

Ethnicity and National Identity: A Comparison of Three Perspectives

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As recent genocides in Rwanda and “ethnic cleansing” in Bosnia and Kosovo make painfully clear, the level of interethnic truculence at the end of the 20th century seems to be every bit as ferocious as it was at the beginning of the 20th century. Indeed, the end of the Cold War seems to only have re-energized ethnic conflicts in exactly those parts of the world expected to bloom into a new era of freedom, intergroup harmony, and civic tolerance. It now seems clear that the national mobilization of the Cold War’s bipolar international system only temporarily restrained hostilities that have lost little of their earlier virulence. Furthermore, rather than being restricted to any particular part of the world, this interethnic belligerence is found across all major regions of the world (see Gurr, 1994).

In many cases, intergroup conflict within multiethnic states turns on the question of the compatibility of subgroup versus national identities and loyalties. Thus, within multiethnic states, one wonders whether one can truly be loyal to one’s own ethnic subgroup and still remain a loyal member of the nation-state as a whole? Can Israel only rely upon ethnic Jews, or can Israeli-Arabs also be fully included in the family of “Israelis?” Can a Gypsy also be Hungarian and Francophones be as interested in the welfare of Canada as other Canadians, etc.? There is a second and related question one could ask, and a question made all the more salient by the recent events in Kosovo. Namely, within multi-ethnic states, does love of and devotion to the nation imply rejection of other ethnic groups who are also citizens of the nation-state? For example, does being a patriotic Yugoslav also imply rejecting Yugoslav citizens of Albanian extraction? Does being a patriotic

White American also imply being anti African-American, anti Latino-American or anti Asian-American?

Not surprisingly, how one is inclined to answer these questions critically depends on one's overall theoretical model of the interface between national and ethnic identity. Within the context of contemporary American discourse, models of this intersection can be broken down into essentially three primary categories: the classical "melting-pot" model, the "pluralist" model, and the general group dominance model.

The Melting-Pot and American Identity

A *de facto* policy of “Americanization” was the first way in which the United States dealt with the issue of ethnic diversity. Everybody was expected to adopt the language, dress, customs, beliefs, and loyalties of the dominant English culture that originally defined American culture. However, this original Americanization model was only meant to apply to immigrants of European extraction and clearly excluded non-whites such as Indians and Africans. However, by the end of the 19th century, this Americanization model was replaced by the more inclusive notion of the “melting pot.” Unlike the Americanization model, by which everyone was expected to adopt the pre-existing WASP standard, the new melting-pot model implied a continuous reformulation of what it means to be “American.” In the melting-pot formulation, all immigrants were considered to have valuable things to offer America, and this value was to be recognized as American society incorporated parts of the language, cuisine, social sensibilities, and economic and political values of new immigrant cultures. This continuous reformulation of American culture, coupled with marriage across ethnic, and religious boundaries, became the alternative resolution of ethnic diversity, and the suspicions it produced. This ‘melting-pot’ metaphor resolved -- at least intellectually -- the struggle over whether immigrants were “real Americans” by loosening (if not severing) the connection between English Protestant heritage and “American-ness.” The result was a continually changing American culture and a continually changing American ethnicity still expressing the basic theme “from many, one” (see e.g., Salins, 1997).

The Pluralist Model: The Unmelted Pot

While the notion of the “melting-pot” has been the dominant metaphor for most of this century, it is being gradually replaced with allusions to “salad bowls,” “quilts,” or “glorious mosaics.” While there are slight variations in the precise manner in which the term “pluralism” is

understood, the central idea suggests that, unlike the notion of the “melting-pot,” one’s communal identity is not expected to be submerged into a common national identity, but is retained. In a pluralist society one’s religious, ethnic and “racial” distinctiveness are allowed, and even encouraged, to remain salient and cherished social identities. Thus Catholics recognize Protestants; the progeny of Italian immigrants see themselves as different from “Yankees” or Polish immigrants and Blacks and Whites are aware of and respect their “racial” differences. Social views will naturally vary between different communities, but there is no notion that these differences are either unbridgeable or structurally hostile.

Most importantly, the pluralist ethos posits that individuals from various subgroups will still feel a common identity with and loyalty to the larger American community. A more widespread recognition of the pluralist quality of the society in the 1960s is often attributed to the re-emergence of a white ethnic identity that developed in response to the civil rights movement (see Greeley, 1971, 1976; Novak, 1971). However, as Milton Gordon (1963) and others (e.g., Wolfinger, 1965; Parenti, 1967) demonstrated over three decades ago, resistance to the melting pot and a preference for retaining a separate communal identity was even strong among many communal groups early in the 1900s. Rather than adding to the “disuniting” of America” as some have argued (e.g., Schlesinger, 1992), pluralism proponents argue that these distinct ethnic loyalties will actually contribute to rather than detract from a superordinate sense of American identity (see, Powell, 1995).

Not only is pluralism promoted in purely proscriptive or normative terms, but it has also been proposed as an empirically demonstrable and accurate description of contemporary American life (see de la Garza, Falcon and Garcia, 1996).

The General Group Dominance Perspective

Central to the pluralist argument is the notion that all ethnic groups be regarded as **co-equal** partners in the pursuit of the “American dream.” However, in contrast to this vision, there are a cluster of theories of intergroup relations which suggest that this “co-equality” condition will never actually describe relationships among salient groups within multi-ethnic societies. These theoretical models have been referred to as group dominance models, where social dominance theory is the most explicit and recent statement of this general position (see Sidanius & Pratt, 1999; for related models see Blumer, 1960; Jackman, 1994). These group dominance models suggest that societies tend to be organized as *group-based* hierarchies, with dominant groups enjoying a disproportionate share of positive social value (e.g., power, prestige, privilege) and subordinate social groups suffering from a disproportionate share of negative social value (e.g., poor health, poor education, prison sentences and premature death). This group-based and hierarchical structure is thought to apply to both “democratic” and non-democratic as states, despite differing discourses concerning “inclusivity” or pluralism. Not only do such group dominance models have much to say about how positive and negative social value will be distributed across the group-based social hierarchy, but these models also have implications for the general interface between national and group identity. Because most multi-ethnic societies were created as a result of the military conquest and/or the enslavement of subordinates at the hands of dominants, in general dominants should have a greater sense of ownership of and entitlement to the nation-state than subordinates. Since the “nation” is conceived in terms of being the property of dominants rather than subordinates, the sense of patriotic attachment to the nation should also be associated with relative preference for dominants and relative rejection of subordinates. In other words, patriotic attachment to the nation should have a distinctly *exclusionary* flavor. Given this, it is then easy to regard the classical “Americanization”

perspective discussed above as merely a special case of the general group dominance position.

