WPCʭ ۺ#/,ﾥJUi)+rZ!ˈiݩo!.ѽl~ߍ^.۪A΍@/ g]5?d]a2lȀ80{sɞ  *gL=3V*eZ۴ %Ϗ` a~~tkӥlV>dd#!uoM4M "aMNU<R 1k 0Cf< 8$'F/#6 77A kGCSCSgU6‚U6 0e.UL % 72 0' 1u݇wR4Vj ml(N  }}a B^ ^^l\  `$Times NewRoman$35;AGOW_e11.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1.a.($     \\R3' Letter\  !NOUS.,,,. T@RW6&A43'6&A43'T @  _XXXX88B.88@ HPX "XB 2z  1XX 2z_The_Ԁ_ethnic_Ԁ_breakdown_Ԁ_of_Ԁ_the_Ԁstudentsin_the_Ԁschool_district_Ԁdisd52%_Hispanic_,34%_African_Ԅ_American_,11% 8 _white_Ԁand4%_Asian_._The_Ԁ_registered_Ԁ_voter_Ԁ_population_Ԁin_the_Ԁschool_district_Ԁis_approximately_Ԁ57%_white_,25%_African_Ԅ  _American_,15%_Hispanic_Ԁand3%_Asian_.XX 2z  !NOUS.,,,. T@RW6&A43'6&A43'T @  _XXXX88B.88@ HPX "XB 2z    2  _SXX 2zince_Ԁ_the_Ԁ_sample_Ԁ_was_Ԁ_drawn_Ԁfrom_the_Ԁpolllist_we_Ԁ_could_Ԁ_determine_Ԁ_the_Ԁage_of_Ԁ_the_Ԁ_respondent_Ԁfrom_the_Ԁ_voter_ 8 _registration_Ԁlist_before_Ԁ_the_Ԁ_interview_._We_Ԁ_used_Ԁa_stratified_Ԁ_random_Ԁ_process_Ԁto_sample_Ԁ_the_Ԁunder65and_the_Ԁ65andover $ _population_._Based_Ԁ_on_Ԁdata_kept_Ԁby_the_ԀCounty_Clerk_Ԁ_of_Ԁ_Courts_,_we_Ԁknow_approximately_Ԁ_the_Ԁage_distribution_Ԁ_of_Ԁ_those_  _who_Ԁ_voted_Ԁin_the_Ԁbond_election_XX 2zXX 2z,_so_Ԁ_we_Ԁ_can_Ԁ_weight_Ԁ_the_Ԁ_sample_Ԁ_based_Ԁ_on_Ԁage._This_Ԁage_distribution_Ԁis_clearly_Ԁ_biased_ t _toward_Ԁolder_voters_._Approximately_Ԁ5%_of_Ԁ_the_Ԁ_voters_Ԁ_were_Ԁunder30,43%_were_Ԁ_between_Ԁ30and49,19%_were_Ԁ_between_ p8 50and64,22%_were_Ԁ_between_Ԁ65and74and11%_were_Ԁover75._We_Ԁ_say_Ԁ_approximately_Ԁ_because_Ԁ17%_of_Ԁ_those_Ԁ_on_Ԁ_the_ 4 _voter_Ԁ_registration_Ԁlistdonotreport_their_Ԁ_exact_Ԁage.XX 2zXX 2zӀ_The_Ԁ_ethnic_Ԁ_distribution_Ԁ_was_Ԁ_estimated_Ԁfrom_precinct_Ԅ_level_Ԁ_returns_.  _The_Ԁ_response_Ԁrate_was_Ԁ73_percent_,andis_defined_Ԁas_completions_/_completions_Ԁ+partial_completions_Ԁ+_refusals_Ԁ+ringno   _answer_Ԁ+_ineligible_Ԁ+_answering_Ԁ_machine_.XX 2z . !NOUS.,,,. T@RW6&A43'6&A43'T @  XXXX88B.88@ HPX "XB 2z    1  XX 2zGiventhesmallsamplesizeforblacksandHispanics,wereportsignificancelevelsatp.<.10.XX 2z  !NOUS.,,,. T@RW6&A43'6&A43'T @  _XXXX88B.88@ HPX "XB 2z    2  XX 2z_This_Ԁis_simply_Ԁamatter_of_Ԁ_renaming_Ԁ_the_Ԁ_concept_._What_Ԁ_was_Ԁ_once_Ԁ_called_Ԁ _symbolic_Ԁ_racism_is_now_Ԁmore_aptly_ 8 _called_Ԁ _racial_Ԁ_resentment_(_Kinder_Ԁand_Sanders_Ԁ1996)._The_Ԁ_questions_,_however_,are_the_Ԁsame.For_this_Ԁ_sample_,_the_  _correlation_Ԁ_between_Ԁ_items_Ԁ_was_Ԁ.29.XX 2z < !NOUS.,,,. T@RW6&A43'6&A43'T @  _XXXX88B.88@ HPX "XB 2z    3  XX 2z_We_Ԁ_regard_Ԁ_this_Ԁ_item_Ԁas_symbolic_Ԁ_since_Ԁit_combines_Ԁan_implied_Ԁrace/_ethnicity_Ԁ_dimension_Ԁ_with_Ԁa_traditional_ 8 _public_Ԁpolicy(_noncitizens_Ԁin_the_Ԁcountry_illegally_Ԁ_should_Ԁnotbe_educated_Ԁat_taxpayer_Ԁ_expense_).XX 2zHP LaserJet 11000 !NOUS.,,,. T@RW6&A43'6&A43'T @  _XXXX88B.88@ HPX "XB 2z    2  XX 2z_We_Ԁ_also_Ԁ_subtracted_Ԁ_the_Ԁblackand_Hispanic_Ԁratingfrom_the_Ԁ_white_Ԁrating,and_used_Ԁ_these_Ԁ_differences_Ԁscoresas H _correlates_._They_Ԁ_were_Ԁ_nonsignificant_Ԁ_except_Ԁfora_coefficient_Ԁ_of_Ԁ.13for_the_Ԁ_white_Ԅ_Hispanic_Ԁ_difference_Ԁ_among_Ԁ_whites_.For   _these_Ԁ_reasons_,_plus_Ԁ_those_Ԁ_discussed_Ԁ_above_,_we_Ԁ_shall_Ԁ_use_Ԁ_the_Ԁ_symbolic_Ԁ_racism_Ԁ_scale_Ԁto_measure_Ԁ_racial_Ԁ_resentment_Ԁin_the_  _multivariate_Ԁ_analysis_.XX 2z  !NOUS.,,,. T@RW6&A43'6&A43'T @  _XXXX88B.88@ HPX "XB 2z    1  XX 2z_We_Ԁ_use_Ԁdifferent_measures_Ԁ_of_Ԁ_racial_Ԁand/or_ethnic_Ԁ_resentment_Ԁfor_each_Ԁ_racial_Ԁ_group_Ԁ_which_Ԁ_also_Ԁ_argues_Ԁfora 8 separate_analysis_Ԁby_racial_/_ethnic_Ԁ_group_ XX 2z. !NOUS.,,,. T@RW6&A43'6&A43'T @  _XXXX88B.88@ HPX "XB 2z    2  XX 2zFor_instance_,in_the_Ԁ_study_Ԁ_of_Ԁ_presidential_Ԁ_popularity_Ԁa_common_Ԁ_generalization_Ԁis_that_Ԁan_international_Ԁ_crisis_ 8 _leads_Ԁtoan_upward_Ԁ_spike_Ԁin_presidential_Ԁ_popularity_.A_good_Ԁ_example_Ԁis_the_Ԁ1991Gulf_War_.Forall_respondents_,_the_  time_series_Ԁ_shows_Ԁalargepositive_coefficient_Ԁ(rally_effect_)for_the_Ԁ_Iraqi_Ԁ_invasion_._But_Ԁ_looking_Ԁatblack_respondents_Ԁ_only_,  _there_Ԁisno_popularity_Ԁ_increase_Ԁ(_Dawson_Ԁ1994)._We_Ԁ_found_Ԁ_much_Ԁ_the_Ԁsame_thing_Ԁfor_these_Ԁdata._Important_Ԁ_ethnic_/_racial_ L _differences_Ԁare_missed_Ԁina_common_Ԁ_sample_Ԁ_with_Ԁasimple_control_Ԁforrace.XX 2z  !NOUS.,,,. T@RW6&A43'6&A43'T @  _XXXX88B.88@ HPX "XB 2z    3  XX 2z_The_Ԁ _public_Ԁ_financed_Ԁ_education_Ԁforillegal_immigrants__item_Ԁis_correlated_Ԁat.55_with_Ԁ_the_Ԁ_symbolic_Ԁ_racism_Ԁ_scale_ 8 d_among_Ԁ_whites_d,_which_Ԁ_suggests_ _among_Ԁ_whites_ _they_Ԁare_measuring_Ԁ_the_Ԁsamelatent_concept_.Asingle_factor_Ԁ_hypothesis_Ԁis  _also_Ԁ_supported_Ԁbya_confirmatory_Ԁ_factor_Ԁ_analysis_Ԁ_of_Ԁ_the_Ԁ_three_Ԁ_items_.Asingle_factor_Ԁ_solution_Ԁisdad_better_Ԁ_fit_Ԁto_the_Ԁdata_than_  a_two_Ԁ_factor_Ԁ_solution_,_which_Ԁ_posits_Ԁ_the_Ԁ_immigration_Ԁ_item_Ԁ_loads_Ԁ_on_Ԁa_second_,_orthogonal_Ԁ_factor_._The_Ԁnull_model_ԀhasaX2 L _value_Ԁ_of_Ԁ157.3;_the_Ԁ_one_Ԁ_factor_Ԁ_solution_ԀhasaX2_value_Ԁ_of_Ԁ47.8_while_Ԁ_the_Ԁ_two_Ԁ_factor_Ԁ_solution_ԀhasaX2_of_Ԁ126.9._The_ H _loadings_Ԁfor_the_Ԁsingle_factor_Ԁ_solution_Ԁare.728_on_Ԁ_the_Ԁ_immigration_Ԁ_item_,.721_on_Ԁ_the_Ԁfirst_racial_Ԁ_resentment_Ԁ_item_Ԁand.776   _on_Ԁ_the_Ԁ_second_Ԁ_racial_Ԁ_resentment_Ԁ_items_Ԁ(_see_ԀAppendixfor_question_Ԁ_wording_)._Using_Ԁ_only_Ԁ_the_Ԁ_conventional_Ԁ_two_Ԁ_items_,_the_  b_of_Ԁ.22drops_only_Ԁ_slightly_Ԁtoab_of_Ԁ.18.XX 2z  !NOUS.,,,. T@RW6&A43'6&A43'T @  _XXXX88B.88@ HPX "XB    1  XX_The_Ԁ_change_Ԁin_probability_Ԁis_computed_Ԁ_using_ԀPetersons(1985)_corrected_Ԁ_method_Ԁas_modified_Ԁby_Kaufman_ 8 (1996)._Kaufman_s_modification_Ԁ_involves_Ԁ_simply_Ԁ_moving_Ԁ_along_Ԁ_the_Ԁ_logistic_Ԁ_curve_Ԁin_both_Ԁ_directions_Ԁ_away_Ԁfrom_the_  _reference_Ԁ_point_,as_opposed_Ԁto_moving_Ԁ_the_Ԁsame_direction_._This_Ԁ_solves_Ԁ_the_Ԁproblem_of_Ԁ_potentially_Ԁ_biased_Ԁ_estimates_Ԁfor  _multicategory_Ԁ_dummies_Ԁ_that_Ԁ_can_Ԁ_occur_Ԁ_using_ԀPetersons_correction_._The_Ԁ_formula_Ԁfor_computing_Ԁ_the_Ԁ_change_Ԁin_probability_ L _coefficients_Ԁis: H XXXXԀ   XXXX̌_PXX3šXX̌3sj_ԀXX,3šXX̌3sӀ=XX3šXX̌3s򀀀1XX3šXX̌3sӀXX3šXX̌3s򀀀1XX3šXX̌3s,XX3šXX̌3sXX,3šXX̌3sӀ_where_ԀXX3šXX̌3sLXX3šXX̌3sӀ=lnXX3šXX̌3s򀀀_PXX3šXX̌3sref_XX,3šXX̌3s򀀀XX3šXX̌3sӀXX3šXX̌3sӀXX3šXX̌3sXX,3šXX̌3sӀ  XX3šXX̌3sӀ1+XX3šXX̌3seXX3šXX̌3s򀀄(XX,3šXX̌3sLXX,3šXX̌3s+_bXX,3š,,XX3sj_XX,,3sXX̌3s)XX,3šXX̌3sӀ1+XX3šXX̌3seXX3šXX̌3s򀀄(XX,3šXX̌3sLXX,3šXX̌3s_bXX,3š,,XX3sj_XX,,3sXX̌3s)XX,3šXX̌3sӀ"1XX3šXX̌3s_Pref_XX,3šXX̌3sӀ_ _  m XX3šY $Map Symbols<6X9`(Courier New((2_$ !NOUS.,,,. TRV6&A4X3' Letter 6&A43'T   X+XXXX+XXX+88    0  3|Px9 Z4Times New Roman NormalXi)($NOUS.,,,. TRW6&A43'6&A43'T  3#37=CIQYag1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)nL(@8P!$U _$NOUS.,,,. XXXXXXXX88    1    _XX_There_Ԁis,_however_,a_great_Ԁ_deal_Ԁ_of_Ԁ_similadritdy_Ԁ_among_Ԁschoolbond_elections_.AsHamiltonand_Cohen_Ԁ(1973) 8 note,bond_elections_Ԁ_bear_Ԁa_strong_Ԁ_resemblance_Ԁto_legislative_Ԁ_elections_Ԁin_the_Ԁformer_Soviet_ԀUnion._There_Ԁis_only_Ԁ_one_  _visible_Ԁ_campaign_!_that_Ԁ_favoring_Ԁ_passage_Ԁ_of_Ԁ_the_Ԁbond._There_Ԁis_almost_Ԁno_visible_Ԁ_counter_Ԅ_campaign_._That_Ԁ_pattern_Ԁ_very_  _much_Ԁ_characterized_Ԁ_this_Ԁ_particular_Ԁ_election_._The_Ԁbond_issue_Ԁ_was_Ԁ_vocally_Ԁ_supported_Ԁby_the_Ԁbusiness_community_,most L _civic_Ԁ_organizations_Ԁand_the_Ԁ_local_Ԁmedia._The_Ԁ_only_Ԁ_source_Ԁ_of_Ԁ_opposition_Ԁ_was_Ԁa_poorly_Ԁ_funded_Ԁ_property_Ԁ_rights_Ԁ_group_, H _which_Ԁ_argued_Ԁ_property_Ԁ_taxes_Ԁ_were_Ԁ_already_Ԁ_too_Ԁhighand_the_Ԁschool_administration_Ԁ_should_Ԁmakedo_with_Ԁ_current_Ԁ_revenues_.#XX# 2zӀ !NOUS.,,,. T@RW6&A43'6&A43'T @  _XXXX88B.88@ HPX "XB    1  XX_This_Ԁ_pattern_Ԁ_can_Ԁbe_seen_Ԁmost_clearly_Ԁby_collapsing_Ԁtrust_into_Ԁ_two_Ԁ_categories_!most_of_Ԁ_the_Ԁtime/_some_Ԁ_of_Ԁ_the_Ԁtime 8 anda_little_/notatall.Under_this_Ԁ_scheme_,41%_of_Ԁ_whites_Ԁ_distrust_Ԁ_government_,28%_of_Ԁ_blacks_Ԁand38%_of_Ԁ_Hispanics_._But_  _of_Ԁ_the_Ԁ_distrusting_Ԁ_whites_,59%_voted_Ԁ_against_Ԁ_the_Ԁbond,72%_of_Ԁ_the_Ԁ_distrusting_Ԁ_blacks_Ԁ_voted_Ԁ_against_,and62% _foo_ _of_Ԁ_the_  _Hispanics_Ԁd_voters_d. L #XXd# W _$NOUS.,,,. XXXXXXXX88    1    _XXԀdGiven_our_Ԁ_conceptualization_Ԁ_the_Ԁrace_items_Ԁ_cannot_Ԁbe_used_Ԁin_the_Ԁsame_manner_Ԁ_across_Ԁall_groups_d.d_The_Ԁ_racial_ H _resentment_Ԁ_scale_Ԁisnotrelevantford_blacks_,d_who_d_would_Ԁin_essence_Ԁbe_askded_difd_they_Ԁd_racially_Ԁ_resent_Ԁfellow_African_Ԅ   _Americans_, .dIn_addition_d, _the_Ԁ_publicly_Ԁ_funded_Ԁ_education_Ԁforillegal_immigrants_Ԁ_will_,to_many_,_reference_Ԁ_Hispanics_Ԁdand  _therefore_dit_too_Ԁ_does_Ԁnot_fit_Ԁ_with_Ԁ_our_Ԁ_conceptualization_._The_Ԁsame_logic_Ԁ_holds_Ԁfor_the_Ԁ_feeling_Ԁ_thermometer_Ԁrating_of_ L _blacks_Ԁand_Hispanics_Ԁ_reported_Ԁin_Table_Ԁ1.#XX# dV(  TTRV6&A4Y03' Letter 6&A4 3' LetterT TTRV6&A4Y03' Letter 6&A4 3' LetterT !NOUS.,,,. TRV6&A4X3' Letter 6&A43'T   _TRY03' LetterV6&A4 3' Letter 6&A4TUSNO,.XXXXB.` hp x (#XB (43CYX    Age,Race,SelfInterestandFinancingPublicSchoolsThroughReferenda 8      KentL.Tedin  " RichardE.Matland !# GregoryR.Weiher "$     UniversityofHouston p$&      `    JOPSubmission8/28/99 \% ' 88B.88@ HPX "XBӀ  +&. CYX CTRV6&A4Y03' Letter 6&A4 3' LetterT C  TRY03' LetterV6&A4 3' Letter 6&A4T8`YX  FinancingpublicschoolsintheUnitedStatesoverthenextseveraldecadesseemsdestined 8 tobeoneofthemostcontentiousissuesfacinglocalgovernment.InstatessuchasCalifornia,  Texas,Arizona,Florida,NorthCarolinaandMassachusettstheDepartmentofEducation(DOE) P projectsa20percentormorestudentenrollmentincreaseoverthenextdecade.Tocopewiththis 0  influx,aDOEreportsaysabout6,000additionalschoolsneedtobebuilt(OlsonandHendrie1998).   Schooldistrictsacrossthecountryare,however,hardpressedtosimplymaintainexistingschools,  H  letalonebuildnewones.Ithasbeenestimatedthatforthe50largestschooldistrictsthereisa (  backlogofmorethan13.3billiondollarsindeferredmaintenanceandrepairs(CounciloftheGreat   CitySchools1994).Thestandardmethodusedbyschooldistrictstomaintainandimprovecapital x@  stockistoissuegeneralrevenuebonds,whicharepaidforbyanincreaseinpropertytaxes.Inmost   schooldistricts,thesebonds(andthetaxincrease)mustbeapprovedbythevotersinareferendum.  Thisapprovalhasbeendifficulttogetinrecentyears.AsurveybytheNationalAssociationof p8 SchoolBoardsfoundthatonefourthoftheschooldistrictsrespondinghadexperiencedtherejection  ofabondproposaloverarecentfouryearperiod(OlsonandHendrie1998).Commonlyadvanced  asareasonforthedifficultyinpassingschoolbondsistheintersectionoftwodemographictrends h0 theincreasinglylargeminoritypopulationinthepublicschoolsandtheagingofthepopulationas  babyboomersmovethroughthelifecycle.     