beta_2 - \beta_3 \bar{X}_1) X_2 + \beta_3 X_1 X_2$ , we get the same fit with the changes in the estimated parameters given from the correspondence between the left- and right-hand side of this equality. For example,  $\hat{\lambda}_0$  will be equal to  $\hat{\beta}_0 + \hat{\beta}_3 \bar{X}_1 \bar{X}_2$ .

**Table 1** Simulation of models

Dependent variable:  $Y$   
 True model is  $Y = 3X_1 + 5X_2 + 8X_1X_2 + \epsilon$

	(1)	(2)	(3)
$X_1$	10.989 (19.202)	2.999 (4.72)	10.997 (24.51)
$X_2$	12.994 (22.71)	4.996 (7.86)	12.991 (28.97)
$X_1X_2$	–	8.000 (17.75)	–
$(X_1 - \bar{X}_1)(X_2 - \bar{X}_2)$	–	–	8.000 (17.75)
$R^2$	0.64	0.78	0.78

The true model is  $Y = 3X_1 + 5X_2 + 8X_1X_2 + \epsilon$  where  $X_1 = 1 + \epsilon_1$  and  $X_2 = 1 + \epsilon_2$ ,  $\epsilon_i \sim N(0, 1)$  for  $i = 1, 2$  ( $X_1$  and  $X_2$  are not correlated) and  $\epsilon \sim N(0, 100)$ . A constant is included but not reported. The sample size is 500 and the number of simulations is 20,000. Averages of estimated  $t$  statistics are shown in parentheses

### 2.2 A simple observation on IV estimation

3. In the case where, say,  $X_2$  is endogenous,  $X_1$  is exogenous, and  $Z$  is a valid instrument for  $X_2$ ,  $X_1Z$  will be a valid instrument for  $X_1X_2$ .

### 2.3 Robustness to mis-specification

If one considers second order terms, a more general specification that one may want to consider for robustness is the full second order expansion

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1X_1 + \beta_2X_2 + \beta_3(X_1 - \bar{X}_1)(X_2 - \bar{X}_2) + \beta_4X_1^2 + \beta_5X_2^2 + \epsilon. \quad (4)$$

(We will refer to  $X_i^2$ ;  $i = 1, 2$  as “second-order terms”—in applications one may wish to enter the second-order terms in a demeaned forms for the same reasons as discussed for the interaction term, but for notational brevity we use the simpler non-demeaned form here.) The relevance of this observation is as follows.

4. In a regression with interaction terms, the main terms should always be included unless excluded by economic theory. Otherwise, the interaction effect may be significant due to left-out variable bias. ( $X_1X_2$  is by construction likely to be correlated with the main terms.)<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Some authors have referred to this as a multicollinearity problem. [Althausser \(1971\)](#) shows that the main terms and the interaction term in Eq. (1) are correlated. These correlations are affected in part by the size and the difference in the sample means of  $X_1$  and  $X_2$ . [Smith and Sasaki \(1979\)](#) also argue that the inclusion of the interaction term might cause a multicollinearity problem. In our view, collinearity is not a particular problem for regressions with interaction effects—as elsewhere in empirical economics correlations between regressors make for fragile inference if one asks too much from a small sample.

**Table 2** Simulation of models: misspecified model

		Dependent variable: $Y$ True model is $Y = X_1 + X_1^2 + \epsilon$		
		(1)	(2)	(3)
	$X_1$	1.000 (12.84)	3.001 (36.77)	1.000 (6.98)
	$X_2$	–	0.000 (0.00)	–0.000 (–0.00)
The true model is $Y = X_1 + X_1^2 + \epsilon$ where $X_1 = 1 + \epsilon_1$ and $X_2 = 1 + X_1 + \epsilon_2$ , $\epsilon_i \sim N(0, 1)$ for all $i$ ( $X_1$ and $X_2$ are correlated). A constant is included but not reported. The sample size is 500 and the number of simulations is 20,000. Averages of estimated $t$ statistics are shown in parentheses	$X_1^2$	1.000 (31.38)	–	1.000 (15.57)
	$X_2^2$	–	–	0.000 (0.00)
	$(X_1 - \bar{X}_1)(X_2 - \bar{X}_2)$	–	0.666 (19.88)	0.000 (0.00)
	$R^2$	0.92	0.86	0.92

5. If  $Y = f(X_1, X_2)$  can be approximated by the second order expansion (4) with a non-zero coefficient to either  $X_1^2$  or  $X_2^2$  and  $\text{corr}(X_1, X_2) \neq 0$ , the coefficient  $\beta_3$  in the interacted regression (1) may be spuriously significant. For example, if  $\text{corr}(X_1, X_2) > 0$ , the estimated coefficient  $\hat{\beta}_3$  will usually be positive even if  $\beta_3 = 0$ . If quadratic terms are not otherwise ruled out, we recommend also estimating the specification (4) to verify that a purported interaction term is not spuriously capturing left-out squared terms.

The potential bias from leaving out second order terms is easily understood. If  $X_1$  and  $X_2$  are (positively) correlated, we can write  $X_2 = \alpha X_1 + w$  (where  $\alpha$  is positive) so the interaction term (we suppress the mean for simplicity) becomes  $\alpha X_1^2 + X_1 w$  where the latter term has mean zero and will be part of the error in the regression. If  $X_1^2$  is part of the correctly specified regression with coefficient  $\delta$ , the estimated coefficient to the interaction term when estimating Eq. (1) will be  $\alpha\delta$ .

### 2.3.1 Monte carlo simulation

In Table 2, the true model does not include an interaction term; instead it is nonlinear in one of the main terms. We simulate  $Y = X_1 + X_1^2 + \epsilon$  where  $X_1 = 1 + \epsilon_1$  and  $X_2 = 1 + X_1 + \epsilon_2$ ,  $\epsilon_i \sim N(0, 1)$  for all  $i$ . When  $\text{corr}(X_1, X_2) \neq 0$ , as in this example, the interaction term might pick up a left-out variable effect. In column (1), we show the correct specification. In column (2), we estimate the interaction model and observe that the interaction term is highly significant. Our suggestion is to include the squares of both main terms together with the interaction term to hedge against such spurious inference. We report this specification in column (3). This model is correctly specified albeit overspecified with some regressors having true coefficients of zero and we get the correct result.