Given its history as a “Herrenvolk” democracy, and its longstanding and institutionalized racism, the United States would appear to be a good candidate to confirm the general group dominance perspective. Consistent with the “Americanization” perspective, the North American colonies of the New World were originally thought to be for the exclusive benefit of Europeans. America's first citizenship statute, passed in 1790, limited naturalization to “aliens being free white persons.” Though Black men were granted de jure citizenship rights by the 14th amendment in 1868, the 1790 naturalization law remained the law of the land until 1952. For example, as late as the 1940s, this law forced nonwhite petitioners to prove that they were “white” before they could be granted citizenship in the United States. The idea of the United States as a “White man’s country” was so pervasive that it can even be seen in the legal decisions of very “liberal” jurists. For example, in his opposition to the majority decision of *Plessy v. Ferguson*, the very liberal Supreme Court Justice, John Marshall wrote:

“The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional liberty.”¹

While civil rights legislation of the 1960s was designed to finally guarantee full citizenship rights to African-Americans, rights first extended in the 14th and 15th Amendments to the Constitution, empirical evidence shows that the United States remains clearly organized as a racial hierarchy. This is a hierarchy in which European-Americans remain the dominant group, while Asian-, Latino-Americans and especially African-Americans constitute subordinate groups (see e.g.,

Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Smith, 1991; Steinberg, 1989).

Empirical Implications of the Interface Between National and Ethnic Attachment

The three models discussed above (i.e., the melting-pot, pluralist, and group dominance perspectives) lead to a different set of expectations concerning the expected interface between national and ethnic identity. This paper will explore four of these expectations for each model.

The salience of ethnic identity - While the melting-pot model should not expect one's ethnic or racial identification to be a salient social category for most Americans, both the pluralist and group dominance perspectives would expect these social identities to remain important and salient social identities. Not only should the salience of ethnicity express itself in terms of social identity, but also in terms of quite generalized ethnocentric bias against Americans from other ethnic groups.

Patriotism and Ethnicity - Both the melting-pot and pluralist perspectives should expect patriotic attachment to the United States to be essentially equal across ethnic groups. In contrast, and for reasons already explained above, the group dominance perspective should expect dominants (i.e., Euro-Americans) to have significantly higher levels of patriotism than subordinates (i.e., Asian-, Latino- and especially African-Americans).

*African-Americans v. resident-alien*s - While one would expect all legal residents of the United States should have a certain degree of patriotic attachment to the United States, regardless of their citizenship status, all three models would still expect there to be a certain difference in the **degree** of this patriotic attachment as a function of one's citizen status. Thus, it is reasonable to suspect that citizens of the nation (i.e., those who can vote and hold elective office) should be significantly more patriotic than non-citizens or those who are not allowed to participate in the body politic. Consequently, all three models should expect that Euro-Americans to have significantly

greater patriotic attachment to the United States than resident-alien. However, since both the melting-pot and pluralist perspectives argue that African-Americans are citizens to the same degree as any other American citizen, it then follows that these two models would expect African-Americans should also have significantly greater patriotic attachment to the United States than resident-alien. In contrast, the general group dominance perspective makes a qualitatively different prediction concerning the relative patriotism differences between African-Americans and resident-alien. Because of their traditional and continuing status as the extreme subordinate group in American society, the group dominance model should not expect patriotic attachment to America to be any greater among African-Americans than it is among resident-alien, i.e., those who can neither vote nor hold elective office.

The interface between patriotism and ethnocentrism - Finally, both the melting-pot and the pluralist models should expect either no correlation at all, or a negative correlation between patriotism and ethnocentrism against other groups of American citizens. This is to say that if these two variables are related at all, one should find that the more patriotic one is, the less ethnocentric one will be towards other American citizens. Furthermore, both models would expect that the nature of this correlation should be homogeneous across ethnic groups. In contrast, the group dominance approach would predict that there should be a correlation between patriotism and ethnocentrism against other groups of Americans. However, consistent with the general ideological asymmetry hypothesis taken from social dominance theory (see Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), this correlation should be distinctly asymmetrical across the social status continuum. The relationship should be positive among dominants and negative among subordinates. The **more** ethnocentric dominant Americans are against subordinate Americans, the **more** patriotic they should be. In contrast, the **more**

ethnocentric subordinates are against dominants, the **less** patriotic they should be.

Table 1 summarizes the expected interface between ethnic and national attachment for each of the three theoretical models.

Thus far, we know of only two studies which have attempted to explore the relative plausibilities of these conflicting models. Using a large random sample of Euro- and Mexican-Americans, de la Garza and his colleagues (1996) found clear empirical support for the pluralist model. They found that Mexican Americans who were strongly attached to their ethnic heritage were no less patriotic than Mexican Americans with weak ethnic attachments. Furthermore, their data showed virtually no relationship between the strength of this ethnic identity and core American values such as individualism. Even more striking was their finding that Mexican-Americans appeared slightly *more* patriotic than native born white Americans.

However, a follow-up study by Sidanius, Feshbach, Levin and Pratto (1997) found only partial support for the de la Garza findings. When comparing the interface between ethnic and national identity between Euro- and Afro-Americans, the results showed clear support for the group dominance perspective in two respects. First, Euro-Americans showed significantly higher levels of patriotism than Afro-Americans. Second, there was clear evidence of asymmetry in the correlation between patriotism and ethnocentrism across dominant and subordinate ethnic groups. This is to say that among dominants (i.e., Whites), the **greater** one's ethnocentrism, classical racism and ingroup favoritism, the **greater** the level of patriotism. Among Blacks in particular, on the other hand, the exact opposite tended to hold. The **lower** the ethnic bias vis-a-vis dominants, the **greater** the level of patriotism. While this asymmetry was quite consistent for the contrast between Euro- and African-Americans, it was less consistent with respect to the contrast between Euro- and

Latino-Americans. This asymmetry held among a sample of Euro- and Latino-American college students, but did not hold among a national probability sample of Whites and Latino adults (see Sidanius, et al., 1997). In Sidanius et al's (1997) analysis of an American national probability sample, the results were essentially consistent with the de la Garza, et al (1996) findings.

How might we explain the somewhat conflicting findings between the de la Garza, et al (1996) and the Sidanius, et al (1997) findings. First and most obviously, the de la Garza, et al study only compared whites and Latinos, while the Sidanius, et al study examined a wider range of ethnic groups, including Blacks. Second, even the slightly different findings with respect to Latinos might have something to do with major differences in political context. In recent years, immigration from Mexico and Central America has become a salient and contentious political issue in California, where the Sidanius et al (1997) data were collected. It is quite possible that Southern California's highly racialized public discourse concerning illegal Latino immigration (e.g., proposition 187) induced Latinos to feel under attack and as political outsiders in a fashion similar to the way African-Americans have felt for the bulk of American history.

