

Quotation Matters

Paul Saka

psaka@uh.edu

1. Cats are Four-legged, "Cats" is Four-lettered

The distinction between plain language and quotation, subserving that of use and mention, grounds the discipline of linguistics by delimiting its subject matter. It also poses persistent problems pertaining to such foundational matters as opacity and compositionality, the nature and very existence of logical form, convention and intention, and the semantics-pragmatics boundary.

Very broadly speaking there are two main approaches to quotation today, (i) the Demonstrative Theory and (ii) the Identity Theory. Both agree that quotation involves picturing or displaying -- in contrast to the old Name Theory -- but they differ on a number of other points. These points are spelled out in this section and are taken up one by one in the remainder of the paper. In every case I conclude in favor of the Identity Theory.

(i) THE DEMONSTRATIVE THEORY. Demonstrative Theorists include Prior 1971, Partee 1973, Davidson 1979, Goldstein 1984, Bennett 1988, Garcia-Carpintero 1994, Cappelen & Lepore 1997, Simchen 1999, and Benbaji 2004. Davidson's version treats (1) as equivalent to (1').

(1) "Lobster" is a word.

(1') Lobster. The expression type of which this is a token is a word.

The version by Cappelen & Lepore, henceforth C&L, treats (1) as equivalent to a complicated quantificational structure which they simplify as (1").

(1") $\forall x$ (x is a word if x tokens the same as that). Lobster

For the sake of brevity, not to mention misgivings about taking (1) as expressing a quantificational structure, I will sometimes represent the Demonstrative analysis as (1*) instead of (1'/1"). Nothing hinges on my doing so, however.

(1*) Lobster. This/that is a word.

Several features of the Demonstrative account can be discerned.

- (a) The paratactic thesis: quoted matter is logically external to the quoting sentence.
- (b) The reference thesis: quotation marks are deictic referring terms, or correspond to quantificational structures that contain deictic referring terms.
- (c) The mark thesis: mentionings require quotation marks.
- (d) The singularity thesis: a quotation always mentions an expression type.
- (e) The congruence thesis: quoting is the same as mentioning, and explications of one are explications of the other.
- (f) The unity thesis (Demonstrative): the more phenomena a theory can explain, the better it is; the Demonstrative Theory explains more relevant phenomena than does the Identity Theory.

These form a fairly tidy package. If the quoted matter in (1) is removed from the sentence then the remaining portion, (2), will be ungrammatical unless a pair of quotation marks is understood as a referring term or as a quantificational structure containing a referring term; (a) implies (b), which is to say there is at least a strong inference from (a) to (b).

(2) "" is a word.

And if quotation marks are referring terms then (1) will be ungrammatical unless the quoted matter is regarded as parenthetical or extra-sentential; (b) implies (a). Furthermore, if the quoted matter is removed from (1), and if there were no quotation marks to serve as referring terms in the remaining sentence, then the remaining sentence would be ungrammatical; (a) implies (c). Given that mentioning invariably aligns with quotation, accounting for one may automatically account for the other; (c) implies (e). Finally, as Demonstrative Theorists acknowledge, treatments of quotation should give unified explanations for diverse kinds of quotation; the very proposing of the Demonstrative Theory of quotation implies (f).

Theses (a) and (b) jointly make up the heart of any Demonstrative Theory, (c, e, f) are vital but derivative, and (d) is prominent in both Davidson's and C&L's influential versions. (For some, the paratactic and reference theses do come apart, though it is not explained how this is possible: Wittgenstein 1953 appears to hold (a) while standing silent on (b); Read 1997 and Recanati 2001 clearly hold (a) while rejecting (b); and Goddard & Routley 1966:21 and possibly Searle 1983 hold (b) while standing silent on (a).)

(ii) THE IDENTITY THEORY. According to the Identity Theory, what you see is what you get: (1) consists of a single sentence in which, more or less, the quoted matter refers to itself, and the quotation marks are merely punctuation (e.g. Frege 1892, Searle 1969, Haack 1974, Clark & Gerrig 1990, Washington 1992, Reimer 1996, Saka 1998 & 2004, Gomez-Torrente 2001¹).

My own version of the Identity Theory recognizes two intersecting aspects of language: *functional* distinctions, such as that between use and mention, and *formal* distinctions, e.g. between plain expressions and those having quotation marks. More precisely, there is one functional distinction between use and non-use and another between mention and non-mention, and there is a whole variety of formal distinctions drawn by quotation marks: double apostrophes and single, italics, and so forth each carries their own conditions of use. My work grows out of a cognitivist or psychologistic vision of language, as opposed to one that is "realist", referentialist, or platonist. Consequently I avoid appeals to truth-conditions, emphasizing instead mental associations, speech act conditions, and pragmatic factors more generally. (For elaboration of this paragraph, see xxxx 2004.)

While my background assumptions lend plausibility to the Identity Theory, they are by no means necessary. Fregeans and others may come to the same conclusions that I do.

(a') The integration thesis: quoted matter is part of the quoting sentence.

- (b') The punctuation thesis: quotation marks, comparable to the determinatives of written Egyptian, serve to disambiguate.
- (c') The plain mention thesis: it is possible to mention an expression without using quotation marks.
- (d') The multiplicity thesis: a quotation may mention a token, a phonetic type, an orthographic type, a content-type, and so on.
- (e') The divergence thesis: quoting and mentioning are distinct; moreover, to understand quotation it is necessary to understand first the use/mention distinction.
- (f') The unity thesis (Identity): the more phenomena a theory can explain, the better it is; the Identity Theory explains more relevant phenomena than the Demonstrative Theory.

The remainder of the paper argues for (a') through (f') as against (a-f).

2. Quoted Matter Belongs to the Sentence

Quoted matter is opaque, meaning that it is not always intersubstitutable with truth-conditionally equivalent expressions. This creates a problem for any compositional truth-conditional semantics. One solution is to export the opaque fragment outside of the sentence, to treat it as paratactic. An alternative solution is to adopt the approach of Pietroski 1999, and yet another is to deny the whole framework of compositional truth-conditional semantics (as done for a variety of reasons by e.g. Jackendoff 1985, Kempson 1988, Atlas 1989, Brandom 2000). Since the debate between truth-conditionalists and others cannot be settled here, I will focus on points specific to quotation. I start by countering an argument in favor of quotational parataxis and then I give positive arguments against parataxis.