Thecombinationofwhiteflight,immigrationandhighbirthratesamongsomeminorities ` (" hasresultedinvirtuallyalllargemetropolitanschooldistrictsbeingoverwhelminglyminority.This "$ patternisastrueinnorthern,predominatelywhite,citiessuchasMinneapolis(61%nonwhite #x& studentenrollment),Denver(71%),Milwaukee(75%)andKansasCity(76%)asitisinhigh X% !( growthcitiesintheSouthwestsuchasHouston(89%nonwhite),Dallas(88%),Phoenix(70%),and '"* LosAngeles(88%)(JeraldandCurran1998,5657).Ontheotherhand,theelectoratesinthese (p$, citieshaveeitheramajorityorapluralityofwhitevoters.Animportantquestioniswhetherwhite P*&. voterswillapprovebondreferendumsinschooldistrictswherethestudentpopulationismajority +'0 minority.Ifnot,istherearacebasedexplanationordoestheexplanationlieelsewhere? -h)2   H/+4 `YX `TRV6&A4Y03' Letter 6&A4 3' LetterT `  TRY03' LetterV6&A4 3' Letter 6&A4T8XXdd8/  Aseconddemographictrendwithimplicationsforschoolbondelectionsistheagingofthe 8 population.TheCensusBureauestimatesthatin199813%ofthepopulationwas65andover,  whichwillincreaseto20%bytheyear2030(_Pressley_Ԁ1998).Theelderlypercentageofthevoting P populationwillbeevenhigher.Oldercitizensareunlikelytohavechildreninthepublicschools. 0  Wemight,therefore,expectthispopulationtovoteinitsownselfinterestthatisagainstschool   bondstokeeppropertytaxeslow.Evidencefrommanypreviousstudieslendssupporttothis  H  hypothesis(fordatedreviewssee_Piele_ԀandHall1973;HamiltonandCohen1974).Morerecently, (  _MacManus_Ԁ(1996)foundthe yesvoteinaFloridaschoolbondelectionwas30pointslower   amongthoseover50thanthoseunder50.StudiesbyButton(1993)andPreston(1984)yieldthe x@  sameconclusion.     Itiscommontofindantitaxsentimentamongoldercitizenstobeamajorpredictorofa  negativevoteonbondreferenda(_Cataldo_Ԁand_Holm_Ԁ1983;Loweryand_Sigelman_Ԁ1981).The p8 concernaboutselfinterestedvotingamongthe65andoverpopulationhasledmanyschooldistricts  toincludeanexemptionfrompropertytaxincreasesforthisgroupshouldabondissuepass.Most  researchshowsthetacticisineffective(_Rubinfeld_Ԁ1977;_Bergstrom_Ԁetal.1982;Fisherand_Rasche_ h0 1984;foranexceptionseeBrokaw,Galeand_Merz_Ԁ1990).Thesefindings,however,predominately  referencethewhitepopulationorpopulationswhereminoritysubgroupsaretoosmalltobebroken   outforseparateanalysis. ` ("   AlargebodyofliteraturebeginningwithSearsandKinder(1971)arguesthatselfinterest "$ amongwhiteswillbeaminordeterminantofpreferencesonpolicyissueswitharacialcomponent. #x& Rather,theyarguepreferencesonthesesortsofissueswillmostlybedeterminedbysymbolic X% !( values.Anotherliterature,however,stressesthatoneareawhereselfinteresteffectsfrequently '"* occurisovertaxes.Thosewhomustpaythetaxesusuallyopposethem(SearsandCitrin1985; (p$, Greenand_Gerken_Ԁ1989).Athirdliteratureemphasizes_sociotropic_Ԁ(publicregarding)influenceson P*&. voting.Ifthenationaleconomyisdoingwell,citizenswillvotefortheincumbentpartyregardless +'0 oftheirownpersonalfortunes(Kinderand_Kiewiet_Ԁ1981;_Kiewiet_Ԁ1983).Translatedtoourcase,if -h)2 _respondentsperceivetheschooldistrictasperformingitsjobeffectively,theywillvoteforthebond 8 regardlessofhowitaffectstheirpocketbook.Inaddition,amajorthemeofthebondcampaignwas  thatsubstantialschoolovercrowdingpreventedthedistrictfromproperlyeducatingitsstudents. P Froma_sociotropic_Ԁperspective,wehypothesizethatthosewhosharethisviewwouldvoteforthe 0  bondregardlessofhowthebondissueaffectedthempersonally.Thus,thereisamixofquite   plausiblemotivesasexplanationsforthedirectionofthebondvote!symbolicvalues,selfinterest,  H  anda_sociotropic_Ԁevaluation.Itisalsoplausiblethatwhitesandnonwhitesmaybringadifferent (  mixofthesemotivestothevotingbooth.     Therearealimitednumberofstudiesthatlookatdifferencesbetweenblackandwhite x@  respondentsonracetargeteddependentvariables(forexamples,seeBoboand_Krueger_Ԁ1993;   KinderandSanders1996),andfeweryetthatconsiderwhite,blackandHispanicrespondents  simultaneously(oneexampleisAlvarezand_Butterfield_Ԁ1998).Ourpurposeinthispaperisto p8 analyzetheeffectsofsymbolicvalues,racialresentment,agerelatedselfinterestfactorsand  _sociotropic_Ԁfactorsamongwhites,blacksandHispanicsasdeterminantsofsupportfororopposition  tothepassageofaschoolrevenuebond.Ofcourse,inanyelectiontheremaybeidiosyncraticand h0 localfactorsthatwillinfluencethevote.._"   1      _рGiventhedemographictrendsinlargemetropolitan  schooldistricts,however,almosteveryschoolbondelectionwillactivatepredispositionsregarding   partisanshipandideology,race,thecollectivegood,andconsiderationsaboutwhetheroneshould ` ("  orshouldnotvotetoincreaseonesowntaxes. "$ 8  Thedataforourstudycomefromapostelectionsurveyof623personswhovotedinabond 8 referendumheldinthespringof1996isalarge,southwestern,urbanschooldistrict._   1      _ԀA   comparisongroupof320nonvoterswerealsointerviewed.Respondentsweresampledfromthe P polllist,sowearecertaintheyeithervotedordidnot.Thevotersamplewasthenweighted(forthe 0  descriptiveanalysis)toreflecttheknownageandethnicdistributionofthevoters._   2      _ԀTheschool   bondissuewastheonlyitemontheballot,sothereisnoambiguityaboutmotiveingoingtothe  H  polls.Ourfocusinthisanalysisisonvoters,withreferencetononvotersonlytoillustrate (  descriptivepoints.     Inthespringof1996thedistrictschoolboardrequestedapropertytaxincreaseof6.6cents x@  per$100inassessedvaluetopayfora390milliondollarcapitalimprovementprogram.The   requestforthebondissuewasbroughtonbyadramaticincreaseinthestudentpopulation.Inthe  eightyearsbetween1988and1995thenumberofstudentsintheschooldistricthadincreasedby p8 17,000.Theplancalledfor15newschoolstobebuilt,withthemajoritygoingtopredominately  Hispanicneighborhoodswheretheenrollmentincreasehadbeenmostpronounced.Butsomenew  schoolsweretargetedforpredominatelyAfricanAmericanandwhiteneighborhoodsaswell,anda h0 sizableexpenditureofthebonddollarswasearmarkedfortherepairandupgradeofexisting  facilities. Turnoutintheelectionwasjustunder10%. Theproposedbondandtaxincreasewas   defeatedby53%to47%.Whileturnoutwaslow,justunder10percent,itdoesnotappearthe ` (" outcomeoftheballotingwouldhavebeenmuchdifferenthadallregisteredvoterscasttheirballots. 8 Amongthesampleofnonvoters,36%favoredpassageofthebond,25%wereundecidedand39%  wereopposedtoitspassage. P 4  I.HypothesisTests        Intestingourhypotheses,we beginwithamodelthatincludesdemographicsandsymbolic s ;  values,andthenaddtotheequationselfinterestvariablesfollowedby_sociotropic_Ԁvariables.The    initialmodelincludesthestandarddemographicsusedinmostanalysesofelectoraldata,aswellas   thesymbolicvaluesofpoliticalideology,partisanship,politicaltrust,equalitarianismandracial k3  resentment.Basedonpastresearch(AlexanderandBass1973;_Cataldo_Ԁand_Holm_Ԁ1983;Chewet   al.1991;HamiltonandCohen1974;_Piele_ԀandHall1973),wehypothesizethatyoungervoters,  renters,women,andthosewithhighincomesandeducationswillbemostlikelytosupportthe c+ bond.ThebivariaterelationshipsarereportedinTable1(seeAppendixAforthequestion   wording). {   Table1AboutHere [# H8    Despitethenearconsensusthatoldercitizensvote noonschoolbondissues,the  relationshipislimitedtowhites.Itiswhites65andoverthatweremostopposedtothebond(only s 28%voted yes)!muchaspopularlorewouldpredict.Supportincreasesslightlyamongwhites S! between50and64(32%votedyes).Oncewedropbelow50,amajorityofwhiterespondents  # (66%)supportedthebond.Ontheotherhand,theagecoefficientsforAfricanAmericansand "k% Hispanicshavethewrongsign.Amongblacks,65%ofthose65andovervotedforthebond K$ ' comparedto59%ofthose64andunder.Blacks65andoverbelongtothe civilrightsgeneration, %!) andthroughthisexperiencemaybeuniquelyinfluencedtothinkintermsofgroupinterest.Among 'c#+ Hispanics,56%ofthose 65andovervotedforthebond,comparedto55%forthoseunder65. C) %- Whateverthereason,onlywhitevotersfit theconventionalwisdomconcerningageandvotingon *&/ schoolbonds. ,[(1   Amongwhites,botheducationandincomehavesignificantpositivecoefficients,meaning H thehighertheincomeandeducationthemorelikelyapositivevote,againconsistentwithmostpast  research.Theserelationships,however,arenearzeroforblacksandHispanics.AmongHispanics P thecoefficientforgenderissignificant.   1      ׀Theinitialmodelalsoincludespartisanship,whichis @ significantforwhitesandHispanicsintheexpectedfashion,butnotforblacks,andpolitical   ideology,whichissignificantforwhitesandblacks,butnotforHispanics.Consistentwiththe  H  workofothersonreferenda(_Magleby_Ԁ1984),therelationshipsforpoliticalideologyandparty 8  identificationarenotasstrongascommonlyseeninpartisanelections.      @ II.MeasurementofRacialandOtherSymbolicValues  @  G  Manyracialattitudesfallintothegeneralcategoryof symbolicvalues.Thesearebroad 0 rangingpredispositionslearnedearlyinlife.Laterinlifetheseorientationsareaconsiderationin  thewaycitizensrespondtocurrentpoliticalissues(SearsandFunk1991,13).Agooddealof 8 researchhasshownthatmeasuresofmodernorsymbolicracismacombinationofantiblackaffect ( andtraditionalAmericanvaluesareeffectivepredictorsofpolicyissueswitharacialcomponent  (Sears,VanLear,_Carrillo_Ԁand_Kosterman_Ԁ1997;Hughes1997).Inparticular,Alvarezand_Brehm_ x0 (1997,362)foundsymbolicracismhadthestrongesteffectofallvariablesacrossawidevarietyof   racebaseddependent_redistributive_Ԁpolicies.Racialresentmentinoursurveyismeasuredwithtwo   agreedisagreeitemsmeasuringsymbolicracismtakenfromthe1986_NES_Ԁ(KinderandSanders p(" 1996),_ T   2      _Ԁandwithanitemaskingrespondentsiftheyfavororopposeprovidingfreeeducationtothe !$ childrenofimmigrantswhoareintheUnitedStatesillegally._    3      _ "x& H8H  Wehypothesizethathighlevelsofracialresentmentamongwhiteswillpredictanegative h$ !