Intraparty Bargaining and Ministerial Selection under Mixed Member Systems

Hiroki Kubo
Rice University
hiroki.kubo@rice.edu

University of Houston EITM Summer Institute
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Overview

- 1) Research Question
- 2) Literature
- 3) EITM framework
- 4) Theory
- 5) Hypothesis
- 6) Research Design
- 7) Findings
- 8) Implications

Research Question

- "Who gets what, when and how? (Laswell 1936)" In particular, **cabinet formation and ministerial selection** are central to the problem of parliamentary democracies.

- In the field of coalition politics in European parliamentary democracies, a number of researchers examine theories and empirical evidence on coalition barraging (Gamson 1961; Riker 1962; Browne and Franklin, 1973; Laver and Shepsle 1996; Laver and Schofield 1998).

- In this research project, I clarify two neglected factors explaining ministerial selection: (i) **intraparty bargaining** and (ii) **electoral systems**.

Literature Review 1: Intraparty Bargaining

- "Democracy is not be found in the parties but between the parties (Schattschneider 1942)."

- Intraparty politics is often neglected. (Giannetti and Benoit 2008; Kam 2009; Cross and Katz 2013)

- Some exceptions:
  - Factional politics (Leiserson 1968; Mershon 2001; Boucek 2012; Ceron 2012; 2013)
  - Party discipline/unity: party leaders vs legislators (Pekkanen 2006 et al. 2006; Kam 2009; Kam et al. 2010, Ono 2012; Back et al. 2013)

- The collective goals of the parties, not the prime minister, affect ministerial selection process (Kam, Bianco, Sened, and Smyth 2010).

- However, party organization is endogenous to legislative organization and electoral systems. **So, how and why do chamber structure and electoral institutions affect intra party bargaining over ministries?**

Kam, Bianco, Sened, and Smyth (2010)

FIGURE 1.   Cabinet and Shadow Cabinet Appointments in the 1992–97 Parliament (a) and the 1997–2001 Parliament (b).

Literature Review 2:
party/candidate centered electoral systems

- There are growing research on intraparty dimension (party/candidate-centered) electoral systems (Carey and Shugart 1995; Shugart and Wattenberg 2003).

- With a few exceptions(Golder 2006; Carroll and Cox 2007), the research on elections and cabinets are separated.

- To sum up, the unsettled problems are: 1) how to integrate the research on electoral system with the research on coalition politics, and 2) how to analyze the causal mechanism between candidate-centered electoral systems, intraparty bargaining and ministerial selection process.

A Powerful Clue to Solve the Unsettled Problems: Japanese Politics under the Mixed Member Systems

- Contemporary Japanese politics is an ideal laboratory for comparing the effects of four different electoral systems.

- There are first past the post (FPTP) and closed list proportional representation (CLPR) in the lower chamber and single non-transferable vote (SNTV) and open list proportional representation (OLPR) in the upper chamber.

- Utilizing this unique experimental setting, I examine the effect of the intraparty dimension of electoral systems (the extent to which an electoral system is candidate or party centered).

Shugart (2003)
Table 2.2. Scores on the Intraparty Dimension

Candidate-centered systems

−1.00	−2, −2, −1	SNTV	Pre-reform Japan, Colombia
−0.86	−2, −2, 0	SSD-plurality with unrestricted access	Philippines
−0.71	0, −1, −1	Open list PR	Greece, Italy, Brazil
−0.57	−2, 0, −1	STV	Ireland
−0.43	0, 0, −1	Quasi-list PR	Finland, Chile
−0.29	−1, −2, 0	SSD two rounds	USA, France
−0.14	0, −2, 0	SSD-plurality with party control	UK, Canada

Party-centered systems

|			
0.20	1, −1, 1	Separate nomination and allocation districts	Denmark, Slovenia
0.40	0, 1, 1	Flexible list	Belgium, Netherlands
0.60	−1, 2, 1	Nominations by primary, closed list in general	Costa Rica
0.80	1, 2, 1	Closed list	Portugal, Spain
1.00	2, 2, 1	Closed lists with concentrated nominations	Pre-reform Venezuela

3) EITM framework

- How to Apply Three-Step EITM Framework to My Research Topic (Granato and Scioli 2004; Granato, Lo, and Won 2010; Granato, Lo, and Won forthcoming)

- Step 1: Theoretical concept is decision making and game theory. Statistical concept is nominal choice.