### 2.4 Panel data

Consider a panel data regression with left-hand side variable  $Y_{it}$  where  $i$  typically is a cross-sectional index, such as an individual or a country (we will use the term country, for brevity), and  $t$  a time index. For a generic panel data variable  $X_{it}$ , denote the average over time for cross-sectional unit  $i$  by  $\bar{X}_i$ . (i.e.,  $\frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T X_{it}$ ), the average across cross-sectional units at period  $t$  by  $\bar{X}_{.t}$ , and the mean across all observations by  $\bar{X}_{..}$ .

A researcher may estimate the regression

$$Y_{it} = \mu_i + \beta_1 X_{1it} + \beta_2 X_{2it} + \beta_3 (X_{1it} - \bar{X}_{1i.})(X_{2it} - \bar{X}_{2..}) + \epsilon_{it}, \tag{5}$$

where  $\mu_i$  are country-fixed effects.

The regression (5) is not robust to squared terms as in the case of OLS; but, in the panel data case, this regression is also not robust to slopes that vary across, say, countries. If the correct specification is, say,

$$Y_{it} = \mu_i + \beta_1 X_{1it} + \beta_{2i} X_{2it} + \epsilon_{it}, \tag{6}$$

then, if the mean of  $X_1$  varies by country and the covariance of  $\bar{X}_{1i.}$  and  $\beta_{2i}$  is non-zero, the covariance of  $(X_{1it} - \bar{X}_{1i.})(X_{2it} - \bar{X}_{2..})$  and  $\beta_{2i} X_{2it}$  becomes non-zero and the interaction term will pick up the country-varying slopes.

6. In order to hedge against the interacted regression (5) spuriously capturing country-varying slopes, we suggest that panel data regressions are estimated as

$$Y_{it} = \mu_i + \beta_1 X_{1it} + \beta_2 X_{2it} + \beta_3 (X_{1it} - \bar{X}_{1i.})(X_{2it} - \bar{X}_{2i.}) + \epsilon_{it},$$

where the country-specific means are subtracted from each variable in the interaction. Of course, if the time-series dimension of the data is large, one may directly allow for country-varying slopes. This specification is suggested, in particular, in datasets where one may expect heterogeneity across the cross-sectional observations. Alternatively, this specification provides a useful robustness test. (Similar considerations might be applied to heterogeneity across time periods.)

Note that the panel data regression  $Y_{it} = \mu_i + \beta_1 X_{1it} + \beta_2 X_{2it} + \epsilon_{it}$  is equivalent to the regression  $Y_{it} = \beta_1 (X_{1it} - \bar{X}_{1i.}) + \beta_2 (X_{2it} - \bar{X}_{2i.}) + \epsilon_{it}$ , and, indeed, that is how most software packages perform the estimation since this avoids having a large dimensional regressor matrix in case the cross-sectional or time dimension is large. This follows from the fact that a regression on a country dummy is equivalent to subtracting the country-specific average and an application of the Frisch–Waugh theorem.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Frisch and Waugh (1933) theorem: Consider an equation  $Y = X_1 \beta_1 + X_2 \beta_2 + \epsilon$  where  $\beta_1$  is  $k_1 \times 1$ ,  $\beta_2$  is  $k_2 \times 1$ . The estimated coefficients to  $X_1$  from an OLS regression of  $Y$  on  $X_1$  and  $X_2$  are identical to the set of coefficients obtained when the residuals from regressing  $Y$  on  $X_2$  is regressed on the residuals from regressing  $X_1$  on  $X_2$ . That is, the OLS estimate of  $\beta_1$  is  $\hat{\beta}_1 = (X_1^{\psi'} X_1^{\psi})^{-1} X_1^{\psi'} Y^{\psi}$  where

**Table 3** Simulation of models: PANEL

Dependent variable:  $Y$   
 True model is  $Y_{it} = \alpha_i + X_{1it} + \xi_i X_{2it} + \epsilon_{it}$

	(1)	(2)
$X_1$	1.000 (26.57)	1.000 (25.80)
$X_2$	1.500 (56.36)	1.500 (54.72)
$(X_1 - \bar{X}_{1..})(X_2 - \bar{X}_{2..})$	-0.152 (-11.01)	-
$(X_1 - \bar{X}_{1i.})(X_2 - \bar{X}_{2i.})$	-	-0.000 (-0.02)
$R^2$	0.86	0.85

The true model is  $Y_{it} = \alpha_i + X_{1it} + \xi_i X_{2it} + \epsilon_{it}$  where  $X_{11t} = 1 + \epsilon_{1t}$  and  $X_{21t} = 1 + X_{11t} + \epsilon_{2t}$  for the first country,  $X_{12t} = 1/4 + \epsilon_{3t}$  and  $X_{22t} = 1 + X_{12t} + \epsilon_{4t}$  for the second country where  $\epsilon_{it} \sim N(0, 1)$  for all  $i$ .  $X_1$  and  $X_2$  are correlated within each country. We let  $\xi_1 = 1$  and  $\xi_2 = 2$ . Fixed effects are included in the regressions but not reported. We have  $i = 1, 2$  and  $t = 1, \dots, 500$ . The number of simulations is 20,000. Averages of estimated  $t$  statistics are shown in parentheses

2.4.1 Monte Carlo simulations: panel data with varying slopes

We consider a panel data regression with two “countries”  $i = 1, 2$  for  $T = 500$  “years.” The true model has the slope for  $X_2$  varying across countries:  $Y_{it} = \alpha_i + X_{1it} + \xi_i X_{2it} + \epsilon_{it}$ .<sup>6</sup>

In Table 3, column (1) shows the results of estimating model (5). We find a spuriously significant coefficient to the interaction term and a coefficient to  $X_2$  which is similar to the average of the true country-varying slopes. The variable  $X_1$  has a lower mean for country 2 and, because the slope of  $X_2$  is larger for country 2, the least squares algorithm can minimize the squared errors by assigning a negative coefficient to the interaction term. In the true model,  $\partial Y_{it} / \partial X_2 = \xi_i$ , while in the estimated model  $\partial Y_{it} / \partial X_2 = \beta_2 + \beta_3 (X_{1it} - \bar{X}_{1..})$ . If the average over  $t$  of  $(X_{1it} - \bar{X}_{1..})$  varies with  $i$ , this term will be correlated with  $\xi_i$  and the regression will likely result in a non-zero  $\beta_3$  coefficient. In the second column, we illustrate how the subtraction of country-specific means from each variable prevents the interaction term from becoming spuriously significant due to country-varying slopes.