Finally, while the dimension of patriotism, or love of the nation, will be a central dimension of national attachment, it is clearly only one of several different possible ways in which citizens can be psychologically attached to the nation. Previous research has shown that there are at least two important dimensions of national attachment, patriotism (or love of country and its symbols) and nationalism (the desire that one's country dominate other countries; see Kosterman & Feshbach, (1989; Sidanius et al, 1997; Hofstetter, Feierabend, & Klicperova-Baker, 1999). Previous research also suggests that while dominants are significantly more patriotic than subordinates, they are not more nationalistic than subordinates (see Sidanius et al., 1997). Therefore, in this paper, we will also

be interested in exploring if these differential national attachment findings can be replicated.

Method and Design

We used five different datasets in these analyses and a total of 7,400 respondents.

Los Angeles County Samples:

Dataset 1: UCLA Student Sample

This sample consisted of 725 randomly sampled UCLA undergraduates collected in the fall of 1993. The sampling frame stratified a list of all registered students into four “ethnic” strata (Whites, Blacks, Latinos, and Asians), and randomly sampled from each stratum. The subjects were enticed to participate by the offer of four \$50 prizes. The ethnic breakdown of all of the samples is found in Table 2. The students were given a questionnaire primarily assessing their attitudes towards patriotism and their affect towards various American ethnic groups. However, unlike the Sidanius, et al. (1997) study, in this paper we will explore the responses of resident-alien as well.

Patriotism Measures

Kosterman and Feshbach (1989) and Sidanius, et al. (1997) have shown that patriotism could be well measured by an 8-item scale consisting of items such as: “I am proud to be an American,” and “Every time I hear the national anthem, I feel strongly moved.” Not only did this scale have a high degree of face validity, but it also had a fairly high level of reliability (i.e., $\alpha = .91$).

Ethnocentrism

Ethnocentrism was operationalized by use of thermometer rating scales. The respondents were asked to indicate their degree of positive or negative feeling towards each of four ethnic groups using a seven-point rating scale (“7-very positive,” “4-neutral,” “1-very negative”). The groups were: Whites, Blacks, Latinos and Asians. Two different types of ethnocentrism scores were computed:

a) *generalized ethnocentrism* and b) *hierarchical ethnocentrism*.

Generalized ethnocentrism was defined by simply subtracting the thermometer rating given to one's ethnic ingroup - minus the thermometer rating given to the average ethnic outgroup.

Hierarchical ethnocentrism was measured slightly differently, depending upon whether one was a member of a dominant or subordinate ethnic group. For Whites hierarchical ethnocentrism was defined in precisely the same way for as generalized ethnocentrism. However, for the each of the three subordinates groups, hierarchical ethnocentrism was defined as the positive rating given to one's ethnic ingroup minus the rating given to the dominant group (i.e., Whites).

Dataset 2: Los Angeles County Social Survey (LACSS)

These data are drawn from two years (1997 and 1998) of the Los Angeles County Social Survey (LACSS). The LACSS is a countywide random digit dial telephone survey of adults living in households conducted by the Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing unit of UCLA's Survey Research Center. The LACSS employs a twelve call-back procedure, systematically varying the day of the week and the time of day, before dropping any numbers from the sample. A total of 1,232 respondents were interviewed (see Table 2).

Patriotism Measures

Two items often for this purpose were used to operationalize patriotism: 1) "I find the sight of the American flag very moving," and 2) "I have great love for the United States." The questions were answered on a four-point scale from "4-strongly agree" to "1-strongly disagree." The reliability of the scale was considered adequate ($\alpha = .68$).

Ethnocentrism

Generalized and hierarchical ethnocentrism was defined by use of affect differentials in the

same manner as used in Sample 1.

National Samples:

Dataset 3: National Election Study -1992 (NES)

The third dataset was a national probability sample of Americans collected as part of the 1992 National Election Study (NES) conducted by the Center for Political Studies at the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan. Altogether, the 1992 study interviewed 2,452 respondents and the analysis is limited to the four major ethnic groups that are the focus of this study (i.e., Whites, Blacks, Latinos & Asians; see Table 2 for details.

Patriotism

Patriotism was defined by two questions that had a content that was virtually identical to the patriotism questions used Sample 2: (1) “When you see the American flag flying does it make you feel extremely good, very good, somewhat good, or not very good?” (2) “How strong is your love for your country, extremely strong, very strong, somewhat strong or not very strong?” ($\alpha = .78$).

Ethnocentrism was defined in precisely the same way as before.

Dataset 4: National Election Study -1996 (NES)

The fourth dataset was the 1996 National Election Study (NES), also conducted by the Center for Political Studies at the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan (N = 1,687; see Table 2). This data set did not contain measures of patriotism, but it did contain feeling thermometers which were used to define ethnocentrism in the standard fashion. The 1996 NES permitted a replication of the ethnocentrism patterns observed in the 1992 study, and a check against a one-time pattern.

Dataset 5: General Social Survey -1996 (GSS)

The 1996 GSS contained the answers from 1,304 respondents to thirty-four questions concerning Americans' feelings of national attachment. While the thirty-four national attachment items formed a reasonable coherent and homogeneous scale ($\alpha = .84$), examination of the items revealed distinctly different types of national attachment within this scale. To further explore this issue and before any further analyses were attempted, we first factor analyzed these items using a Alpha factor extraction approach. While there were as many as 10 factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.00, the scree test suggested that only four of these factors were meaningful. Altogether these four factors accounted for approximately 37% of the total variance. The factors were interpreted as:

Patriotism or Pride in one's nation (51% of the common variance) was primarily defined by nine items such as: "Proud of the way democracy works in America," "Proud of America's economic achievements," "Proud of America's political influence in the world," Proud of America's scientific and technical achievements."

Nationalism (20% of common variance) essentially embraced a chauvinistic and belligerent attitude towards other nations and peoples (see also Bar-tal & Staub, 1997). The items most strongly defining this dimension were: "TV should give preference to American films," "Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land," "America should follow its own interests," "People should support their country even when the country is wrong," and "People would be better off if they were more like Americans."

Unwillingness to leave America (16% of common variance) primarily expressed people's unwillingness to move away from America (e.g., "Willing to move outside of America," "Willing to move outside of North America").