- Step 2: Theoretical analogue is utility maximization. Statistical analogue is discrete choice modeling (binary choice).

- Step 3: I build hypothesis about the relationship between intraparty bargaining and ministerial selection. I measure interaction between electoral systems and the relative ideological position within parties as intra-party bargaining.

Theory: The Logic of Intraparty Bargaining under the Party/Candidate Centered Systems

- Assumptions:
  - (i) MPs are **office seekers**
  - (ii) The party leadership uses portfolios in order to **maintain value of party membership.**
- **Party splits** are a constant threat to majority status
- Credibility of defection threats vary by electoral system:
  - Under the <u>party-centered system</u>, members who are **close** to the party leaders, should be selected.
  - Under the <u>candidate-centered system</u>, **electorally strong** MPs have strong bargaining positions, and it makes their threat credible and party leaders give in to the demand.

Theoretical concept: dynamic game between party leadership and party members

(Revolt or Exit)

MPs

(Ignore and Not Allocate)   (Acquiesce)

Party Leadership

(Demand)   (Allocate)

MPs

(Not Demand)

Implications

- The consequence of the game depends on credible threats of MP's defection to their party leadership.

- Candidate-centered electoral systems make disloyal (ideological outlying) MP's threat more credible. Party centered electoral systems make them less credible.

Hypothesis

- Hypothesis 1: In party-centered lower house: MPs who are **ideologically close to the prime minister** are more likely to receive cabinet posts.

- Hypothesis 2: In candidate-centered upper house MPs who are **ideologically far from the party median** are more likely to receive cabinet posts.

Research Design 1: Dependent Variable

- Dependent Variable (Ministerial Selection): selected as a cabinet minister=1, otherwise=0
- I consider the 17 cabinets allocation process for the upper house members in the PM party 2004 to 2013 (N=1730). In the same way, I examine the 17 cabinets allocation process for the lower house members in the PM party 2003 to 2012 (N=5010).
- During this period, LDP was the PM party 2003 to 2009, DPJ from 2009 to 2012. LDP regained the power in 2012.

| PM	Election	Reshuffle	Start	PM_party	Coalition	Total	Upper	Lower	Coalition	Non-MPs
Koizumi	2	1	2003/11/19	LDP	Komei	17	2	15	1	2
Koizumi	2	2	2004/9/27	LDP	Komei	17	3	14	1	0
Koizumi	3	1	2005/9/21	LDP	Komei	17	3	14	1	0
Koizumi	3	2	2005/10/31	LDP	Komei	17	3	14	1	0
Abe	1	1	2006/9/26	LDP	Komei	17	2	15	1	1
Abe	1	2	2007/8/27	LDP	Komei	17	2	15	1	2
Fukuda	1	1	2007/9/26	LDP	Komei	17	3	14	1	2
Fukuda	1	2	2008/8/2	LDP	Komei	17	3	14	1	1
Aso	1	1	2008/9/24	LDP	Komei	17	2	15	1	0
Hatoyama	1	1	2009/9/16	DPJ	People, SDP	17	4	13	2	0
Kan	1	1	2010/6/8	DPJ	People	17	4	13	1	0
Kan	1	2	2010/9/17	DPJ	People	17	5	12	1	1
Kan	1	3	2011/1/14	DPJ	People	17	4	13	2	1
Noda	1	1	2011/9/2	DPJ	People	17	5	12	1	0
Noda	1	2	2012/1/13	DPJ	People	17	5	12	1	0
Noda	1	3	2012/6/4	DPJ	People	18	3	15	1	1
Noda	1	4	2012/10/1	DPJ	People	18	4	14	1	1
Abe	2	1	2012/12/26	LDP	Komei	18	3	15	1	0