(i) REBUTTING THE PARATACTICIANS. What I call the Universality Argument for extra-sententialism cites foreign words and animal sounds. We can quote them, in fact anything at all, even though they are not part of English; and being no part of English, they are no part of English sentences (cf. Caplan

2002:75). Against this view, suppose that spark plugs manufactured in Canada are installed in cars that are otherwise completely manufactured in Detroit. We need not fancy an alternate plane of existence, wherein spark plugs really are separate from cars, to judge of a car that it is American-made. Likewise a sentence containing a foreign element, if put together by an anglophone using an anglophone matrix, can be viewed as English without pretending that on some other plane of existence the foreign term stands outside the sentence.

To put the point less allegorically, ordinary beliefs about individuating language are simply mistaken. Few non-linguists realize that a language is little more than "a dialect with an army" (there is no linguistically principled distinction between languages and dialects), and few even have the vocabulary for referring to idiolects. I reject the whole question of language as an immaterial object ("does x belong to language L's lexicon?") and would replace it with questions of living language users ("does x belong to speaker S's repertoire?", "for some identifiable population Σ , does x belong to the repertoire of most members of Σ ?"). Knowing a foreign word or knowing of one, I can say e.g. "*mahatma* means 'great-souled'" or "Gandhi was called *mahatma*, whatever that means". In so doing, I perform a speech act, about the language of others, entirely in my own idiolect. The fact that an anglophone can quote from another language does not make the quoted matter sentence-external.

I turn now to the case against the paratactic thesis.

(ii) THE EMPTY QUOTATION ARGUMENT. The paratactician argues that quoting a word, and saying something about it, is like pointing at an object, and saying something about it: the word quoted is no more a part of the sentence than is the object pointed to. But if this were true then we should be able to remove quoted matter from its context while maintaining well-formedness. Just as I can say "that is an apple" in the absence of an apple (I can do so grammatically if not felicitously), so too should (1) be sayable/writable in the absence of "Lobster", i.e. (3) should be just as good as (4).

(3) "" is a word.

(4) That is word.

Without context (3), like (4), will lack truth-conditions; but like (4), it should seem like a complete sentence. Yet it doesn't. Quoted matter is an integral part of any quotational sentence.

Paratacticians will reply that grammar is deceptive: a sentence can be ill-formed on its surface yet well-formed at the level of logical form, and in fact at logical form (3) is well-formed because the lonely quotation marks in (3) are covert referring terms.

The position, then, is that quotation marks are both overt (visible at the level of surface form in [3]) and covert ([3] lacks a subject at surface form but not logical form). Now the very suggestion of an overt covert category strikes me as absurd. But even putting that aside, there's a problem. If surface form deviates from logical form, it does so either as a matter of historical contingency or for a general reason. In the former case we should expect other languages to represent quotation very differently from English, namely we should expect quoted matter to be presented as external to the sentences that normally contain them. But I am not aware of any language that does this. On the other hand, if quotational surface form is deceptive for some general reason that applies to all languages, one would hope to have some clue as to what this reason is, or evidence that it at least exists. But again I am not aware of any.

(iii) THE SCARE-QUOTE ARGUMENT. The paratactic thesis is additionally refuted by scare quotes.

(5) Chang is a "bad" boy.

(6) Lee "shamelessly" flirted.

(7) Ishmael floated "above" the other astronaut.

According to the Demonstrative Theory, (5-7) are equivalent to:

(5') Chang is a that boy. bad

(6') Lee that flirted. shamelessly

(7') Ishmael floated that the other astronaut. above

For Demonstrative Theorists, quotation marks must be convertible to any syntactic category -- they function as adjective in (5), as adverb in (6), as preposition in (7), and so forth. Although English is unusually liberal in allowing words to convert, I do not know of any English lexeme that can so naturally be used as any part of speech at all, and I would be surprised if quotation marks really could. The implausibility of the case is magnified when we consider those languages having quotation marks that generally prohibit conversion. Besides, postulating conversion doesn't work in cases like:

(8) Chang wants to "call upon" Chung.

Because the quoted matter in (8) does not form a syntactic unit, no pro-noun, pro-verb, or pro-form of any kind can take its place. I conclude that quoted matter is an integral part of the sentence that it appears to be in.

3. Quotation Marks Do Not Refer

Demonstrative Theorists insist that quotation marks are demonstratives or contain demonstratives. It is strange, then, that they neither define "demonstrative" nor refer the reader to any of the distinct accounts available in the literature.

I take it that demonstratives do more than point. Fingers point but are not demonstratives. A demonstrative is a verbal element with syntactic properties, being neither name nor description yet having referential power. It may refer to a singular object (*this, that*), a plurality of objects (*these, those*), a manner (*thus, so*), a property (*such*), or a degree (*yay*); or it may combine with an incomplete phrase, as a determiner does, to yield a referring phrase. In addition, some languages conceivably have demonstrative verbs, prepositions, and conjunctions. But in all cases to be a demonstrative is to function linguistically, to enjoy syntactic powers.

I begin by discrediting a recurrent argument for the reference thesis and then turn to discrediting the reference thesis itself.

(i) REBUTTING AN ANALOGY. Partee 1973:416 reasonably observes that (9) and (10) share a common underlying form. After all, they both use demonstratives, they both use mimicry or display, and in both cases the display occurs outside of the sentence.

(9) He stuck out his tongue and went like this: [gesture]

(10) Morry went like this: [vocal noise].

But then Partee concludes that quotations such as (11) share the same form as well.

(11) Morry went, "[vocal noise]".

