Rebel Group Emergence: Domestic Conflict and International Pressures
Outline

- Introduction
  - Research Question
  - Importance
  - Existing Answers
- Theory
  - Structural Conditions and International Forces
- Empirical Implications
- Current Progress
Research Question

- What explains the variance in the number of rebel groups in civil wars?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rebel Count</th>
<th>Observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Importance

- Number of rebel groups effects:
  - Outcomes
  - Intensity
  - Duration
Expectations

- A United Rebellion
  - Maximizes strength
  - Improves bargaining position
  - Blocks divide and conquer tactics

- Fractured Resistance
  - Goals not aligned
  - Internal conflicts
  - Credible commitment issues

- Random
Bapat and Bond (2012)

- Examines alliances between rebel groups
  - Assumes that rebels want to work together
  - Unable to because of credible commitment issues
  - Solved by foreign actors

- Do these assumptions represent reality?
  - No clear answer for when alliances would end
  - Their example is troublesome
Findley and Rudloff (2011)

- Rebel fractionalization
  - Occurs in waves at predictable times
  - Demonstrates importance of civil war dynamics
  - Challenges orthodoxy

- Is fractionalization the whole story?
  - Does not account for group emergence
  - Gives no conclusive theory on causes
My Theory

- Continue to expand bargaining theory of war
  - Information and commitment problems
  - Continuous process, doesn't end at onset
  - Complicated by N actor nature of civil war
    - Includes active rebels and latent groups

- Structural factors

- International Pressures
The Bargaining Theory of War

- War is costly, so why do states fight?
  - Information problems
  - Commitment problems

- Applied to civil war
  - Same mechanisms apply
  - Often assumes rebels as unitary actor
  - Usually not ongoing, only covers onset
Explanations for Onset

- **Greed and Grievance**
  - Potential rebels are financially motivated/constrained
  - When potential gains from rebellion are high enough, or opportunity costs low enough rebellion is more likely
  - Commodity prices often used as a measure
Concerns in the Field

- The data does not support the theory
  - Only works for natural resources which are generally controlled by the government
  - Depending on how the data is spliced all significant findings fall apart
  - State capacity is a better explanation
In C&H's Defence

- Data is the problem, not the theory
  - Commodities must be appropriate for a potential rebel
  - What is important differs regionally
  - Several case studies support the theory when regional differences are considered
  - State capacity is closely linked
Expansion to Ongoing Conflict

- Information problems seem unlikely
  - Battles have revealed resolve and capacity

- Potential sources of commitment shifts
  - Decisive or disastrous battles
  - Economic shocks
  - External intervention
Latent Groups

- While a rebel group is potentially unitary, one group can not act for all
- Latent Groups can be divided along many axes
  - Ethnic
  - Religious
  - Class
  - Tribal
  - Ideology
- They often overlap
Latent Groups Example
Emergence Game

- Three player bargaining game
  - Government(G), Rebels(R) and a Latent Group(L)
- At time t R has already rebelled
  - L has not
- G always makes an offer to L and can either make an offer to R or opt to fight
  - If given a choice, both L and R either accept the offer or fight
### Parameters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G, R, L, S</td>
<td>Players- Government, Rebels, Latent Group, Sponsor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P_R$</td>
<td>Probability the G defeats R $\epsilon[0,1]$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P_L$</td>
<td>Probability the G defeats L $\epsilon[0,1]$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P_{RL}$</td>
<td>Probability the G defeats R and L $\epsilon[0,1]$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\pi_i$</td>
<td>Offer made to R or L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$c_i$</td>
<td>Costs of fighting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_i$</td>
<td>Distribution of resources $\epsilon[0,1]$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Parameters

- Costs include economic factors as well as destruction from battle

- $P$ is a function of capability ratio
  - At time $t$ both $PR$ and $PL$ are $> .5$
  - $PRL$ can be $< .5$ but is not necessarily so

- Beta and $Pi$
  - Beta is the whole distribution of benefits
  - $Pi$ is the proportion of this that $G$ offers
Base Game
Payoffs

- (O, A, A)
  - G: $1 - O_R - O_L$
  - R: $O_R$
  - L: $O_L$

- (O, A, F)
  - G: $P_L(B_{GL}) - C_{GL} - O_R$
  - R: $O_R$
  - L: $(1-P_L)(B_{GL}) - C_L$

- (O, F, A)
  - G: $P_R(B_{GR}) - C_{GR} - O_L$
  - R: $(1-P_R)(B_{GR}) - C_R$
  - L: $O_L$

- (O, F, F)
  - G: $P_{RL}(B) - C_{GRL}$
  - R: $(1-P_R)(B_{GR}) - C_R$
  - L: $(1-P_L)(B_{GL}) - C_L$
Intuition From Base Game

- $L$ will not rebel in time $t$
  - May rebel in $t + 1$ depending on battle outcomes

- If there is any cost involved with making offers to rebel groups, $G$ will only offer when likely to be accepted
External Shock- Economic

- An exogenous downward shock in commodity prices will:
  - Decrease CL
  - Decrease either the offer G can make or G's capabilities
- If the shock is sufficiently large L will rebel
External Shock- Foreign Aid

- If given to government:
  - Increases resources, allows government to make sufficient offers more often

- If given to rebels:
  - Effect is dependent on aid type
  - Can have spillover effect from R to L, or L to R
  - Generally increases number of rebel groups
Empirical Implications

- Structural conditions may explain most variation
  - Population
  - Country Size
  - Latent Groups
    - Measurement issues
  - Conflict Length
International Pressures

- Commodity Price Shocks
  - Need to be appropriately measured
  - New data set forthcoming
    - May still not be appropriate

- Foreign Aid
  - Multiple versions of this data exist
  - Is often guess work