Constitutional Foundations of Military Coups

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Puzzle

• Military Coup Literature
  – Region Studies
    • Africa
    • Latin America
  – Cross Country Studies
    • Lack of constitutional design variable

• Democratic Breakdown Literature (Perils-of-Presidentialism)
  – Neglect political influence of military in a world outside of established democracies
  – Mostly fail to distinguish between different types of breakdowns
  – Only focus on democratic countries
    • 1950-2006 (excluding fully authoritarian states like kingdoms): 91 military coup occurred, only about 20 of them were in democratic countries.
Does Constitutional Design Matter?

• Endogenous Explanation:
  – Mechanism in “Perils of Presidentialism” (Linz 1978);
    • Fixed term rule
    • Winner takes all
    • Dual legitimacy
  – Horowitz (1990), Mainwaring and Shugart (1997), Shugart and Carey (1992), Stephan and Skach (1993), Cheibub and Limongi (2002) and so on...

• Exogenous Explanation:
  – Military Legacy (Cheibub, 2007)

• Criticisms to Exogenous Explanation: (Sing 2012, Maeda 2012)

• Different Theoretical Approach:
  – Discussing the inherent features of parliamentarism.

• Mechanism proposed here;
  – Military Elites’ influence on political decision making, particularly during government formation processes in developing world
  – Inherent features of parliamentarism makes military elites even more influential.
Theoretical Framework

- **Inherent features** of parliamentary systems give *alternative options* to the military, which are less costly, so that they do not need to conduct a coup, but they get what they want.
  - Inherent features
    - possibility of coalition governments
    - early government terminations
    - vote of no confidence
  - Alternative option
    - threatening the political arena and creating an ideologically desirable government from the parliament.

- **Such a threatening possibility is not a best option for the military in presidential systems because**
  - There is no vote of confidence rule, and impeachment procedure is highly costly.
    - Nevertheless, impeachment occurs and military uses this procedure as a new mechanism that replaces the military coups in Latin America. (Perez Linan 2007)
  - Resignation of a chief executive will require new elections or constitutionally mandated successor to be chief executive
Civil-Military Conflict of Turkey in 1997 and Egypt in 2013

• Parliamentary Vs. Nonparliamentary

• Several similarities
  – Culture and demography
  – Islamist movements and parties
    • National Outlook and Muslim Brotherhood
    • Welfare Party and Freedom and Justice Party
  – Success of Islamist movements and military’s reaction
  – Economy and social classes
  – Military prerogatives (economy and judiciary)
  – Historical circumstances
Civil-Military Conflict of Turkey in 1997 and Egypt in 2013

- Military’s response in Turkey: Threatening
  - Prime minister resigned
  - 37 legislators of a coalition party resigned and joined to another party
  - New coalition was formed and the military’s reaction settled down.

- Military’s response in Egypt: Coup
  - The above strategy is less costly.
  - Why Egyptian military did not use it?
EITM Framework

• Theoretical and statistical concepts:
  – Decision-making
  – Discrete choice (to conduct a coup or not)

• Theoretical and statistical analogues:
  – Game-theoretic bargaining model, Utility maximization
  – Probit and Survival Model (in both cases dep. var. is binary)

• Unifying analogues
  – Military elites will decide to conduct a coup, or not to do so, depending on the opportunities the constitutional design provides, and other actors’ strategies.
Actors and Their Possible Choices

• Chief Executive
  – Acquiescence to the Military Ideology
  – Not Acquiescence to the Military Ideology

• Military
  – Coup
  – Threaten the Politicians
  – Nothing

• Chief Executive
  – Resign
  – Not Resign

• Parliament
  – Dismiss the Chief Executive
  – Not Dismiss the Chief Executive
Notations for the Bargaining Model

A: The payoff chief executive receives when he pursues her own policies in office.

x: The cost chief executive pays when he acquiesces.

B: The payoff military elites receive when they pursue their own policies.

P: The payoff parliament aggregately receives in case there is no exogenous intervention

c_e: The cost chief executive pays when faces military coup.

c_m: The cost of conducting military coup.

c_p: The cost parliament pays when faces military coup.

t_e: The cost chief executive pays when faces threat and pressure for resignation by military.

t_m: The cost of threatening and pressuring to change the government composition. \( t_m < c_m \)

t_p: The cost parliament pays when faces threat and pressure from military for resignation of chief executive, but does not (need to) dismiss chief executive

d_e: The cost chief executive pays when dismissed by the parliament \( d_e > t_e \)

d_m: The cost military pays when the parliament is forced to dismiss the chief executive

d_p: The cost parliament pays when dismisses chief executive due to military pressure \( d_p = l_p n \)

l_p: Parliament’s level of loyalty to democratically elected chief executive

n: Number of legislators necessary to be persuaded to dismiss the chief executive
Bargaining Between Military and Chief Executive
\((I_p \cdot n) > t_p\) (Presidential Systems)
(l_p n) < t_p (Parliamentary Systems)
Hypotheses

• H1: Parliamentary systems are less prone to military coups.