The form of her argument -- a is an instance of F , b is an instance of F , therefore c is an instance of F -- is not deductively valid. Partee might defend the inference by pointing to similarities among a , b , and c , but this move fails. As for surface similarities, (9) and (10) *look* like they have demonstratives and are paratactic while (11) doesn't. As for the purported logical form of (11), it cannot be presumed to resemble (9, 10) without begging the question. The argument is so weak as to merit neglect except variants of it continue to crop up, e.g. Garcia-Carpintero 1994:260.

(ii) THE EMPTY QUOTATION ARGUMENT AGAIN. The notion of a referring term, at least in the special case of a singular term, is that it can combine with a predicate to form a complete grammatical sentence. But quotation marks do not do this.

(3) "" is a word.

As established in §2ii, *quoted matter is necessary* for making quotation referential. The very same evidence now yields another conclusion, that *quotation marks are not sufficient* for making quotation referential.²

(iii) THE REDUNDANCY ARGUMENT. Wertheimer 2005: fn 13 and Recanati 2001:654 argue that, though (12) is well-formed, its purported equivalence (12') is not.

(12) The word "emu" is fun.

(12') The word that is fun. emu

Bennett 1988:417 anticipates the point and denies that it is a problem: (13a) and (13b) have the same semantic value, he suggests, but that does not preclude them from combining.

(13a) the composer of *Parsifal*

(13b) Richard Wagner

(13c) the composer Richard Wagner

Likewise, by implication, "the word" can logically combine with a demonstrative phrase even though (12') is ill-formed for surface grammatical reasons.

This defense is not completely convincing, however. Though (13a) and (13b) co-refer, neither is even a partial synonym, analysis, or logical form of the other. Their information values differ, and (13c) is not redundant. Truly redundant appositives would be deviant:

(13d) the composer the composer of *Parsifal*

(13e) the musician the composer of *Parsifal*.

Since (12) is not deviant, quotation marks cannot contain the sense "the word". Moreover, it looks like this argument can be extended to other proposed analyses. Since (14) is acceptable but (14') is not, quotation marks cannot mean what Davidson, in (1'), says they do.

(14) The expression type of which "emu" is a token is fun.

(14') The expression type of which the expression type of which that is a token is fun. emu

For related discussion on the paradox of analysis, see xxxx.

(iv) NO JOKING MATTER. Another problem for the Demonstrative Theory is that in many cases it cannot interpret speech ascriptions.

(14) "You've got to be kidding," I laughed.

(14') I laughed that. You've got to be kidding

Because "laugh" is intransitive, (14') is meaningless. But (14) is meaningful.

Therefore (14, 14') cannot be equivalent.

Demonstratives needn't be singular terms. Were they to take the form of deictic adverbs then (14) would mean

(14") I laughed thus. You've got to be kidding

The problem here is that "thus", if it referred, would refer to some manner; yet the quoted matter is a sentence, not a manner. Demonstrative Theorists may correctly observe that sentences can be mentally associated with manners, but this move is puzzling. If Demonstrative Theorists are willing to invoke pragmatic associations, why are they not willing to do so earlier in the game, before attributing unobservable logical forms to quotation marks in the first place?

(v) THE SUPERFLUOUS-TERM ARGUMENT. Recanati 2001:654 observes that quotation marks can be used even in the absence of a matrix sentence, where referring terms should be out of place. Such free-standing quotation is illustrated by Philip Roth in *Portnoy's Complaint*:

(15) "Alex, I want an answer from you. Did you eat French fries after school? Is that why you're sick like this?"

"Nuhhh, nuhhh."

According to Demonstrative Theorists, (15) contains dangling referring terms, which are more evident in its logical form:

(15') This. Alex, I want an answer from you. Did you eat French fries after school? Is that why you're sick like this?

This. Nuhhh, nuhhh.

Quotation marks are used in (15) to ascribe words to parties not explicitly identified and to indicate dialog boundaries. But referring terms do not serve this function, as illustrated by the deviance of (15'). Therefore the items serving this function, the quotation marks, are not referring terms. And if quotation marks are not referring terms in (15), there is no reason to think that they are elsewhere either.

(vi) THE MISSING-TERM ARGUMENT. Whereas novelists routinely use unascribed dialog inside quotation marks, which appears to refute the

Demonstrative Theory, playwrights routinely use unascrbed dialog without quotation marks, and this too poses a problem for the Demonstrative Theory. Consider, for instance, Joseph Heller's *We Bombed in New Haven*.

(16) STARKEY Is it [the mission] dangerous?

MAJOR Not for those who survive.

Demonstrative Theorists must make a choice. One option is to recognize normal font as marks of quotation when set in opposition to capitalized character names. In this case, (16) would fall to the dangling-term objection:

(16') Starkey, this. Is it dangerous?

Major, this. Not for those who survive.

In response to (16'), which if taken literally would be ludicrous, Demonstrative Theorists may posit a pragmatically understood "says" in each line. But if they are willing to do that, why not posit a pragmatically understood "says that" in (16)? And if "that" is but pragmatically understood in (16), font does not express it. Alternatively, Demonstrative Theorists might opt to regard contrastive font as linguistically inessential. In this case, (16) amounts to:

(16'') Starkey. Is it dangerous?

Major. Not for those who survive.

This constitutes plain mentioning -- quotation without quotation marks, if you will. Yet Demonstrative Theorists deny the existence of plain mentioning.

4. Plain Mentioning is Legitimate

The Identity Theory holds that quotation marks disambiguate material that can intrinsically be either used or mentioned. It follows that even unmarked matter can be mentioned, i.e. plain mentioning as in (17) is possible.

(17) Cats has four letters.

In saying that (17) is possible, I say that it is grammatical, though not necessarily as grammatical as (17'), or grammatical in the same way.

(17') Cats have four legs.

My claim rather is that the syntactic well-formedness of (17) is comparable to that of (17"), though of course they differ in acceptability.

(17") "Cats" has four letters.

In xxxx 2004 I explain how (17', 17") rely on very different principles of construction. The same difference applies to (17') and (17).

After arguing that plain mentioning is in fact well-formed, I defend the thesis from unsound criticisms and then appeal to reflective equilibrium. On this issue hinges the plausibility of the Demonstrative Theory.

