ABSTRACT

Much discussion of democratization seems to assume that allowing the citizens to shape public policy is one of the costs, rather than one of the benefits, of introducing a new democracy. Yet, a principal claim of democracy is to connect the desires of citizens and the actions of policymakers. Moreover, institutionalized citizen influence may help constrain elite exploitation and encourage citizen support. If that were a serious goal of democratization, how might it be affected by differences in the design of democratic institutions? This essay considers: (a) the conceptual problem of aggregating citizen’s preferences into policymaking influence; (b) what we know about the role of two critical institutional arrangements—election rules and decision rules—in shaping citizen influence in established, stabilized democracies; (c) some elements in a research agenda for analyzing the establishment of such connections in newly democratizing systems.
Institutional Design, Citizens’ Preferences and Policymaking

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Much discussion of democratization seems to assume that allowing the citizens to shape public policy is one of the costs, rather than one of the benefits, of introducing democracy. Citizens are apparently too short sighted to endure the dislocations of economic transitions from authoritarian dominated economies, too enamored of welfare expenditures to support economic investment, too susceptible to populist “quick fixes” to control inflation, guarantee property rights, or even sustain civil freedoms. Institutional design needs to insulate policy makers from citizens, rather than create connections to them, needs to combine the virtues of guardianship with the symbols of democracy.

Yet, one of the primary justifications for a democratic political system is that it provides institutional arrangements, above all genuinely competitive elections, that will enable the wishes of the citizens to prevail in making public policy. Democracy and guardianship are, philosophically, very different types of political systems. There is scattered evidence, moreover, that in new democracies as in old ones, guardians too easily confuse self-interest and public interest, while average citizens have unexpected capacities to demonstrate patience, learn perspective on their long term interests and penetrate elite smoke-screens. In some cases the successful establishment of institutions for genuine citizen influence on policy making is apparently not a luxury, but a necessity to complete a transition to a consolidated democracy and a competitive economy. (See especially Hellman 1998.)

My goal in this paper is to discuss a research agenda for studying the effects of institutional arrangements on the citizen-policymaker connection in democratizing countries. I shall just assume for my purposes that strong connections are desirable, both intrinsically and for the net public policy outcomes. Whether the latter is in fact so, is another research issue. I shall organize the discussion in the following way. (1) I shall briefly discuss the conceptual issues involved in connecting citizens’ preferences with what policymakers do, trying to recognize the difficulties and suggest some ways around them; (2) I shall review some recent work on how election rules and decision rules shape these connections in the established democracies of the economically developed world; (3) I shall suggest some of the things we need to know about the effects of institutions in the social and political contexts of the newly democratizing countries–some elements in a research agenda.

Conceptualizing Citizens’ Preferences and Policy Connections

Analyzing the desirable connections between what citizens want and what policymakers do is a very difficult problem, particularly if we want to assess the success of different institutional designs in achieving such connections. It is difficult both theoretically and empirically. I cannot in this brief paper adequately address all the issues involved. (For more extensive discussions see
Huber and Powell 1994, and Powell 2000.) The existing empirical literature, especially the
literature on representation, has taken basically two general approaches. The first assumes that
citizens’ votes are appropriate measures of their preferences and that desirable connections
between citizens and policymakers are those which maximize some measure of responsiveness to
voting behavior. The very large literature on the effect of election rules on vote-seat
(dis)proportionality of legislative party representation (eg. Rae 1967, Gallagher 1991, Lijphart
1994) takes this approach. It can be extended to link votes to governments, chief executives, or
influential policymakers. (See Powell 2000, Ch. 5-6, and the references therein. Also see Pinto-
Dushinsky 1999 and Powell 1999.)

This approach has the virtue of beginning with citizens’ behavioral revelation of a vital
implication of their preferences and allowing the citizen to deal with the problem of aggregating
all the different kinds of issues he or she cares about. However, as I have shown elsewhere,
(Powell 2000, Ch. 6,) different normative assumptions lead to quite different empirical measures
of responsiveness. For example, majoritarians care little about vote-seat correspondence as long
as vote winners are given control of policy making.

An even more serious difficulty is that votes are doubtful measures of citizens’ preferences,
especially when making comparisons across different electoral rules and party systems, because
citizens can only choose from among the candidate or party choices given to them. Citizens may
vote for a party or candidate because it is the best of several unpalatable alternatives or as a
nearly random pick among equally desirable parties. What if many voters are nearly indifferent
among several parties with relatively similar positions on the spectrum--but feel quite estranged
from a large party far away from them? The latter might win a plurality if the similar parties split
the vote; yet we feel intuitively that it would be wrong to include such a party in government,
while excluding the slightly smaller parties that are substantively close to lots of voters. To deal
with these problems, (as well as issues raised by strategic voting,) we need direct evidence of
citizens’ preferences, not just voting outcomes.

The second major body of empirical literature uses public opinion surveys to measure the
preferences of citizens and compares these to the positions of policymakers (or, more rarely,
specific policies or policy outcomes.) The classic study of Miller and Stokes 1964 on linkages
between constituents and representatives in the US Congress has been extended in a variety of
ways (eg. Barnes 1977; Converse and Pierce 1986; Dalton 1985, Manion 1996) that help
elucidate how different election rules and party systems help shape the connections. Work on the
policy consequences of party manifestos or spatial positions has linked parties to policy
consequences.

While these studies have the tremendous virtue of beginning with citizen’s own reports of
their preferences, they raise immediately the difficulty of accuracy of the surveys, the
comparability of issues across different systems and, more fundamentally, of the linking of
positions on different political issues.. Public policy in any large society covers an enormous
range of possible activities. Different societies have different needs and different traditions.
Even within the same country different citizens care about different issues. Moreover, many citizens will be uninformed about the details of policy issues and the reasonableness of different alternatives. Which issues, which formulations and which combinations shall we choose to compare?

Except for the sheer scale of modern polities, there is nothing new about this situation. Political philosophers have worried about the ignorance of the average citizen on specialized policy issues for over 2000 years. The general answer they propose is that citizens are not expected to know about the details of specific issues and programs. Rather, they are supposed to give general direction to policy, to steer the ship of state, not to run it. (See, e.g. Cohen 1971.) Following this line of thought transforms the problem of identifying citizen’s detailed policy preferences into identifying their stance towards a general policy direction in the discourse of his or her society. Ideally, we should like the citizen himself or herself to identify this general policy stance, taking account of all the various issues in which he or she is interested. We need, however, a comparable language of policy discourse.