• H2: Parliamentary systems allow more elite influence on politics in between elections. (will be tested in future)
Data and Method

• Years: 1960-2006

• Number of countries: 125
  – (57 parliamentary, 68 presidential or semipresidential)

• Unit of analysis: regime years

• Method:
  – Probit
  – Survival Model (Cox Proportional Hazard Rate)
Dependent Variable

• Military coup: it takes value of 1 if a coup occurred at a country in a given year, 0 otherwise

• Definition: “illegal and overt attempt by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive that provides at least 7 days of ruling power to the perpetrators” (Powell and Thyne 2011)

• Aim is resignation of chief executive

• Incoming chief executive does not need to be a general
Independent Variables

- Parliamentarism: takes value of 1 if a system is parliamentary, 0 otherwise. Obtained from Gerring et al. (2009)
- Log of GDP per capita (lagged for one year)
- Change in the GDP
- Change in military expenditure
- Log of number of military personnel
- Soldier quality (which is calculated through dividing military expenditure by the number of soldiers)
- Military legacy
- Authoritarian dummy
Results

Survival Estimate Graph

Kaplan-Meier survival estimate

percent survival

analysis time

95% CI
Survivor function
Results

Survival Estimate Graph by Constitutional Design

Kaplan-Meier survival estimates
Results

Survival Estimate Graph by Constitutional Design (Excluding Consolidated Democracies)
# Multivariate Analyses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>Probit Polity IV 6 to 10</th>
<th>Probit Polity IV 0 to 9</th>
<th>Probit Polity IV -5 to 9</th>
<th>Probit Polity IV 0 to 9</th>
<th>Duration Model No SemiPres</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>-0.44*</td>
<td>-0.43**</td>
<td>-0.74***</td>
<td>-0.88**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.318)</td>
<td>(0.247)</td>
<td>(0.209)</td>
<td>(0.269)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Change in GDP</td>
<td>-2.93</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>-0.69</td>
<td>-0.86</td>
<td>-1.09</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.014)</td>
<td>(1.636)</td>
<td>(1.042)</td>
<td>(1.786)</td>
<td>(1.641)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Change in Mil. Exp.</td>
<td>-0.36</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.27*</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.359)</td>
<td>(0.142)</td>
<td>(0.077)</td>
<td>(0.162)</td>
<td>(0.137)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Soldier Quality</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>-0.35***</td>
<td>-0.47***</td>
<td>-0.36***</td>
<td>-0.35***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.121)</td>
<td>(0.109)</td>
<td>(0.077)</td>
<td>(0.162)</td>
<td>(0.137)</td>
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<td>Log Mil. Personnel</td>
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<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.12</td>
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<td>(0.065)</td>
<td>(0.073)</td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
<td>(0.098)</td>
<td>(0.075)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Log GDPPC(lagged)</td>
<td>-0.44**</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.201)</td>
<td>(0.213)</td>
<td>(0.166)</td>
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<td>Authoritarian</td>
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<td>-0.40*</td>
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<td>(0.229)</td>
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<td>Military Legacy</td>
<td>-0.62**</td>
<td>-0.94***</td>
<td>-0.88***</td>
<td>-1.13***</td>
<td>-1.26***</td>
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<td>(0.277)</td>
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<td>(0.206)</td>
<td>(0.289)</td>
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<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.78***</td>
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<td>(0.993)</td>
<td>(1.285)</td>
<td>(0.975)</td>
<td>(1.572)</td>
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<td>Observations</td>
<td>1,779</td>
<td>1,148</td>
<td>1,448</td>
<td>893</td>
<td>2,788</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Post-Estimation Graphs

The solid line represents presidential systems and dashed line represents parliamentary systems.
Conclusion

- This study aimed to make two contributions to the literature:
  - Theoretically
    - Proposed an alternative theory in regards to how military elites are influential in political decision making process and how this may change the probability of coups.
    - Challenges the superiority of parliamentary systems as demonstrated by Linz. (“Parliamentarism provides a more flexible and adaptable institutional context for the establishment and consolidation of democracy.” Linz 1990)
  - Empirically
    - Examines a data on military coups which has not been tested before.
Future Research

• Quantitative analysis introducing a variable for electoral rules.

• Direct way to test the influence of elites on government formation (H2).

• Collect data on military’s influence on the government formation and termination.