Footnote 5 continued

$(X_1^\psi = M_2 X_1, Y^\psi = M_2 Y, M_2 = [I - P_{X_2}] (M_2$  is the residual maker), and  $P_{X_2} = X_2 (X_2' X_2)^{-1} X_2'$ . This method is called “netting out” (or partialing out) the effect of  $X_2$ . Because we remove the linear effects of  $X_2$ , the cleaned variables  $Y^\psi$  and  $X_1^\psi$  are uncorrelated with (“orthogonal to”)  $X_2$ .

<sup>6</sup> We set  $X_{11t} = 1 + \epsilon_{1t}$  and  $X_{21t} = 1 + X_{11t} + \epsilon_{2t}$  for the first country,  $X_{12t} = 1/4 + \epsilon_{3t}$  and  $X_{22t} = 1 + X_{12t} + \epsilon_{4t}$  for the second country where  $\epsilon_{it} \sim N(0, 1)$  for all  $i$ . We allow the slope of  $X_2$  to vary by country by setting  $\xi_1 = 1$  and  $\xi_2 = 2$ .

### 2.5 Orthogonalizing the regressors

In a situation where the regression of interest utilizes a large number of regressors, the estimated interaction term may capture all sorts of interactions between the variables. In this situation, one might ascertain that a regression with interactions captures only interactions between innovations to the variables of interest by orthogonalizing the variables by means of the Frisch–Waugh theorem. Consider Eq. (1). If we want to find the effect of  $X_1$  on  $\partial Y/\partial X_2$  and we want to ascertain that we are not picking up any other interaction or square term, we can interact  $X_2$  with the Frisch–Waugh residual.

**Case 1** If the concern is how the variable  $X_1$ , cleaned of any other regressors, affects the impact of  $X_2$  on  $Y$ —or robustness with respect to this—we suggest running the following regression model:

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_1^\psi (X_2 - \overline{X_2}) + \beta_4 Z + \epsilon, \tag{7}$$

where  $Z$  is a third regressor (or vector of regressors),  $X_1^\psi = M_2 X_1$  and  $M_2$  is the residual maker (from regressing  $X_1$  on a constant,  $X_2$ , and  $Z$ ).  $X_1^\psi$  is  $X_1$ , orthogonalized with respect to the other regressors.

If  $\alpha_0 + \alpha_1 X_2 + \alpha_2 Z$  is the projection of  $X_1$  on the other regressors, then  $X_1 X_2 = X_1^\psi X_2 + (\alpha_0 + \alpha_1 X_2 + \alpha_2 Z) * X_2$ , which clearly illustrates how an effect of, say,  $Z X_2$  on  $Y$  could make  $X_1 X_2$  significant in the case where  $\alpha_2 \neq 0$ . Alternatively, the researcher could include  $X_2^2$  and  $Z * X_2$  in the regression; however, orthogonalization may be more convenient if the number of regressors is large relative to the sample size. Of course, it may be that the DGP is such that  $X_1 X_2$  belongs in the regression, rather than  $X_1^\psi X_2$ . In either event, this robustness test can alert the econometrician to potential mis-specification.

Notice that this generalizes the subtraction of the average and “country-specific” averages from regressors discussed previously. This procedure may not result in an unbiased coefficient to the interaction if it is truly the interaction of the non-orthogonalized  $X_1$  and  $X_2$  that affects  $Y$ ; however, if the interaction involving orthogonalized terms is significant, it makes it less likely that the interaction is spurious. In either event, this robustness exercise may help the researcher obtain a better understanding of the data.

**Case 2** If one wants to ascertain that the interaction of  $X_1$  and  $X_2$  captures no other regressors, a simple robustness check is to run the following regression model:

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_1^\psi X_2^\psi + \epsilon, \tag{8}$$

where  $X_1^\psi = M_2 X_1$  and  $X_2^\psi = M_1 X_2$ ,  $M_1 = [I - P_{[\beta_0, X_1]}]$  and  $M_2 = [I - P_{[\beta_0, X_2]}]$  ( $M_1$  is the residual maker from regressing  $X_2$  on a constant and  $X_1$  and  $M_2$  is the residual maker from regressing  $X_1$  on a constant and  $X_2$ ). In the case of other regressors in the specification, we suggest taking the residuals from a regression of all regressors.

**Table 4** Simulation of models: Frisch–Waugh—A

Dependent variable:  $Y$   
 True model is  $Y = 3X_1 + 5X_2 + 8X_1X_2 + \epsilon$

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$X_1$	18.993 (17.65)	18.999 (29.83)	18.999 (18.30)	19.004 (19.96)	18.993 (19.94)	18.999 (29.83)	18.999 (29.83)	18.999 (29.83)
$X_2$	13.006 (17.10)	13.002 (28.88)	13.001 (17.72)	12.998 (19.31)	13.004 (19.31)	13.002 (28.88)	13.002 (28.88)	13.002 (28.88)
$(X_1 - \bar{X}_1)(X_2 - \bar{X}_2)$	–	7.994 (10.17)	–	–	–	–	–	–
$(X_1 - \bar{X}_1)^2$	–	0.009 (0.01)	–	–	–	5.338 (14.40)	0.009 (0.01)	8.006 (17.56)
$(X_2 - \bar{X}_2)^2$	–	0.000 (–0.00)	–	–	–	2.664 (14.38)	3.997 (17.54)	0.000 (–0.00)
$X_1^\psi X_2^\psi$	–	–	5.380 (6.29)	–	–	5.331 (10.17)	–	–
$X_1^\psi (X_2 - \bar{X}_2)$	–	–	–	8.010 (11.82)	–	–	7.994 (10.17)	–
$(X_1 - \bar{X}_1)X_2^\psi$	–	–	–	–	7.997 (11.79)	–	–	7.994 (10.17)
$R^2$	0.81	0.93	0.82	0.85	0.85	0.93	0.93	0.93

