No. 2999: HANNIBAL'S GRAND STRATEGY
Today, Hannibal at the gates. The Honors College at the University of Houston presents this program about the machines that make our civilization run, and the people whose ingenuity created them.
Antiquity is united in declaring Hannibal of Carthage one of the greatest generals of all time. Anyone can conjure up the image of Hannibal crossing the Alps, trudging up mountain passes with masses of men, pack animals, and elephants. His reputation as a tactical genius remains; but was he also a strategic genius? In other words, what was the real plan in crossing those Alps?
Take a closer look at northern Italy in those days, and the strategy makes sense. Up north along the Po River, the peoples settled there weren't Italic tribes at all, but Celts — or Gauls, as the Romans called them. They were relatives of those Gauls on the other side of the Alps, and they had only recently been brought under Roman rule. Many of them still hated the Romans, as Hannibal knew. And the Greeks and other peoples living to the south of Rome werenít much happier.
So the strategy was to cross into Italy and declare himself the liberator of Rome's allies. Hannibal's tactical genius allowed him to inflict heavy defeats on the Romans right away, most notably at Lake Trasimene in 217 BC. His ambush and annihilation there of an entire Roman army with its Consul was a staggering blow, causing panic in Rome. A year later at Cannae, Hannibal's astounding victory over the largest Roman army ever mustered gave further reason for Rome's allies to break away. In neighboring Greece, the King of Macedon was so impressed he made an alliance with Hannibal. So in these early stages, it seems Hannibal knew what he was doing by turning his tactical brilliance into strategic momentum. More victories meant more allies, and a good chance of breaking the Roman alliance system apart.
Hannibal of Carthage. Photo Credit:Wikimedia Commons
The Romans eventually learned that facing Hannibal on the battlefield was not the way to win: harassment, not decisive engagement could turn this into a war of attrition, a war that Rome could definitely win. Time and hunger would fritter away Hannibalís army; meanwhile the Romans turned to punishing their defecting allies. Once the allies saw Hannibal was powerless to defend them, the defectors fell back in lineóor faced liquidation.
In the end, procrastination proved to be the best option for dealing with Hannibal; they simply put off the decisive battle until they could fight it on his home turf in Africa, which they did at Zama in 202 BC. So Hannibalís grand strategy failed, though as a tactical commander, he left Italy undefeated. The Romans bested him only once in a major battle. But strategically speaking, once was enough.
Iím Richard Armstrong at the University of Houston, where weíre interested in the way inventive minds work.
Hoyos, Dexter. 2008. Hannibal: Romeís Greatest Enemy. Liverpool UP.
For more background on Hannibalís family and the Carthaginian state, see:
Hoyos, Dexter. 2003. Hannibalís Dynasty: Power and Politics in the Western Mediterranean, 247-183 BC. Routledge.
And for a good, brisk narrative of the Punic Wars generally, see:
Hoyos, Dexter. 2015. Mastering the West: Rome and Carthage at War. Oxford UP.
A nice schematic discussion of the possible routes Hannibal took through the Alps can be read here: http://www.livius.org/person/hannibal-3-barca/hannibal-in-the-alps/
This episode was first aired on March 20, 2015