

Can Tolerance be Taught?
Adult Civic Education and the Development of Democratic Values

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Introduction

Can individuals in emerging democracies learn democratic values and skills through participation in civic education programs? Certainly the U.S. government expects the answer to be yes. The State Department's Agency for International Development (USAID) and other governmental organizations spend tens of millions of dollars annually on civic education programs as part of their efforts to support democracy abroad (Carothers 1999). Part of the rationale for funding civic education is to strengthen the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the host countries that conduct such programs, as the existence of strong secondary associations may be beneficial to consolidating democracy and implementing democratic reforms.

Yet the goals of USAID go beyond the fortification of NGOs in fledgling democracies. Indeed, the agency's own strategic framework states explicitly that it seeks, through its civil society programs such as civic education, to "strengthen democratic political culture," to promote "acceptance by both citizens and political elites of a shared system of democratic norms and values," and to encourage citizens "to obtain knowledge about their system of government and act upon their values by participating in the political and policy process" (USAID Democracy Strategic Framework 1998). Clearly, USAID and other sponsors believe that the programs they support have the potential to shape the democratic skills, values, and behaviors of ordinary citizens.

Surprisingly, until recently little effort has been made to assess the impact of civic education programs on their target populations. There is an extensive literature on the effectiveness of school-based civics education among children and young adults (e.g. Morduchowicz, Catterberg, Niemi and Bell 1996; Niemi and Junn 1998; Jennings and Niemi 1974; Ichilov 1990; Torney, Oppenheim and Farner 1975; Slomczynski and Shabad 1999). Among adult programs, however, nearly all evaluations of civic education have looked exclusively at implementation and management issues such as the numbers of people trained, the quality of teachers and trainers, the quality of materials and whether the programs

achieved their stated organizational goals (e.g. USAID 1992, 1989). Only in the last several years have efforts begun to evaluate the impact of civic education on the democratic values, attitudes and activities of ordinary citizens who take part in these programs (Bratton *et al.* 1999; Finkel *et al.*, 1998; Finkel *et al.*, forthcoming).

In this paper I examine the effect of adult civic education programs on the core democratic value of political tolerance. Political tolerance, or the willingness to extend procedural liberties such as free speech and association to unpopular or disliked individuals or groups, has long been viewed as essential for a stable and effective democratic system (see Sullivan and Transue 1999, and Finkel *et al.* 1999 for recent reviews). As Sniderman *et al.* assert (1989, 25), “the more tolerant citizens are of the rights of others, the more secure are the rights of all, their own included; hence the special place of political tolerance in contemporary conceptions of democratic values and democratic citizenship.” The extent to which individuals endorse democratic principles such as tolerance figures prominently in debates over the desirability of mass political participation as well, as many scholars argue that increased participation by the “authoritarian-minded” may have deleterious consequences for democratic stability (e.g., Dahl 1956). Thus to assess whether civic education can influence tolerance is to assess its impact on one of the central components of the democratic ethos.

In the context of developing democracies, the task of evaluating the effects of civic education on tolerance is especially urgent. Much research in the new democracies of Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, Latin America and South Africa has documented the generally low levels of tolerance and support for minority rights after the emergence of democratic institutions (Dalton 1994; Gibson *et al.* 1992; Gibson and Duch 1993; Gouws 1993; Weil 1993; see also Seligson and Booth 1993). Though there is also a limited willingness to extend civil liberties to unpopular groups in established democracies, the abysmally low levels of tolerance and support for what Gibson and Duch (1993) term “minoritarian” principles in developing contexts may pose a significant danger to the future stability of these democratic systems. Indeed, Gibson’s finding (1997) that individuals who embraced democratic principles were more likely to resist the attempted coup staged in Moscow in 1991 suggests that increasing tolerance can

be instrumental in the consolidation of fledgling democratic regimes. Given the powerful racial, ethnic and political animosities that characterize many developing democracies, as well as the strains placed on these systems by poor economic and political performance, it is difficult to imagine a more pressing task for civic education in these settings than to raise support for the exercise of democratic political liberties and “the rules of the democratic game.”