The true model is  $Y = 3X_1 + 5X_2 + 8X_1X_2 + \epsilon$  or, equivalently,  $Y = 19X_1 + 13X_2 + 8(X_1 - \bar{X}_1)(X_2 - \bar{X}_2) + \epsilon$  where  $X_1 = 1 + \epsilon_1$  and  $X_2 = 1 + X_1 + \epsilon_2$  where  $\epsilon_i \sim N(0, 1)$  for all  $i=1,2$  ( $X_1$  and  $X_2$  are correlated), and  $\epsilon \sim N(0, 100)$ . For columns (3) – (8),  $X_1^\psi = M_2X_1 = [I - P_{\text{constant}, X_2}]X_1$ ,  $X_2^\psi = M_1X_2 = [I - P_{\text{constant}, X_1}]X_2$ . A constant is included but not reported. The sample size is 500 and the number of simulations is 20,000. Averages of estimated  $t$  statistics are shown in parentheses

This specification does not deliver a consistent estimate for the coefficient to the interaction term if the DGP actually involves  $X_1 * X_2$ , but may alert the econometrician to potential problems if the specification is not tightly pinned down by theory.

### 2.6 Monte Carlo simulations: Frisch–Waugh orthogonalization

In Table 4, we simulate a model with an interaction term and correlated regressors and estimate various specifications and robustness regressions as suggested above. The first columns show the linear regression and a regression involving the demeaned interaction and quadratic terms. Of more interest is column (3), which uses the interaction of Frisch–Waugh orthogonalized terms. Orthogonalizing either  $X_1$  or  $X_2$ , but not both, results in consistent estimates in this case. In column (6), using the interaction of orthogonalized terms, results in the quadratic terms in  $X_1$  and  $X_2$  being significant. Orthogonalizing either  $X_1$  or  $X_2$  leads to a consistent estimate for the interaction and

**Table 5** Simulation of models: Frisch–Waugh—B

Dependent variable:  $Y$   
 True model is  $Y = 3X_1 + 5X_2 + 8X_1 \epsilon_2 + \epsilon$

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$X_1$	-4.998 (-6.18)	-4.999 (-6.61)	-5.001 (-6.61)	-4.998 (-6.17)	-4.997 (-7.87)	-4.996 (-7.85)	-4.996 (-7.85)	-4.996 (-7.85)
$X_2$	12.998 (22.71)	12.996 (24.32)	13.001 (24.28)	12.999 (22.69)	12.994 (28.92)	12.994 (28.85)	12.994 (28.85)	12.994 (28.85)
$(X_1 - \bar{X}_1)(X_2 - \bar{X}_2)$	-	2.667 (8.59)	-	-	-	-	-	-
$(X_1 - \bar{X}_1)^2$	-	-	-	-	-	-2.671 (-7.23)	-8.005 (-12.46)	-0.001 (-0.04)
$(X_2 - \bar{X}_2)^2$	-	-	-	-	-	2.668 (14.39)	4.004 (17.54)	-0.001 (-0.00)
$X_1^\psi X_2^\psi$	-	-	5.340 (8.57)	-	-	5.338 (10.17)	-	-
$X_1^\psi (X_2 - \bar{X}_2)$	-	-	-	-0.015 (-0.03)	-	-	8.005 (10.17)	-
$(X_1 - \bar{X}_1)X_2^\psi$	-	-	-	-	8.003 (17.69)	-	-	8.005 (10.17)
$R^2$	0.59	0.64	0.64	0.59	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75

The true model is  $Y = 3X_1 + 5X_2 + 8X_1 \epsilon_2 + \epsilon$  where  $X_1 = 1 + \epsilon_1$  and  $X_2 = 1 + X_1 + \epsilon_2$  where  $\epsilon_i \sim N(0, 1)$  for all  $i = 1, 2$  ( $X_1$  and  $X_2$  are correlated) and  $\epsilon \sim N(0, 100)$ . For columns (3)–(8);  $X_1^\psi = M_2 X_1 = [I - P_{\text{constant}, X_2}] X_1$ ,  $X_2^\psi = M_1 X_2 = [I - P_{\text{constant}, X_1}] X_2$ . A constant is included but not reported. The sample size is 500 and the number of simulations is 20,000. Averages of estimated  $t$  statistics are shown in parentheses

non-zero quadratic terms for  $X_2$  and  $X_1$ , respectively. A researcher doing a specification search will conclude that an interaction term belongs in the model but would need theoretical consideration to decide if quadratic terms should be included in a “best” specification.

Table 5 is an example where there is a significant interaction between  $X_1$  and  $X_2$ , but the DGP involves an interaction between  $X_1$  and the component of  $X_2$  that is orthogonal to  $X_1$ . In non-structural applications, it is often not obvious that whether the derivative of  $Y$  with respect to  $X_1$  is a function of some  $X_2$  or some variable which is correlated with  $X_2$ . For example, if the effect of credit varies by industry, it may not be “industry” (the type of product made) that matters, but the correlation of industry dummies with financial structure. In the example here, the regressions where  $X_2$  is Frisch–Waugh orthogonalized deliver consistent estimates, while the regular interaction, still significant, does not—neither does the specification with both terms orthogonalized. The specification in column (5) is the true model. An investigator searching for specifications would notice the high  $t$  value for the interaction term in