(i) THE USE ARGUMENT. To settle any debate over grammar, it would help to make our ideas of grammar explicit. I propose the following principle: if speakers regularly and unapologetically use construction C, then C is grammatical. Note first of all that this is intended as a criterion, not a definition or explication; and like criteria generally are, this one is defeasible. (Regularly and unapologetically using construction C because one is ordered to at gunpoint, or doing so in fits of religious mania -- "speaking in tongues" -- does not count as evidence for C's grammaticality.) Note too that the principle is not biconditional. A construction may be grammatical even if no one ever uses it, for it may be obviously false, too long for human breath, rude or taboo, etc.

Now the evidence strikes me as perfectly straightforward. First, plain mentioning is widespread. Proof of this, of course, would take too much space to enumerate. Second, plain mentioning is resistant to change. After telling my linguistics students that they absolutely must use quotation-marks when citing words, I invariably get some who fail to do so. (When questioned, they will sometimes say that quotation marks were inappropriate because what was meant was obvious.) Third, plain mentioning can be found in expertly written, professionally copy-edited texts. Lynn Truss, an authority on punctuation, writes of Woody Allen's character:

(18) He just wanted to know how to spell Connecticut. [2004:130]

And Paul Dickson conforms to the practice found in books put out by many fine publishers when he writes:

(19) Chang is the most common name in the world. [1996:196]

Indeed, when the word "name" appears in the subject rather than the predicate -- when the listener can expect a name mentioned rather than used -- quotation marks are not merely omissible; they are positively deviant.

(19') My name is "Pat".

All of this is evidence that plain mentioning is no performance error. The product of competence, it is grammatical.

In addition, it is widely agreed that in speech one can mention a word without vocally marking it in any special way, i.e. one can plain mention it. It follows, to the extent that written language is a record of spoken language, that written language may also grammatically be plain mentioned.

(ii) A QUESTION-BEGGING CRITICISM. Cappelen & Lepore 1999:§1-2 deny that plain mentioning is possible, giving an argument seconded by Predelli 2003. Recall that (17) is "Cats has four letters."

Consider a language E*... E* has no mention-quotation distinction, and so (17) is ungrammatical in E*. Ask yourself: could a speaker assertively utter a token of (17), and her audience still understand what she means by her token? Should we expect that speakers of E* might occasionally omit... quote marks? The answer is trivially "yes". E* speakers could omit quote marks whenever what's meant is obvious... If E* speakers can omit quote marks and still get across what they mean, then the fact that we omit quote marks is no evidence that we are not ourselves E* speakers...

On the face of it, C&L contradict themselves. They posit (a) that language E* has no mention-quotation distinction, i.e. its speakers invariably quotation-mark their mentionings; and at the same time (b) that E*'s speakers occasionally omit quotation marks when mentioning.

Perhaps C&L mean (a') that E* has no *grammatical* mention-quotation distinction, i.e. its speakers invariably quotation-mark their mentionings when speaking grammatically; and (b') E*'s speakers may omit quotation marks when mentioning as long as "what's meant is obvious", although doing so is ungrammatical. But C&L err in thinking that obviousness licenses ungrammatical utterances. Whenever a grammatical subject in English denotes the established topic of a conversation, what's meant, however obvious, is not systematically omitted outside of marked genres such as notes to oneself. Also, telegraphic language (not to be confused with elliptical language, which is perfectly grammatical) is usually clear in meaning, and certainly saves on breath, and yet telegraphic speech is generally not found except in telegrams, in headlines, among the brain-damaged, and the like. In short, principle (b') does not describe English; if plain mentioning is ungrammatical in E* then E* is clearly distinguishable from English, where plain mentioning is widely, regularly, and unapologetically used.

More fundamentally, in stipulating a language that has no mention-quotation distinction, C&L invoke a premise that I am not willing to grant. Quotation marks are forms that a language may or may not possess. Mentioning is a function, it is what people do with language, it is not a feature of the language itself. In speaking or writing *any* language whatsoever, therefore, I can choose to mention one of its expressions regardless of whether I use a quotational form. There is no such thing as a possible language which lacks the mention-quotation distinction, and in appealing to it C&L beg the question.

(iii) THE AMBIGUITY CRITICISM. If plain mentioning is possible then (19) is ambiguous, allowing for an objectual reading (the font is elegant) and a metalinguistic reading (the name of the font is elegant).

(20) Arial is elegant.

Both C&L 1999 and Caplan 2002 criticize this ambiguity view, treating it as absurd. I do not see why they feel this way unless they think all ambiguity is lexico-syntactic. But such a restricted view of ambiguity matches neither that

expressed by the Identity Theory nor that of ordinary language. (Mona Lisa's smile is ambiguous without being lexico-syntactically so.)

Not incidentally, C&L and Caplan must themselves posit systematic ambiguity, being proponents of the Demonstrative Theory. The Demonstrative Theory treats (21) and (21') as equivalent. Yet apparently (21) is true while (21') is self-contradictory -- (a) contradicts (b).

(21) "You are either with us or against us" is an Orwellian lie.

(21') (a) You are either with us or against us. (b) That is an Orwellian lie.

If (21') is not to be self-contradictory, (a) must lack assertoric force. Yet in ordinary contexts (a) possesses assertoric force. Since (a) is sometimes assertoric and sometimes not, (a) is ambiguous.

(iv) REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM. I judge plain mentioning to be grammatically well-formed, C&L do not. To decide between us, you should look at the theoretical considerations for supporting one judgment over the other. But you should look further, too. You should look for the stories each side can give for explaining the intuitions of the other.

As a general rule, if you know of an effective means of doing something that you value, you will frown upon those who willfully refuse to adopt it, you will regard their choices as erroneous. Using quotation marks is an effective means of being explicitly precise, which is of value to scholars; hence it is easy for scholars to condemn language that does not use it. The fact that plain mentioning might be eschewed by certain speakers is no evidence of its ungrammaticality.