If the language of discourse has the property of mapping most of the specific issues onto a single dimension, this will also solve a serious theoretical problem. For, social choice theory seems to demonstrate that the preferences of citizens may well be collectively uninterpretable if they form more than one dimension. Regardless of the distribution of preferences or the relative weight that citizens assign to the different dimensions, there is no single position that the majority prefers to all other positions. Indeed, a process of sequentially pitting one position against another can lead to almost any outcome (McKelvey, 1976, 1979.) Thus, it becomes conceptually problematic to evaluate one outcome as more congruent with citizen preferences than another. This theoretical result has led some important theorists to be doubtful of the conceptual possibility of linking citizens’ preferences to policy outcomes (Schumpeter 1942; Riker 1982a). If the various political issues can be mapped onto a single dimension, however, then there is a preferred position. The position of the median voter is the only one preferred to all others by a majority of voters. It also is the position that minimizes the number of opposing voters.

The availability of a meaningful, unidimensional language of political discourse allows us

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1Riker puts this very firmly: “The populist interpretation of voting (i.e., that what the people, as a corporate entity, want ought to be public policy) cannot stand because it is inconsistent with social choice theory. If the outcomes of voting are, or may be, inaccurate or meaningless amalgamations, what the people want cannot be known. Hence the populist goal is unattainable.” (Riker 1982a, xviii.)
unambiguously to determine whether the position of the policymakers is congruent with the preferences of the citizens of their society, (assuming, of course, that we can place both citizens and policymakers on the dimension.) If, moreover, the positions on that discourse can be identified in ways such that the distances between them are comparable across systems, then we can compare the degrees of congruence between citizens and their policymakers.

Interestingly enough, empirical studies suggest the emergence of such a unidimensional discourse, identified in the contemporary world most frequently by the terms “left and right,” but sometimes by “progressive and conservative” or other terms, in most consolidated democracies. In some way that we urgently need to understand, through political discussion, debate and competition, the theoretically open-ended possibilities of issues and alternatives tend to be reduced to a far smaller and heavily patterned set of choices. Electoral and legislative debate then come to fit and be fitted into these constrained alternatives. Studies of legislative behavior in the US Congress over a very long time period, for example, suggest that the votes of legislators can usually be described in a single dimension. (Poole and Rosenthal 1985, 1991.) Studies of campaign manifestos often demonstrate the same feature. Studies of citizens show that mass publics in most of the consolidated democracies are also able to think about political issues, and place themselves reasonably meaningfully, on a left-right scale (eg. Inglehart and Klingemann 1976, Inglehart 1984.) Their self-placements seem to be determined by attitudes toward the issues of the day and by perceptions of the party system.

For our purposes we do not need to assume that the meaning of a "5" on a ten-point left-right scale implies the same substantive policy preferences to citizens in different countries. Almost certainly, it does not. A middle of the road position on health policy in the United States is quite different than a middle position on health policy in Britain. The countries have different existing state institutions and policies and different needs. But we do not need to compare the preferences of the citizens in one country to the preferences of the citizens in another country. Rather, we need to compare the citizens in a country with the positions of the political parties or candidates competing in elections in that same country. Where the parties in the government and/or policymaking coalition are close to the citizens on the left-right scale, we can conclude that elections are performing well linking general preferences of citizens to their policymakers. The further away from the citizens, the less successful the performance of elections in creating representational congruence between voters and policymakers. The availability of a language of discourse identifying roughly comparably the similarities and differences in general policy making orientation within each political system thus makes it possible to move behind the vote and begin with the preferences of the citizens. A government at the position of the median citizen is as close to the collective preferences of those citizens as it can possibly be.2

It is worth re-emphasizing at this point that the position of the median voter has no absolute

2This is a theoretical point, not an empirical one. However, it does not attempt to take account of preference intensity, which might lead to attention to the mean citizen position, rather than the median.
substantive meaning. The median voter may support different policies in different electorates. That position may favor change or continuity, government intervention or government disengagement. The meaning of the position of the median voter is simply that it is the position that finds exactly half of the electorate on either side of it.

The empirical work in the consolidated democracies described in the next section builds on identification of the positions of citizens and parties on a single dimension of discourse, the “left and right” scale, in each country. While I am reasonably confident of the meaningfulness of this procedure in most of these countries, I am much less confident that we can identify such a discourse in newly democratizing countries and in countries under other social and economic conditions. Prior to the emergence of such a discourse, and to the degree that such an emergent discourse clearly contains multiple dimensions that are unrelated to each other, the conceptual meaningfulness of distinguishing between more and less congruent outcomes is in question.

Moreover, the comparison of distances between the median and the government or policymakers depends on rough comparability of the scale units. If the difference between 3 and 5 incorporates much more meaningful policy distance (whatever that may mean) in one political system than in another, then we can’t be confident in inferences we draw about institutional success or failure in creating congruence of citizens and policymakers. Intuitively, and on the basis of some evidence of comparability of different measures of the perceptions of citizens, parties, and experts, (see Gable and Huber 2000, Powell and Vanberg 2000) I am reasonably comfortable with this assumption in the consolidated democracies. As discussed below, discourse, dimensionality and unit distances remain critical problems for analysis in the newly democratizing countries.

Institutions, Preferences and Policymaking in Established Democracies

Let us assume for the moment the necessary conditions of freedom of communication and persuasion, right to form new parties, genuine competition, fair vote counting, etc., (while noting that during democratization these too must be established..) Let us also assume, as does most of the literature, that competitive elections are going to be the key to creating democratic citizen connections. Given these assumptions, how exactly are competitive elections supposed to create connections between citizens and policy makers? Both in the literature and in political debate there are some rather different ideas about this. Let me first sketch out some alternative theoretical arguments. Then, I’ll note explicitly what they imply, or are at least usually entangled with, in terms of institutional design, given current literature about these arrangements. (See Powell 1989 for an earlier development of these ideas; also Lijphart 1984 and 1999, as well as my more recent works cited below.) After sketching the theoretical implications, I’ll report some empirical analyses and then suggest what we do and don’t seem to know about elections and the connection between citizen preferences and policymakers.

Theoretical arguments about connections in alternative visions.
I develop the theoretical arguments from two “visions” of democracy, which I call majoritarian and proportional. (These correspond closely to what Lijphart 1984, 1999 calls majoritarian and consensus approaches. For a broader history of these alternatives, see Powell 2000, Ch. 1) I use the term “vision” because each contains both normative and empirical assumptions in a fairly coherent package.