**Table 6** Simulation of models: Frisch–Waugh—misspecified model

Dependent variable:  $Y$   
 True model is  $Y = X_1 + X_1^2 + \epsilon$

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
$X_1$	1.000 (12.84)	3.000 (36.79)	3.001 (27.47)	3.001 (27.47)	3.001 (27.47)
$X_2$	–	0.000 (0.00)	0.001 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)
$X_1^2$	1.000 (31.40)	–	–	–	–
$(X_1 - \bar{X}_1)(X_2 - \bar{X}_2)$	–	0.666 (19.88)	–	–	–
$X_1^\psi X_2^\psi$	–	–	0.005 (0.05)	–	–
$X_1^\psi (X_2 - \bar{X}_2)$	–	–	–	1.000 (15.70)	–
$(X_1 - \bar{X}_1)X_2^\psi$	–	–	–	–	0.001 (0.01)
$R^2$	0.92	0.86	0.75	0.83	0.75

The true model is  $Y = X_1 + X_1^2 + \epsilon$  where  $X_1 = 1 + \epsilon_1$  and  $X_2 = 2 + X_1 + \epsilon_2$  where  $\epsilon_i \sim N(0, 1)$  for all  $i$  ( $X_1$  and  $X_2$  are correlated). For columns (3)–(5);  $X_1^\psi = M_2 X_1 = [I - P_{\text{[constant, } X_2]}]X_1$ ,  $X_2^\psi = M_1 X_2 = [I - P_{\text{[constant, } X_1]}]X_2$ . A constant is included but not reported. The sample size is 500 and the number of simulations is 20,000. Averages of estimated  $t$  statistics are shown in parentheses

this specification. The quadratic term in  $X_2$  in column (7) is also highly significant so an investigator would need to invoke theoretical considerations to choose between specifications—our suggested robustness tests do not substitute for this. They do, however, flag potential issues which the practice of reporting only a regression with  $X_1$ ,  $X_2$ , and  $X_1 * X_2$  does not.

Table 6 simulates a model with a DGP which is quadratic in  $X_1$ , while  $X_1$  and  $X_2$  are correlated. In this case, the interaction term will be spuriously significant unless quadratic terms are included or  $X_2$ , or both independent variables, have been orthogonalized. Our suggestion is to include quadratic terms, but if this is impractical, maybe due to a large number of regressors, the orthogonalized regressions may be substitutes.

### 3 Replications

We replicate five influential papers and examine if their implementation of interaction effects are robust. (Data details are given in the Appendix.) First, in Table 7, we examine if the results of Rajan and Zingales (1998) are robust. The conclusion of this paper, which has by early 2010 has almost 2,500 references, is that accounting standards

**Table 7** Replication of [Rajan and Zingales \(1998\)](#): Table 4 (column 5)

Dependent variable: annual compounded growth rate		
	(1) <sup>a</sup>	(2)
<i>I</i>	-4.33 (-3.20)	-4.33 (-3.20)
<i>ET</i>	0.12 (0.82)	-
<i>EA</i>	1.33 (3.74)	-
$(E - \bar{E})T^\psi$	-	0.38 (2.40)
$(E - \bar{E})A^\psi$	-	1.73 (4.38)
$R^2$	0.42	0.42

The dependent variable is the annual compounded growth rate in real value added for each ISIC industry in each country for the period 1980–1990. *E* is the fraction of capital expenditures not financed with internal funds for U.S. firms in the same industry between 1980–1990. For interaction terms, *E* is multiplied by financial development variables; total capitalization to GDP ratio (*T*) and accounting standards in a country in 1990 (*A*). *T* is the ratio of the sum of equity market capitalization and domestic credit to GDP (It varies by country). *I* is industry's share of total value added in manufacturing in 1980. The sample size is 1,042 for all of the regressions. All regressions include a constant, country- and industry-fixed effects but their coefficients are not reported. All coefficients are multiplied by 10. *t* statistics in parentheses. The new variables which are created according to the Frisch–Waugh theorem:  $T^\psi = (I - P_{[\text{constant}, I, E, A]})T$ ,  $A^\psi = (I - P_{[\text{constant}, I, E, T]})A$

<sup>a</sup> Replicates [Rajan and Zingales \(1998\)](#)

matters—in particular in industries that are highly dependent on finance. Considering the influence of the paper, it is important to examine if the results are robust. The interactions of interest are between sectors' external financial dependence (*E*) and the country-level indicators of finance availability: the ratio of (total equity market capitalization plus domestic credit) to gross domestic product (GDP) total capitalization (*T*) and accounting standards (*A*). We examine if the results are robust to using Frisch–Waugh residuals for *T* and *A*. We find that using of Frisch–Waugh residuals in the interaction term strengthens the size and significance of the interactions; in fact, the interaction of external dependence (*E*) and equity market capitalization and credit turns from insignificant to clearly significant at the 5 % level with the expected sign. Our robustness exercise makes the original claims of [Rajan and Zingales \(1998\)](#) empirically more convincing.

We also briefly consider the results of [Rajan and Zingales \(2003\)](#), who examined if the number of listed firms in a country is affected by openness (*O*), the historical (1913) level of Industrialization (*I*), and the interaction of *O* and *I*. From Table 8, we see that the *t* statistics on the main terms are very much affected by the interaction terms not being centered although this only involves a different interpretation of the *t* statistics which are positive and significant when the variables are centered in the interaction. The impact of the interaction term is very robust to including quadratic

**Table 8** Replication of [Rajan and Zingales \(2003\)](#): Table 7 (panel B)

Dependent variable: number of companies/million population							
	(1) <sup>a</sup>	(2) <sup>a</sup>	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<i>I</i>	238.46 (1.76)	-212.00 (-1.37)	362.44 (3.49)	318.03 (0.72)	354.22 (3.34)	370.00 (3.46)	347.27 (3.37)
<i>O</i>	35.36 (3.86)	-0.91 (-0.08)	44.17 (6.26)	69.00 (2.30)	41.05 (5.86)	40.65 (5.85)	44.59 (6.27)
<i>I</i> <sup>2</sup>	-	-	-	0.07 (0.02)	-	-	-
<i>O</i> <sup>2</sup>	-	-	-	-10.58 (-0.87)	-	-	-
<i>IO</i>	-	919.95 (3.79)	-	-	-	-	-
$(I - \bar{I})(O - \bar{O})$	-	-	919.95 (3.79)	743.35 (2.27)	-	-	-
$I^\psi O^\psi$	-	-	-	-	957.24 (3.61)	-	-
$I^\psi(O - \bar{O})$	-	-	-	-	-	950.65 (3.64)	-
$(I - \bar{I})O^\psi$	-	-	-	-	-	-	929.71 (3.76)
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.54	0.77	0.77	0.79	0.76	0.76	0.77

