# Post-Conflict Elections and Recurrence of Violence

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# First post-conflict elections (PCE)




- A turning point: Former belligerents start the political process
- Foundational event: institutionalization before liberalization
- When do institution matter in generating cooperation ?

# Agenda

- Two chapters of my dissertation
  - First: What causes the conflict to recur after the first post conflict election ?
  - Second: Building a model to analyze the mechanism and condition (Main focus of this presentation)
- Brief discussion of the overall puzzle and the first chapter, since they are linked

# First post-conflict elections (PCE)

- More than half of all civil wars are the relapse of the old cases (Walter 2004, Doyle and Sambanis 2000)
- Post-conflict elections increase the risk of conflict recurrence (Collier, Hoeffler, and Sderbom 2008; Paris 2004)

**Why/When are PCEs risky events?**

# First post-conflict elections (PCE)

Why are PCEs risky ?

- New area of study
- Case studies: Disarmament of combatants key before holding the elections (Lyons 2005)
- Timing matters: Recent empirical works show that PCEs held within one year are risky (Brancati & Snyder, 2012; Flores & Nooruddin, 2012)

# The Puzzle

- But the effect of timing may be spurious
- Risk of conflict recurrence is highest during the early years after the conflict, irrespective of an election (Collier, Hoefler and Soderbom 2008; Snyder 2000; Fearon and Laitin 2003)
- Therefore, the main puzzle is
  controlling for time, what other factors make the elections risky?
- Rather than structural factors, I take the rational choice approach and examine the Strategic decision making of the groups/parties involved in choosing to fight after contending in the first PCE.

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# Past works

**Why fight?**

- Why do actors choose the suboptimal fight option rather than peaceful negotiations?
- Literature:
  - Pull: limited information on capabilities and coordination problem in allocating resources (Fearon 1995; Hirshleifer, 2000)
  - Push: lack of credible commitment to peace and therefore better off defecting (Powell 2006)

# The puzzle

- Furthermore, the war equilibrium model by Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007:680) suggests,
  - Both sides have the best utility in choosing to fight, rather than any other alternative, **whether they are in fighting state, or in settlement state short of decisive outcome** (also Leventoglu & Slantchev, 2007)

Restating the puzzle: Can electoral institution build cooperation and change war equilibrium to peaceful equilibrium ?

# Theory building

- External third parties help by minimizing the credible commitment problem (Walter 1999)
- Elections should work in similar way
- Electoral functions are important predictors of stability in two ways.
  - First, elections provide incentives of political power against the high cost of war
  - Second, elections provide an integral mechanism of third party arbitration for the belligerents since the outcome of elections is dependent on the civilian mass rather than the opponent; Self-enforcing democracy (Fearon 2011)
- **But an election loses its utility when it is rigged**

# Pre-election violence

Violent events in Sierra Leone, 2000/05-2001/05



Violent events in Sierra Leone, 2001/05-2002/05 before elections

Violent events in Mali, 1990/04-1991/04



Violent events in Mali, 1991/04-1992/04 before elections



Legend

- <20 civilian fatalities
- 20-40 civilian fatalities
- 40-60 civilian fatalities

# Theory

- Two main election irregularities: Pre-election violence and fraud
- Post-conflict elections are more vulnerable to such manipulations (Mason and Crane 1989; Weidmann and Callen 2013)
- Fraud by incumbents and pre-election violence by oppositions (Schdler 2002)

# Theory

- Electoral misconducts serve as the basis for the conflict recurrence on following three grounds.
  - First, fraudulent elections and pre-electoral violence serve as barrier to information regarding true popular support, and provides incentive for the losing party to seek violent path
  - Second, as a result of electoral misconduct and the uncertainty, the self-enforcing mechanism of the election, where the people act as the neutral arbiter, loses its meaning
  - Third, electoral misconducts lower the legitimacy of the incumbent, and the opposition can capitalize on it by challenging the weak incumbent on numerous problematic issues (Riker, 1982, pp. 206209; Beaulieu 2014)

# Theory

*H1: As the incidence of pre-electoral violence in the first PCE increases, there should be higher likelihood for conflict recurrence.*

*H2: As the incidence of electoral fraud in the first PCE increases, there should be higher likelihood for conflict recurrence.*

# Moving Ahead

- But, extent of electoral malpractice and the opposition allegation can also be subjective

The New York Times

ASIA PACIFIC | NYT NOW

## Candidate Says Recordings Show Afghan Election Was Rigged

By AZAM AHMED JUNE 22, 2014

KABUL, Afghanistan — One of the candidates in Afghanistan's disputed presidential election released on Sunday what his campaign said were recordings of phone calls in which a top election official, other election officials and aides of a rival candidate speak about stuffing ballot boxes and rigging the vote.

- Modeling the condition:
  **Under what conditions do electoral malpractices risk the sustainability of electoral institutions?**

# Model

## Mechanism and Condition

When do election irregularities lead to violence?