(  voteontheschoolbond,whichTable1showsisclearlythecase.ForHispanics,thecoefficienthas &"* therightsignbutisinsignificant.Theitemconcerningpublicfundingofeducationforillegal H immigrantsissignificantforwhitesandblacks,butthecoefficientsarelowerforthelattergroup._(   1      _Ԁ      Ofcourse,thereareotherexplanationsforwhyattitudesaboutracemightaffectvotingina P bondreferendumforanoverwhelminglyminorityschooldistrict.Oneapproachholdsthatovert @ racialprejudiceisaconsiderationamongmanywhiteswhenrespondingtopoliciesthatbenefit   racialminorities(_Gilens_Ԁ1995;_Kuklinski_Ԁetal.1997;_Peffley_Ԁetal.1997).ButAlvarezand_Brehm_  H  (1997)foundantiblackstereotypinghadvirtuallynopredictivepowerfordependentvariableswith 8  aracialcomponent,evenwhenthemodernracismvariablewasremovedfromtheequation.Table1   showsthosewhitesgivinghigherratingstoblacksandHispanicsaremorelikelytovoteforthe @  bond,althoughthefeelingthermometersareweakerthaneitherofthetwosymbolicracism 0 measuresforwhites.Ontheotherhand,thecoefficientsforblackandHispanicrespondentsonthe  zerototenratingscalesare_nonsignificant_._ d   2      _ 8   Racialattitudescanalsobeaffectedbyevaluationsofcompetinggroupinterests.Bobo ( (1983)arguesthatrealisticgroupconflictoccurswhenwhitesresistpolicieswhichbenefitother  racialorethnicgroupsbecausetheysensetheircollectiveinterestisthreatened(seealsoGilesand x0 _Buckner_Ԁ1993andGilesandHertz1994).Whilesomepoliticalscientistshaveemphasizedthe   possibilitiesthatviewingpolicyoutcomesfromagroupperspectivemayleadtotension,othershave   emphasizedgroupidentificationmayleadtoevaluationofpublicpoliciesintermsofgroupbenefits. p("  KinderandSanders(1996),forexample, hypothesize thatsupportforracetargetedpoliciesamong !$  blackswillbedrivenbyperceptionsofacollectivegain. "x& 8HX  Untilthemid_Ԅ1960s_,thelifeopportunitiesforblackAmericansweredecisivelydetermined 8  byrace.Although decisivelymaynolongerbetheproperadverb,manyblacksstillfinditmore  efficientinpoliticalmatterstodeterminewhatisgoodfortheirracialgroupthantodeterminetheir P ownpersonalselfinterest.Dawson(1994)callsthisperspectivetheblackutilityheuristic.He 0  suggeststhataslongasraceplaysamajorroleindefininglifechances,itisrationalforAfrican   Americanstofollowgroupcuesincomingtopoliticaldecisions.Thisperspective_is_Ԁlikelytobe  H  especiallytrueofoldergenerationsofAfricanAmericanswhowerepoliticallysocializedinatime (  periodwhenlifeopportunitiesweredecisivelydeterminedbyrace.Theblackutilityheuristic   hypothesisis,however,oftendifficulttodirectlytest.Boboand_Kluegel_,forexample,concluded x@  forracetargetedpoliciesthereexistsubstantialgroupinterestsamongblacks.Theybasedthis   conclusiononaresidualratherthanondirectobservation.Thatis,theyruledoutotherexplanations  andwereleftwiththegroupinterestalternative(Boboand_Kluegel_Ԁ1993,459).Wewillusemuch p8 thesamestrategy.Breakingdownthevotebyrace/ethnicityshows41%ofwhitesvotedforthe  bond,61%ofblacksand56%ofHispanics.    Twopointsherearerelevant.First,aplausibleexplanationforthisdifferenceisarealistic h0 assessmentofgroupbenefits.Second,havingsaidthatmuch,thereisgreatervariationintheblack  votethanonewouldnormallyexpect.Inmostpartisanelectionstheblackvoteusuallyapproaches   90%Democratic.Inotherreferendawithracialimplications,suchasCaliforniasProposition209, ` (" theblackvotewas82%against(Alvarezand_Butterfield_Ԁ1998).Inthisbondelection,thereis "$ variationtoexplainamongAfricanAmericansthatwedonotalwaysencounter. #x&   OtherSymbolicValues.Aconsistentthemeintheliteratureontaxreferendaisthata X% !( principlesourceof novotescomefromthosealienatedfromgovernment(Loweryand_Sigelman_ '"* 1981;SearsandCitrin1985).Weinclude,therefore,ameasureofpoliticaltrust.Unlikeage,Table (p$, 1showsthatpoliticaltrusthasasignificantcoefficientforallthreeracial/ethnicgroupsthegreater P*&. thedistrustofthegovernmentinWashington,themorelikelyavoteagainstthebondissue.Not +'0 unexpectedly,whiteshadlowertrustscoresthanblacksandHispanics.Whatissomewhat -h)2 surprising,however,isthestrongereffectamong nonwhitesthanwhites._&   1      _؀Distrustingblacksand 8 distrustingHispanicsweremorelikelytovoteagainstthebondthanweredistrustingwhites.Itis  quiteclearthatthebondissueattractedanumberofminorityvotersdisenchantedwithgovernment P whomanifestedthatdisenchantmentbyvotingagainsttheschoolbond.Sincemanybondissuesin 0  urbandistrictsaredecidedbyclosemargins,the_translationofalienationfromgovernmentintoa   negativevoteamongaconstituencywithasubstantialgroupinterestinapositiveoutcomeisa  H  findingofsomepotentialconsequence. (    Finally,weconstructedascaleforequalitarianismusingitemsfromthe1992NES(Kinder   andSanders1996).Wehypothesizethatthosemostcommittedtoequalitarianismwouldfavorthe x@  bond,giventheroleeducationplaysinpromotingtheequalityofopportunity.Othershavefound   equalitarianismtobeastrongpredictorofpolicieswithracialimplications(HurwitzandPleffley  1992;Tedin1994;Sears,VanLear,Carrillo,andKosterman1997).Thesedata,however,show p8 onlyaweakpositiverelationshipforwhites,andnosignificantrelationshipforblacksandHispanics  (butseethemultivariateanalysis).     III.MeasurementofSelfInterest  h0   Anissueaffectsonespersonalselfinterestwhenitimpactsdirectlyupononesindividual, @ materialwellbeinginthehereandnow(Barry1965;Searsetal.1979).Atthetheoreticallevel,it   iswidelyunderstoodthatthemotivesleadingtoapolicypreferencehaveimportantimplications.  X" Bothclassicalrepublicantheoryandliberaltheoryholdthatvirtuouscitizenssetasidetheirprivate 8"$ interestsandjudgetheperformanceofgovernmentbasedonthepublicgood(Burtt1993; #& Mansbridge1980).Mostmodernpoliticalthinkersdismissthismodelofcivicvirtueashighly %P!(  implausible.Selfinterestispartofhumannature.Beyondthetriviallevel,widespreadself 0'"* sacrificeisnottobeexpected.Virtuouscitizensexistonlytotheextentthatthecollectiveinterest 8 andselfinteresthappentocoincide(Monroe1991).     Attheempiricallevel,considerableresearchshowsthatpersonalselfinterestisoftena P minorornonexistentdeterminantofpreferencesinthepoliticalarena.Itisarguedbysomethat 0  peoplecompartmentalizetheirthinkingonpublicandprivatematters(Lane1962).Theytendnotto   linktheirownpersonalfortunestotheactionsofgovernment.Therehavebeenmany  H  demonstrationsofnonrelationshipsbetweenselfinterestandavarietyofpolicypreferencessuchas (  busing,affirmativeaction,genderissues,guaranteedjobs,welfareprograms,nationalheath   insuranceandimmigrationpolicy(seeCitrinandGreen1991forareview).Mostofthese x@  nonrelationshipsforselfinterest,however,usedattitudesratherthanbehaviorasadependent   variable.Whileselfinterestdoesnotpredictattitudesaboutbusing,itdoespredictbehavior(Green  andCowdon1992).Oneareawhereselfinterestdemonstratesaconsistenteffectisforclearly p8 targetedtaxincreases.Thosewhomustpaythetaxusuallyopposeit(SearsandCitrin1985;Green  andGerken1989).Sinceweareinvestigatingafairlydemandingbehavior(votedirectionina  referendumwhereturnoutwasonly10%),andataxissue,weanticipateselfinteresteffects. h0   Numerousstudiesanalyzetheeffectracialattitudes,symbolicattitudesandselfintereston  racerelateddependentvariables.Thesestudiesare,however,almostentirelylimitedtothewhite   population,astheracialcomponentinthesemodelsisconceptualizedasracialresentmentamong ` (" whites.Theconsequenceisthatmuchofwhatweknowaboutselfinterestiswhat is weknow "$ aboutselfinterestamongwhites.Foraschooldistrictwhere89%ofthestudentsarenonwhiteand #x& closeto50%oftheeligiblevotersarenonwhite,itwouldseemessentialtoincludethenonwhite X% !( populationintheanalysis.Theselfinterestvariablesareoperationalizedasfollows: '"*   SI1.Iftherespondenthaschildrencurrentlyattendingschoolinthedistrict,wehypothesize (p$, apositivevoteonthebond. )\%-     SI2.Ifthebondhadpassed,doestherespondentbelieveanewschoolwillbebuiltinhisor l+4'/ herneighborhood.Ifyes,wehypothesizeapositivevote. X, (0   D- )1   SI3.Weaskedwhateffectpassingthebondwouldhaveonpropertytaxeswouldpassage 8  resultinalargeincrease,amoderateincrease,asmallincreaseornoincrease?Wehypothesizethat $ thesmallertheperceivedincrease,themorelikelyapositivevote.    SI4.Ifarespondentisover65,andknowsaboutthepropertytaxexemptionforthoseover  65,wehypothesizeanincreaseintheprobabilityofapositivevotewhencomparedtothosewhodo  notknowabouttheexemption.   `X  AsTable1indicates,selfinterestwasclearlycorrelatedwithvoteintention.Having  ` childreninthepublicschooldistrictwasonlysignificantforwhitevoters(butseethemultivariate @   analysisforblacksandHispanics).Inaddition,theexpectationthatthetaxincreasewouldbe   significantwasstronglycorrelatedwiththevoteforallthreegroups.Wecanfurthertestforself X  interestbylookingattheeffectsofknowingaboutthetaxexemptionif_ one thevoterisover65. 8 Theschooldistricthasalocaloptiontoexemptthose65andoverfromanyincreaseinproperty  taxesresultingfrompassageofarevenuebond.Respondents65andoverwereaskediftheyknew P whethertheschooldistricthadexercisedthisoption(ithad).Amongseniorswhoknewaboutthe 0 taxbreak,45%votedforthebond.Amongthosewhodidnot,only32%votedtoapprove.The  evidenceimpliesaselfinterestconsideration,asthosewhowereunawareofthetaxexemption,and H thereforebelievedtherewouldbeasignificantpersonalcost,werelikelytovoteagainstthebond. (   Whenone_disaggregates_Ԁbyrace/ethnicity,however,thereisnostatisticallysignificant  differenceamongwhites(30%whoknewaboutthetaxbreakvotedyes,versus27%whodidnot). x@  Thereis,however,alargedifferencesforblacksandHispanics.Amongblacks,91%ofthosewho  !" knewaboutthetaxbreakvoted yes,versus45%whodidnotknowaboutthetaxbreak.Among "$ Hispanics,73%who knewaboutthetaxbreakvoted yes,versus42%whodidnotknowaboutthe p$8 & taxbreak.Theseresultsprovideacautionarytalethatextrapolatingresultsfromearlierstudiesof &!( predominantlywhitevoterstoallvotersmayleadtothewrongconclusions.Aswenotedearlier, '#* theliteratureonbondreferendaandtaxabatementshasgenerallyfoundtheseabatementsare h)0%, ineffective.Foroursamplewefindthatgeneralizationistrueonlyforwhitevoters.Forblacksand +&. Hispanics,theconsequenceoftheabatementisasubstantialincreaseinsupportforthebond.Ina 8 closeelection,ataxabatementmayspellthedifferencebetweenwinningandlosing.     IV._Sociotropic_ԀVoting.  P   Therehavebeenseveraldemonstrationsof publicregardingor _sociotropic_voting,where 7  politicalbehaviorseemsdrivenbyacollectiveevaluationratherthanpersonalgain.Whenpeople   areaskeddirectlywhytheycasttheirvoteastheydid,collectivemotivesarethemostfrequent  O  explanation(_Verba_,_Schlozman_ԀandBrady1995:118).Soitcertainlyconceivablethatonemotive /  forvoting yesinaschoolbondelectionisaconcernforthepublicgood.Beyondpotentialself   servingrecall,however,theevidenceforpublicregardingmotivesisambiguous.Studiesof G  _sociotropic_Ԁvoting(Kinderand_Kiewiet_Ԁ1981;LewisBeck1988)showonlythatrespondentsrelyon ' _sociotropic_Ԁinformationinmakingdecisions,notwhetherthemotivefordecisionsisbasedonself  interestorsocietalinterest(Kinderand_Kiewiet_Ԁ1981). w?   