Is it credible that smart people can be confused by the distinction between ungrammaticality on the one hand and stylistic infelicity, flouting of scholarly practice, and other sorts of ill-advisedness on the other? Our long sorry history proves that it is so. Grammarians rail against "ain't", saying that it isn't a word, when in fact its real problem is prudential. Speakers who use the word give themselves lower status, they do not violate grammar.

To summarize, some regard (17-19) as well-formed and some do not. The best theory not only justifies one side but also explains the existence of divergent intuitions. On my account, those who accept (17-19) attend to the grammar while those who reject it are distracted by other felicity conditions. So far as I know, C&L cannot account for divergent intuitions. They cannot say, for instance, that those who reject (17-19) attend to grammar while those who accept it do so because some ungrammatical constructions are assertable. For as a general rule, ungrammatical constructions are *not* regularly and unapologetically assertable.

(v) THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PLAIN MENTIONING. If thesis (c') is right then it serves as additional argument against the paratactic and reference theses (a, b). For given that plain mentioning is possible, (17") would keep its meaning, modulo ambiguity, even if stripped of its quotation marks.

(17") "Cats" has four letters.

But in that case, for purposes of grammaticality and interpretability, quotation marks need not add content to the sentences that they are in (modulo ambiguity). Hence so-called semantic accounts of quotation, including the Demonstrative Theory, are at best superfluous. I conclude that Demonstrative Theorists must do more than show that their account is possible. They must show that simpler accounts do not work. They must show both that it's possible to construe quotation marks as demonstratives *and* that it's not possible to construe them as simpler non-referring elements.

5. Quotations have Multiple Referents

The multiplicity thesis -- that quotations can variously signify types, tokens, spellings, meanings, and so forth -- is called "extraordinary" by C&L 1999:§4. Yet it is taken for granted in much of the literature, and forms of it are explicit inside philosophy and out (e.g. Goddard & Routley 1966:1, Christensen 1967:363, Goldstein 1984, Jorgensen & al. 1984:113, Atlas 1989:xiv, Clark & Gerrig 1990:767, Garcia-Carpintero 1994, Reimer 1996: fn 6, Wertheimer 2005). If the

thesis is mistaken it calls for sound refutation. After arguing that no sound refutation is available, I point out that the question, though significant in its own right, matters not to the debate between Demonstrative Theorists and others.

(i) DEFENDING THE MULTIPLICITY THESIS. C&L 1999:§4 claim that the multiplicity thesis is unnecessary, and Haack 1974:282 agrees. To begin with, C&L complain that it commits one to allowing that in some contexts statements of the form "*a*"="*a*" are false. They regard this as absurd, but it's not. One can imagine someone ascribing different truth-values to different tokens of the liar sentence (L).

(L) (L) is false.

How do we avoid deducing that (L) is both truth and false? Tokenists tell us that it is by recognizing that one deduction establishes one token of (L) as true, another deduction establishes a different token of (L) as false; in a word, tokenists say, equivalence between "(L) is false" and "(L) is false" fails because

(22) "(L) is false" ≠ "(L) is false".

Regardless of whether tokenists are right about (L)'s truth-values, it seems that they succeed in using the two quotations in (21) to refer to distinct tokens.

C&L suggest that speaker/hearers who understand (23) *paraphrase* it as (23').

(23) "I" refers to me.

(23') The token of "I" in this sentence refers to me.

Of course speaker/hearers do not literally *restate* (23) as (23'), either out loud or sotto voce. Evidently C&L's intention is that (23) *means* the same as (23'), or more pedantically that (23) means the same as (23").

(23") The token of "I" in (23) refers to me.

But to acknowledge that a speaker uses (23) to denote what (23") does is to concede my point!

Finally, C&L suggest that the language community may simply be mistaken, due to metaphysical misapprehension, in thinking that its quotations

refer to anything other than expression types. While their scenario is indeed conceivable, C&L's desperate appeal to ignorance hardly undermines the multiplicity thesis. It would be just as reasonable to say that the conceivability of Cappelen and Lepore being robot spies from Mars undermines our current belief that they are human beings.

(ii) THE MULTIPLICITY THESIS IN PERSPECTIVE. While C&L 1999:§3-4 energetically criticize Saka 1998 for advocating the multiplicity thesis, I confess I do not completely understand their motivation. True, Davidson stated that quotations always refer to expression types as individuated by shape, but I never took this element of the Demonstrative Theory seriously, and indeed Garcia-Carpintero 1994:259-61, defending the Demonstrative Theory, asks us not to.

What's more, C&L's rejection of the multiplicity thesis goes against their own work. Because C&L 1999b:216 place no semantic constraints on the same-tokening relation, I take it that x tokens the same as y iff there is some contextually delimited type F such that x and y each belong to F . Consequently (1), given analysis (1"), allows many readings.

(1) "Lobster" is a word.

(1") $\forall x$ (x is a word if x tokens the same as that). Lobster

Although "that" in (1") univocally refers to a token, what gets predicated (1) varies according to context (all members of a given word-form, of a given word-class, of a unit class, etc.). In effect, C&L's analysis entails the multiplicity thesis.

That said, I readily acknowledge that expression types may be privileged as the *typical* or *default* referent of quotation. I also acknowledge that language may evolve to the point when double apostrophes conventionally single out just expression types -- which would be imaginable if single apostrophes, italics, and so forth came into standard use for singling out other sorts of mention. But, like Gomez-Torrente 2001:128, I deny that the issue matters much to what is really at stake. The singularity thesis is not integral to the Demonstrative Theory, nor is the multiplicity thesis "central" to the Identity Theory, pace C&L 1999:141.

6. The Use-Mention Distinction is Relevant

The use-mention distinction bears on our understanding of quotation. First I argue that neglecting the distinction keeps us in the dark, then I argue that respecting the distinction is illuminating.

(i) AGAINST NEGLECTING THE DISTINCTION. Recall that the Demonstrative Theory treats (21) and (21') as equivalent, yet (21') appears to be self-contradictory.

(21) "You are either with us or against us" is an Orwellian lie.