Importance of American Identity (13% of common variance), as distinct from patriotism or

pride in nation one's nation, this dimension expressed people's sense of social identity as being American. The dimension was primarily defined by items such as: "It is important to have lived in America for life," "It is important to have been born in America," "It is important to have American citizenship."

Factor scores were computed for each respondent on each factor. Not surprisingly, these factor scores were positively correlated, with the strongest correlation found between Patriotism and American Identity ($r = .42$), and the weakest between Nationalism and Unwilling to Leave the U.S. ($r = .10$).

Results

Issue I: The Continued Salience of Ethnic Identity

Within the melting-pot model, one's ethnic identification is not expected to be a particularly salient social identity. We explored the validity of this assumption in two different ways: 1) by examining the degree to which American citizens also think of themselves in racial/ethnic terms, or only think of themselves in terms of their common American identities, and 2) by examining ethnocentric bias against other American ethnic groups.

First, the respondents in sample 4 were asked, "In addition to being American, what do you consider your main ethnic group or nationality group?" The responses to this question were classified into one of three categories: 1) "One nationality or ethnic group mentioned" ($n = 1,241$), 2) "More than one nationality or ethnic group mentioned" ($n = 279$), or 3) "Just American; no other group mentioned" ($n = 147$). If racial/ethnic identity was no longer a salient feature of one's social identity, we expect most people to think of themselves as "Just Americans," rather than in terms of some racial/ethnic subgroup. However, the n 's above and the data in Table 3 show that only 8.9% of the

respondents think of themselves as “Just American.” Besides thinking of themselves as American, fully 74% of respondents think of themselves having one other racial and/or ethnic identity, while 16.8% of respondents think of themselves as having more than one other racial and/or ethnic identity.

More interestingly, however, the nature of these social identities was not evenly distributed over ethnic groups ($\chi^2(6) = 71.44, p < 10^{-10}$). Inspection of the standardized residuals (\underline{sr}) in Table 3 show that dominants (i.e., Whites) tended to be over represented among those considering themselves as “Just Americans” ($\underline{sr} = 1.8, p < .05$), while subordinates (especially Blacks and Latinos) tended to be under represented among those considering themselves as “Just Americans” ($\underline{sr} = -2.3 \text{ \& } -2.2, p < .01$ respectively). Also, among those claiming a salient ethnic/racial identity other than simply “Just American,” dominants are disproportionately over represented among those claiming multiple ethnic/racial identities, while subordinates are disproportionately under represented among those claiming only one racial/ethnic identity. Altogether, these data tend not to support the melting-pot thesis. Not only does ethnicity remain a salient social identity, but consistent with social identity theory, all ethnic subgroups show a distinct ethnocentric bias in favor of their own ethnic subgroups in comparison to other groups of Americans (see e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1986).

Secondly, and using the Los Angeles and national probability samples, we simply examined the generalized ethnocentrism scores were for each ethnic group. If one’s ethnic/racial particularism is no longer a salient feature of people’s social identity, as a strict reading of the model-pot model would expect, then Americans from one particular ethnic or racial group should tend **not** to exhibit ethnocentric bias against other American racial/ethnic groups. However, inspection of Table 4

shows that the data is clearly inconsistent with this expectation. Without exception, all four major American ethnic/racial groups showed clear and statistically significant evidence of ethnocentric bias against the average ethnic outgroup. While Euro-Americans in Los Angeles appeared to be slightly less ethnocentric than members of the other major ethnic groups (i.e., ethnocentrism = 3.39 vs. 8.16, 8.43 & 7.84), the level of ethnocentrism among Euro-Americans in the nation as a whole appeared to be no more or less extreme than among other major ethnic groups in the nation as a whole (i.e., 10.29 vs. 17.28, 8.30 & 9.78).

Issue II: Ethnicity and Patriotism

Our second question concerns whether or not the degree of patriotic attachment to the nation is the same across all major ethnic groups. While both the “melting-pot,” and pluralist models would expect such symmetry, the group dominance approach would expect a distinct type of asymmetry. Thus, dominants (e.g., Euro-Americans) should have significantly higher levels of patriotism than subordinates (e.g., Hispanics, Asians, and Blacks). In addition, since African-Americans have long been, and remain the group at the very bottom of America’s ethnic hierarchy, the group dominance approach would expect the mean level of patriotism among African-Americans to be relatively low and no greater than that found among resident-alien, or people barred from participation in the political system. To explore these questions, we compared patriotism as a function of ethnicity across four of the five samples (UCLA students, Los Angeles County residents, and two representative samples from the nation as a whole).²

The results in Table 5 were rather unambiguously inconsistent with both the melting-pot and the pluralism models. Contrary to what we would expect from both of these perspectives, patriotic attachment to the United States was not uniform across the ethnic status hierarchy. All four samples

showed fairly consistent and statistically significant overall group differences. Furthermore, inspection of the η -coefficients showed that the strengths of the correlations between ethnicity and patriotism were far from trivial (i.e., η varied between .14 - .35). Second and consistent with the group dominance perspective, patriotism was consistently highest among the dominant group (i.e., Euro-Americans) and almost always lowest among America's most subordinate group (i.e., African-Americans). Third, and not surprisingly, resident-alien tended to have lower patriotism levels than those with American citizenship.

Issue III: The Patriotism of African-Americans vs. Resident Aliens

However, not only did African-Americans tend to have lower patriotism scores than all other groups of American citizens, but the trend showed that African-Americans tended to be no more patriotic than resident-alien (see Table 5). As a matter of fact, among the university students, the patriotism scores among African-Americans were **even significantly lower** even lower than those found among for resident-alien in the United States for more than five years (Scheffé post-hoc, $p < .001$). These results were also supportive of the group dominance model rather than the melting-pot or pluralism models (see Table 1).

Multivariate Analyses

However, to control for the possible effects of other demographic factors such as gender and socio-economic status, we also analyzed these patriotism scores by use of hierarchical multiple regression analyses. In the first step in this analysis, we entered demographic information such as the respondents' gender, age and socio-economic status. At the second stage of the analysis we entered the dummy-variable coded ethnic group membership. In all of the regression analyses, Euro-American ethnicity was treated as the contrast category. Use of this coding scheme had the

distinct advantage of providing a direct test of the patriotism differences between the dominant ethnic group (i.e., whites) and each of the subordinate ethnic groups, net of the effects of all other factors. The results of these analyses for the four different samples are found in Tables 6 - 9.