The dependent variable is the number of listed companies per million of population in 1913. Per capita *I* is the index of industrialization for that country in 1913. *O* is the sum of exports and imports of goods divided by GDP in 1913. Coefficient estimates for per capita *I* and its interaction with *O* are multiplied by 1000. A constant is included in all regressions but not reported. *t* statistics in parentheses. The new variables which are created according to the Frisch–Waugh theorem are  $I^\psi = [I - P_{[\text{constant}, O]}]I$  and  $O^\psi = [I - P_{[\text{constant}, I]}]O$

<sup>a</sup> Replicates [Rajan and Zingales \(2003\)](#)

terms in the main variables or orthogonalizing the regressors (indicating that these were likely to be near-orthogonal to begin with). Overall, the conclusions of [Rajan and Zingales \(2003\)](#) are robust to the potential mis-specifications that we suggest examining.

[Castro et al. \(2004\)](#) hypothesize that stronger property rights, as measured by laws mandating “one share-one vote,” “anti-director rights” (which limit the power of directors to extract surplus), “creditor rights,” and “rule of law,” are beneficial for growth and more so when restrictions on capital transactions (capital flows) are weaker. They examine this by including interaction terms between the property rights indices and capital restrictions. Table 9 replicates Table 1 of their paper. We do not display regressions with centered interactions because the interaction terms are the variables of interest (the coefficients to the main terms are not shown). In column (2), quadratic terms for the property rights measures are included, but this strengthens the authors’

**Table 9** Replication of [Castro et al. \(2004\)](#): Table 1

Dependent variable: average annual growth rate of real GDP per worker 1967–1996					
	(1) <sup>a</sup>	(2)	(3)	(4)	
<i>OV * RCT</i>	9.10 (0.60)	-9.94 (-0.57)	3.36 (0.19)	-	-
<i>AR * RCT</i>	-5.30 (-1.42)	-7.29 (-1.64)	-5.78 (-1.35)	-	-
<i>CR * RCT</i>	-10.29 (-2.17)	-11.14 (-2.30)	-3.73 (-0.64)	-	-
<i>RL * RCT</i>	-1.01 (-0.34)	1.22 (0.35)	2.51 (0.73)	-	-
<i>LRGDPW67</i> <sup>2</sup>	-	-	-9.25 (-2.02)	-	-
<i>OV</i> <sup>ψ</sup> ( <i>RCT</i> - $\overline{RCT}$ )	-	-	-	15.57 (1.02)	-
<i>AR</i> <sup>ψ</sup> ( <i>RCT</i> - $\overline{RCT}$ )	-	-	-	-6.15 (-1.55)	-
<i>CR</i> <sup>ψ</sup> ( <i>RCT</i> - $\overline{RCT}$ )	-	-	-	-9.38 (-1.32)	-
<i>RL</i> <sup>ψ</sup> ( <i>RCT</i> - $\overline{RCT}$ )	-	-	-	-12.62 (-2.06)	-
( <i>OV</i> - $\overline{OV}$ ) <i>RCT</i> <sup>ψ</sup>	-	-	-	-	7.14 (0.40)
( <i>AR</i> - $\overline{AR}$ ) <i>RCT</i> <sup>ψ</sup>	-	-	-	-	-6.57 (-1.52)
( <i>CR</i> - $\overline{CR}$ ) <i>RCT</i> <sup>ψ</sup>	-	-	-	-	-14.30 (-2.60)
( <i>RL</i> - $\overline{RL}$ ) <i>RCT</i> <sup>ψ</sup>	-	-	-	-	-2.91 (-0.91)
Quadratic terms included but not shown	N	Y	Y	N	N
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.50	0.59	0.64	0.50	0.53

*RCT* measures restrictions on capital transactions. *CR* is an index of creditor rights. *AR* is an indicator of antidirector rights and *OV* is a dummy for one-share one-vote, *OV*. *LRGDPW67* is the natural logarithm of real gross domestic product per worker in 1967. *RL* is an index for rule of law. The coefficients are multiplied by 1,000. Main terms of these variables are included in all regressions but suppressed. Sample size is 43. A constant is included but not reported. *t* statistics in parentheses. The new variables which are created according to the Frisch–Waugh theorem are:

$$\begin{aligned}
 RCT^\psi &= (I - P_{[\text{constant}, LRGDPW67, OV, AR, CR, RL]})RCT, \\
 OV^\psi &= (I - P_{[\text{constant}, LRGDPW67, RCT, AR, CR, RL]})OV, \\
 AR^\psi &= (I - P_{[\text{constant}, LRGDPW67, OV, RCT, CR, RL]})AR, \\
 CR^\psi &= (I - P_{[\text{constant}, LRGDPW67, OV, AR, RCT, RL]})CR,
 \end{aligned}$$

and  $RL^\psi = (I - P_{[\text{constant}, LRGDPW67, OV, AR, CR, RCT]})RL$

<sup>a</sup> Replicates [Castro et al. \(2004\)](#)

**Table 10** Replication of [Caprio et al. 2007](#): Table 5 (column 1)

Dependent variable: market-to-book value				
	(1) <sup>a</sup>	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Loan Growth</i>	0.27 (0.76)	0.64 (1.42)	0.19 (0.54)	0.19 (0.53)
<i>Rights</i>	0.31 (5.75)	-0.22 (-1.10)	0.14 (3.43)	0.07 (1.81)
<i>CF</i>	2.27 (4.33)	-1.57 (-2.98)	-0.57 (-3.23)	-0.44 (-2.35)
<i>Loan Growth</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.27 (0.76)	-1.17 (-1.44)	-	-
<i>Rights</i> <sup>2</sup>	-	0.05 (1.51)	-	-
<i>CF</i> <sup>2</sup>	-	1.34 (2.03)	-	-
<i>CF Rights</i>	-0.89 (-5.78)	-	-	-
$(CF - \overline{CF})(Rights - \overline{Rights})$	-	-0.82 (-5.11)	-	-
$CF^\psi (Rights - \overline{Rights})$	-	-	-0.91 (-6.14)	-
$(CF - \overline{CF})Rights^\psi$	-	-	-	-0.39 (-4.32)
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.20	0.23	0.22	0.15