(21') (a) You are either with us or against us. (b) That is an Orwellian lie.

Davidson responds that (a) is not asserted, it is merely "said". What does it mean to say something? Davidson seems to suggest that saying is non-intentional, that it amounts to uttering, when he defines quotation as a relation to an expression *shape*. The problem is that the objects of utterance, mere syllables, are neither true nor false. If quotation is defined by reference to uttering then (21) claims that sounds as sounds can be false, when in fact it seems that only interpretations of sounds, or sounds relativized to interpretations, have truth-value. Davidson himself appears to acknowledge this elsewhere when he says that truth-values are borne by *structural descriptions* (lexemes plugged into trees). On the other hand, if saying is more than flapping one's gums, to say is to make an assertion, pose a question, issue a directive, exclaim, attribute words to others, cite... But if one explains quotation in terms of saying and saying in terms of attributing or citing, one doesn't get very far. The resulting account of quotation is circular or at best incomplete.

C&L do spend one sentence on mentioning: "expression e is mentioned in an utterance u just in case the token of e occurring in u is produced in order to be demonstrated so as to talk about tokens that same-token it" (1997: fn 8). Not only does this formulation contain minor flaws -- e.g. speakers talk, expressions do not, and even then speakers do not always talk about the expressions that they mention

-- more to the point, in consigning their discussion to a footnote C&L marginalize the essential relation between quoting and mentioning.

(ii) FOR RESPECTING THE DISTINCTION. I believe that by examining the use-mention distinction, specifically how it develops both historically and in the individual, we find evidence for the correct theory of quotation.

I treat the use-mention distinction as a matter of how language is used. Being thus independent of the lexico-grammatical peculiarities of languages, the distinction presumably applies to all languages; a speaker of any language can intend to draw attention to an expression. This is true even for a language without quotation marks. Such is easy to imagine, for ancient languages lack quotation marks, as do juvenile versions of modern languages. Now imagine that you, a child, wish to write that you've learned a new word one day, "uranium". You start by writing, "I learned a new word today". How do you finish?

(24) It is this. uranium

(25) It is this: uranium.

(26) It is this, uranium.

(27) It is URANIUM.

(28) It is uranium.

(29) It is "uranium".

I grant that (24, 25) are real possibilities. This shows that it is possible to mention by means of paratactic demonstrating, though it does not show that such is either necessary or typical, nor that this is how quotation works. A more common and natural way for children to write is probably (26), which, though demonstrative, is not paratactic. Also to be expected would be (27) and (28). Those children who underline, box, capitalize, or otherwise fancify the quoted matter, as in (27), are inventing their own quotation marks, perhaps though not necessarily as an effort to represent in writing some feature of speech. It is the naturalness of the likes of (28) that establishes that proto-language, be it juvenile English or Old English, does not

grammatically require either demonstrative reference to that which is mentioned nor paratactic separation of that which mentions from that which is mentioned.

The question now is this: in the development from ancient to modern language, or from juvenile language to mature, which hypothesis is most plausible for explaining current conventions of quotation?

- (a) Elite speakers (editors and whatnot), realizing the ambiguity of (28), first took (28) and secondly supplemented it with innovated disambiguating punctuation.
- (b) Speakers first took (24), secondly replaced the ordinary demonstrative with quotation marks, thirdly moved the quoted matter into the sentence at surface form but not logical form, and fourthly banished (28) as a way of mentioning.

The answer, of course, is that simplicity overwhelmingly favors (a).

7. Quotation is Unitary

Considerations of simplicity favor the Identity Theory, and what's more those of scope and unity do too. In particular, the Demonstrative Theory fails to achieve both the unity that it purports to and the unity found by the Identity Theory.

(i) KINDS OF DISCOURSE. Let's consider in precise detail C&L's 1997 unification of indirect discourse (30), direct discourse (31), and mixed discourse (32).

(30) Clinton said that he'd cut taxes.

(31) Clinton said, "I'll cut taxes."

(32) Clinton said that he'd "cut taxes".

To begin with, every discourse report existentially quantifies over some utterance *u* and relates the speaker to *u*. For indirect discourse, *u* is related to paratactic material by the relation of "same-saying"; for direct discourse they are related by "same-tokening"; and mixed discourse expresses both relations.

(30') $\exists u(\text{SAID}_{c,u} \ \& \ \text{SAME-SAID}_u, \text{that}). \text{he'd cut taxes}$

(31') $\exists u(\text{SAID}_{c,u} \ \& \ \text{SAME-TOKENED}_u, \text{that}). \text{I'll cut taxes}$

(32') $\exists u(\text{SAID}_{c,u} \ \& \ \text{SAME-SAID}_u, x \ \& \ \text{SAME-TOKENED}_u, y). \text{he'd cut taxes}$
[where x points to "he'd cut taxes", y points to "cut taxes"]

My first objection is that C&L's account fails to unify discourse reports because C&L equivocate in their construal of "say". On the one hand, if "said" expressed a single relation, SAID, then (30') and (32') would have no source for their SAME-SAID. On the other hand, if "said" expressed two relations at once, SAID and SAME-SAID, then we should expect (31') to include SAME-SAID. It appears that for C&L "said" is ambiguous, sometimes expressing a single relation and sometimes two, which contradicts the unification claim.

To construe "say" uniformly suggests revising (31') as:

(31'') $\exists u(\text{SAID}_{c,u} \ \& \ \text{SAME-SAID}_u, \text{that} \ \& \ \text{SAME-TOKENED}_u, \text{that}). \text{I'll cut taxes}$

Unlike the original, the revised proposal treats alike the various modes of discourse report ((30), (31), (32)) except in regard to what, if anything, gets same-tokened. However, (31''), like (31'), still fails to entail (30'). Even worse, (32'') entails that Clinton said that I, not he, would cut taxes.