Inspection of these tables shows a moderate degree of result consistency across samples. In Model 1, when the demographic factors were considered, there was a very consistent tendency for males to show significantly higher patriotism than females. There was also a fairly consistent tendency for older people to have higher patriotism than younger people. The only exception to this trend was found among college students, where the age range was fairly narrow. Nonetheless, the results from Model 2 showed that, even after considering the effects of the major demographic factors, the patriotism differences between ethnic groups remained reliable. This was especially true among the college students. Without exception, the contrasts between the dominants (i.e., whites) and all of the subordinates groups showed whites to have significantly higher patriotism scores. However, the most powerful contrast remained the black/white distinction ($t = -8.60$, $p < 0.001$, $\beta = -.39$). Nonetheless, while the net black/white contrast remained significant across all four samples, and the resident-alien/white contrast was significant wherever it could be tested, the contrasts between whites on the one hand, and Asian- and Latino-Americans on the other hand, tended **not** to be significant within the other adult samples (see Tables 6 - 9).

Furthermore, and consistent with what one should expect using all three theoretical models, even after controlling for demographic differences between groups, European-Americans were also always found to have a significantly greater level of patriotic attachment to the America than resident-alien (i.e., Sample 1: $t = -4.79$, $p < .001$; $t = -4.54$, $p < .001$; Sample 2: $t = -2.02$, $p < .05$; Sample 5: $t = -1.83$, $p < .05$). However, consistent with the expectations of the group dominance

thesis, a series of planned comparisons controlling for demographic differences revealed that, despite their status as American citizens, there was not a single instance in which African-Americans had significantly greater patriotism than resident-alien. As a matter of fact, among university students and controlling for other demographic differences, African-Americans still had significantly **lower** patriotism scores than aliens residing in the U.S. five years or longer (i.e., Sample 1: $t = 5.20$, $p < .001$).

Altogether then, while these results are clearly inconsistent with both the melting-pot and pluralism perspectives, they are reasonably, but not completely consistent with the expectations of the group dominance perspective. Most importantly, even after controlling for demographic factors, the dominant ethnic group (i.e., European-Americans) always had the highest level of patriotism, while the most subordinate American ethnic group (i.e., African-Americans) always had the lowest patriotism scores. Furthermore, the level of patriotism of this most subordinate of all American ethnic groups (i.e., African-Americans) was sometimes lower than, but **never higher than** that found among resident-alien (i.e., those not allowed to participate in American politics).

Ethnicity and Additional Dimensions of National Attachment

However, as mentioned before, unlike the other datasets examined, the 1996 GSS dataset contained a much richer array of national attachment questions. These additional questions afforded us the opportunity to examine the connection between ethnic and national attachment across additional dimensions of national attachment. Thus, besides the dimension of patriotism, we were also able to identify three additional dimensions of national attachment: 1) *Nationalism* - i.e., an aggressive and dominance-oriented stance towards other nations, 2) *Unwillingness to leave America*, and 3) *Importance of American Identity*. Most interestingly, the ethnic differences with regard to

these three additional dimensions of national attachment were very different than those found for patriotism.

First, there were no significant ethnic groups differences with respect to *nationalism*. Second, while there was an overall difference with respect to *Unwillingness to leave America* (i.e., $F(3,1249) = 10.68, p < .001, \eta = .16$), inspection of Scheffé post-hoc comparisons showed that this difference was essentially due to the fact that resident-alien were significantly less opposed to leaving the USA than all other American groups, not surprisingly.

The one national attachment dimension where the group differences were quite different than previous results was *Importance of American Identity*. Not only did the different ethnic groups show significant overall differences here, ($F(3,1290) = 13.68, p < .001; \eta = .18$), but the nature of these differences were qualitatively different than those found with respect to patriotism (see Figure 1). As seen in Figure 1, while one should expect resident-alien to have the lowest level of American identity, given what we have already seen, it is not immediately obvious that African-Americans should have the highest level of American identity. Furthermore, controlling for demographic differences did not substantially change this picture. Use of the hierarchical regression analyses showed that while the resident-alien had significantly lower American identity scores than the dominant European-Americans ($t = -3.74, p < .001$; see Table 10), African-Americans had unambiguously **greater** American identity scores than the dominant European-Americans ($t = 3.50, p < .001$). Re-running these regression analyses and recoding ethnicity using blacks as the contrast group revealed that, everything else being equal, blacks also had significantly greater American identity than all groups except Latinos.

Issue IV: The Interface Between Patriotism and Ethnocentrism

What should we expect of the correlation between patriotism and ethnocentrism vis-a-vis other groups of American citizens? Both the melting-pot and pluralist models should either expect these two dimensions to be unrelated, or if correlated, to be negatively correlated. This is to say that the more patriotic one is, the **less** likely one should be ethnocentric against other groups of American citizens. Furthermore, whatever the correlation among these variables, both the melting-pot and pluralist models should expect the nature of this relationship to be essentially homogeneous across ethnic groups. In contrast, the group dominance view should expect patriotism and ethnocentrism against other groups of American citizens to be related to one another. In addition, this expected relationship should be of a very specific, asymmetrical character across the ethnic status hierarchy. Namely, the **more** Whites are ethnocentric against subordinate American ethnic groups, the **more** patriotic they should be. However, among subordinates (e.g., Latinos, Asians & Blacks), the exact opposite should hold. The **more** ethnocentric subordinates are against the dominant group, the **less** patriotic they should be (see Table 1).

To explore this issue, we regressed patriotism on the *hierarchical ethnocentrism* index within each major ethnic group within the three samples where we had appropriate data (Samples: 1 - 3). The results of these analyses were reasonably consistent across all three datasets, but were, again, most consistent among the university students (see Table 11). For example, the **more** White students were ethnocentric against Blacks, the **more** patriotic they were ($\underline{b} = .37, \underline{p} < .05$; see Table 11). The same general tendency with respect to whites' ethnocentrism against both Latinos and Asians (i.e., $\underline{b} = .44, \underline{p} < .01$, and $\underline{b} = .41, \underline{p} < .05$ respectively). Among subordinates, on the other hand, the exact opposite trend was found. Without exception, the **more** ethnocentric subordinates were against dominants (i.e., whites), the **less** patriotic they were. Thus, while the regression of patriotism upon

hierarchical ethnocentrism among whites against Latinos was significantly positive (i.e., $b = .44$, $p < .01$), the corresponding regression of patriotism on ethnocentrism against whites among Latinos was negative (i.e., $b = -.49$, $p < .01$). To test whether or not these asymmetries in the relationships between ethnocentrism and patriotism were statistically significant across the status continuum, we used simple slopes analyses to test for interaction ethnic group and ethnocentrism (see Aiken & West, 1993). As can be seen for the student dataset in Table 11, these slope differences were significantly different in all cases (i.e., $F = 19.63$, $p < .001$, $F = 20.80$, $p < .001$, $F = 17.78$, $p < .001$ for the white v. black, white v. Latino, & white v. Asian contrasts respectively). While these asymmetries were not as strong or consistent within the adult samples, the general tendencies still held. Altogether, in seven of the nine contrasts between dominants and subordinates across all three samples, ethnocentrism implied more American patriotism among dominants, and less American patriotism among subordinates. The only exceptions to this general trend were found among Blacks and Latinos in the Los Angeles County sample (see Table 11).