Notethatevaluatingtheschoolbondreferendum_sociotropically_Ԁdoesnotautomatically  meanayesvoteonelection_day._ԀRatheritmeansthevoterconsiderswhetherthebondisawise  investmentofthepublicsresourcesfromtheperspectiveofthewholesociety.Wetestthe o7 _sociotropic_Ԁhypothesiswithanitemthataskstherespondenttogradetheperformanceoftheschool  district(seeAppendixAforthequestion).Iftherespondentgivestheschooldistrictapositivejob   ratingforthepastperformanceweexpectthevotertoseetheschoolbondasmoneywellspentand g /" hypothesizea yesvoteonbond;ifthejobratingisnegativeweexpectthevotertoseetheschool "$ bondasapooruseofpublicresourcesandhypothesizea novote.Inaddition,weaskedifstudent #& overcrowdinginthedistrictposedasubstantialproblem.Overcrowdingwasthemajortheme _%'!( drivingsupportersofthebond.Wehypothesizethatifrespondentsbelievedovercrowding was isa '"*  substantialproblemtheywillvoteforthebond,regardlessofhowthebondmightaffecttheir (w$, personalselfinterest.AsmuchasanyinstitutioninAmerica,publicschoolsunderstressshould W*&. elicitacollectivistresponseamongatleastsomeelementsoftheelectorate.WecanseeinTable1 +'0 thatthosewhogivetheschooldistrictapositivejobevaluationtendedtovoteforthebond,and 8 thosewhogaveitanegativeevaluationtendedtovoteagainst(althoughtherelationshipisweakfor  blacks).Thosewhothoughttherewassubstantialovercrowdingintheschoolsalsotendedtovote P forthebond. 0     V._Multivariate_ԀAnalysis    YӀ  Ourpurposeinthissectionistoassessthevarioushypotheseswitha_multivariate_Ԁmodel,  H  andprobethematerialmotivationsandotherpsychologicalprocessesthatpredictwhethera (  positiveornegativevotewascastintheschoolbondreferendum.Thestatisticalmethodusedis   logisticregression.Inadditiontotheregressioncoefficients,wealsopresentthefirstdifferences x@  thechangeinprobabilityofcastingapositivevotewhichresultsfromchangingthevaluesofan   independentvariable(Kaufman1996).Thedataare_unweighted_,asina_multivariate_Ԁanalysis  weightingcandistortcoefficients(_Brehm_Ԁ1993,117120).Thestrategyforanalysisistobeginwith p8 aninitialmodelconsistingofdemographicsandsymbolicvalues.Wethensequentiallyintroduce  categoriesofpredictorsintosuccessiveequationsbasedonthetheoreticalconcernsdiscussedabove,  anddeterminewhichcoefficientsaresignificantwithstatisticalcontrols.Ourgoalistomake h0 inferencesaboutthecausalunderpinningofthevotepreference.Indoingso,we will estimate  separateequationsforeachracialethnicgroup.   1      ׀Ifwecombinethesesmallergroupswithawhite   majority,weriskmissingthemotivationsuniquetoeachgroup._@   2      _ ` ("   WebeginwithananalysisofModelIpresentedinTables2,3and4,whichconsistsofthe "$ demographicandsymbolicitems.Thedemographicsaredummiesforage(5064,and65andover, #x& with49andundertheexcludedcategory),gender,education,income,martialstatus(withmarried X% !( excluded)andownerrenterstatus.Thesymbolicvaluesaredummiesforpartisanshipandideology 8 (themiddlecategoriesareexcluded).Forracialresentment,inthecaseofwhites,thevariableis  redefinedtoinclude publiclyfinancededucationforillegalaliensalongwiththeothertwoitems P inthescale._   3      _؀Forblacks,only publiclyfinancededucationforillegalaliensisused,andfor 0  Hispanicsonlythetwoitem_NES_Ԁsymbolicracismscaleisused.Theothertwosymbolicvaluesare   politicaltrustandequalitarianism(seeAppendixAforthewording) .Sincetheseindicatorsusea  H  continuousscale,wewillevaluatechangesofoneandtwostandarddeviations.Thecoefficientsfor (  whites arepresentedinTable2, forblacksinTable3andHispanicsinTable4 . 󀀀Asnotedearlier,   sincesignificancelevelsareafunctionofsamplesize,coefficientssignificantatp.<.10arereported x@  forBlacksandHispanics.     Ourinitialmodelshowssomestarkdemographicdifferencesamongthethreegroups.For  whites,threedemographicswithselfinterestovertonesarethemostimportantpredictors.Age p8 showsthestrongesteffectwiththechangeinprobabilityfora yesvotebeing..36forthose  between50and64,and.37forthoseover65whencomparedtothose49andunder(theexcluded  category)._   1      _֣ ӀAshypothesized,ageisacriticalfactor.Butinthisinitialspecificationitisbeingwhite h0 and50andoverthatseparatessupportersfromopponents,nothavingreachedconventional  retirementage.ForblacksandHispanics,agehasnoeffectinthisfirstmodel.Forwhites,beinga 8 renterratherthanahomeownermeansa.27greaterprobabilityofvotingforthebond,andwhites  whohavenevermarriedhavea.47lowerprobabilityofcastinga yesvotethanthosewhoare > married.Noneofthedemographicsareofconsequenceforblacks.ForHispanics,femalesare.35  morelikelytovoteforthebond,anddivorcedrespondentsare.39morelikelytovoteforthebond D  thanthosewhoaremarried.     `֣  Forthesymbolicitems,neitherpartisanshipnorpoliticalideologyissignificantamongwhite   respondents.Thisresultstandsinsharprelieftomostresearchusingpublicpolicydependent   variableswithracial/ethnicovertonesandwhiterespondents(SearsandFunk1990;Citrinand d,  Green1991;Hughes1997).Incontrast,beingconservativeandbeingRepublicanissignificant   amongAfricanAmericanrespondents,andbeingaDemocratissignificantamongHispanic | respondents.Forallthreegroups,politicaltrustissignificant.Themoreonetruststhegovernment \$ inWashingtontodotherightthing,themorelikelyoneistovoteforthebond.Withdemographics  andpartisanship/ideologycontrolled,trustingthegovernmentinWashingtonresultsinasubstantial t increaseintheprobabilityofa yesvote.Thisfindingisaninterestingextensionofrecentresearch T ontrust(_Hetherington_Ԁ1998),inthattrustingthegovernmentinWashingtonextendsalltheway   downtowhatisperhapsthemostlocalofpoliticaldecisions!thoseregardingpubliceducation. l" Basedonpastresearch,wewouldexpectatranslationofalienationfromgovernmentintoa no L $ voteamongwhites.Thatsametranslationalsooccursamongminorities!inthefaceofsomefairly !& stronggroupinterestincentives.Equalitarianismissignificantonlyamongblacks!notsurprising #d( giventhehistoricbattleAfricanAmericanshavefoughtforequalopportunity.Finally,welookat D% !* theeffectofracialresentment.Table2showsforwhitesthatchangesofoneandtwostandard &", deviationslowertheprobabilityofa yesvoteby.15and.28,respectively.Forblacks,our (\$. measure(opposingpubliclyfundededucationforillegalimmigrants)issignificant(p.<.05),butnot <*&0 quiteasstrongwiththechangeinprobabilitybeing.10and.20,andforHispanicsthevariableis +'2  insignificant. -T)4   Forourinitialspecification,weseeamongwhitesthatdemographicfactorswithselfinterest 8  implicationshavethegreatesteffectonthevote.Politicaltrustissignificant,butnotasimportantas  itisforblacksandHispanics.Theonesymbolicitemwhichdistinguisheswhitesisracial P resentment.Thosescoringhighonthismeasurearemorelikelytovote noonthebond.Itisclear 0  ingeneralthatsymbolicvaluesaremoreimportantforblacksandHispanicsthanforwhites,and   demographicsmeasuringlatentselfinterestaremoreimportantforwhites.Itmaybethatfor  H  minoritiessomesymbolicvaluesareproxiesforgroupinterests!suchasequalitarianismamong (  blacks.     InModelIIweaddfourdirectlymeasuredselfinterestitems.Havingchildreninadistrict x@  schoolisanacidtest,asitisadirectandimmediateindicatorofselfinterest.Forallthreegroups   thisitemyieldssignificantcoefficients,butthemagnitudeisnotasgreatasmightbeexpected.For  whites,thosewithchildreninadistrictschoolare.23morelikelytovoteforthebondthanthose p8 without.Forblacks,thechangeinprobabilityis.29,andforHispanics,thechangeinprobabilityis  .50.Ifthesecoefficientswerenotsignificant,itwouldcastseriousdoubtonevenconditional  modelsofselfinterestandthevote. h0   Oneconsistentfindingfromthewritingonselfinterestisthatclearfinancialbenefitsor  penaltiesleadtoselfinterestedbehavior(SearsandCitrin1985;Greenand_Gerkin_Ԁ1989).Before   thevote,thelocationofproposednewschoolsfundedbybondwaswidelypublicized.One ` (" argumentbondproponentsmadewasthatthesenewschoolswouldincreaseneighborhoodproperty "$ values.Itisinterestingtonoteforwhitesnotonlywasthepossibilityofgettinganewschool #x& statisticallysignificant,butithadamorepowerfuleffec t thanhavingchildrenattendingadistrict X% !( school.ForblacksandHispanics,ontheotherhand,gettinganewschoolisnotsignificant.This '"* findingmayreflecttherealitythatanewschoolwouldlikelydomoretoraisepropertyvaluesin (p$, middleclasswhiteareas,whichhavemoredesirablelocations,thaninblackorHispanic P*&. neighborhoods,whichhavelessdesirablelocations.Thedatasupporttheconventionalwisdom +'0 regardingcampaigntacticsinmultiraceschooldistrictsappealtowhiteselfinterestby 8 convincingthemthatpassingaschoolrevenuebondwillprotectorincreasetheirpropertyvalues.  8  Forthetaxincreaseissue,dummieswerecreatedfornone/small,moderateandlarge.The P excludedcategoryis14%whosaid unsure.Forallgroups,perceptionsthatpassingthebond 0  wouldleadtoa largetaxincreaseresultedin.51to.74decreaseintheprobabilityofvotingfor   thebond(whencomparedtotheunsure).Amongwhites,14%thoughttherewouldbea largetax  H  increase.Forblacksitwas16%andforHispanicsitwas22%(weighteddata).Onlyabeliefthat (  theincreasewouldbe largehadaneffect.Thisfindingisconsistentwiththegeneralthrustof   otherresearchonselfinterest,whereitisarguedthatselfinterestconsiderationscomeintoplay x@  onlywhenthebenefitorpenaltyis certainandlarge(CitrinandGreen,1991).Inaddition,unlike   somevariables,certainandlargetaxpenaltieshaveconsistenteffectsacrossallthreeracial/ethnic  groups. p8   Oncedirectlymeasuredselfinterestfactorsarecontrolled,weseesomeprovocativeage  relationshipsemergeinModelIIforbeing65andover,andknowingabouttheexemptionfroma  propertytaxincreaseshouldthebondgetamajority_vote. _ԀForwhiterespondents,thevariableis h0 insignificant.Whitevotersawareoftheexemptionarenomoreorlesslikelytovoteforthebond  thanthosenotaware.Buttheawarenesscoefficientislargeandsignificantforbothblacksand   Hispanics andinexactlytheoppositedirectionthatistheoverallpatternforwhites.InModelII, ` (" blacks65andover,whoknowaboutthetaxbreak,are.77morelikelytovoteforthebondthanare "$ allotherblackrespondents.InModelII,Hispanics65andover,whoknowaboutthetaxbreakare #x& .78morelikelytovoteforthebondthanallotherHispanics. X% !