How might elections connect the preferences of citizens and the behavior of policymakers in the majoritarian vision? In this vision of democracy, the election stage is the critical stage for citizens’ choices of policymakers, retrospectively and prospectively. Citizen majorities elect governments with unchecked power to keep promises; governing parties are held accountable if they fail. To succeed in connecting citizen and policymakers, the political system needs alternative coherent competitors (parties or teams), competition to the citizen center, (or at least a winner at the center,) and unchecked governments making policy between elections.

How might this work in the proportional vision? At the electoral stage multiple parties ensure that each citizen has desirable choices and there is fair legislative representation of each substantial grouping of citizen preferences. After the election the parties bargain to form governments and make policy. To succeed in connecting citizens and policymaking, the system needs multiple disciplined, parties, nonconvergent competition, representative legislatures, either domination of legislative bargaining by the median party or proportional influence of all parties. Each subgroup holds its own party accountable.

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

Table 1 offers a theoretical summary, adapted from Huber and Powell 1994, of how each respective vision purports to connect the preferences of citizens and the selection of policymakers. We see particularly, of course, the critical role of the electoral stage in the majoritarian vision, while the proportional vision assumes the relevance of multiple stages. While the table does not specify the institutional designs upon which these two visions are based, they seem in practice usually to incorporate the following:

| Majoritarian Design | Single Member District election rules (limits parties, creates majorities) |
|                     | Parliamentary system (enforces party cohesion) |
|                     | No institutional checks on government control of policy (enables election winner to carry out mandates; clear responsibility) |

| Proportional Design | Low threshold PR election rules (creates choice, equity) |
|                     | Parliamentary system (enforces party cohesion) |
|                     | Strong, sharing committee system and other sources of opposition influence. (encourages bargaining with opposition) |

How well did the visions fare in practice in twenty developed democracies in 1977-1994?
I summarize here briefly the results reported at more length in Powell 1999, Powell 2000, Powell and Vanberg 2000. Also see Huber and Powell 1994.

1. There was in fact a strong association of the electoral and policymaking institutions to create predominately majoritarian or proportional designs. Most of these countries were parliamentary systems. Countries using low threshold PR were likely to have committee structures and legislative agenda rules, etc., that facilitated opposition party influence. Countries using SMD were likely to have committee structures and agenda rules that facilitated/reflected government domination. In subsequent discussions I refer to these packages as alternative “constitutional” arrangements although, of course, many of them are founded in ordinary law and practice, not in written constitutional documents.

2. The designs did tend to create the predicted processes, which are in some conflict with each other. For 156 elections in the 20 countries, there was a .47 between a trichotomous measure of majoritarian constitutional design and majority status of the incumbents; a .55 correlation between the same measure and identifiability of future governments during the elections. The correlations with various measures of proportionality of representation in the legislature or policy makers were even higher in the opposite direction. This outcome could be seen as a trade-off from a process point of view.

Similarly, the designs succeed on their own terms as measured by vote-government-policymaker responsiveness: majoritarian “constitutions” succeed in creating majority governments dominating policymaking; proportional “constitutions succeed in giving lots of influence to representatives of lots of voters. But (a) each design only succeeds by its own criteria--not the alternative ones--and has some failures even by that standard; (b) majoritarian designs only succeed by plurality criteria, as single parties rarely win majorities. There was a sharp trade-off between achievement of the two ideals of responsiveness, suggested by a correlation coefficient of -.58 (123 cases in the 15 countries with consistent constitutional designs of either proportional or majoritarian type.)

3. Citizen preferences and policymaker positions. All the process measures mentioned in the last paragraph build from the assumption that citizens’ votes are what should determine the baseline for a citizen-policymaker connection. But votes can be highly misleading. Ideally, we need to begin with preferences. In the 19 stabilized democracies for which I had data, it was reasonable to use the left-right scale to measure preferences and their correspondence with policymaking political parties.3

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3The position of the median citizen was identified by surveys of citizens, especially the two World Value studies and the Eurobarometers, supplemented by election studies in some countries. The positions of the parties was identified by two studies of experts, (Castles and Mair 1984 and Huber and Inglehart 1995,) who were asked to place the parties on the left-right scale. (In Powell and Vanberg 2000 we also supplemented the latter with some analysis based on party
Again, the full criteria for successful citizen connections are somewhat different in the two “visions.” But congruence between the citizen median and the policymaker position is desirable to both. Sometimes each vision works well, (as best we can see with the left-right scale). Governments and policymakers are close to the median citizen. Sometimes each fails; governments and policymakers that are quite a ways from median dominate policy making.

In the 19 countries and roughly 80 elections, however, on average the conditions for majoritarian success seem to be more stringent and hard to realize: a single party almost never won a majority of vote; the winning party was often not at center (although not anti-democratic either.) Coordination failures seem costly. Figure 2 in Powell and Vanberg 2000 shows the left-right position of the winning and losing parties in elections in the five majoritarian systems. Sometimes, as in New Zealand in the early 1980s, both parties were fairly close to the median. Even though the “wrong” party (plurality loser) actually won the New Zealand elections of 1978 and 1981 and there was very high vote-seat disproportionality, the outcomes provided good correspondence between citizen and legislative medians (and government and policy maker positions.) Sometimes, as in France 1988 or Australia 1993, a party close to the median citizen defeated a more distant party. On the other hand, though, sometimes we see elections such as those in Britain 1983 or Australia 1980 or France 1978 where both major parties were far from the voters and no direct election outcome could create very good congruence between citizens and governments. Equally troubling, despite the availability of a closer party, sometimes the more distant party won the election (Canada 1979, 1988; New Zealand 1993). These outcomes imply a lot of variance across the SMD election outcomes, with about half of them quite a long way from the citizens, and the average much further than in the PR systems. (The cross-hatched area of the figure shows the average distance in the latter, which was about .6 of a scale point, compare to the 2 ½ points for both parties in 1983 Britain.)