Research Design 2: Independent Variable

- Independent Variable 1 (Electoral Systems)
  - Upper Chamber (SNTV=0, Open List PR=1)
  - Lower Chamber (SMD=0, Closed List PR=1)

- Independent Variable 2 (Intraparty Bargaining)
  - The Ideological Distance from the Prime Minister
  - The Ideological Distance from the Party Median (party's collective goal

- The Control Variables
  - The 1st Dimension Position, The 2nd Dimension, Seniority, Electoral Strength (SMD members), Population Density (SMD members), and the LDP led government period

How to measure ideal points in Japan?

- 1) Rollcall vote analysis
- This approach is meaningless in the context of Japanese party politics because of high voting unity (Poole and Rosenthal 1997; Poole 2000; Rosenthal and Voeten 2004; Spirling and McLean 2006).

- **2) Survey data analysis**
- Pre-electoral elite survey is available and respondent rate is high.
- Ideological positions obtained from pre-election survey (UTAS survey) of all legislative candidates for both chambers from 2003 to 2013.
- Blackbox Scaling (Poole 1998; Armstrong II, Bakker, Carroll, Hare, Poole, and Rosenthal 2014; Poole, Rosenthal, Lewis, Lo and Carroll 2014) estimates ideological positions of individual MPs from survey data.

- 3) text analysis
- Slapin and Proksch (2008); Proksch, Slapin and Thies(2011)

House of Councillors Election 2004

Legend: LDP, SDP, Komei, JCP, DPJ, Other

House of Councillors Election 2007

Legend: LDP, SDP, Komei, JCP, DPJ, National, Other

House of Councillors Election 2010

Legend: LDP, SDP, Komei, JCP, DPJ, National, Other

General Election 2003

Legend: LDP, SDP, Komei, JCP, DPJ, Conservative, Other

General Election 2005

Legend: LDP, SDP, Komei, JCP, DPJ, National, Other

General Election 2009

Legend: LDP, SDP, Komei, JCP, DPJ, National, Other

House of Representatives (2003)
The 1st Dimension (Security)

House of Representatives (2003)
The 2nd Dimension (Economy)

House of Representatives (2003)

House of Representatives (2003)

House of Councilors (2004)
The 1st Dimension (Security)

House of Councilors (2004)
The 2nd Dimension (Economy)

House of Councillors (2004)

The 1st Dimension (left right position on security issues)

factor(Party_2004)
LDP
DPJ

House of Councillors (2004)

The 2nd Dimension (left right position on economic issues)

factor(Party_2004)
LDP
DPJ

The Prime Ministers and the Party Medians

	Model 1	Model 2
Distance from Prime Minister (1st)	0.10	0.13
	(0.33)	(0.34)
Distance from Prime Minister (1st)*CLPR		−0.98
		(1.71)
Distance from Prime Minister (2nd)	−1.30**	−1.20*
	(0.49)	(0.50)
Distance from Prime Minister (2nd)*CLPR		−2.33
		(2.34)
Distance from Party Median (1st)	−0.07	−0.19
	(0.43)	(0.43)
Distance from Party Median (1st)*CLPR		3.55†
		(2.08)
Distance from Party Median (2nd)	0.76	0.61
	(0.57)	(0.59)
Distance from Party Median (2nd)*CLPR		1.51
		(2.10)
Closed-List PR	−0.70***	−0.94*
	(0.19)	(0.41)
The 1st Dimension	0.65**	0.66**
	(0.24)	(0.24)
The 2nd Dimension	1.01**	1.03**
	(0.32)	(0.32)
Seniority	0.17***	0.17***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
LDP Government	−0.48***	−0.50***
	(0.11)	(0.11)
(Intercept)	−2.15***	−2.14***
	(0.11)	(0.11)
N	4143	4143
AIC	1282.73	1286.65
BIC	1535.89	1641.08
$\log L$	−601.36	−587.33