(   Theinterestingquestioniswhydoesknowingaboutthetaxexemptionhavesuchapowerful '"* effectonblacksandHispanics,buthavenoeffectinthecaseofwhites?Themostlikely (p$, explanationforisthatoncetheselfinterestconsiderationofhighertaxesisremovedforblacksand P*&. Hispanics,theyvotetheirgroupinterest.Oncethetaxpenaltyisfactoredout,minoritiesvoteto +'0 supportafundingincreaseforaschooldistrictthatis89%minority.Whitevotersdonothavethat 8 groupinterestincentive.Asaconsequence,otherconsiderations(perhapssomegenericopposition  toanytaxincrease)are a moreimportant. P   Finally,the_sociotropic_Ԁitemsareincludedintheequation(ModelIII).Anevaluationofthe 0  districtsjobperformance(gradedAthroughF)isaddedalongwiththeagreeunsuredisagree   _Likert_Ԁitemonschoolovercrowding.ForwhitesandAfricanAmericansthecoefficientforthe  H  retrospectiveevaluationyieldsnontrivialchangesinthelikelihoodofsupportingthebond.Changes (  ofoneandtwostandarddeviationsresultinanincreasedprobabilityofa yesvoteby.24and.48   forwhitesandby.13and.27forblacks.TheitemisnotsignificantforHispanics.Whiteswithlow x@  trustingovernmenttendtogivetheschooldistrictlowmarksonjobperformance.Consequently,   oncethejobperformancevariableisenteredinModelIII,trustbecomesinsignificant.Itseems  clear,however,thatlowtrustingovernmentlowersthejobevaluationgiventheschooldistrict p8 whichdirectlyaffectsthevote._Blacks_Ԁandwhites(butnotHispanics)whobelievethereis  substantialovercrowdingintheschoolsareslightlymorelikelytovoteforthebond,butthe  coefficientsaresmall.Nevertheless,thereisatleastsome small evidenceofpublicregarding h0 considerationsonthepartofthevotersinthiselection(seeAppendixBforadiscussionofpossible  _endogeneity_Ԁinthesepreferenceitems).     V.DiscussionandConclusion  ` ("     Inthispaperweexploredtheunderpinningsofapositiveornegativevotefora390million "$ dollarbondtoimprovecapitalfacilitiesinalarge,metropolitanschooldistrict.Wetestedforthe #x& effectsofracialresentment,self-interestand_sociotropic_Ԁvoting.Whatwefound,forarealdispute X% !( involvingactualbehavior,differsinsomefundamentalaspectsfromotherresearchinthisarea. '"* Symbolicvalueswereoflittleconsequenceforwhites,butofgreaterconsequenceforminorities. (p$, Allgroupsshowedsubstantialself-interesteffects._Sociotropic_Ԁconsiderationshada_nontrival_ P*&. impactonthevotingdecisionofwhitesandblacks(butnotHispanics).Theanalysisshowsthatina +'0 multi-ethnicschooldistrict,whites,blacksandHispanicshaveacoreofcommoninterestswhich 8 increaseordecreasetheprobabilityofa"yes"vote,buttherearealsoasetofconsiderationsthat  varyintheirimpactamongtheracial/ethnicgroups. P   Forwhites,thefinalmodelshowsseveraldemographiccharacteristicswithcloseself 0  interestelements,includingage,beingarenter,andbeingnevermarriedhavealmostthesame   (large)coefficientsasinModelI.Inthecaseofage,itappearsthattherearevariablesnotdirectly  H  measuredthatincreasedtheprobabilityofa"no"voteonthebondamongthose50andover.In (  contrasttootherstudiesofwhiterespondentsonrace-targeteddependentvariables,symbolicvalues   wereoflittleconsequence.OnlyracialresentmentissignificantinModelIII,anditseffectwasnot x@  large.Therearesubstantialself-interesteffects.Thosewithchildreninadistrictschool,andthose   whothoughttheirneighborhoodwas were morelikelytogetanewschoolhadagreaterprobability  ofvotingforthebond.Likeallgroups,thosewhothoughtthebondwouldresultina"large" p8 propertytaxincreaseweremorelikelytovoteagainstit,butvotechoicewasnotaffectedbyabelief  thatthetaxraisewouldbemoderateorsmall.Exemptingwhites65andoverfromthepropertytax  increasedoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofapositivevote.Thereare,however,significant h0 _sociotropic_Ԁeffects,withthosegivingtheschooldistrictapositiverating,andthosebelievingthere   existssubstantialovercrowdingtendingtovoteforthebond.     ThefinalmodelforAfrican-Americansshowedanageeffectwedontseeforwhites.That ` (" is,blacks65andoverwhowereawareofthetaxabatementwerestronglypredisposedtovotefor "$ thebond.Removetheselfinteresttaxpenaltyandseniorblacksseemclearlyinclinedtovotetheir #x& groupinterest.Symbolicvaluesalsoplayedasubstantialroleforblacks,unlikethecaseforwhites. X% !( NotbeingRepublicanandbeingequalitarian increasedtheprobabilityofa"yes"vote.Blacks '"* votedtheirself-interestinthatrespondentswithchildren weremorelikelytovoteforthebondand (p$,  thosewhothoughtpassingthebondwouldresultinalargetaxincreaseweremorelikelytovote P*&. againstit.Likewhites,thedataforblacksshowsthesameeffectfor_sociotropic_Ԁconsiderations.A 8 positivejobevaluationandabelieftheschoolsareovercrowdedpredictsapositivevote.     TheModelIIIresultsforHispanicsshowsthatifavoterwasfemaleordivorcedthe P probabilityofa yesvoteincreased.Thesedemographicswerenotofconsequenceforeither 0  blacksorwhites.Likeblacks,being65andoverandawareofthetaxabatementresultedina   considerableincreaseintheprobabilityofa"yes"vote.Symbolicvalueswereimportant.Beinga  H  Democratandtrustingingovernmentmeantagreaterprobabilityofa"yes"vote.Likeblacksand (  whites,theself-interestvariablesofhavingchildreninadistrictschoolandabeliefthatpassingthe   bondmeansa"large"taxhikewerealsosignificant.The_sociotropic_Ԁitemswerenotsignificant. x@    Althoughthisbondproposallost,largebondissuesinurbanareascertainlycananddo   succeed.Afteraninitialloss,votersinLosAngelesapproveda2.4billiondollarbondproposal  thelargestspendingpackagetodateapprovedbyvoters.Ironically,thesamehappenedforthis p8 schooldistrict.A$678milliondollarschoolbondissuewaspassedwith72%approvalinthe  November1998generalelection.Fourfactorsweremajorcontributorstothisreversal.First,  shortlyfollowingthedefeatofthebond,theroofinanelementaryschoolcollapsed.Theschoolin h0 questionhadbeentargetedforrepairshadthe1996bondpassed.Second,averystronglocal  economydampenedtheanti-taxsentiment.Third,theschooldistrictengagedinahighlyeffective   publicrelationscampaigntodemonstrateitsresponsivenesstorecommendationsmadeina ` (" performanceauditdonetwoyearspreviousbythestateComptroller.TheComptroller,forhispart, "$ gavethedistricthighmarksforimprovement.Giventheimpactofnegativeretrospectivejob #x& performanceevaluations,thisstrategyprobablyturnedaroundsomewhitevoters.Fourth,the X% !( districtranamuchbetterfunded,moresophisticated,campaign.Likemostbondelections,there '"* wasalmostnovisiblecampaignontheotherside,butthepro-bondforcesranamuchsuperior (p$,  campaigntothatrun in1996. P*&.   Whilethe_marginals_Ԁclearlyshifted,anexitpollshowedthebasicrelationshipsdescribedin   thispaperstillheld.Amongwhites,59%votedyescomparedto79%amongHispanicsand90% x amongblacks.Only40%ofwhitesover60voted"yes"comparedto66%ofthoseunder60.There  P wasnoagerelationshipwithvoteamongminorities.Whiterenters gave10%moreoftheirvoteto  thebondthandidwhitehomeowners.EventhoughthebondissuewasontheNovembergeneral p  electionballot,turnoutwasonly25%.Thus,itdoesnotseemlikelythatmobilizationisthesole  H  explanationforthefavorableoutcomein1998.   8  Basedonthisresearch,wereachtwogeneralconclusions.First,unlikemostotherresearch h  onsocial-welfarepolicieswitharacial-ethniccomponent,racialresentment,whilerelevant,isnot @  likelytodrivevoterdecisionsinelectionsofthistype.Therecan,ofcoursebeexceptions,most  notablyiftheenvironmentisraciallycharged.Whileitmayseemanobviouspoint,thesedata ` showtheelectoratecanexpressitsself-interestthroughthemechanismofelections.This 8 demonstrationisimportantbothpracticallyandtheoretically,andisausefulcorrectivetothethrust  ofalargebodyofresearchwhichemphasizestheroleofsymbolicvalues. X   Second,whileourresearchshowsthatmanyfactorsfunctionsimilarlyacrossracialand 0 ethnicgroups,somefactorsfunctionindramaticallydifferentmanners.Becauseofthis,research  andpolicyrecommendationsthatextrapolatefrompredominatelywhitesamplestomixedrace P  samplesrunaconsiderabledangerofmakingmisleadingandincorrectassertions.Twoplaces (" whereourstudyfounddramaticdifferencesacrossracialandethnicgroupsaretheeffectofageand  $ theeffectofpropertytaxexemptions.Whenwelimitedouranalysistothewhiteportionofthe H"x& samplewefoundresultsperfectlyconsistentwithstandardwisdominthefieldandprevious # !( researchfindings.Elderlywhitevotersvotedatsignificantlylowerratesforschoolbondsthan %"* youngerwhitesandknowledgeofapropertytaxexemptionhadlittleinfluenceonthevoteof @'p$, elderlywhites.Whenweanalyzedthesesamequestionslookingattheminoritypopulation, (&. however,wefounddramaticdifferences.ElderlyblackandHispanicvoterswereinfactmorelikely *'0 tovoteforschoolbondsthanyoungerblacksandHispanicsandknowledgeofapropertytax 8,h)2 exemptionhadasubstantial positiveinfluenceontheirvoteforthebond.Thesedramatic H differencesarenotonlysignificantfortheoreticalreasonstheyalsohaveimportantpractical  implicationsastheywillbeespeciallyimportantpreciselyforschoolbondissuesinlargeurban P areaswherethevotingpopulationislikelytohaveaconsiderablylargerproportionofminority @ votersthanthecountryasawhole.   Ӏ Table1:Correlations(_Polychoric_)betweenVoteDirectionandIndependentVariables  &"*   088 HX #88X0Race/Ethnicity )%. H8  ̀(N=623)(N=380)(N=143)(N=100) *Q'0 Ѐ  򀀀AllWhitesBlacksHispanics   Z+(1 %VotedforBond47%41%61%55%,,aX  ,(2   Demographics -U*4   ̀  AllWhitesBlacksHispanics     AgeV V * .19**9H.30**I.06X.04  Income + .04HH:H.18**H.01ffW.07 C Education + .07HH:H.19**I.04ffW.09 L Own/rent + .10HH:H.15**I.00ffW.02   Gender + .07HH:H.04I.10.X.24**  ̀RacialItems P  ̀  򀀀AllWhitesBlacksHispanics      RacialResentment ( .23**9H.26**.ffW.10X X gX .  K  IllegalImmigrantEducationV V * .28**9H.32**H.19*X. T  RateBlacks + .09HH:H.17**I.ffW.05   RateHispanics + .11**HH:H.14**I.00X.   ̀SymbolicValues X  ̀  򀀀AllWhitesBlacksHispanics     PartyIdentification + .24**HH:H.17**I.14X.29** S PoliticalIdeology + .23**HH:H.22**I.18*X.09 \ Equalitarianism + .18**HH:H.15**I.09X.05X X gX .  PoliticalTrust + .35*HH:H.37**I.41**X.28*  ̀SelfInterestItems ` ̀  򀀀AllWhitesBlacksHispanics    Childin_HISD_ + .20**HH:H.26*I.10X.09 [ Newschoolinneighborhood.21*HH:H.24*I.20*X.39** d HowlargetaxincreaseV V * .38**9H.37*H.41**.39** % 65+/AwareofTaxRebate.14.03.48**.31*    _Socio_Ԅtropic Collective Items h     Ӏ )! Ѐ  AllWhitesBlacksHispanics   " RateJobPerformance.34**.40**.14*.28** c# SchoolOvercrowding.24**.28**.24**.13* l$$ ̀ & ̀XXӀ*p.