In general then, the results concerning the fourth issue were clearly inconsistent with the expectations of both the melting-pot and pluralist perspectives, while being generally consistent with the asymmetric expectations of the general group dominance perspective.

Summary and Discussion

There are essentially three basic ways of thinking about the interface between ethnic identity and national attachment in American society: 1) the traditional American melting-pot approach, 2) the pluralist model, and 3) the group dominance approach. In an effort to assess the relative validity of three different ways of thinking about the intersection of national and ethnic identity, we explored a set of four issues (see Table 1). These issues concerned: 1) the salience of ethnic identity and the

presence of ethnocentrism against other groups of Americans, 2) the relationship between patriotic attachment to the nation and ethnic group membership, 3) whether or not African-Americans will be more patriotic than resident-Aliens, and 4) the nature of the interface between ethnocentrism and patriotic attachment to America.

First, compared to the other ethnic groups, Euro-Americans are more likely to think of themselves in purely national rather than ethnic terms (i.e., as just “Americans”). Nonetheless, ethnic subgroup identities remain a salient social identity for all major groups. However, in direct contradiction to what a melting-pot model would expect, one’s ethnic/racial membership remains a salient and meaningful social identity for Americans within all major ethnic groups. Consistent with the expectations of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), this is attested to by the fact that most Americans display clear ethnocentric bias against other ethnic groups of American citizens.

Secondly, inconsistent with both the melting-pot and pluralism perspectives, patriotic attachment to the nation was generally not uniform across ethnic groups. Not only did Euro-Americans have stronger patriotic attachment to the nation than resident-alien, as almost everyone would expect, but consistent with the group dominance perspective, there was also a clear tendency for Euro-Americans to have stronger patriotic attachment to the nation than American citizens from subordinate groups. This tendency was particularly strong and consistent with respect to the white/black contrast. There was not a single instance in which this white/black contrast failed to be statistically reliable.

Third, not only did blacks have consistently lower patriotism scores than all other major ethnic groups, but the predictions of the group dominance thesis were also confirmed with respect

to the black/resident-alien contrast as well. Patriotism among Blacks was no stronger, and sometimes even weaker, than that found among resident-alien, or those who are not even members of the body politic. In other words, at least with respect to patriotic attachment to the nation, the long-term subordinates in American society, i.e., African-Americans, remain “outsiders” to the same extent as true aliens.

Fourth and finally, both the melting-pot and pluralism theses were contradicted by the nature of the correlation between ethnic and national attachment across ethnic groups. The melting-pot perspective should not expect there to be any substantial correlation between patriotic attachment to the nation and ethnocentrism against any other group of American citizens. Within the pluralism perspective one should either expect this correlation to be either non-existent, or if there is a connection at all, it should be uniformly negative across groups. This is to say that the **more** ethnocentric one is against other Americans, the **less** patriotic one should be. In contrast, the group dominance thesis does expect American patriotism and ethnocentrism against other Americans to be systematically related. Furthermore, this relationship should be distinctly asymmetrical across the social status continuum. The **more** ethnocentric dominants are against subordinates, the **more** patriotic they should be. However, the **more** ethnocentric subordinates are against dominants, the **less** patriotic they should be. Here, the data were clearly more consistent with the group dominance thesis than with either the melting-pot or the pluralism perspectives. The clear asymmetry in the relationship between ethnocentrism and patriotism across the social status continuum can be regarded as a special case of *ideological asymmetry* discussed by social dominance theory (see Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), and demonstrated in a number of studies (see e.g., Fang, Sidanius, & Pratto, 1998; Levin & Sidanius, 1999; Levin, Sidanius, Rabinowitz, & Federico, 1998; Sidanius,

Pratto, & Rabinowitz, 1994).³ The robustness of these basic asymmetrical findings is not only supported by their consistency with work generated by social dominance research, but also by recent work outside of this tradition (e.g., Hofstetter, et al, 1999).

Altogether then, while these latter are generally inconsistent with expectations derivable from both the melting-pot and the pluralist perspectives, they are generally consistent with what one would expect within group dominance models (e.g., social dominance theory). Within the dominance models, members of dominant groups are expected to both be more patriotic and associate their patriotism with ethnocentric bias, even against other groups of American citizens. This is because national institutions will disproportionately serve the interests of dominant groups and be disproportionately prejudicial to the interests of subordinate groups. Members of each group recognize will this disparity, and this recognition should then reflect itself in asymmetrical relationships between ethnic and national attachment. Therefore, the relatively low level of patriotic devotion among African-Americans should be easily understandable given the ferocious history of racial oppression they have suffered in the not too distant past, and the continuing, albeit attenuated subordination and more subtle forms of discrimination they continue to face today (see Fredrickson, 1981; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Against this background, perhaps the more appropriate question is **not** why African-Americans have such relatively low patriotism compared to other groups, but rather why this patriotism **is not lower still**.

On the other hand, these data also attest to the fact that the precise interface between ethnic and national attachment very much depend upon exactly which dimension of national attachment one is dealing with. While African-Americans clearly have low levels of patriotic commitment to America compared to other ethnic groups, they were also found to attach relatively high importance

to their American identity. As a matter of fact, not only did African-Americans attach greater importance to their American identities in comparison to European-Americans, but in comparisons to almost all other ethnic groups, even after considering demographic factors such as age, gender, income and education. Among other reasons, this finding is noteworthy because it is not easily derivable from either of the three theoretical models we have focused on.

There are at least two possible and related reasons for this somewhat counter-intuitive finding. First, this result might be due to the fact that the average African-American family has considerably deeper roots in American soil and history than any other of the major ethnic group, including the average Euro-American family. The bulk of Africans were kidnaped into America between 1619 and 1807, 1807 being the year the American slave trade was abolished by Congress. Thus, by 1781 approximately 18% of the American population consisted of Blacks, both slave and free. In contrast, the bulk of European immigration occurred between 1820 and 1910. Secondly, and perhaps even more importantly, due to the particular circumstances of African immigration into America, African-American culture became more American than the cultures of other major ethnic groups in the United States. Because their native cultures were systematically stripped away upon arrival in the New World, compared to every other group in the society, African-Americans have no competing national identity associated with their ethnicity. Almost all of African-Americans' cultural capital (e.g., language, music, cuisine, religion, family structure, marriage customs, etc.) were either adopted, created or imposed upon them in America. In contrast, the descendants of Irish, German, Scandinavian, Polish, and Italian immigrants possess cultural artifacts and capital native to their nations and cultures of origin. Thus, because of its emergent property on American soil, African-American culture is arguably the most thoroughly "American" of any major ethnic group.