A deeper objection is that SAME-SAY and SAME-TOKEN are nearly vacuous. The former has "no apriori constraints" (1997:218) and does not mean "say the same as" (p. 280), the latter "is not settled by the semantics" (p. 216) and evidently is inequivalent to "tokens the same as". Such official disclaimers may be palatable if we had some inarticulate conception of how speakers might manage to same-say without same-tokening, but even that much is elusive. Ordinarily, I take it, same-saying is a subset of the same-tokening relation: Marcel Marceau same-tokens Marlo Thomas, for both belong to the type CELEBRITY, yet they do not same-say, for Marlo speaks while Marcel (suppose) says nothing. On the other hand, if (31) is to come close to entailing (30), the reverse would seem to be

required (modulo indexical details) -- same-tokening should be a subset of same-saying. It looks like unification is bought at the cost of losing empirical content, which makes this unification not so valuable after all. (The lack of empirical bite means there is no way to evaluate Tsohatzidis 1998, a fact that in itself undermines C&L 1998.)

In short, if the difference among discourse reports is in the pragmatics, as C&L seem to suggest, why then do they ascribe distinct logical forms to them?

(ii) MORE KINDS OF QUOTATION. C&L 1999:§6 state that it is impossible to account for quotation without a theory of indirect discourse, challenging Identity Theorists "to yield a unified theory of opacity" (1997:219). Since they themselves give no account of non-discourse opacities, e.g. modal opacity, I question the seriousness of the challenge. More importantly, indirect discourse is not opaque, or at least it doesn't seem to be so opaque as direct discourse. It's far from obvious that a theory of the one requires a theory of the other.

Granted, the Demonstrative Theory, using the device of parataxis, gives a unified account of discourse reports, whereas I have almost nothing to say about indirect discourse. This means that, were all else equal, the Demonstrative Theory would be superior. However, the Demonstrative Theory fails to give unified accounts of phenomena that are intuitively related. First, its account of cited matter does not cohere with its account of reported matter. C&L, recall, treat discourse reports as existential quantifications (30'-32') while treating metalinguistic citations as universal quantifications (1").³ (They do mention the possibility of adding a universal quantifier to the logical forms of discourse (fn 7), but even then logical forms for discourse and for citation will inexplicably vary according to the number of quantifiers they contain.) Second, the Demonstrative Theory fails to identify the common denominator of quotation-marked mentionings and plain mentionings. Third, it fails to see any resemblance between quotation marks and the disambiguating determinatives of Egyptian writing. Fourth, C&L give no account of scare quotes at all.

A Demonstrative analysis of scare quotes is in fact available from Benbaji 2004. Elsewhere I argue that it cannot explain the full range of scare quoting (xxxx), and here I object to it for not treating quotation as a single kind of phenomenon. Benbaji himself insists that quotation marks have "only one linguistic meaning... if we loosen our criterion for sameness of linguistic meanings" (2005:§1), but I cannot take this seriously. First, Benbaji appears to admit at least two kinds of quotation rule: his own "echoed speaker" rules, and a non-echoic rule for interpreting citations. Second, Benbaji writes:

Do quotation marks have the same meaning in every context in which they occur? No! In my view, the role of quotation marks varies... This, however, is not a disadvantage, since ambiguity is part of the data.
[2004a:§5.3d; cp. 2004b:107]

In particular, Benbaji points to:

(33) "Londres" is pretty.

On its citational reading, (33) states that a certain word is pretty; on its scare-quote reading, (33) states that something which someone has called "Londres" is pretty. That these are indeed distinct readings may thus seem to vindicate Benbaji's claim that the theory of quotation require divergent semantic rules.

This viewpoint assumes that distinct readings require distinct semantics. But to see that they don't, consider "green eggs and ham". Two different readings result from the same lexemes and the same combinatorial rules, the difference being in the order of rule application and not in the rules themselves. This gives a short and uncontroversial proof that distinct readings do not require linguistically distinct rules; with more time and more controversy one could argue that distinct readings do not require linguistically distinct representations either (Atlas 1989). Just as scope ambiguity justifies positing neither two words "and" nor two rules of conjunction, so too the kind of ambiguity in (33) does not in itself motivate a motley theory of quotation.

To summarize the main points: C&L, inspired by Davidson, offer a theory to unify (30-32) but it does not even purport to apply to (1, 7, 18). Benbaji, attempting to extend the approach further, deals with all but (18) but not in a unified way. My approach, on the other hand, consists of two components (xxxx). My treatment of mention unifies all but (30), and my treatment of quotation unifies (31, 32, 1, 7).

(30) Clinton said that he'd cut taxes.

(31) Clinton said, "I'll cut taxes."

(32) Clinton said that he'd "cut taxes".

(1) "Lobster" is a word.

(7) Ishmael floated "above" the other astronaut.

(18) Chang is the most common name in the world.

I believe that it is my theory which gets the scope of inquiry correct.

(iii) MORE PRAGMATICS. My approach leans heavily on pragmatic associations. Appeals to pragmatic associations are necessary for understanding countless linguistic phenomena, for instance echo questions and ellipsis.

(34) A: I'm leaving.

B: You're leaving?!

Echo questions appear to seek confirmation or to express affect regarding the interlocutor's words. But Noh 1998 observes that echo questions need not hitch on to *words* in prior discourse.

(34') A: [heads toward door]

B: You're leaving?!

Elliptical statement (35) may be interpreted according to strict identity (Joyce parked Mark's car) or by sloppy identity (Joyce parked her own car).

(35) Mark parked his car and Joyce did too.

In the case of sloppy identity, the interpreter understands the second-clause predicate in terms that match neither the reference nor the sense of the first clause; the second-clause interpretation is not generated by the literal meaning of the first

clause, it is constructed by pragmatic principles operating on what has been made manifest by the first clause.

Echo questions and ellipsis are but two examples that illustrate the rich non-linguistic/linguistic interface and the power of pragmatics, in particular the significance of ostension. Given that pragmatic principles govern the production and comprehension of (34', 35), I believe that methodological concerns of simplicity, scope, and unity impel us to seek pragmatic principles in explaining as much of language as we can, including quotation.