Proportional success seems more frequent: PR rules generated multiparty competition and fair representation; most parties were cohesive in legislative behavior; bargained majorities were usually close to center, further helped by committee and other rules to take account of opposition; manifestos and on the expert survey by Laver and Hunt (1992.) All legislators and government members were assumed to hold the position of their party. Multiparty governments were assumed to have positions weighted by the legislative strength of the parties (as, almost always, are cabinet portfolios.) “Policymakers” were calculated to have positions that reflected the positions of all parties in the legislature, weighted by government-opposition relations and the legislature’s committee system (Powell 1989, 2000.)
minority governments were usually pulled toward center by bargaining. When governments fell, their replacements were usually closer, not further, from citizens. Table 2 shows the inferior performance of the “majoritarian” design systems in both procedural representation of voters in the legislature and, in the three rightmost columns, in producing legislatures, governments, and policymakers further from the citizen median than in the “proportional” systems.

TABLE 2 HERE

In short, limited elite offerings and mechanical aggregation of their intersection with citizen choices did NOT work as well as wider elite offerings, fair representation and post-election bargaining in creating correspondence between citizen preferences and policymaker positions. Examination of the reasons for failure suggest that it may be difficult to correct the former, which has stringent conditions to succeed and large impacts of small events.

However, it’s important to note that even the worst outcomes here aren’t perversely non-connected: the largest distances are about 2 ½ points away on the ten point scale, as compared to the roughly 5 points we might see with the most extremist parties in the Huber and Inglehart countries (eg. if the National Front had won in France, the Afrikaner Resistance Movement in South Africa, or the Refounded Communists in Italy).

Limitations in what we can infer from the Left-Right investigations in these 20 countries.

The work on which I have been reporting, although consistent with the few other studies we have on these issues (eg. Dalton 1985), leaves many important questions unanswered.. I want to note these here before turning to the implications for research in the newly democratizing systems as such. Not only are these important issues everywhere, but some of them have particularly important implications for applying these results to other systems. Indeed, some of them can only be studied in other environments.

(1). Single dimension scale versus multidimensionality. My intuition, and theoretical argument, suggest that multidimensional citizen-policymaker correspondence should give the proportional approach even more advantage, because it is more likely to allow different majorities to form on different issues. The policymaker coalition is not locked into the single outcome from the election. This is another possible way to deal with the conceptual difficulty into aggregating a single best combined outcome. But thus far I can’t see how to investigate that empirically and comparatively.

(2). Does giving parties apparent influence opportunities (within multiparty government and between government and opposition in legislatures with strong committees or when there is a minority government, for example) really translate into their having an impact on policies? What are the magnitudes of the effects? There is some good work and more underway on various aspects of policymaking in different legislative environments (Doering, et al 1994). There is some wonderful recent work by Martin (1999) showing how the scheduling of legislation is
shaped by the position of the parties holding the cabinet portfolio and the prime ministership, and also how the preferences of the opposition have impact under minority governments. I am also doing some work using expert reports of opposition influence under various situations. But comparative research of this kind is still badly needed.

(3). Positions and policies. Does correspondence on the left right scale or with the party manifesto mean that real policies will correspond? There are, of course, now quite a few studies of manifests and policies, and of government control and policy more generally. But there is much more to be done here. Note that this is so difficult in part because it gets tangled up with (1) and (2). It is also difficult because policymakers must respond to (perceived) policy conditions, even if they attempt with the best of faith to translate their promises into policies. So, correct specification of policy equations depends on much more than simple manifesto and policy outcome information. As majoritarians often argue that clear responsibility for policy is necessary to force governments to carry out their manifesto promises, this is an empirical problem with particularly important normative entanglements. (Of course, when majority parties are committed to policies opposed by the citizens, being faithful to their promises doesn’t help representation. But it would still be important to know when all kinds of parties are faithful to their commitments and constituencies.)

(4). Status Quo. When does dispersing influence give an advantage to the status quo, rather than moving policy to a degree proportional to citizen support? There are some formal analyses, and some (controversial) studies touching on the problems of reaction of minority governments to economic problems, but I’m not familiar, at least, with much empirical work along these lines.

(5). Party cohesiveness. When parties aren’t so cohesive, does that harm or improve correspondence between citizens and policymakers? We can make up a story either way. Obviously the reasons for lack of cohesion are important (eg. responding to geographic constituencies versus responding to corruption), but this is hard to study comparatively in most of the stabilized parliamentary systems because the parties are in fact so cohesive.

(6). Institutional variations. In the twenty countries I examined, about three quarters of them were quite clearly predominately majoritarian or proportional systems in their institutional designs. Thus, we cannot say very much about the independent effects of elements in the institutional arrangements or about institutional mixtures. Moreover, almost all the majoritarian election rules featured single member districts. For this reason our inferences about the implications of majority-creating election rules based on, say, high threshold PR are extremely limited. On the other side, the proportional design systems featured low threshold PR and power sharing within a single institution (the dominant legislative house,) rather than power sharing across institutions with different majorities. Although I tried to take account of this in my analysis, I had to make a lot of rather ad hoc assumptions. Relatedly, of course, these were almost all parliamentary systems, not presidential or mixed ones.

Problems of Institutional Design in Democratization: Some Research Priorities
Suppose we assume, for the moment, that the results described in the previous section are valid and, indeed, hold up for consolidated majoritarian and proportional designs across a wide range of conditions and time periods. Suppose, with a somewhat greater leap of faith, that we can figure out supportive answers to the first three problems mentioned above: that the proportional advantage is not lessened by multidimensionality of citizen preferences; that our crude estimations of the conditions of influence of the opposition are roughly correct (and could be refined further); and that the left-right scale or manifesto promises are a good guide to party policy efforts. It is clear, nonetheless, that to understand how institutional design affects citizen influence on policymaking in newly democratized countries requires answering some other important research questions. I see these as falling into three major categories: (1) problems of sheer newness of institutional conditions; (2) problems of alternative institutional designs, especially the variations on presidential systems; (3) problems of different societal contexts, including deeply divided societies, the presence of corruption and corruption, and different levels of economic development.

Learning To Make Democratic Institutions Work.

