Below is sample research that either applies the EITM framework or provides background in formal analysis, empirical tests, and methodology in general.

Achen, C. H. 1983. “Toward Theories of Data: The State of Political Methodology.” In Political Science: The State of the Discipline, ed. A. Finifter. Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association. 

Achen, Christopher H., 2002. "Toward a New Political Methodology: Microfoundations and ART.” Annual Review of Political Science 5: 423-450. 

Achen, C. H. 2005. “Let's Put Garbage-Can Regressions and Garbage-Can Probits Where They Belong.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 22:327”339. 

Achen, C. H. 2006. “Expressive Bayesian Voters, their Turnout Decisions, and Double Probit: Empirical Implications of a Theoretical Model.” Typescript. Princeton University.

Aldrich, J., Alt, J. 2003. “Introduction to the Special Issue on Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models.” Political Analysis, 11(4): 309-315.  

Aldrich, J. H., J. E. Alt, and A. Lupia. 2008. “The EITM Approach: Origins and Interpretations.” In The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology, eds. J. M. Box Steffensmeier, H. E. Brady, and D. Collier. New York: Oxford University Press. Pages 828-843. 

Alesina, A., Rosenthal, H., 1995. Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy. Cambridge University Press, New York. 

Anderson, S. P., Goeree, J. K., Holt, C. A. 2002. The Logit Equilibrium: A Perspective on Intuitive Behavioral Anomalies.” Southern Economic Journal 69(1): 21-47.  

Arrow, K. J. 1948. “Mathematical Models in the Social Sciences.” In Advances in Experimental Psychology, eds. D. Lerner and H. D. Lasswell. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 

Banks, J. S., Kiewiet, D. R. 1989. “Explaining Patterns of Candidate Competition in Congressional Elections.” American Journal of Political Science 33(4): 997-1015. 

Black, G. S. 1972. "A Theory of Political Ambition: Career Choices and the Role of Structural Incentives." American Political Science Review 66(1): 144‑59.  

Blais, A., Achen, C. H. 2011. “Taking Civic Duty Seriously: Political Theory and Voter Turnout.” Working Paper.  Box-Steffensmeier, J. M., H. E. Brady, and D. Collier., eds. 2008. The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology. New York: Oxford University Press. 

Boyd, R., Richerson, P. J. 1985. “Culture and the Evolutionary Process.” The University of Chicago Press.  
Cagan, P. 1956. "The Monetary Dynamics of Hyperinflation". In Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money, Friedman, Milton (ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 

Chamley, C.P., 2004. Rational Herds: Economic Models of Social Learning. Cambridge University Press, New York. 

Clarke, H., Granato, J. 2004. “Autocorrelation: From Practice to Theory.” In K. Kampf-Leonard (ed.), Encyclopedia of Social Measurement. San Diego: Academic Press. 

Eckel, Catherine C., and Rick Wilson, 2004. Is Trust a Risky Decision? Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 55: 447-465. 

Evans, G.W., Honkapohja, S., 2001. Learning and Expectations in Macroeconomics. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. 

Farmer, J. D., and D. Foley. 2009. “The Economy Needs Agent-based Modelling.” Nature 460: 685-686. 
Fey, M., McKelvey, R. D., Palfrey, T. R. 1996. “An Experimental Study of the Constant-Sum Centipede Game.” International Journal of Game Theory 25(3): 269-87. 

Friedman, M., and A. Schwartz. 1991. “Appendix: A Cautionary Tale about Multiple Regressions.” American Economic Review 81: 48-49. 

Gabaix, X., and D. Laibson. 2008. “The Seven Properties of Good Models.” In The Foundations of Positive and Normative Economics: A Handbook, eds. A. Caplin and A. Schotter. New York: Oxford University Press. Pages 292-299. 

Gerber, A. S., Green, D. P., Larimer, C. W. 2008. Social Pressure and Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment. American Political Science Review 102(1): 33-48.  

Granato, J., M.C.S.Wong. 2004. “Political Campaign Advertising Dynamics.” Political Research Quarterly, 57(3): 349-361. 

Granato, J., M. Lo., M.C.S.Wong. 2010b. “A Framework for Unifying Formal and Empirical Analysis.” American Journal of Political Science 54, 3: 783-797. 

Granato, J., M. Lo, M.C.S. Wong. 2011. “Modeling and Testing the Diffusion of Expectations: An EITM Approach.” Electoral Studies. 30: 389-398.

Granato, J., F. Scioli. 2004. “Puzzles, Proverbs, and Omega Matrices: The Scientific and Social Consequences of the Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models (EITM).” Perspectives on Politics 2: 313-323.

Habyarimana, J., Humphreys, M., Posner, D., Weinstein, J. 2007. "Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision? An Experimental Approach." American Political Science Review 101(04): 709-725.

Haney, Patrick J., Roberta Q. Herzberg, and Rick K. Wilson, 1992. Advice and Consent: Unitary Actors, Advisory Models, and Experimental Tests. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 36(4): 603-633.