8. Conclusion

Demonstrative Theorists maintain, and Identity Theorists deny, that quotation marks are referential and that quoted matter is no part of the sentences they appear in. Disagreements between the parties persist in part because of questions concerning the grammaticality and interpretability of examples like (17-19). Such disagreement is diagnosed in (i), and my paper is summarized in (ii).

(i) DISCIPLINARY DIFFERENCES. Linguists and philosophers sometimes talk past one another because they carry distinct preconceptions of language. According to traditional linguistics, spoken languages constitute a natural kind (modulo signed languages). Written languages do not belong to this kind, they are not coordinate to spoken languages but *representations thereof*. This view is supported by the fact that spoken language is "natural" in ways that written language is not: it is culturally universal, found in every society; it is socially universal, found in every class and member of society, even the retarded; it is acquired without deliberate instruction; and it is used spontaneously, rapidly, and without conscious effort. Many philosophers, in contrast, prioritize written language over spoken, perhaps under the delusion that the durable is "more real" than the transitory.

Recognizing this difference is important for clearing up a number of confusions. In the quotation literature, for example, Recanati claims that (36, 36') are the same sentence.

(36) Alice said that life is difficult to understand.

(36') Alice said that life is "difficult to understand".

In response, Predelli 2003:19 calls Recanati's claim "bizarre". But Recanati does not claim that the writing in (36, 36') are the same; he claims that (36, 36') can represent the same spoken sentence.

Another difference is the tendency for linguists to think of languages as psychological objects and for philosophers to think of them as logical objects. C&L manifest the latter conception when they stipulate a language in which all mentionings are quotation-marked. If they are citing a *logical* possibility then they aren't grappling with the linguist's concerns. If they purport to cite a *nomological* possibility for the class of all natural human languages, then they are begging the question.

Another misunderstanding arises when C&L take issue with the methodological principle that syntactic structure is defeasibly to be taken as corresponding to semantic structure (cf. the Grammaticality Constraint of Jackendoff 1983, Saka 1998, the Interface Rule of Stainton 1999, the *ceteris paribus desideratum* of Pietroski 1999). They rightfully recognize this principle as a threat to their project, so they try to offer a counter-example to it, namely a case of recursive syntax without recursive semantics.

Consider the recursive orthographic rule: "If α is a quotable item of English, then so is α concatenated with α ." For example, since "Aristotle" is a quotable item of English, then so is "AristotleAristotle"... [1999:§5]
But this seems to be mistaken because the reason I can quote "AristotleAristotle" is not that I can quote "Aristotle", it is that I can quote any graphic shape whatsoever. Hence C&L's rule, though it helps to specify a possible language in

one sense of "language", is not a "psychologically real" or causally efficacious rule in any natural language.

In correspondence C&L write that because the Demonstrative Theory is semantic and mine is pragmatic, the two cannot possibly conflict. If this were true then their subsequent arguments in favor of their theory over mine would be irrelevant. The fact is, pragmatic and semantic explanations can rival each other much as psychiatric and demonological explanations of eccentric behavior rival each other. Indeed, xxxx and the present paper form a diptych whose point is to diminish the role of semantics, as understood by platonists and other realists, in all linguistic explanation.

(ii) SUMMARY. My theory, whereby quotation marks signal disambiguating intent, makes several predictions. First, slapdash writers oblivious to possible ambiguity will frequently omit quotation marks. Second, quotation marks will be omitted even by careful editors in cases, such as written plays, where ambiguity is systematically not a problem. Third, if quotation marks were added by some amateur playwright, as in (16"), they would be regarded as inelegant, but not as uninterpretable, by those familiar with the norms of playwrighting.

(16") STARKEY: "Is it dangerous?"

MAJOR: "Not for those who survive."

Fourth, as first noticed by Wertheimer 1999:515, it will be unusual to find quotation marks around non-linguistic material, for lack of ambiguity.

(37) The color within the square, □, is white.

These facts and others favor the Identity Theory over the Demonstrative Theory.

Most crucially, the ill-formedness of example (3) establishes the integration thesis, that quotations *include* their quoted matter, and it also establishes the punctuation thesis, that quotation marks are not referring terms.

(3) "" is a word.

Sections 2 and 3 mount additional evidence for the same conclusions, and they furthermore support each other: if *either* section is correct, that would count as grounds for the other.

Section 4 observes that (18) is not the result of performance error, it is grammatical.

(18) Chang is the most common name in the world.

Furthermore, if (18) is grammatical then we seem to have a word referring to itself, in accordance with the Identity Theory. We certainly do not have demonstratives doing the referring. All of this suggests that the simplest account of (18') is that it too has no demonstrative referring terms.

(18') "Chang" is the most common name in the world.

This conclusion is reinforced in section 6, which speculates on the transition from a primitive language to one having quotation.

Section 7 extends methodological considerations from simplicity to unifying scope. On this score too the Identity Theory comes off better than the Demonstrative Theory. Section 5, on the singularity versus multiplicity theses, though it does not bear on the dispute between the Demonstrative and Identity Theories, is important for a complete understanding of quotation.

I conclude that the Identity Theory is a contender that deserves at least some consideration. It should not be dismissed out of hand, contra C&L 1997:213. Quite the opposite, I find C&L's account to be neither "enormously attractive" nor "almost irresistible" (C&L 1997:217-18).

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¹ Gomez-Torrente dissociates himself from the Identity Theory for reasons similar to those of Saka 1998. In taking quotation marks plus quoted matter as jointly referring in (1), Saka and Gomez-Torrente both differ from classical Identity Theory. They come near enough, however, for purposes at least of this article. (Gomez-Torrente calls himself a Tarskian, but does so only by denying the traditional interpretation of Tarski as a Name Theorist.)

² This argument is anticipated by Gomez-Torrente 2001:130. I wish to emphasize it, to point out the two distinct conclusions, to consider how paratacticians might respond to at least one of them (§2ii), and to deny Gomez-Torrente's assertion that it extends against the Identity Theory.

³ Examples like (1) are called "pure quotation" by C&L 1997 and "closed quotation" by Recanati 2001, but these neologisms are confusing given that "citation" is already established by linguists for this purpose.