Developing Equilibria: Party Cohesion. It seems clear that some institutional designs can consistently create incentives for behavior that when put into practice can lead to expectations that further support that behavior, that is, a stable equilibrium of incentives, expectations and behavior on the part of all involved. In consolidated parliamentary systems, for example, the citizens’ expectation that parties in the legislature vote cohesively, in a “disciplined” way, leads them to rely nearly exclusively on party as a cue to behavior at the polls, assuming individual characteristics and promises of candidates have little relevance. On the other side, legislator’s expectations that citizens will vote largely on the basis of party, increases the value of the party label and inhibits deviation from party in legislative behavior. Thus, we find very cohesive party voting in the legislatures in experienced parliamentary systems, even across a wide range of party types, preferences, and electoral rules.4

In a new democracy, however, the legislators do not know how citizens will react to the deviation from their party after the election; the citizens do not know whether such deviation will be common or unusual, and therefore do not know whether to collect information on the personal views of the candidate. Even with potentially very strong patterns of incentive and expectation, it may take some time for an equilibrium to emerge. We know very little about the dynamics of this process. (However, see Cox 1987 on the historical emergence in Britain.) We need to know

4Election rules that encourage members of the same party to compete against each other in the general election may weaken such cohesion, as in Italy before 1994 and Japan before 1996. So may expectations that the rules themselves are changing and encouraging new parties to appear, as in New Zealand 1993-1996. Also see Carey and Shugart 1995 on election rules and party cohesion. Party organizational differences may also shape party cohesion.
more about how (whether) these patterns of expectations emerge as voters and legislators in parliamentary systems gain experience with each other and what might prevent them. This research is both necessary in order to understand democratization and an important part of the development of mature theory in this field generally. (Also see below on party cohesion in parliamentary systems in the context of less economically developed societies.)

Political Discourse and its Dimensionality. The dynamics through which citizens, party activists, leaders and policy makers develop relatively stable expectations need examination in other areas as well. An extremely important example that has not, as far as I know, been subjected to rigorous theoretical or empirical investigation is the emergence of a common “discourse” of politics. The absence of an accepted discourse makes evaluation of general representational congruence doubtful, even in concept.

There is some evidence that a common discourse about politics tend to develop in most democratic systems, even in very different societies, and seems to develop among the politicians and expert observers quite quickly. Remarkably enough, the survey of experts in 42 societies, carried out by Huber and Inglehart in 1993 found 80% of them accepting the terms “left and right” to define the major poles of political conflict in their societies and to place the political parties on them (Huber and Inglehart 1995.) Sixty percent of the experts named no second dimension, apparently content that single dimension (whatever its name,) adequately identified party competition in their country. There was substantial agreement among the experts as to the content of that dimension and in most—but not all—countries there was a very large gap between the issue content mentioned first (usually economic or class conflict) and that mentioned second (such as authoritarianism versus democracy, traditional versus new culture, or xenophobia.) There was, moreover, very substantial agreement among the experts in the placement of individual political parties on the scale.

Naturally enough, Huber and Inglehart do report systematic differences in the amount of agreement on party placements between well established democracies (over ten years,) new democracies, and their nondemocracies. The mean standard deviation in party location for all parties was 1.33 in the non-democracies, 1.1 in the new democracies (under ten years) and .90 in the older democracies (p 80). It isn’t clear what part of the greater variances is due to lack of agreement on the meaning of the scale positions and what part is due to uncertainty about new political parties. Moreover, looking at the individual cases one might infer that some of the disagreement reflects controversy about the meaning of left and right in the formerly communist countries of Eastern and Central Europe and some of it reflects genuine multidimensionality being mapped differently into the scale in placing the parties (religious parties in India, for example.)

Also, not surprisingly, it is clear that the newer democracies (and non democracies) are more likely to find an “authoritarianism and democracy” element in their political discourse than are the older democracies. We can’t tell, unfortunately, how often this and other system-threatening issues form a genuinely second dimension and how often they are wrapped into (mapped onto)
the primary dimension. As mentioned in the theoretical discussion, if such issues form a
different, second dimension, it may be much more difficult conceptually to distinguish what
“good congruence” means. We also have little idea, I think, as to whether the “stretch” of the
scale itself is roughly similar when it incorporates issues of democracy itself as well as economic
conflict. Nor do we know whether such conditions as much greater income inequality or absolute
poverty level alter the differences perceived between scale points.

Despite these concerns, the preliminary evidence from experts suggests that the question of
congruence may be answerable conceptually after only a few elections in many new democracies.
However, as far as I know, we do not have any evidence about how quickly and intensively the
discourse is developed and assimilated on the part of the citizens. Without the perception, at least
passively, of a common language of discourse by the citizens, the analysis of preference
correspondence will be of doubtful meaningfulness. While the left-right scale question was
asked in the World Values studies, we need careful analysis of its meaning to the citizens in
newer democracies.

Election Laws and the Number of Parties. We have a huge body of literature, both theoretical
and empirical, on the relationship between electoral rules and the number of parties offering
candidates, winning votes and winning legislative seats. (See especially Duverger 1954; Rae
1967, Riker 1982; Lijphart 1994, Cox 1997.) As Cox has shown so clearly, the relationships
here also depend on the interplay of incentives and the mutual expectations of parties
(candidates) and voters. There are some interesting difficulties in the relationships between local
and national levels of competition, as well as complexities created by the
concentration/dispersal of citizen preferences in relation to geographic constituencies. (See Cox
1997, Ch. 10; Powell and Vanberg 2000.) Some of these may prove especially important in
newly established democracies. Despite the complexities, the general empirical relationship
between SMD versus low threshold PR election rules and the number of parties in consolidated
democracies is quite powerful.

It is clear, however, that the interactions of strategy, preference and expectation can take
some time to develop. We need, here too, to try to understand what contributes to this process
and what can prevent it or change it. The experience in Poland, for example, seem to
suggest that parties can react fairly quickly to rectify coordination problems of too many parties if
it is clear that some groupings or positions are badly hurt by coordination failure. But at the
moment this is merely an inference from one particular context. (Also, see below on context and
the working of election rules.)

Alternative Institutional Designs: Presidential Systems

As noted in the second section of the paper, the study of institutions affecting citizen-
policymaker linkages is both helped and hindered by the relatively easy characterization of the
institutional designs of consolidated democratic systems as majoritarian or proportional. Having
a number of cases of each major type and being able to analyze and compare them facilitates
testing hypotheses about the effects of this variation. But it greatly hinders our ability to analyze
the effects of different institutional designs. In the context of the newly democratizing countries, the most serious single problem, it seems to me, is to understand the effect of presidential institutions. Among the consolidated democracies in economically developed countries only the US is fully a presidential design, with independence of selection and removal for both legislature and executive, and some independent policymaking powers given to both institutions.