<.10 p!(( Ѐ**p.<.05XX W") X8388 HX %88#3  򀀀  "*   HXXR8Table2.LogisticRegressionforEffectsofSymbolicValues,PersonalSelfInterestand CollectiveSelfInterest _Socio_ԄtropicFactorsonSupportfor )p&3 SchoolBond(WhitesOnly) R8XXH x*0'4 HXXR8Ӏ *'5 Ѐ  ModelI  󀀀  ModelII  󀀀  ModelIIIXXHR8   +q(6 HXXR8ӀCoefChangeinCoefChangeinCoefChangein :,(7 hр_icient_Ԁ_Probabilitya_󀀀_icient_ԀProbability_icient_ԀProbability ,)8 Ѐ -r*9 XHԀ z.2+: _ 83p 8p HX %883  8 XIntercept p 1.150.423.68** H   8688 HX %p8p6Ӏ(1.15)(1.34)(1.66)   83p 8p HX %883 Age5064 p 1.56**.361.23**.291.35**.33 r   8688 HX %p8p6Ӏ(.38)(.43)(.46) s+  83p 8p HX %883 Age65+ p 1.66**.371.36**.331.46**.35 ,   8688 HX %p8p6Ӏ(.36)(.48)(.51)   83p 8p HX %883 Gender p 0.300.240.22 V   8688 HX %p8p6Ӏ(.25)(.28)(.30) W  83p 8p HX %883 Income p 0.070.010.01     8688 HX %p8p6Ӏ(.09)(.10)(.11)     83p 8p HX %883 Education p 0.030.070.09  :    8688 HX %p8p6Ӏ(.10)(.11)(.12) ;    83p 8p HX %883 Own/Rent p 1.19**.271.61**.381.63**.38      8688 HX %p8p6Ӏ(.42)(.49)(.53)  e  Democrat0.430.470.38 f   Ѐ(.35)(.38)(.41)   Republican0.440.510.61*.18   Ѐ(.30)(.34)(.36) I  Cons.0.170.290.21 J  Ѐ(.29)(.32)(.34)   Liberal0.120.460.60 t Ѐ(.45)(.50)(.55) u- Widowed0.290.360.46 . Ѐ(.40)(.44)(.49)  Divorced0.370.130.03 X Ѐ(.45)(.49)(.53) Y NeverMarried2.13**.472.18**.492.35**.52  Ѐ(.56)(.64)(.69)  RacialResentment 0.22**.15/.280.20**.13/.280.15*.11/.21 < Ѐ(.06)(.06)(.07) = Equalitarianism0.050.060.08  Ѐ(.06)(.07)(.07) g Trust0.38*.09/.160.36*.08/.150.27 h   Ѐ(.16)(.19)*(.20) !! Havechildrenin1.02**.230.84*.20 " districtschool(.40)(.43) K#  X X 8XX XXR8 HXX8 HR8Newschoolinneighborhood1.48**.351.48**.35  % Ѐ(.31)(.33) ~& Taxraisenone/small0.620.44 7' Ѐ(.42)(.44) 8 ( Taxraisemoderate0.210.27  ) Ѐ(.43)(.46) !b* LargeTaxIncrease2.27**.512.23**.51 c"+ Ѐ(.74)(.75) #, over65/knowabout0.110.19 # - taxbreak(.39)(.41) $F!. Ѐ G%!/ Retrospectivejobper1.12**.20/.48 &"0 formanceevaluaton(.23) &q#1  X X 8XX XXR8 HXX8 HR8SchoolOvercrowding.38*.09/.16 3($3 Ѐ(.23) (%4  X X 8XX XXR8 HXX8 HR8ӀModel1:N=380Model2:N=380Model3:N=380󀀀 f*'6 Ѐ󀀀X2=110.7(p.<.01)X2=176.1(p.<.01)X2=206.5(p.<.01) +'7 Ѐcorrectlyclassified:71%correctlyclassified:77%correctlyclassified:80% +(8 ЀReductioninerror:53%Reductioninerror:61%Reductioninerror:65% ,I)9 Ѐ J-*: Ѐ*p.<.05(onetailedtest) .*;   **p.<.01(onetailedtest) .t+< ЀaFordummyvariables,thecoefficientindicatesthechangeinprobabilityfrom.5ifthevariable H  goesfromzerotoone.Forcontinuousvariables,thecoefficientindicatesthechangeinprobabilityfrom  .5ifthevariablechangesbyoneandtwostandarddeviations.ThesameappliestoTables3and4. r  X X 8XX XXR8 .+: Ї HXXR8Table3.LogisticRegressionforEffectsofSymbolicValues,PersonalSelfInterestandSociotropicFactors CollectiveSelfInterest onSupportfor  SchoolBond(BlacksOnly) XXHR8 B HXXR8Ӏ   Ѐ  ModelI  󀀀  ModelII  󀀀  ModelIIIXXHR8    HXXR8ӀCoefChangeinCoefChangeinCoefChangein L ЀicientProbability󀀀icientProbabilityicientProbability   ЀXH   83p 8p HX %883  8 XIntercept p 1.170.884.16*  D    8688 HX %p8p6Ӏ(1.65)(2.08)(2.70) E    83p 8p HX %883 Age5064 p 0.430.180.27      8688 HX %p8p6Ӏ(.56)(.65)(.67)  o   83p 8p HX %883 Age65+ p 0.060.430.43 p (    8688 HX %p8p6Ӏ(.55)(.77)(.81) )   83p 8p HX %883 Gender p 0.37)0.350.27     8688 HX %p8p6Ӏ(.43)(.51)(.54) S   83p 8p HX %883 Income p 0.110.180.27 T    8688 HX %p8p6Ӏ(.15)(.18)(.54)     83p 8p HX %883 Education p 0.090.43**.16/.290.48**.17/.32 ~    8688 HX %p8p6Ӏ(.16)(.22)(.23) 7  83p 8p HX %883 Own/Rent p 0.060.210.34 8   8688 HX %p8p6Ӏ(.62)(.70)(.74)  Democrat0.600.560.42 b Ѐ(.49)(.63)(.67) c Republican2.77**.563.96**.793.92**.79  Ѐ(1.58)(1.99)(2.01)  Cons.0.69*.150.77*.180.53 F Ѐ(.53)(.65)(.70) G Liberal0.160.240.35  Ѐ(.49)(.58)(.62) q Widowed0.511.090.75 r* Ѐ(.79)(.96)(.99) +  Divorced0.290.650.58 ! Ѐ(.68)(.80)(.82) U" N/Married0.480.630.82 V# Ѐ(.63) .10/.20 (.75)(.78) $ Educationfor0.37**.10/.200.130.04 % IllegalAliens(.18)(.22)(.23) 9&  X X 8XX XXR8 HXX8 HR8Equalitarianism0.21*.08/.170.36**.14/.280.33**.13/.26 ( Ѐ(.13)(.18)(.20)  l) Trust0.89**.17/.310.49*0.44 m!%* Ѐ(.28)(.33)(.35) &"+ Havechildrenin1.29**.291.41**.34 ", districtschool(.68)(.70) #P - Newschoolinneighborhood0.010.11 Q$ !. Ѐ(.81)(.85)  %!/ Taxraisenone/small1.58*.361.10 %{"0 Ѐ(1.07)(1.13) |&4#1 Taxraisemoderate0.19)0.73 5'#2 Ѐ(.93)(1.02) '$3 LargeTaxIncrease2.58**.553.30**.66 (_%4 Ѐ(1.21)(1.30) `)&5 over65/knowabout3.86**.773.86**.77 *&6 taxbreak(1.32)1.41 *'7 Ѐ +C(8 Retrospectivejobper0.72**.13/.27 D,(9 formanceevaluaton(.36) ,):  X X 8XX XXR8 HXX8 HR8SchoolOvercrowding0.58*.10/.20 w./+< Ѐ(.44) 0/+=  X X 8XX XXR8 HXX8 HR8ӀModel1:N=143Model2:N=143Model3:N=143󀀀   Ѐ󀀀X2=26.8(p.<.01)X2=65.6(p.<.01)X2=71.2(p.<.01) z Ѐcorrectlyclassified:79%correctlyclassified:86%correctlyclassified:85% {3 ЀReductioninerror:46%Reductioninerror:64%Reductioninerror:64% 4 Ѐ   X X 8XX XXR8 HXX8 HR8Ӏ*p.<.10(onetailedtest)    Ѐ**p.<.05(onetailedtest)  Z   X X 8XX XXR8_ .+: Ї HXXR8Table4 2. LogisticRegressionforEffectsofSymbolicValues,PersonalSelfInterestand_Sociotropic_ԀFactors CollectiveSelfInterest onSupport  K  forSchoolBond(HispanicsOnly)  S  Ѐ  ModelI  󀀀  ModelII  󀀀  ModelIIIXXHR8     HXXR8ӀCoefChangeinCoefChangeinCoefChangein  L  Ѐ_icient_ԀProbability󀀀_icient_ԀProbability_icient_ԀProbability T  Ѐ    83p 8p HX %883  8 HIntercept p 5.03**5.46**7.58**     8688 HX %p8p6Ӏ(2.23)(3.29)(4.11) E   83p 8p HX %883 Age5064 p 0.851.571.69 F    8688 HX %p8p6Ӏ(.75)(1.21)(1.23)   83p 8p HX %883 Age65+ p 0.060.080.12 p   8688 HX %p8p6Ӏ(.67)(1.14)(1.17) q)  83p 8p HX %883 Gender p 1.46**.351.65**.391.60**.39 *   8688 HX %p8p6Ӏ(.59)(.88)(.88)   83p 8p HX %883 Income p 0.110.090.13 T   8688 HX %p8p6Ӏ(.21)(.28)(.29) U   83p 8p HX %883 Education p (.02)0.090.13    8688 HX %p8p6Ӏ(.24)(.31)(.32)   83p 8p HX %883 Own/Rent p 0.630.580.47 8   8688 HX %p8p6Ӏ(.70)(.87)(.87) 9 Democrat1.04**.270.870.79  Ѐ(.57)(.76)(.77) c  Republican1.631.170.90 d! Ѐ(1.29)(1.99)(2.07) " Cons.0.260.560.58 # Ѐ(.74)(.91)(.94) G$ Liberal0.130.160.13 H% Ѐ(.70)(1.08)(1.07) & Widowed1.022.071.95 r' Ѐ(1.16)(1.78)(1.77) s +( Divorced1.67*.393.37**.683.35**.68 ,!) Ѐ(1.10)(1.60)(1.69) !* N/Married0.511.601.47 "V+ Ѐ(1.28)(1.87)(1.81) W# , S/Racism0.220.330.30 $ - Ѐ(.15)(.24)(.23) $!. Equalitarianism0.080.100.11 %:"/ Ѐ(.16)(.21)(.24) ;&"0 Trust1.33**.24/.471.64**.28/.531.60**.28/.53  Ѐ(.42)(.59)(.59) 'e$2 Havechildrenin2.35**.502.10**.47 f(%3 districtschool(1.12)(1.14) )%4  X X 8XX XXR8 HXX8 HR8Newschoolinneighborhood0.850.90 *Q'6 Ѐ(.89)(.91) R+ (7 Taxraisenone/small0.360.36  ,(8 Ѐ(1.18)(1.21) ,|)9 _Taxraisemoderate1.251.09 }-5*: Ѐ(1.16)(1.17) 6.*; LargeTaxIncrease3.77**.743.59**.70 .+< Ѐ(1.34)(1.36) /`,= / TRY03' LetterY03' Letter 3' Letter 3' LetterT   over65/knowabout3.95**.783.52**.70 H taxbreak(1.94)(1.94)  Ѐ r Retrospectivejobper0.42 s+ formanceevaluaton(.55) ,  X X 8XX XXR8 HXX8 HR8SchoolOvercrowding0.29 ^ Ѐ(.61) _  X X 8XX XXR8 HXX8 HR8ӀModel1:N=100Model2:N=100Model3:N=100󀀀    ЀX2=32.5(p.<.01)X2=64.5(p.<.01)X2=65.4(p.<.01)  J  Ѐcorrectlyclassified:76%correctlyclassified:84%correctlyclassified:84% K   ЀReductioninerror:47%Reductioninerror:64%Reductioninerror:66%    Ѐ  u   X X 8XX XXR8 HXX8 HR8Ӏ*p.<.10(onetailedtest) q  Ѐ**p.<.05(onetailedtest) r*   X X 8XX XXR8  AppendixA:QuestionWording    ________________________________________________________________________________ i ________________________________________________________________________________ r*  RacialResentment(agreedisagree)  3 ЀGenerationsofslaveryhavecreatedconditionsthatmakeitdifficultforblackstoworktheirwayoutof  thelowerclass. m ЀMostblackswhoreceivemoneyfromwelfareprogramscouldgetalongwithoutitiftheytried. v.  Publiceducationforchildrenofillegalimmigrants 7 Ѐ Doyoufavororopposeprovidingfreepubliceducationtochildrenofimmigrantswhoareinthe   UnitedStatesillegally? t! Ѐ Equalitarianism(stg.agreestg.disagree)  }5" ЀOneofthebigproblemsinthiscountryisthatwedontgiveeveryoneanequalchance. A# ЀIfpeopleweretreatedmoreequallyinthiscountry,wewouldhavefewerproblems $  PoliticalTrust  {% ЀHowmuchofthetimedoyouthinkyoucantrustthegovernmentinWashingtontodotheright <& thing!mostofthetime,someofthetime,alittle,ornotatall? E '  TaxIncrease  !( ЀIfthebondissuehadpassed,doyouthinkitwouldhavecausedanincreaseinpropertytaxes?[IF !) YES]Doyouthinkthatincreasewouldhavebeensmall,moderateorlarge? "@*  Over65TaxBreak  I# + ЀStatelawallowsschooldistrictstheoptionofgivinghomeownerswhoareover65abreakbynot  $ , requiringthemtopayincreasedpropertytaxesresultingfromschoolbonds.Wouldorwouldnotthose $!- over65havegottenthistaxbreakifthe[schooldistrict]bondproposalhadpassed? %D".  NewSchoolinNeighborhood  M&#/ ЀIftheMay28thbondissuehadpassed,would[theschooldistrict]havebuiltanewschoolthatchildren '#0 inyourneighborhoodwouldattend? '$1  OvercrowdinginSchools(stg.agreestg.disagree)  (H%2 ЀThereisnosubstantialproblemofstudentovercrowdingin[theschooldistrict] Q) &3  RetrospectiveRatingofSchoolDistrict  *&4 ЀStudentsareoftengivengradesofA,B,C,D,andFailingtodenotethequalityoftheirwork.Ifyou *'5 weretoratethe[schooldistrict]whatgradewouldyougivethe[schooldistrict]overall? +L(6  Party_Identification  U, )7 ЀGenerallyspeaking,doyouconsideryourselfaDemocrat,aRepublican,anIndependent,orwhat? -)8  PoliticalIdeology  -*9 ЀInpolitics,doyouconsideryourselfastrongconservative,conservative,middleoftheroad,aliberal .P+: orastrongliberal? Y/,; Ѐ 8 |8(8@ HPX "%(08@HPX` 888Hh8X|8(8@ HPX "#(08@HPX` 8 8X(בXXXӀAppendixB:Testsfor_Endogeneity_ԀofPreferences   ______________________________________________________________________________   |8(8@ HPX "#(08@HPX` 8 8X#(בXXX  Instudiesofvotingbehaviorusingcrosssectionaldata,variablessuchasageoreducation H  donotcauseestimationproblemsasageisnotamatterofchoice,andchoicessuchaseducation    havebeenmadesofarinthepastthattheycanbetreatedasexogenous.However,preferencesthat   aremoreproximatetothedependentvariable,suchastheretrospectiveevaluationofjobdoneby S theschooldistrictmaybejointlydeterminedalongwiththedependentvariable.Ifthatwerethe L case,coefficientsfromsingleequationsolutionswillbebiasedupward(_Berndt_Ԁ1995:375381).We   employamethoddevelopedbyRiversand_Vuong_Ԁ(1988)totestfor_endogeneity_Ԁ(seealsoAlvarez  1997;AlvarezandGlasgow1999).Thetestdeterminesifasetofunobservedvariablesarea W commoncauseofthedependentvariableaswellasproximatepreferences. P   Fourpreferencesarecandidatesforpossible_endogeneity_!thebelieftherewillbeaproperty  taxincrease,thebeliefthatanewschoolwouldbebuiltintherespondentsneighborhood,the [ retrospectivejobevaluationoftheschooldistrict,andthebeliefthatclassroomsareovercrowded. T Wewereunabletofindsuitableinstrumentsforthefirsttwo,sonotestsareconducted.    