Standard errors in parentheses

† significant at $p < .10$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$

Cabinet Post Allocation to the Lower Chamber

	Model 3	Model 4
Distance from Prime Minister (1st)	−0.09	−0.06
	(0.66)	(0.76)
Distance from Prime Minister (1st)*OLPR		0.37
		(1.77)
Distance from Prime Minister (2nd)	−0.51	−1.18
	(0.71)	(0.87)
Distance from Prime Minister (2nd)*OLPR		2.15
		(1.42)
Distance from Party Median (1st)	0.12	1.14
	(0.87)	(0.98)
Distance from Party Median (1st)*OLPR		−4.94*
		(2.40)
Distance from Party Median (2nd)	2.60**	2.58*
	(0.98)	(1.18)
Distance from Party Median (2nd)*OLPR		0.74
		(2.29)
Open List PR	0.12	0.27
	(0.18)	(0.42)
The 1st Dimension	0.17	0.30
	(0.47)	(0.51)
The 2nd Dimension	1.71***	1.88***
	(0.51)	(0.56)
Seniority	0.54***	0.55***
	(0.09)	(0.09)
LDP Government	−0.01	−0.06
	(0.21)	(0.22)
(Intercept)	−3.21***	−3.23***
	(0.31)	(0.34)
N	1115	1115
AIC	346.75	346.26
BIC	547.41	627.19
$\log L$	−133.37	−117.13

Standard errors in parentheses

[†] significant at $p < .10$; [*]$p < .05$; [**]$p < .01$; [***]$p < .001$

Cabinet Post Allocation to the Upper Chamber

|	Model 5	Model 6
Distance from Prime Minister (1st)	0.20	−0.11
	(0.35)	(1.18)
Distance from Prime Minister (1st)*Electoral Strength		0.19
		(0.67)
Distance from Prime Minister (2nd)	−1.40**	1.51
	(0.51)	(1.29)
Distance from Prime Minister (2nd)*Electoral Strength		−1.67*
		(0.69)
Distance from Party Median (1st)	−0.27	−1.36
	(0.44)	(1.53)
Distance from Party Medianm (1st)*Electoral Strength		0.62
		(0.83)
Distance from Party Median (2nd)	0.69	2.26
	(0.61)	(1.67)
Distance from Party Median (2nd)*Electoral Strength		−0.90
		(0.90)
Electoral Strength	0.45***	0.75***
	(0.07)	(0.16)
The 1st Dimension	0.59*	0.46†
	(0.25)	(0.26)
The 2nd Dimension	1.03**	0.91**
	(0.34)	(0.33)
Seniority	0.17***	0.17***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Populartion Density	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)
LDP Government	−0.50***	−0.46***
	(0.12)	(0.12)
(Intercept)	−2.84***	−3.39***
	(0.17)	(0.31)
N	3278	3278
AIC	1196.94	1190.73
BIC	1465.12	1556.42
$\log L$	−554.47	−535.36

Standard errors in parentheses

† significant at $p < .10$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$

Ministerial Selection (only SMD members)

Cabinet Post Allocation to the SMD Members

Distance from Prime Minister (2nd)

- Electoral Strength=1
- Electoral Strength=1.5
- Electoral Strength=2
- Electoral Strength=2.5

Cabinet Post Allocation to the SMD Members

Distance from Party Median (2nd)

- Electoral Strength=1
- Electoral Strength=1.5
- Electoral Strength=2
- Electoral Strength=2.5

Findings

- In the upper house, MPs, who are preference outliers, are more likely to join in the cabinet.

- In the lower house, MPs, who are ideologically close to the Prime Minister, are more likely to join in the cabinet.

- In addition, in the lower house, electorally strong MPs are more likely to join in the cabinet.

Case Study 1: The ideological gap between PM and minister from the upper house

-Yoichi Masuzoe (LDP - Independent)

-Councilor(Senator) 2001-2013

-Governor of Tokyo 2014-

-Selected as ministrer of Health, Labour and Welfare(2007-2009)

Source:
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/96_abe/actions/201406/17sankourou.html

-Shinzo Abe (LDP)

-Prime Minister(2006-07, 2012-)

-He selected Maszoe as minister after 2007 upper house election.