So, whereas in the case of parliamentary systems we at least have baselines of expectations (theoretical and empirical) against which to test the effect of (in)experience (above) or social setting (below), in presidential systems we must build from a much narrower base. The problem of even developing theory here is compounded by the very substantial variations in presidential designs themselves, which link executive and legislative components differently at both electoral and policymaking levels (generally, see Shugart and Carey 1992 and Mainwaring and Shugart 1997.)

However, we can target some important empirical issues at both the electoral and policymaking stages:

1. Electoral competition stage. The first problem, of course, is to estimate the positions of the presidential candidates, who may well not be at the general position of their party, or not even be members of a party and are almost always less bound by any party manifesto or behavioral record than are prime minister candidates. (This would, however, also be a useful question to investigate empirically.) Candidates may or may not issue official manifestos, may or may not have well established records of their own. In a general sense this is a problem for voters as well as analysts in presidential systems, but the degree of difficulty probably varies greatly.

We do have some evidence from the United States that is worth mentioning here. Estimates of the left-right positions of presidential candidates in 1988 and 1992 by campaign contributors (using those who gave to the candidates party, but not to the given individual), reported by Brown, Powell and Wilcox 1995, showed a good deal of variation across the candidates, although all of the Democratic candidates in both years were left of the median voter and all of the Republican candidates were to the right of the median voter. (The World Values study showed the median voter just to the right of the absolute center point of the scale.) The winning candidates in both years were neither the most extreme nor most centrist of those running, with respect to the electorate as a whole. (The most extreme candidates were Jackson in 1988 and Buchanan in 1992, either of whose (improbable) victory would have resulted in a chief executive further from the median than in any election outcome in my 19 country study.) The Republican nominee in both years, Bush, was about ½ point to the right of the Republican party as a whole (as estimated in the Huber and Inglehart survey of 1993), while the Democratic nominee in 1988, Dukakis, was estimated as about a point to the left of the Democratic party (and a full 2 ½ points from the citizens) while the 1992 nominee, Clinton was right at the party position (and much closer to the citizen median.) These results are not improbable and suggest that estimates by experts and close observers can be the basis for discriminating candidates from each other and from parties. However, at the moment I know of no comparative studies doing this and such
Substantively, the variation in the US candidate positions in 1988 and 1992, as well as general observation of other presidential elections certainly suggests there are plenty of potential difficulties in producing candidates close to the citizen median. Some studies assume presidents will be more representative of the entire citizenry than the legislatures, because the president has a national electorate and in the case of two candidate races, Downsian theory could be used to predict convergence of both to the median. However, all the problems that emerged in practice in majoritarian elections in the consolidated parliamentary democracies seem likely to appear here also. Potential “coordination problems” in the sense of Cox 1997, abound. The US cases suggests the familiar situation of the two main parties on the sides of the citizen median, with candidates dispersed at or further from the party position, likely reflecting both self-selection and the mobilization potential of activists. The relationship between the primary and general election creates an obvious strategic voting problem. While it is unlikely (although not impossible) that the most extreme candidates will win both primary and general election, there is a good chance that occasionally the winner will be a substantial distance from the citizen median. With plurality or majority run-off elections, less institutionalized parties, and “outsider” candidates drawing on special assets of visibility or wealth, the possibilities for electing extreme candidates would seen to be enhanced. Such outcomes would seem to be further encouraged by the problem of getting good information about the positions of individual candidates, especially “outsiders,” compared to political parties.

However, I should emphasize that these concerns are not grounded in comparative studies of the distances between citizens and presidents, let along the effect of alternative arrangements, party systems, and so forth on these distances. Despite the difficulties of information gathering, this would seem to be a fascinating and important area for research.

A further interesting aspect is that many presidential systems do not allow incumbents to seek immediate reelection. Whether or not this is a problem for the citizen-policymaker connection depends on whether we think the retrospective element in citizen voting behavior is important. For those majoritarians who see the key to democracy as resting on the ability of citizens to evict unsatisfactory incumbents, this is somewhat unsatisfactory, although voters may be able to penalize the incumbent’s party if there is a stabilized party system.

(2) Policymaking Stage. Surprisingly, given the prominence and attention gained by the US and French examples, studies of representative connections even in those countries have not solved the problems of cross-institution policy dependence and its effects on citizen influence. The American representation studies in the tradition of Miller and Stokes’s classic work of 1964, for example, have worried about cross-district representation in the Congress, but not about cross-institution representation between president and Congress. Similarly, Converse and Pierce in France (1986) produced a splendidly sophisticated analysis of legislative representation in France, but paid absolutely no attention to the connections between citizens and presidents, even at a time when the president was the most important actor in the policy making process. There is,
of course, some excellent work on relative influence of presidents on policymaking under various conditions and on deadlocks versus policy production, but this has not, as far as I know, been linked to collective influence of citizens’ preferences.

We need, therefore, to build upon the growing studies of presidential powers (reactive and proactive, institutional and partisan, legislative and nonlegislative) and their relationship to other institutions (legislature, courts, state governments, etc.) We need to see how the interaction between the institutional powers and the distributions of party control shape the relative influence of the parties involved. Moreover, we need to see how various combinations of veto and decree powers, for example, encourage bargaining versus deadlocks. The interplay with electoral competition and party cohesion is another important factor to take into account. In the consolidated parliamentary systems it was usually the case that the net policymaker position was pulled towards the citizen median if governments had to take serious account of the opposition parties. But this depends, of course, on the positions of the parties in relation to the citizen median. Encouraging bargaining is especially helpful if the two parties are on opposite sides of the citizen median. This has generally been the case in the US and France, but it need not be so logically. If the president, for example, is at the citizen median, having to bargain with the opposition that controls the legislature will pull him or her away from the citizens.

Moreover, comparative studies show that the interaction of presidential and legislative elections, especially their “concurrence” is important for connections. (See Shugart and Carey 1992, Shugart 1995.)

(3) Additional problems of mixed systems. Needless to say, all these questions, plus some additional ones, apply to the mixed presidential/parliamentary systems. I might add that the French case, at least, suggests that the complexities of election and institution-based powers can be so great in these systems that it may take politicians, as well as citizens, quite some time to figure out the strategic dynamics.

Alternative Institutional Designs: Divided Institutions Generally.