Totestfor_endogeneity_,weusedatwostageconditionalmaximumlikelihoodestimation _ method(_2SCML_).Weused_OLS_Ԁtoestimateareducedformequationfortheretrospective X   evaluationoftheschooldistrictandabelieftheschoolsaresubstantiallyovercrowded,asbothare ! continuous.Theseestimatesaremadefromtheexogenousvariablesinthefullmodelplusadditional " variablesexcludedfromthefullmodel,whichareassociatedwiththevariablessuspectedof c# _endogeneity_. \$$   Fortheretrospectivejobevaluationoftheschooldistricttheadditionalvariablesusedinthe  & firststageestimationare(1)a10pointscaleaskingrespondentstoevaluatetheteachingofmoral !g' valuesintheschooldistrict.Respondentswhoratemoralinstructionpositivelywilllikelygivea `"(( schooldistrictahighergradethanwhoratemoralinstructionnegatively,(2)a_Likert_Ԁitemstating I !#) wouldliketoseealargergovernmentthatprovidesitscitizenswithmoreservices.Thosewho #* endorsethisstatementshouldalsotendtogivehighgradestoalargegovernmentorganizationthat $k + providesanimportantservice,(3)supportoroppositionforschoolvouchers.Thosewhofavor d%,!, schoolvouchersshouldtendtogivetheschooldistrictalowergradethanthosewhoopposeschool %&!- vouchers. &".   Forthebeliefinsubstantialschoolovercrowdingtheexcludedvariablesusedinthefirst h(0$0 stageare(1)a_Likert_Ԁitemstating Ifthe[schooldistrict]builtanewschoolinmyneighborhood,it ))$1 wouldleadlotsofkidswhowerentfrommyneighborhoodcominghere.Theitemsuggeststhe )%2 overflowfrom crowed crowdedschoolswouldendupintherespondentsneighborhood,(2)support *s&3 foraschoolvoucherprogram.Giventhatsubstantialschoolovercrowdingwastheoverriding l+4'4 themeofthecampaign,thosefavoringavoucherprogrammayseeitasasolutiontoovercrowding, -,'5 aswellotherproblemsafflictingthepublicschools.Thefirststagecoefficientsarereportedbelow ,(6 forblacksandwhitesseparately,butnotforHispanicsasneitheritemwassignificantinthefull -w)7 modelforHispanics. p.8*8 Ї  Theexplainedvarianceis21%forthejobevaluationmodelforwhitesand13%forthejob 8 evaluationmodelforblacks.Whentheresidualsfromthefirststage_OLS_Ԁareaddedtothefull  equationthejobevaluationbis.72andthestandarderroris.51,yieldingatstatisticof1.45.We  thereforeacceptthenullhypothesisofno_endogeneity_.Forblacks,whenthejobevaluation {C residualsareaddedtothefullmodel,bis1.18andthestandarderroris1.38.Weacceptthenull < hypothesisofno_endogeneity_.     G   Theexplainedvarianceforthefirststageequationsforabeliefthereissubstantialschool 8 overcrowdingis13%forwhitesand10%forblacks.Thuswedonothavemuchconfidenceinthe  proxyvariables.Whentheresidualisenteredintothefullmodelforwhites,bis.89andthe  standarderroris1.13.Forblacksbis3.62andthestandarderroris4.99.Sincethestandarderrors {C exceedtheregressioncoefficients,weacceptthenullhypothesisofno_endogeneity_. <   Ourconclusionisnotthattheerrortermsforthesevariablesandthedependentvariableare  completelyuncorrelated.Rather,amoredefensibleconclusionisthat_endogeneity_Ԁdoesnot  G underminethebasicconclusionswereachinthispaper!eventhoughwedonothaveinstrumentsfor @  twoofthepreferenceitems.Themostlikelycandidatefor_endogeneity_Ԁistheretrospective    evaluationoftheschooldistrictjobperformance.Anegativeevaluationofjobperformanceanda     novotecouldwellhaveacommoncause(suchasanantigovernment/antitaxideology).Thefact  K  thatweacceptthenullhypothesisforthisitemgivesussomesmallconfidencethattheother D  preferenceitemsforwhichwelackinstrumentsdonotsufferfrom_endogeneity_Ԁproblemssoserious   itunderminesconfidenceinourresults.Inaddition,thetaxincreaseresultsareconsistentwitha   gooddealofpreviousresearch,whichaddstoourconfidenceinthatfinding.Inthecaseofknowing O  ornotknowingifanewschoolwouldbebuiltinonesneighborhoodifthebondpassed,therewas H  considerableinformationabouttheschooldistrictsplansonthismatter.Itdoesnotseemlikelythat    someunmeasuredvariablewouldbeacommoncauseofcorrectknowledgeonthismatterandthe   votedirection. S XXTable1A.FirstStage_OLS_ԀEstimatesforDistrictJobEvaluationandBeliefinSubstantialSchoolOvercrowding   ____________________________________________________________________________________________  ЀJobEvaluationSubstantialOvercrowdingXX U XXӀWhitesBlacksWhitesBlacks - Ѐ  b_S.E._Ԁb_S.E._Ԁb_S.E_Ԁb_S.E._    _Exogeneous_ԀvariablesfromfullmodelXX u  |0(8@ HP0X "#(08@HPX`8X#(בXXX XX  Age5064 @    .10 H .10  .05  .17 P .46** 0 .15  .04 X .24 M XX |(8@ HPX "#(08@HPX`0 X0X#(בXXX X  Age65andover XX  .09 H .10  .24  .17* P .74**  .15  .40**  .23   XX  Income   @    .01 H .03  .05  .05 P .21**  .10  .13  .06    Education @    .01 H .03  .00  .04 P .05  .04  .03** X .07    Owner/renter @    .23** H .12  .17  .19XX P .04  .18.35*  .26  XX  Widowed @    .10 H .12  .37  .21**XX P .24  .17  .06  .29 q  XX  Divorced @  XX  .11 H .14  .16  .20 P .30  .20  .14  .27 X! XX  NeverMarried @  XX  .32** H .14.19  .20 P .24  .20  .08  .27 w?" XX  Gender   @  XX  .09 H .07  .16  .13 P .21**  .11  .16  .18 ^&# XX  Democrat @  XX  .01 H .10  .06  .13 P .14  .14  .46**  .20 E $ XX  Republican @  XX  .08 H .08  .35  .40 P .00  .12  .64  .56 ,!%  X |8(8@ HPX "#(08@HPX`  XX "#(בXXXAdditionalVariablesXX "&  H|(8@ HPX "#(08@HPX`8X#(בXXX   RateTeachingMoralValues  XX.13** H .02  .10**  .03*#XX#Ԁ "{'   Favorlarger_govt_/services  .07** H .04XX  .03  .05 #b( XX PH|(8@ HPX "#(08@HPX` XX#(בXXX   FavorSchoolVouchersXX  .10** H .03  .05  .05.09**  .05  .04..08#XX# $I )  P|(8@ HPX "#(08@HPX` XX#(בXXX X  Newschool/Bringskids   H     XX P .08**  .04  .04  .08 h%0!* Constant     @  0  3.54 H .44  2.34**  .30 P 3.35**  .39  3.14*  .54O&"+##  XXX |8(8@ HPX "#(08@HPX`  XX "#(בXXX |(8@ HPX "#(08@HPX`8X#(בXXX XXXNofcases   @    380 H   143   P 380    143   '#-  P|(8@ HPX "#(08@HPX` XX "#(בXXX XAdjusted_R2_XX,   @    .21 H   .16   P .13    .10 (X$. XXFratio     @    8.18** H   2.89**   P 5.51**    2.14** w)?%/  XX P|8(8@ HPX "#(08@HPX`  XX#(בXXX -)5 Ї  ___Թ888  |(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[ 8X#(בXXX References  2   3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[3X#0{בXX Alexander,ArthurJ.,andGailV.Bass.1974.SchoolTaxesandVoterBehavior:AnAnalysisof  SchoolDistrictPropertyTaxElections.SantaMonic,CA:RandCorporation. u   3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[  3X#0{בXX 3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[3X#0{בXX Allen,RichardL.,MichaelC.Dawson,andRonaldBrown.1989. ASchemabased Appraoch  G  ApproachtoModelinganAfricanAmericanRacialBeliefSystem.AmericanPolitical   ScienceReview:83:421447. y     3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[  3X#0{בXX 3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[3X#0{בXX Alvarez,R.Michael.1997.InformationandElections.AnnArbor,MI:UniversityofMichigan  K  Press.     3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[  3X#0{בXX 3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[3X#0{בXX Alvarez,R.Michael,andTaraL.Butterfield1998. TheRevolutionAgainstAffirmativeAction >  inCalifornia:Politics,Economics,andProposition209.Manuscript,CaliforniaInstitute O  ofTechnology.     3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[  3X#0{בXX 3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[3X#0{בXX Alvarez,R.MichaelandGarrettGlasgow.1999. TwoStageEstimationofNonRecursive B  ChoiceModelsManuscript,CaliforniaInstituteofTechnology. S   3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[  3X#0{בXX 3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[3X#0{בXX Alvarez,R.Michael,andJohnBrehm.1997. AreAmericansAmbivalentTowardsRacial  Policies?AmericanJournalofPoliticalScience41:34576. F   3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[  3X#0{בXXBarry,Brian.1965.PoliticalArgument.NewYork:TheHumanitiesPress.  Berndt,ErnstR.1995.ThePracticeofEconometrics:ClassicandContemporary.Reading, J   MA.:AddisonWesleyPublishingCompany.  [  3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[3X#0{בXX Bergstrom,TheodoreC.,DanielL.Rubinfeld,andPerryShapiro.1982. ExplainingVoter  BehaviorTowardLocalSchoolExpenditures:TheImpactofAttitudes.Economicsof N EducationReview9:3145. _   3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[  3X#0{בXX 3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[3X#0{בXX Bobo,Lawrence.1983. WhitesOppositiontoBusing:SymbolicRacismorRealisticGroup ! Conflict?JournalofPersonalityandSocialPsychology45:11961210. R"   3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[  3X#0{בXX 3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[3X#0{בXX Bobo,LawrenceandJamesR.Kluegel.1993. OppositiontoRaceTargeting:SelfInterest, $$ StratificationIdeology,orRacialAttitudes?AmericanSociologicalReview58:443  %   3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[  3X#0{בXX  464. V!& Brehm,John.1993.ThePhantomRespondents.AnnArbor,MI:UniversityofMichiganPress. "((  3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[3X#0{בXX Brokow,AlanJ.,JamesR.GaleandThomasE.Merz.1990. TheEffectofTaxPriceonVoter Z$* ChoiceinLocalSchoolReferenda:SomeNewEvidencefromMichigan.NationalTax %k + Journal43:5360. %,!,   3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[  3X#0{בXX 3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[3X#0{בXX Burtt,Shelley.1993. ThePoliticsofVirtueToday:ACritiqueandaProposal.American ^'". PoliticalScienceReview87:360368. (o#/   3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[  3X#0{בXX  b*%2  3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[3X#0{בXX Button,JamesW.1993. RacialCleavageinLocalVoting:TheCaseofSchoolandTaxIssue  Referendums.JournalofBlackStudies24:2941. q   3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[  3X#0{בXX 3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[3X#0{בXX Campbell,Angus,PhilipE.Converse,WarrenE.Miller,andDonaldE.Stokes.1960.The  AmericanVoter.NewYork:Wiley. u   3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[  3X#0{בXX 3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[3X#0{בXX Cataldo,EverettF.,andJohnC.Holm.1983. VotingonSchoolFinances:ATestofCompeting  G Theories.WesternPoliticalQuarterly36:619631.     