Source: http://www.metro.tokyo.jp/GOVERNOR/greeting.htm

Case Study 2: The ideological gap between PM and minister from the upper house

-Toshimi Kitazawa (DPJ)

-Councilor(Senator) 1992-

-selected as minister of defense
(2009-11)

Source: http://kitazawa.tsukaeru.info/page/pro.html

Source: http://www.eaci.or.jp/

-Yukio Hatoyama (DPJ)

-Prime Minister (2009-10)

-He selected Kitazawa as minister after 2009 general election.

Conclusion

- I applied the combination of game theory and discrete choice, and scaling method to the problem of ministerial selection and intraparty bargaining.

- Electoral systems and chamber relationship with leadership affects intraparty bargaining and ministerial selection.
  - Under the party centered lower house, the ideological proximity to the prime minister increases the probability to join in the cabinet.
  - Under the candidate centered upper house, disloyal members are more likely to join in the cabinet.

- **<u>Candidate-centered electoral systems make ideologically heterogeneous cabinets and party-centered systems make ideologically homogeneous cabinets.</u>**

Future tasks

- 1) Theory: formalize the extensive form of game about intraparty bargaining. Consider QRE model (McKelvey and Palfrey 1995; 1998).

- 2) Method: Consider statistical analysis of strategic Interaction (Signorino 1999, 2003 ; Signorino and Yilmaz 2003; Leblang 2003).

- 3) Empirical part: expand data and conduct cross-national analysis of bicameral parliamentary democracies. The critical cases are **Australia** and **Poland**.

Cross-National Comparison
(bicameral parliamentary democracies)

	Candidate centered electoral systems			Party centered electoral systems
Upper chamber (has some power, but does not select PM)	**Japan(OLPR, SNTV)**	**Australia (STV)**	**Poland(SMD)**	Italy(CLPR)
Lower Chamber	**Poland (OLPR)**	Ireland(STV)	**Japan(SMD)** **Australia (SMD)**	**Japan(CLPR)**

Ultimate goals

- Reexamine the role of bicameralism in terms of electoral incentive and legislative-executive relations. (cf. Tsebelis (2002) focuses narrowly on the role of veto player.)

- Better understanding of the relationship between bicameralism, parliamentarism and electoral systems.

Intraparty Bargaining
and Ministerial Selection
# under Mixed Member Systems

Hiroki Kubo
Rice University
hiroki.kubo@rice.edu

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Shugart and Wattenberg (2003)

Strom et al. (2003)

Strom (2000)

I. Parliamentary Government


## II. Presidential Government

Figure 1. Delegation and accountability under parliamentary and presidential government.

Central Arguments

- Proposition 1 (Intraparty Bargaining Effects): The essence of ministerial selection process is the strategic interaction between party leadership and rank and files. Party leaders use cabinet portfolios in order to maintain party discipline and achieve their collective goals.

- Proposition 2 (Electoral System Effects): The intraparty dimension of electoral systems affects the intra party bargaining. While candidate centered electoral systems weaken the party leaders' bargaining power, party-centered electoral systems enhance it.

(Revolt or Exit)

Rank and Files

(Ignore and Not Allocate)   (Acquiesce)

Party Leadership

(Demand)   (Allocate)

Rank and Files

(Not Demand)

Who is the party "leader"? Parliamentary delegation chain

- "Dual"-chain of delegation
  - Lower House: (Voters → Lower Chamber → PM) is a typical Westminster system, government *is* the leadership
    - The party leader is **the prime minister**.
  - Upper House: (Voters → Upper Chamber) **No direct linkage to PM.** Upper Chamber party organization isautonomous from government.
    - The relationship between individual goals and **the collective party goal** are more important than relationship with the prime minister.
    - The party "leader" is an agent of the **party median.**
    - PM appoints ministers <u>selected by UH leadership.</u>