As suggested by the remarks concerning presidential and mixed systems, studies of citizen influence often also need to take account of other institutional designs that encourage or require sharing political power. Strong second houses of the legislature are one example (see Tsebelis and Money 1997). Federal institutions that require policymaking on some substantive issues to be made by governments elected at a regional level are another. Policymakers may also be constrained by and bargain with constitutional courts (see Vanberg 1999,) independent central banks, and the like, whose relationship to the electorate is much less direct. (In general see Lijphart’s description of his “2nd dimension” in institutional patterning in Lijphart 1984, 1999.) Not only are there many complex possibilities in the electoral/bargaining patterns, but it would be important to know if, all else equal, it was more difficult to find accommodation of different points of view across institutions rather than within them? This is, of course, a frequent charge against presidential systems in executive/legislative interactions, yet studies of “divided
government” in the US do not seem systematically to demonstrate policy deadlock.

Societal Context

Understanding the effects of institutional design on the influence of citizens on policymaking also involves taking account of the conditions of the society that is experiencing democratization. The societies in which the effects of democratic election rules and decision rules on citizen-policymaker connections have been most extensively investigated enjoy generally high levels of economic development and social modernization. Moreover, in the last twenty five years politics in these countries has taken place in a setting of relative international stability and the absence of a major economic depression. It is obviously hazardous to assume that the incentives and constraints of particular institutional designs will have similar effects in societies of very different social, economic and international conditions. Disentangling the effects of special societal conditions, additive and interactive, from those of democratic inexperience and alternative institutional designs is a serious problem for analysis of institutional design. While the potential research agenda here is virtually unlimited, I can suggest three early targets:

1. Do deeply divided societies require different democratic connections? Deeply divided societies, especially so-called “plural” societies where the political divisions coincide with social and or economic ones and citizens exist in highly segregated interpersonal networks, may experience some special problems in citizen-policymaker relations. It is difficult to bargain and form cross-group coalitions; even if representatives are willing to do so, their constituents may reject them. Possibilities of separatism compound the problems, which take a variety of forms depending on the distributions of the populations and the markers of identifiability. While there is no panacea for this problem, Arend Lijphart (1977) and others have long argued that majoritarian approaches are particularly dangerous in these societies. If no group has a demographic majority, it is threatening and illegitimate to all other groups to create one artificially, even for the plurality group. But even if there is a natural majority, allowing it to have unchecked domination of the political process may still be unworkable. The majority dominating groups may well be intolerant and abusive; the dominated groups feel their status intensely and fear the worst, leading them to bolt the usual constitutional arrangements with little provocation.

The presence of such conditions is suggests that analysis of citizen preferences and policymaking must go beyond simply the congruence of the positions of the median citizen and the policymakers. In conditions in which there are permanent, identifiable, distinctive preference majorities, ways should be found to encourage and make visible the influence of minority positions. The use of proportional representation election rules will typically be a necessary, but not sufficient condition. The relevant policymaking institutions must also have incentives for proportional influence of all groups, probably in both process (for symbolic purposes) and substance. “Consociational” theory (Lijphart 1977, etc.) argues, indeed, that not only proportional influence, but the provision of explicit vetoes to the major identifiable groups, despite the great advantage this confers on the status quo, may be necessary to sustain support for
the political system itself. However, it seems likely that if such arrangements constrain (or are seen to constrain) the general direction of policy very far for very long from that preferred by the citizen median, this will also be destabilizing (as well as arguably undemocratic.)

Assuming for the moment that this line of argument is correct, then analysis of institutional impacts on citizen-policymaker relations in deeply divided societies need to examine complex arrangements that encourage basic correspondence of the citizen median and general policy directions plus secondary rewards and constraints for and by the minorities. The use of different decision rules and institutions in different policy areas (eg. requiring supermajorities to make policy changes in particularly sensitive policy areas, such as ethnic or religious relations), or providing temporary insulation from short-term pressures in some areas (eg. judicial and central bank independence) is also a useful area to explore.

2. Do coercive resources play an important role in policymaking? All of the institutional design discussion thus far assumes that democratic policymaking is, in fact, determined by elected representatives using resources allocated by the constitutional decision rules. To the degree that policymaking is shaped by corruption and violence (used or threatened), the democratic connections are vitiated or distorted. On one hand, this is simply a problem of “another variable” that must be “controlled,” statistically or through design, in analyzing the effects discussed above. It is a powerfully documented empirical regularity that societies at lower levels of economic development and modernization are much more prone to violence, corruption and difficulties in sustaining democratic regimes (Powell 1982, Triesman 1999, Przeworski, et al 1996.) As the recently democratizing societies are on average less economically developed, less wealthy, less educated, and so forth, we must be careful to take account of various sorts of coercion in studying citizens’ influence on policymakers.

On the other hand, though, if the institutional design itself encourages corrupt payoffs or military intervention, then “control” is not enough. (Statistically speaking, there is an endogeneity problem.) Rather, we must examine the connections themselves. For example, if presidential systems were more effective than parliamentary ones in controlling violence, then their net effect on citizen influence might be positive, even if on average the elected presidents were rather further from the citizen median than the average prime minister. If, (as may well be the case,) presidential systems are both more vulnerable to military pressure and more likely to choose chief executives farther from the median voter, than the design is doubly disadvantaged. Similarly, some studies suggest that federal systems are more prone to corruption, which may well weaken the connection between median citizen preferences and policies. If that is so, then this negative effect must be weighed against the positive virtues of federalism in helpfully increasing the influence of opposition parties.

3. Do the “same” institutions work differently in different settings? Quite aside from the depth of social divisions or the threat of coercion, the possibility that features of the society cause the same institutional designs to work differently is one in which we urgently need analysis. While the possibilities are, of course, unlimited, and include the role of inherited political
memories and organizations, special international configurations, economic transitions, inequality of income and land holding, and the like, two general issues involving the application of election rules and decision rules in different societies are research agenda items of particularly high priority.

**Geography, preferences and election rules.** We already know, of course, that the relationship between geographic distributions of preferences and electoral boundaries make a substantial difference in the consequences of single member district election rules, especially of the common first-past-the-post form. In some settings the implications of this simple fact can be dramatic. SMD electoral districts usually produced legislative (although not voter) majorities for single parties or pre-election coalitions in the consolidated democracies of Australia, Britain, Canada, France and New Zealand. However, plurality SMD seems to have encouraged tremendous fragmentation in the clan-based political competition of Papua New Guinea (Reynolds and Reilly 1997, 40-42.) In Lijphart’s cross-national comparisons of 36 countries, PNG is remarkable for its combination of high electoral vote-seat disproportionality and a very large number of parties in parliament (1999, p. 169.)