3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[  3X#0{בXX 3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[3X#0{בXX Chew,Kenneth,RichardMcCleary,BeverlySandeenandJonMeyer.1991. WhoCaresabout :   PublicSchools,AmericanDemographics(May):3839.  K    3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[  3X#0{בXX 3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[3X#0{בXX Citrin,JackandDonaldP.Green.1991. TheSelfInterestMotiveinAmericanPublicOpinion. }  Ed.SamuelLong.ResearchinMicropolitics.Greenwich,CT.JIAPress,128. >    3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[  3X#0{בXXCouncilofGreatCitySchools.1994.NationalUrbanEducationalGoals:19921993     IndicatorsReport.Washington,D.C.CounciloftheGreatCitySchools.     Dawson,MichaelC.1994.BehindtheMule:RaceandClassinAfricanAmericanPolitics. S   Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.   K      3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[3X#0{בXX Fisher,RonaldC.,andRobertH.Rasche.1984. TheIncidenceandIncentiveEffectsofProperty F TaxCredits:EvidencefromMichigan.PublicFinanceQuarterly12:291319. W   3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[  3X#0{בXX 3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[3X#0{בXX Gilens,Martin.1995. RaceCodingandWhiteOppositiontoWelfare.AmericanPolitical  ScienceReview90(September):593604. J   3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[  3X#0{בXX 3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[3X#0{בXX Green,DonaldP.,andJonathanA.Cowdon.1992. WhoProtests:SelfInterestandWhite  OppositiontoBusing.JournalofPolitics56:47191.    3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[  3X#0{בXX 3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[3X#0{בXX Green,DonaldP.,andAnnElizabethGerken.1989. SelfInterestandPublicOpiniontoward _ SmokingRestrictionsandCigaretteTaxes.PublicOpinionQuarterly53:116.      3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[  3X#0{בXX 3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[3X#0{בXX Hamilton,HowardandSylvanH.Cohen.1973.PolicybyPlebiscite:SchoolReferenda. R" Lexington,MA:LexingtonPress. c#   3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[  3X#0{בXX 3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[3X#0{בXX Heatherington,Marc.J.1998. ThePoliticalRelevanceofPoliticalTrust.AmericanPolitical  % ScienceReview92:791808. V!&   3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[  3X#0{בXX 3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[3X#0{בXX Hughes,Michael.1997. SymbolicRacism,OldFashionedRacism,andWhitesOppositionto "(( AffirmativeAction.Eds.StevenA.TuchandJackK.Martin.RacialAttitudesinthe #) 1990s.Westport,Connecticut:Praeger. Z$*   3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[  3X#0{בXX 3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[3X#0{בXX Hurwitz,JonandMarkPeffley.1992. TraditionalversusSocialValuesandAntecedentsof %,!, RacialStereotypingandPolicyConservatism.PoliticalBehavior14:395422. &!-   3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[  3X#0{בXX_  (0$0 _Jerald_,CraigD.,andBridgetK._Curran_.1998. BytheNumbers:TheUrbanPicture.    EducationWeekXVII(January8):5669. q  3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[3X#0{בXX Kaufman,RobertL.1996. ComparingEffectsinDichotomousLogisticRegression:AVarietyof C StandardizedCoefficients.SocialScienceQuarterly77:90109.    3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[  3X#0{בXX 3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[3X#0{בXX _Kiewiet_,D.Roderick.1983.Macroeconomicsand_Micropolitics_:TheElectoralEffectsof 6  EconomicIssues.Chicago,Illinois:U.ofChicagoPress.  G   3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[  3X#0{בXXKinder,DonaldR.,andD.Roderick_Kiewiet_.1981. _Sociotropic_ԀPolitics.BritishJournalof y   PoliticalScience11:129161. :    3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[3X#0{בXX Kinder,DonaldR.,andLynnM.Sanders.1996.DividedbyColor:RacialPoliticsand   DemocraticIdeals.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress. }    3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[  3X#0{בXX_Kuklinski_,JamesH.,PaulM._Sniderman_,KathleenKnight,ThomasPiazza,PhilipE._Tetlock_, O   3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[3X#0{בXXGordonR.Lawrence,andBarbara_Mellers_.1997. RacialPrejudiceandAttitudesToward   AffirmativeAction.AmericanJournalofPoliticalScience41:958971.    3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[  3X#0{בXX 3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[3X#0{בXX Lane,RobertE.1962.PoliticalIdeology:WhytheCommonManBelievesWhatHeDoesabout S Politics.Glencoe,IL:FreePress.    3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[  3X#0{בXX 3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[3X#0{בXX LewisBeck,MichaelS.1988.EconomicsandElections:TheMajorWesternDemocracies.Ann F Arbor,MI:UniversityofMichiganPress. W   3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[  3X#0{בXXLowery,DavidandLee_Sigelman_.1981. UnderstandingtheTaxRevolt:EightExplanations.    AmericanPoliticalScienceReview75:963974. J _MacManus_,SusanA.1996.YoungandOld:GenerationalCombatinthe21stCentury.    Boulder,CO._Westview_ԀPress.   3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[3X#0{בXX _Magleby_,DavidB.1984.DirectLegislation:VotingonBallotPropositionsintheUnitedStates. _ Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsPress.      3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[  3X#0{בXX_Mansbridge_,JaneJ.1980.BeyondAdversarialDemocracy.NewYork:BasicBooks. R"  3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[3X#0{בXX Monroe,_Kristen_Ԁ_Renwick_,(ed).1991.TheEconomicApproachtoPolitics.NewYork:Harper $$ andRow.  %   3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[  3X#0{בXXOlson,LynnandCaroline_Hendrie_.1998. PathwaystoProgress.EducationWeek27:3248. "g'  3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[3X#0{בXX _Peffley_,Mark,Jon_Hurwitz_,andPaul_Sniderman_.1997. RacialStereotypesandWhitesPolitical #) ViewsofBlacksintheContextofWelfareandCrime.AmericanJournalofPolitical Z$* Science41:3056. %k +   3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[  3X#0{בXXPetersen,_Trond_.1985. ACommentonPresentingResultsfrom_Logit_Ԁand_Probit_ԀModels. &!-   AmericanSociologicalReview50:130131. ^'". _Piele_,PhillipK.,andJohnStuartHall.1973.Budgets,Bonds,andBallots:VotingBehavior (0$0   inSchoolFinancialElections.Lexington,MA:LexingtonPress. )$1  3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[3X#0{בXX _Pressley_,SueAnne.1998. TaxationforEducationHitsGrayArea.WashingtonPostWeekly #+s&3 Edition(January19),30. +4'4   3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[  3X#0{בXX ,'5  3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[3X#0{בXX Preston,Samuel.1984. ChildrenandtheElderlyintheUnitedStates.ScientificAmerican  (December),4449. q   3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[  3X#0{בXX 3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[3X#0{בXX DouglasRiversand_Quang_ԀH._Vuong_.1988. LimitedInformationEstimatorsand_Exogeneity_ C TestsforSimultaneous_Probit_ԀModels.JournalofEconometrics39(November):34766.    3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[  3X#0{בXX 3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[3X#0{בXX _Rubinfeld_,DanielL.1977. VotinginaLocalSchoolElection:AMicro_Analyis_.TheReviewof 6  EconomicsandStatistics59:3042.  G   3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[  3X#0{בXX 3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[3X#0{בXX Sears,DavidO.,and_Colette_Ԁvan_Laar_,Mary_Carrillo_,andRick_Kosterman_.1997. IsitReally y   Racism?TheOriginsofWhiteAmericansOppositiontoRaceTargetedPolicies. :     3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[  3X#0{בXX  PublicOpinionQuarterly61:1653.  K   3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[3X#0{בXX Sears,DavidO.,andJackCitrin.1985.TaxRevolt:SomethingforNothinginCalifornia.2nd }  edition.Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress. >    3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[  3X#0{בXX 3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[3X#0{בXX Sears,DavidO.,CarlP._Hensler_,andLeslieK.Speer.1979. WhitesOppositiontoBusing:   SelfInterestorSymbolicPolitics?AmericanPoliticalScienceReview73:36984.     3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[  3X#0{בXXSears,DavidO.,andCarolynFunk.1990. SelfInterestinAmericansPoliticalOpinions. S  3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[3X#0{בXX Ӏ  Ed.JaneJ._Mansbridge_.BeyondSelfInterest.Chicago:UniversityofChicago.    3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[  3X#0{בXX 3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[3X#0{בXX Sears,DavidO.,andDonaldR.Kinder.1971. RacialTensionsandVotinginLosAngeles.Los F Angeles:ViabilityandProspectsforMetropolitanLeadership.Ed._W.Z._ԀHirsch.New W York:_Praeger_.    3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[  3X#0{בXX 3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[3X#0{בXX _Sniderman_,PaulM.,andThomasPiazza.1993.TheScarofRace.Cambridge.The_Belknap_ J PressofHarvardUniversity.  [   3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[  3X#0{בXX 3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[3X#0{בXX _Tedin_,KentL.1994. SelfInterestandSymbolicPoliticsintheFinancialEqualizationofthe    3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[  3X#0{בXX  PublicSchools,JournalofPolitics56:628649. N _Verba_,Sidney,KayLehman_Schlozman_ԀandHenryE.Brady.1995.VoiceandEquality:Civic      _Voluntarism_ԀinAmericanPolitics.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress. !  3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[3X#0{בXX _Zaller_,John,andStanleyFeldman.1992. ASimpleTheoryoftheSurveyResponse:Answering c# QuestionsandRevealingPreferences.AmericanJournalofPoliticalScience36:579616. $$   3|(3; CKS ##0{+3;CKS[  3X#0{בXX