Altogether then, while the empirical evidence is not overwhelmingly supportive of any one theoretical position, this evidence is convincingly and unambiguously incongruent with the classical melting-pot thesis. Although the melting-pot might well be a desirable prescriptive goal, and might even arguably be an accurate description of the interface between ethnic and national attachment among various European-American ethnic subgroups (e.g., Italians, Swedes, Germans, Irish), it clearly does **not** accurately describe the nature of this interface across the dominant “racial” categories within contemporary American society. In addition, despite the fact that the data were relatively consistent with the group dominance view with respect to the classical American white/black contrast, the results were more equivocal when comparing the dominant whites with the two ethnic groups in the middle of America’s ethnic hierarchy (i.e., Hispanics and Asians). While the group dominance thesis was quite consistent with the data among university students with respect to all four, major ethnic groups, the pluralist perspective did receive a modicum of support with respect to white/Latino and white/Asian contrast in the non-academic, probability samples.

On the other hand, why the white/Latino - white/Asian contrasts differed so much between the student and adult samples is not exactly clear. One possible reason could be the differing levels of the salience of ethnic identity within the two different social contexts. Despite the fact that Southern California is an ethnically heterogeneous region, most people in Los Angeles County still live in rather segregated and ethnically homogeneous communities (Allen & Turner, 1997). While university students also tend to disproportionately associate with co-ethnics, the dormitory and classroom structure of UCLA’s multicultural campus is arranged so that students are more likely to experience a higher degree of cross-ethnic contact than is the case for the average citizen in society at large.

These complexities also raise the strong possibility that the degree to which any particular model of the ethnic/national-identity interface is correct might very well depend upon any number of other contextual and situational factors that we were not able to consider in this paper. For example, besides the issue of the salience of ethnic identity, the degree to which the group dominance perspective can accurately account for a given set of data might not only depend upon the degree to which a given ethnic group is subordinated (e.g., African-Americans), but might also depend upon the degree to which members of that group are aware of the degree and ferocity of this subordination. Thus, it is quite possible that African-Americans who are relatively ignorant of America's racial history and degree of ongoing racial discrimination might be every bit as patriotic as the average European-American. In contrast, Blacks who are aware both of this racial history and ongoing discrimination might be particularly unlikely to feel a firm sense of patriotic commitment.

Another important factor that might possibly affect the degree to which any particular model of ethnic-identity/national-identity interface is correct is the overall cultural/historical context in which such comparisons are made. For example, while there is some evidence in support of the general dominance perspective with respect to Jews and Arabs of Israeli citizenship in Israel and Euro- and Afro-Americans in the United States (see also Sidanius et al, 1997), we are now privy to some preliminary evidence that this model may not generalize to nations with high levels of ethnic miscegenation such as Cuba or the Dominican republic (Pena, personal communication). Obviously, much more systematic research is necessary to determine if and the conditions under which any given model is generalizable across different nations and social systems. My collaborators and I are now in the process of conducting such cross-cultural examinations.

Table 1

Summary of Hypotheses Derivable from the Melting-Pot, Pluralism and Group Dominance Models.

	Theoretical Model		
Hypotheses	Melting-pot Model	Pluralism Model	Group Dominance Model
1) Ethnicity remains strong social identity	No	Yes	Yes
2) Dominants will be more patriotic than subordinates	No	No	Yes
3) African-Americans more patriotic than resident-aliens	Yes	Yes	No
4) There will be a correlation between ethnocentrism and patriotic attachment to the nation	No	No - or negative correlation	Yes - Asymmetrical correlation across status continuum: positive correlation among dominant, negative correlation among subordinates

Table 2**Samples and Ethnic Groups**

	Samples					
Ethnic Group	Sample 1 UCLA Students 1993	Sample 2 LACSS 1997-98	Sample 3 NES 1992	Sample 4 NES 1996	Sample 5 GSS 1996	Total
Whites	153	539	1,905	1,325	1,015	4,937
Blacks	113	139	312	191	170	925
Latinos	98	221	207	149	54	729
Asians	72	68	28	22	10	200
Jews	32	--	--	--	--	32
Immigrants	257	265	--	--	55	577
Total	725	1,232	2,452	1,687	1,304	7,400

Table 3**Cross-tabulation of Social Identity by Ethnicity****(Citizens only. Entries are standardized residuals)**

America Social Identity	Ethnicity				Total frequencies
	White	Black	Latino	Asian	
One nationality or ethnic group mentioned	-2.0*	2.8**	2.3*	.9n.s.	1,219
More than one nationality or ethnic group mentioned	2.8**	-4.3***	-3.3***	-.9n.s.	275
“Just American” - no other nationality or ethnic group mentioned	1.8*	-2.3**	-2.2*	-1.4n.s.	146
Total frequencies	1,290	182	146	22	1,640

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 4**Level of Generalized Ethnocentrism by Ethnic Group****(Citizens Only)**

	Whites		Blacks		Latinos		Asians	
	USA	LA	USA	LA	USA	LA	USA	LA
Mean ethnocentrism	10.29*	3.39*	17.28*	8.16*	8.30*	8.43*	9.78*	7.84*
Number of cases	2,753	434	391	124	275	202	23	68

* $p < .001$ against null hypothesis that ethnocentrism equals 0.00.

Source: The US national data are drawn from the 1992 and 1996 National Election Study surveys of those years. The Los Angeles data are from the 1997 and 1998 Los Angeles County Social Survey

Table 5
Patriotic Attachment to America as a Function of Ethnicity Across Four Samples.