We would expect proportional representation systems to be less sensitive to the relationships between preferences and geography. But there is good evidence (Powell 1982, Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994, and Cox 1997) that more social cleavages increase the likelihood that permissive (low threshold PR) election rules will result in a more fractionalized party system. It also seems probable that large geographic size makes it more difficult to develop cohesive national political parties coordinating strong local organizations. However, it is not clear whether federal constitutional designs exacerbate that problem or mitigate it.

**Development and parliamentary party cohesion.** Perhaps the single most important area of uncertainty concerning the relationship between societal context and decision rule institutions concerns whether parliamentary systems always encourage legislative cohesion of the political parties. Without reasonably cohesive parties the two-stage connections between groups of voters choosing representatives in proportion to their size and these representatives bargaining to form governments and policymakers could be chaotic and (or) dominated by personalistic and localized log-rolling. Contra the above discussion (under “learning”) Sartori 1994 argues that parliamentary systems do not automatically generate voter-party equilibria of party cohesion. Rather, he argues, successful parliamentary systems depend on “structured” party systems which then interact with parliamentary rules to sustain party cohesion (1994, 37-38.) This kind of “structuring” depends on a challenge to the other parties from at least one mass based, nationally cohesive, idea focused, political party (95-96.) Without this historical event, the parties may remain nothing more than collections of local notables, jostling each other incoherently in the national assembly. (His example is the French 3rd Republic.) Moreover, he suggests elsewhere, general “structuring” is unlikely without mass education (38) and, presumably, exposure to nationalized discourse through media or exceptional organizational conditions (as in the Indian independence movement.)
In a defense of the need for presidential systems as necessary for “the provision of collective goods in less developed countries,” Shugart (1999) offers the same specter, based on the experience of parties in Brazil, but sees the critical conditions as those of social structure. Size, regional disparities, and gross inequalities, he argues, all may contribute to the inability to form large, cohesive, “broadly aggregating” or even national policy oriented, political parties, even under PR election rules and parliamentary decision rules. Shugart suggests that without such parties, institution designers are forced to adopt strong presidential systems to coordinate national “collective good” provision and, in conjunction, typically adopt election rules that further decentralize the parties and encourage candidate-centered organization and competition. Both Sartori and Shugart argue that under these conditions parliamentary regimes are unlikely to succeed in achieving any sort of stable provision of national policies and thus, it would seem, unable to produce general policy directions favored by the citizens.

Analyses of the interplay of legislative and electoral incentives that shape party cohesion, and how these can support or even substitute for each other as newly democratic parliamentary parties come to grips with their freedoms, are beginning to emerge from the two waves of post World War II democratization experiences. (See, e.g., Schuttemeyer 1994 on West Germany and Turan 1994 on Turkey for the “second wave” experiences in these countries, and Sanchez de Dios 1999 on Spain and A’gh on Hungary for some Southern and Central European “third wave” experiences.) But we still lack the systematic comparisons of party cohesion from other parts of the world that would answer the concerns of Sartori and Shugart and bring to bear a full account of the societal and institutional factors.

Summary Comments

Theory and research in consolidated democracies on the preference linkages between citizens and policy makers suggest critical roles for two major features of institutional design, the elections rules and the decision rules. Comparative analysis of elections in 19 countries indicates that the institutional combinations associated with a multi-stage, proportional influence vision of democracy are consistently more successful than majoritarian institutions in creating congruence between the preferences of citizens and the positions of policymakers. In the latter, single member district election rules and government-dominated decision rules frequently resulted in policymakers substantially further from the median citizen.

Although it is much more desirable to base such analyses on the preferences of citizens than their votes, comparative analysis of preference congruence involves a number of complex issues. There is much to be done to understand these processes even within the consolidated democracies in economically developed societies. Among the most urgent problems is conceptualizing and analyzing the connections when the national political discourse is multi-dimensional. Extending such analysis to newly democratized systems throughout the world is both difficult and desirable.

The research agenda for studying the connections between citizen preferences and
policymaking in democratization involves at least three (related) elements: (1) understanding the processes associated with early learning about democratic institutions and establishing equilibria of discourse, competition and policymaking; (2) understanding how electoral connections work with different institutional arrangements, such as presidential systems, high-threshold proportional representation, and power sharing institutions; (3) understanding the interactive impact of features of the societal environment, such as the intensity of social divisions, widespread corruption or coercion, and the level of economic development. Exploring these issues will help reveal strengths and limitations of democracy itself, as well as consequences of choices of institutional design.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process Stages</th>
<th>Majority Control Vision</th>
<th>Proportional Influence Vision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ELECTORAL STAGES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Competition</td>
<td>Identifiable alternative governments, one a responsible incumbent; one or both close to the median citizen</td>
<td>Wide range of party choices; absence of explicit coalition commitments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Outcomes</td>
<td>Party close to median citizen wins majority: Median legislator close to median citizen</td>
<td>Proportional legislative representation of all parties: Median legislator close to median citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>POST-ELECTION STAGES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Formation</td>
<td>Election winner forms majority government</td>
<td>Bargaining: government coalition includes party of median legislator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Making between Elections</td>
<td>Government dominates all policy making</td>
<td>Coalitions may change, but still include median; negotiation with opposition parties may help balance government parties right or left of median party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CONGRUENCE PREDICTIONS</strong></td>
<td>Government is the policy maker and is close to the median citizen</td>
<td>Government includes the median legislator, but weighted position of all policy makers will be closer to the median citizen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Both visions assume that the median voter will be at the same position on the left-right scale as the median citizen.
### TABLE 2

**Representation Failures in Consolidated Democracies: By Type of Election Rules**

70 Elections in 17 Countries 1977-1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Rules</th>
<th>Procedural (Mis)Representation Of Votes</th>
<th>Substantive (Mis)Representation: Distance from Median Citizen: Ten Point Left-right Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vote-Seat Disproportionality (Squared)</td>
<td>Legislative Median</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Member Districts</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-Member Proportional</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Absolute Difference: + 9.2  + 19  + .95 + .50 + .71

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5 All legislators and government members were assumed to hold the position of their party. Multiparty governments were assumed to have positions weighted by the legislative strength of the parties (as, almost always, are cabinet portfolios.) “Policymakers” were calculated to have positions that reflected the positions of all parties in the legislature, weighted by government-opposition relations and the legislature’s committee system (Powell 1989, 2000.)
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