A constant is included in all regressions but not reported. *Market-to-Book* is the market to book value of the bank's equity of a bank. *LG* is the bank's average net loan growth during the last 3 years. *Rights* is an index of anti-director rights for the country. *CF* is the fraction of the bank's ultimate cash-flow rights held by the controlling owners. Sample size is 213. *t* statistics in parentheses. The new variables which are created according to the Frisch–Waugh theorem are:  $CF^\psi = (I - P_{[\text{constant}, LG, Rights]})CF$  and  $Rights^\psi = (I - P_{[\text{constant}, LG, CF]})Rights$

<sup>a</sup> Replicates [Caprio et al. \(2007\)](#)

main result of negative interactions. In column (3), we include a quadratic term in log GDP, which weakens the significance of the parameters of interest below standard significance, but we do not further explore this issue which is not at the focus of this article.<sup>7</sup> If we use Frisch–Waugh residuals for either, the creditor rights measures or the capital restrictions measure, we again find that the estimated interactions are mainly negative. Overall, the point estimates in the [Castro et al. \(2004\)](#) study are not all robust, as one might conjecture from the size of the *t* statistics, but the main message of their regressions appears robust to the kind of robustness checks we recommend.

<sup>7</sup> The dataset used [Castro et al. \(2004\)](#) is fairly small—45 observations—and some non-robustness must be expected. A fair discussion of the validity of their results would involve a much longer discussion.

**Table 11** Replication of Spilimbergo (2009): Table 2a (Column 2)

Dependent variable: <i>Polity2</i> index of democracy			
	(1) <sup>a</sup>	(2)	(3)
<i>Democracy</i> <sub><i>t</i>-5</sub>	0.45 (9.61)	0.44 (8.46)	0.44 (8.44)
<i>Students Abroad</i> <sub><i>t</i>-5</sub> ( <i>S</i> )	24.23 (2.81)	24.23 (2.55)	-1.82 (-0.39)
<i>Democracy in Host Countries</i> <sub><i>t</i>-5</sub> ( <i>DH</i> )	0.12 (2.23)	0.12 (2.23)	0.10 (1.84)
<i>S</i> <sub><i>t</i>-5</sub> <i>DH</i> <sub><i>t</i>-5</sub>	-33.71 (-2.71)	-33.31 (-2.47)	-
( <i>S</i> <sub><i>t</i>-5</sub> - $\overline{S_{t-5i}}$ )( <i>DH</i> <sub><i>t</i>-5</sub> - $\overline{DH_{t-5i}}$ )	-	-	56.44 (1.73)
<i>Time effects</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Country effects</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Observations</i>	1107	1121	1121
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.41	0.82	0.82

The data forms an unbalanced panel comprising five year intervals between 1955 and 2000. The dependent variable, *Polity2*, is the composite Polity II democracy index from the Polity IV data set. Students abroad (*S*) is the share of foreign students over population and democracy in host countries (*DH*) is the average democracy index in host countries. *t* statistics in parentheses

<sup>a</sup> Replicates Spilimbergo (2009)

Caprio et al. (2007) examine if bank valuations (relative to book values) are higher where owners have stronger rights (*Rights*), as measured by an anti-director index, and whether this result is stronger when a larger share of cash flows (*CF*) accrues to the owners. The first column of Table 10 replicates Table 5, column (1) of Caprio et al. (2007). Column (2) includes quadratic terms and centers the variables before interacting. The very large *t* statistic found for the main term, “rights,” in column (1) turns insignificant and both main variables change signs. The non-centered implementation of Caprio et al. (2007), in our opinion, gives a potentially misleading impression of the effect of the main terms; for example, the *t* statistic of “rights” in column (1) implies that there is large significant effect of ownership rights on valuation when owners’ cash-flow share is nil. But, a cash-flow share of nil is meaningless. Better news for the published paper is that the interaction terms, which are the authors’ main focus, are clearly estimated robustly.

Finally, in Table 11, we explore a specific set of results from Spilimbergo (2009), that the interaction of “students abroad” with “democracy in host country” has a negative effect on the *Polity2* measure of democracy.<sup>8</sup> This is a panel-data analysis (country

<sup>8</sup> We choose this article because it is an example of panel data regression for which the data are easily available; however, the results we replicate are just one of a set of estimations in Spilimbergo (2009) article so the discussion here should be seen as an example rather than an examination of the central message of Spilimbergo’s paper.

by time) with both time- and country-fixed effects which implies that the coefficients to the main terms are determined by these variable after country and time means have been subtracted. We ask if the results are robust to potentially country-varying slopes to the main terms by removing country-specific averages before interacting. The first column shows the results reported in [Spilimbergo \(2009\)](#), while the second column replicates the analysis using the data posted by Spilimbergo on the web site of the *American Economic Review*—we need to display both to ascertain that any deviation between our results and the results in the *American Economic Review* is not due the discrepancy between the posted data and the data actually used by Spilimbergo. The results are similar for those columns, except the  $R^2$  is much higher using the posted data. In column (3), we show the results using interactions that are demeaned country-by-country. The results are clearly not robust to this alternative specification—the coefficient to (non-interacted) “students abroad” becomes insignificant, while the coefficient to the interaction changes from significantly negative to (nearly significantly) positive. Within the setting of our paper, it will take us too far afield to discuss in detail whether country-varying slopes in this setting is a reasonable alternative empirical specification for Spilimbergo’s study although it does not seem far fetched that growth of, say, democracy varies across countries. Our main point is that, in general, in panel studies using data from heterogeneous cross-sectional units, it may be a reasonable alternative (unless ruled out by theory) and it will often be reasonable to examine robustness against this alternative.