	Ethnic Group						
	Whites	Asians	Latinos	Jews	Blacks	Resident-aliens (in USA more than 5 yrs.+)	Resident-aliens (in USA 5 yrs. Or less)
	Sample 1 (UCLA students, 1993): $F(6,703) = 16.64, p < .001, \eta = .35$						
Mean patriotism	.693	.628	.617	.555	.432	.585	.477
N	153	72	98	32	106	219	30
SD	.23	.20	.23	.23	.24	.20	.22
	Sample 2 (L.A. County, 1997-98) : $F(4,1203) = 9.53, p < .001, \eta = .18$						
Mean patriotism	.849	.806	.818	--	.757	.763*	--
N	530	66	217	--	138	257	--
SD	.20	.19	.22	--	.25	.23	--
	Sample 3 (NES- 1992) : $F(3,2206) = 66.47, p < 10^{-10}, \eta = .29$						
Mean patriotism	.794	.712	.789	--	.589	--	--
N	1,736	26	167	--	281	--	--
SD	.22	.22	.22	--	.29	--	--
	Sample 5 (GSS- 1996) : $F(3,1204) = 8.72, p < .01, \eta = .14$						
Mean patriotism	.531	--	.505	--	.488	.480*	--
N	973	--	48	--	138	49	--
SD	.11	--	.13	--	.13	.16	--

* Indicates that length of residency for this alien group is unknown.

Table 6

Hierarchical Regression Analyses of Patriotism as a Function of Demographic Factors and Ethnicity (UCLA Students).

	Model 1			Model 2		
Variables in equation	B	β	t	B	β	t
Male gender	0.064	.14	3.49***	.052	.11	2.94**
Age	.00	.00	0.07	-.00	-.01	-.29
SES	.0004	.08	2.10*	.0003	.06	1.48
Resident-aliens vs. whites (5 yrs. or less)				-.22	-.19	-4.79***
Resident-aliens (more than 5 yrs.)				-.11	-.22	-4.54***
Blacks vs. whites				-.25	-.39	-8.60***
Jews vs. whites				-.14	-.12	-2.94**
Latinos vs. whites				-.06	-.10	-2.14*
Asians vs. whites				-.08	-.10	-2.37*
Adjusted R^2	.02**			.13***		

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. Note: B represents the unstandardized regression

coefficients, while β represents the standardized regression coefficients.

Table 7

Hierarchical Regression Analyses of Patriotism as a Function of Demographic Factors and Ethnicity (1997-98 Los Angeles County Sample).

	Model 1			Model 2		
Variables in equation	B	β	t	B	β	t
Male gender	.008	.08	2.68**	.008	.08	2.76**
Age	.003	.27	8.62***	.003	.26	8.20***
Income	.003	.05	1.47	.002	.03	.71
Education	-.004	-.02	-.71	-.006	-.04	-1.00
Resident-aliens vs. whites				-.04	-.08	-2.02*
Blacks vs. whites				-.07	-.11	-3.30**
Latinos vs. whites				.005	.01	0.30
Asians vs. whites				-.010	-.01	-.37
Adjusted R^2	.08***			.10**		

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. Note: B represents the unstandardized regression coefficients, while β represents the standardized regression coefficients.

Table 8

Hierarchical Regression Analyses of Patriotism as a Function of Demographic Factors and Ethnicity (1992 NES).

	Model 1			Model 2		
Variables in equation	B	β	t	B	β	t
Male gender	.02	.05	2.31*	.018	.04	1.78 ⁺
Age	.003	.21	9.16***	.002	.20	9.00***
Income	-.00	-.01	-.64	-.00	-.02	-.79
Subjective social class	.005	.04	1.60	-.00	.00	-.01
Education	-.017	-.08	-3.38**	-.02	-.10	-4.34***
Blacks vs. whites				-.22	-.30	-.14.03***
Latinos vs. whites				-.00	-.00	-.049
Asians vs. whites				-.00	-.02	-.95
Adjusted R ²	.06***			.14***		

+ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. Note: B represents the unstandardized regression coefficients, while β represents the standardized regression coefficients.

Table 9

Hierarchical Regression Analyses of Patriotism as a Function of Demographic Factors and Ethnicity (1996 GSS).

	Model 1			Model 2		
Variables in equation	B	β	t	B	β	t
Male gender	.022	.09	3.21**	.020	.09	3.02**
Age	.003	.30	10.21***	.002	.28	9.61***
Income	-.000	-.03	-.89	-.000	-.04	-1.29
Education	-.016	-.02	-.51	-.002	-.02	-.75
Resident-aliens vs. whites				-.030	-.05	-1.83 ⁺
Blacks vs. whites				-.036	-.10	-3.37**
Latinos vs. whites				.002	.003	0.09
Adjusted R ²	.10***			.11***		

+ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. Note: B represents the unstandardized regression coefficients, while β represents the standardized regression coefficients.

Table 10**Hierarchical Regression Analyses of American Identity as a Function of Demographic Factors and Ethnicity (1996 GSS).**

	Model 1			Model 2		
Variables in equation	B	β	t	B	β	t
Male gender	.017	.05	1.76	-.012	-.04	-1.30
Age	.001	.11	4.04***	.002	.11	3.97***
Income	-.002	-.07	-2.19*	-1.80	-.05	-1.78
Education	-.031	-.21	-7.04***	-.030	-.21	-6.83***
Resident-aliens vs. whites				-.085	-.11	-3.74***
Blacks vs. whites				.049	.10	3.50***
Latinos vs. whites				.009	0.01	0.41
Adjusted R^2	.08***			.10***		

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. Note: B represents the unstandardized regression coefficients, while β represents the standardized regression coefficients.

Table 11

Patriotism Regressed upon Hierarchical Ethnocentrism Within Dominant and Subordinate Groups (Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients).

Ethnocentrism Index among Dominant Group (i.e., Whites)			Ethnocentrism Index Among Subordinate Groups			Interaction Statistics
Among Whites			Among Blacks	Among Latinos	Among Asians	F -statistics for Slope Differences
White - Black	White - Latino	White - Asian	Black - Whites	Latino - White	Asian - White	
UCLA Sample						
.37*			-.47***			19.63**
	.44**			-.49***		20.80**
		.41*			-.51*	17.78**
Los Angeles Sample 1997-98						
-.00 ^{n.s.}			-.09 ^{n.s.}			0.20 ^{n.s.}
	-.00 ^{n.s.}			-.19*		2.05 ^{n.s.}
		.20**			-.10 ^{n.s.}	4.94*
NES 1992 Sample						
.15**			-.21**			30.09***
	.16**			-.12 ^{n.s.}		8.64**
		.16**			-.19 ^{n.s.}	0.73 ^{n.s.}

*p <.05, ** p <.01, ***p <.001

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Footnotes

1. *Plessy v. Ferguson*, 163 U. S. 537 (1896).

2. Because the patriotism measures were assessed using different scales across the different studies, in order to aid in cross-study comparisons, we transformed all of the patriotism measures to the same 0.00 to 1.00 scale, where 0 represents the lowest possible score a respondent can get and 1.00 represents the highest possible score a respondent can get.

3. The ideological asymmetry hypothesis posits that the while the correlations between ingroup bias certain system justifying ideologies will be positive among dominants, these correlations will be negative among subordinates.