Imai, K., Keele, L., Tingley, D., Yamamoto, T. 2011. “Unpacking the Black Box of Causality: Learning about Causal Mechanisms from Experimental and Observational Studies.'' American Political Science Review, 105(4):765-789.  

Jasso, Guillermina, 2010. Linking Individuals and Societies. Journal of Mathematical Sociology. 34 (1): 1-51. 

Jasso, Guillermina, 2008. A New Unified Theory of Sociobehavioral Forces. European Sociological Review 24:411-434.

Kedar, Orit, 2005. When Moderate Voters Prefer Extreme Parties: Policy Balancing in Parliamentary Elections. American Political Science Review. 99 (2): 185-199.

Krehbiel, K. 1988. “Spatial Models of Legislative Choice.” Legislative Studies Quarterly, 13(3): 259-319.

Leamer, E. 1983. “Let's Take the 'Con' Out of Econometrics.” American Economic Review 73: 31-43.

Levine, D. K., Palfrey, T. R. 2007. The Paradox of Voter Participation? A Laboratory Study.” American Political Science Review 101(1): 143-58. 

Lin, T-m. 1999. “The Historical Significance of Economic Voting, 1872-1996.” Social Science History 23: 561-591. 

Lucas, R.E., Jr., 1972. “Expectations and the Neutrality of Money.” Journal of Economic Theory 4, 103”124. 

Lucas, R.E., Jr., 1973. “Some International Evidence on Output-Inflation Tradeoffs.” American Economic Review 63, 326-334. 

Lucas, R. E., Jr. 1976. “Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique.” Carnegie-Rochester Conference on Public Policy 1: 19-46. 

Lucas, R. E. Jr., 1993. “Making a Miracle.” Econometrica 61(2): 251-272. 

McCallum, Bennett T., 1983. "On non-uniqueness in rational expectations models: An attempt at perspective," Journal of Monetary Economics 11(2): 139-168.  

McElrath R., Boyd, R. 2007. Mathematical Models of Social Evolution. A Guide for the Perplexed. The University of Chicago Press.  

McKelvey, R. D., and T. R. Palfrey. 1995. “Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games.” Games and Economic Behavior 10: 6-38. 

McKelvey, R. D., Palfrey, T. R. 1992. “An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game.” Econometrica 60: 803-836. 

McKelvey, R. D., Palfrey, T. R. 1998. “Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games.” Experimental Economics 1: 9-41. 

McKelvey, R. D., Ordeshook, P. C. 1982. “An Experimental Test of Cooperative Solution Theory for Normal Form Games.” In Peter C. Ordeshook and Kenneth A. Shepsle (eds.), Political Equilibrium. Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff. 

Morton, R. B. 1999. Methods and Models: A Guide to the Empirical Analysis of Formal Models in Political Science. New York: Cambridge University Press. 

Morton, R., Williams, K. C. 2010. Experimental Political Science and the Study of Causality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  

Palfrey, T. R., Rosenthal, H. 1985. “Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty.” American Political Science Review 79(1): 62-78. 

Poteete, A. R., M . A. Janssen, and E. Ostrom. 2009. Multiple Methods in Practice: Collective Action and the Commons. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 

Riker, W. H. 1962. The Theory of Political Coalitions. New Haven: Yale University Press. 

Riker, W. H. 1967. “Bargaining in a Three-Person Game.” American Political Science Review 61(3): 642-656. 

Riker, W. H. 1983. “Political Theory and the Art of Heresthetics.” In Political Science: The State of the Discipline, ed. A. W. Finifter. Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association. 

Riker, William H., and Peter C. Ordeshook. 1968. “A Theory of the Calculus of Voting.” American Political Science Review 62(1): 25‑42.  

Rohde, David W. 1979. “Risk‑bearing and Progressive Ambition: The Case of the United States House of Representatives.” American Journal of Political Science 23(1): 1‑26. 

Sargent, T. 1993. Bounded Rationality in Macroeconomics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 

Shively, W. P. 2010. The Craft of Political Research, 8th ed. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall. 

Signorino, C. S. 1999. “Strategic Interaction and the Statistical Analysis of International Conflict.” American Political Science Review 93: 279-297. 

Signorino, C. S. 2003. “Structure and Uncertainty in Discrete Choice Models.” Political Analysis 11(4): 316-344. 

Simon, C. P., Blume, L. 1994. Mathematics for Economists. New York: Norton.  

Wagner, R. H. 2001. “Who's Afraid of 'Rational Choice Theory'?” Department of Government, University of Texas. Typescript. 

Whitten-Woodring, J., James, P. 2012. “Fourth Estate or Mouthpiece? A Formal Model of Media, Protest, and Government Repression.” Political Communication 29(2): 113-136. 

Ziliak, S. T., and D. N. McCloskey. 2008. The Cult of Statistical Significance: How the Standard Error Cost Us Jobs, Justice, and Lives. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.