## 4 Conclusions

We provide practical advice regarding interpretation and robustness of models with interaction terms for econometric practitioners—in particular, we suggest some simple rules-of-thumb intended to minimize the risk of estimated interaction terms spuriously capturing other features of the data. The main tenet of our results is that researchers applying interaction terms should be careful with specification and interpretation and not just put  $X_1 X_2$  into a regression equation without considering robustness of results to functional form.

## Appendix—Notes on data collection

### [Rajan and Zingales \(1998\)](#):

The data are downloaded from Luigi Zingales’ home page. The dependent variable is the *annual compounded growth rate* in real value added for each ISIC industry in each country for the period 1980–1990. External dependence ( $E$ ) is the fraction of capital expenditures not financed with internal funds for firms in the United States in the same industry between 1980 and 1990. Total Capitalization ( $T$ ) is the ratio of (equity market capitalization plus domestic credit) to GDP.  $A$  is a country-level index developed by the Center for International Financial Analysis and Research ranking the amount of disclosure in annual company reports.  $I$  is *industry’s share* of total value added in manufacturing in 1980 from the United Nations Statistics. For more details on data sources, see [Rajan and Zingales \(1998\)](#).

*Rajan and Zingales (2003):*

We collected the data using the sources given in [Rajan and Zingales \(2003\)](#). The dependent variable, *number of companies to population*, is the ratio of the number of domestic companies the equity of which is publicly traded in a domestic stock exchange to population in millions in 1993 (it is used as an indicator of the importance of equity markets). As a first source, stock exchange handbooks are used to count the number of companies and the Bulletin of the International Institute of Statistics is used as a second source. The countries in the sample are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the United States.

GDP in 1913 obtained from the International Historical Statistics ([Mitchell 1995](#)). We could not find this series for Russia and we used Fig. 2 in [Rajan and Zingales \(2003\)](#) to interpolate the data. Openness ( $O$ ) is the sum of exports and imports of goods in 1913 divided by GDP in 1913. Exports and imports are from the Statistical Yearbook of the League of Nations.<sup>9</sup> For Brazil and Russia, we could not find export and import data and we interpolated them from the averages of the variables in [Rajan and Zingales \(2003\)](#)'s Table 6.

Per capita industrialization ( $I$ ) is the index of industrialization by country in 1913 as computed by [Bairoch \(1982\)](#). For more details about data sources, see [Rajan and Zingales \(2003\)](#).

*Castro et al. (2004):*

We collected the data using the sources given in [Castro et al. \(2004\)](#). The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate of real GDP per worker in 1967–1996. *Real GDP per worker* is from the Penn World Tables, version 6.1 ([Heston et al. \(2002\)](#)). The set of countries corresponds to the 49 countries in [La Porta et al. \(1998\)](#) except we do not have data for Germany, Jordan, Venezuela, Switzerland, Zimbabwe, and Taiwan. [Castro et al. \(2004\)](#) use four of the indicators of investor protection introduced by [La Porta et al. \(1998\)](#). The variable  $CR$  is an index aggregating different creditor rights in firm reorganization and liquidation upon default. The indicator anti-director rights ( $AR$ ) and the dummy one share-one vote ( $OV$ ) are two indices of shareholder rights geared toward measuring the ability of small shareholders to participate in decision making. Finally, the index rule of law ( $RL$ ) proxies for the quality of law enforcement. These variables are described in more details in [La Porta et al. \(1998\)](#).

$RCT$  is a variable created to measure restrictions on capital transactions. First, a time-series dummy is constructed based on the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. The dummy variable takes the value of 1 for a given country in a given year if the IMF finds evidence of restrictions on payments on capital transactions for that country-year. Such restrictions include both taxes and quantity restrictions on the trade of foreign assets. Second, we compute  $RCT$  as the average of this dummy over the sample period to obtain a measure of the fraction of time each country imposed restrictions on international capital transactions.

<sup>9</sup> See <http://www.library.northwestern.edu/govpub/collections/league/stat.html>.

*Caprio et al. (2007)*:

The exact data are used in [Caprio et al. \(2007\)](#) and is downloaded from Ross Levine's home-page. It is a new database on bank ownership around the world constructed by [Caprio et al. \(2007\)](#). *Market-to-book* is the market to book value of each bank's equity of a bank from Bankscope database published in 2003.<sup>10</sup> In other words, it is the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity. Loan growth (*LG*) is each bank's average net loan growth during the last 3 years from Bankscope published in 2003.

*Rights* is an index of anti-director rights for the country from [La Porta et al. \(2002\)](#). The range for the index is from zero to six formed by adding the number of times each of the following conditions hold: (1) the country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote, (2) shareholders are not required to deposit their shares before the General Shareholders' Meeting, (3) cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities on the board of directors is allowed, (4) an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place, (5) the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an Extraordinary Shareholders' Meeting is less than or equal to 10 % (the sample median), or (6) shareholders have preemptive rights that can only be waived by a shareholders meeting.

*CF* is the fraction of each bank's ultimate cash-flow rights held by the controlling owners. *CF* values are computed as the product of all the equity stakes along the control chain. The controlling shareholder may hold cash-flow rights directly (i.e., through shares registered in his or her name) and indirectly (i.e., through shares held by entities that, in turn, he or she controls). If there is a control chain, the products of the cash-flow rights along the chain are used. To compute the controlling shareholder's total cash-flow rights direct and all indirect cash-flow rights are summed.<sup>11</sup> See [Caprio et al. \(2007\)](#) for more details on data sources.

*Spilimbergo (2009)*:

The exact data are used in [Spilimbergo \(2009\)](#) and is available from the *American Economic Review*'s web site. It is a unique panel data set of foreign students. The data forms an unbalanced panel comprising five year intervals between 1955 and 2000. The dependent variable, *Polity2*, is an index of democracy. *S* is the share of foreign students over population and democracy in host countries (*DH*) is the average democracy index in host countries. See [Spilimbergo \(2009\)](#) for more details on data sources.

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<sup>10</sup> Bankscope, maintained by Bureau van Dijk, contains financial and ownership information for about 4,000 major banks.

<sup>11</sup> [Caprio et al. \(2007\)](#)'s calculations are based on Bankscope, Worldscope, the Bankers' Almanac, 20-F filings, and company web sites.

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