# EITM Framework

Step 1: Strategic decisionmaking concept and nominal choice

Step 2: Bayesian information update model and duration model to test the prediction

Step 3: Unify the two

# Model

## Two player sequential game: Incomplete information

Players 1 and 2 contend first elections after the end of an armed conflict

# Model

- Player 1's type is either
  - Committed to peace
  - Not committed to peace
- Player 1 knows its type and player 2 has prior belief, p
- Player 1 wins the election either by using **electoral malpractice M or fairly ∼M**
- Using the signal M or ∼M, Player 2 updates its belief about 1's type and chooses one of the following actions
  - Fight or challenge F
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# Model-Payoffs

- $s_1$ and $s_2$ are the shares of popular support for 1 & 2: $s_1 + s_2 = 1$
- When using M, Player 1 gains power/share m that 2 loses
- Both 1 & 2 incur cost from fighting
  - When 1 wins using M, then the expected cost for fighting for 1 is higher ($C_{H1}$), than if it wins fairly –not using M, ($C_{L1}$)
  - For 2, cost of challenging or fighting peaceful type player 1 is less since 2's demands are likely to be addressed more easily ($C_{L2}$), compared to when player 1 is **not** committed to peace that is ready to fight harder ($C_{H2}$)
- $d_2$ is player 2's demands for which it chooses to challenge or fight

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# Model: The Game Tree



# Theory-Propositions

- *Separating Equilibria*
  Player 2 chooses F when 1 plays M and $c_{H2} > c_{L2}$

- *Pooling Equilibria:*
  Player 2 chooses F when 1 plays $\sim$M and

$$c_{H2} < s_2 + \frac{d_2 - p_{CL}}{1 - p}$$

- *Semi- pooling Equilibria:*

  When the cost of fighting is higher, Player 2 chooses A even when 1 plays M

  (Discuss Proofs)

# Equilibria predictions



# Hypotheses

*H3: Low cost of conflict after the first post-conflict elections should increase the risk of conflict recurrence*

*H4: High cost of conflict after the first post-conflict elections should lower the risk of conflict recurrence*

*H5:When the cost of conflict is between the low and high extreme, election irregularities should increase the risk of conflict recurrence*

# Data and Methods

- All post conflict elections 1950-2010
- Minimalist definition of armed conflict 25 or more battle related deaths per year
- PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset & National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) (Hyde & Marinov, 2012).
- Event history analysis (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004)

# Data and Methods

- **Dependent Variable:**

  conflict recurrence after PCE

- **Main explanatory variables:**

  Electoral malpractice (pre-election violence and fraud),
  cost of past conflict (Battle deaths & duration),

  past conflict outcomes (negotiated settlement and victory)

- **Control variables:**

  number of years after end of conflict when the election held,
  population,
  lagged GDP,
  cold war period,

  presence of UN peacekeeping

# Preliminary Findings

- Cost of the prior civil war significant factor in player 2's decision not to challenge incumbent (H3)
- There is less likelihood of conflict recurrence after PR elections compared to Majoritarian elections (H6)
- Not significant: Cost of the prior civil war has similar pacifying effect for negotiated settlements (H4)
- Future work: Margins and conflict recurrence

# Preliminary Findings

- Both pre-election violence and electoral fraud significant predictor of conflict recurrence (H1 & H2)






# Equilibria predictions

| VARIABLES | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pre-election vio | 1.75*** | 1.69*** | 1.60*** |
| | (4.14) | (3.93) | (3.66) |
| Low Cost | 0.63** | | |
| | (1.97) | | |
| High Cost | | -2.59** | |
| | | (-2.22) | |
| Victory | 0.14 | 0.19 | 0.42 |
| | (0.24) | (0.32) | (0.71) |
| PR | 0.46 | 0.53 | 0.58 |
| | (1.23) | (1.46) | (1.47) |
| Monitors | -0.62 | -0.53 | -0.55 |
| | (-1.60) | (-1.36) | (-1.33) |
| Years after conflict | -0.07* | -0.05 | -0.05 |
| | (-1.68) | (-1.16) | (-1.32) |
| Logpop | 0.72*** | 0.84*** | 0.61*** |
| | (3.34) | (3.54) | (2.99) |
| Lag GDP | -0.55*** | -0.65*** | -0.48*** |
| | (-3.25) | (-3.79) | (-2.97) |
| UN peacekeeping | 0.43 | 0.77 | 0.22 |
| | (0.64) | (1.42) | (0.33) |
| Incompatibility | -0.38 | -0.48 | -0.41 |
| | (-0.79) | (-0.98) | (-0.81) |
| Region | -0.10 | -0.04 | -0.16 |
| | (-0.75) | (-0.28) | (-1.04) |
| Constant | -3.74** | -3.48** | -2.74 |
| | (-2.25) | (-2.07) | (-1.53) |
| Observations | 1,329 | 1,329 | 1,252 |
| ll | -97.03 | -92.58 | -96.00 |
| chi2 | 50.61*** | 50.71*** | 42.22*** |

Robust z-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

# Equilibria predictions



# Implications and future

- Shadow of the future and the role of institution
- Other ways to impose cost from outside? Will they work ?

# Challenges

- Building the model
- Probabilities of conflict recurrence associated with cost both from theoretical equilibria and empirics
- Robustness: Other model specifications? Cubic splines?

# Preliminary Findings

CONCLUSION