Aside from these practical concerns, examining the effect of civic education on tolerance has several more general theoretical aims. First, the results can shed light on the extent to which democratic political orientations can be affected *at all* by short-term stimuli, as opposed to changing more slowly due to long-term economic modernization, generational change, the ability of political parties and elites to manage social conflict and the gradual diffusion of democratic ideals through the international mass media (Almond and Verba 1963; Eckstein 1988; Gibson *et al* 1992; Weil 1989). A growing body of literature suggests that support for democracy and democratic values may be susceptible to influence from short-term economic, political, and experiential factors (Dalton 1994; Evans and Whitefield 1995; Reisinger *et al* 1994; Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer 1998; Weil 1993). A finding that civic education influences tolerance --- an orientation that has been thought by many to be difficult to change --- would lend significant support to the view that political culture in general is susceptible to short-term influence. And such changes may then at least partially be within the reach of active efforts at manipulation by governments, political elites, or international actors.

Second, the exploration of civic education’s effects on tolerance in developing democracies affords an important real-world test of recent experimental findings that individual levels of tolerance may change considerably in response to argumentation and efforts at political persuasion (Gibson 1998; Gibson and Gouws n.d.; Sniderman *et al* 1996; Marcus *et al* 1995). As opposed to the notion that individuals have fixed, long-standing attitudes toward tolerance, this line of research views tolerance as the product of *judgments* made by individuals, depending on the considerations they bring to bear at the time, their prior store of political information, attachment to democratic norms, and psychological openness to change. Civic education programs are institutionalized attempts at attitude change. They aim

to change tolerance judgments by imparting new information to individuals, information that promotes the linkage of tolerance to more abstract democratic values, to prior political and psychological dispositions, and to more general positive outcomes associated with democratic systems. Hence an examination of the effects of civic education can provide more theoretical insights into how values may change in response to efforts at persuasion outside the laboratory setting, and increase our understanding of the conditions under which value change is likely to occur.

In this paper, I present the findings from two studies designed to evaluate civic education programs in the Dominican Republic and South Africa.¹ The project was conducted over the last three years under the auspices of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Management Systems International, a Washington-based consulting firm. Using survey data collected on participants in numerous civic education programs as well as control groups in both countries, I show that 1) civic education has small but significant effects on tolerance in both South Africa and the Dominican Republic; 2) that the results hold after controlling for other attitudinal sources of tolerance as well as potential biases related to selection into the programs; and 3) that the effects are largely conditional in nature, dependent on the frequency and nature of the civic education “treatment,” the individual’s prior political dispositions, values and store of political information. I discuss the implication of these findings for theories of democratic political culture and attitude change, and for more practical considerations in the implementation of civic education programs in democratizing contexts in the future.

Civic Education and the Development of Political Tolerance

For the past several decades, the United States and many West European countries have devoted considerable resources to providing democracy assistance and strengthening civil society in emerging democracies around the world (Carothers 1996; 1999; Diamond 1995; Quigley 1997). As Quigley (1997, 564) notes, there are now a “plethora of public and private international actors involved in these efforts

¹ A third country, Poland, was also included in the first study. Basic findings from the Polish analysis can be found in Finkel *et al.* (1998) and Sabatini *et al.* (1998).

[including]...most multilateral organizations, regional development banks, major bilateral assistance programs, as well as literally thousands of non-governmental organizations.” Some of these activities center around the training of lawyers, journalists and other social elites in the rule of law, in assisting constitutional reform, and in strengthening democratic political parties, non-governmental organizations, and other elements of a country’s newly-emerging civil society. Some of the activities, though, are directed explicitly at promoting support for democratic norms and values among ordinary citizens. These efforts constitute “civic education programs,” and range from the adoption of new curricula in primary and secondary schools to teach young people about democracy, to programs that provide instruction about the social and political rights of women, to voter education programs, to neighborhood problem-solving programs that bring individuals in contact with local authorities for purposes of promoting collective action to benefit local communities. In this paper I focus on programs that target adults as opposed to students.

How much impact on a value such as political tolerance are civic education programs likely to have? From the traditional perspective of political culture and socialization, the answer would appear to be very little. According to this view, change in a country’s democratic political culture should occur very slowly, primarily in response to structural factors such as economic modernization (e.g. Lipset 1959), generational replacement (Dalton 1994; Inglehart 1990; Jennings, van Deth et al. 1990), or the long-term experience of citizens with rotations of power and a responsible opposition structure among the country’s political parties (Weil 1989; 1993). The glacial change in cultural values assumed in this view was echoed in much of the early literature in political socialization, which argued that orientations learned early in life “structured” later adult attitudes and limited the extent to which basic values and preferences would change in response to short-term stimuli (Hess and Torney 1967; Sears 1975).

The voluminous literature on the specific determinants of political tolerance offers much support for this view. Many of the most important predictors of tolerance would appear to be well beyond the ability and scope of even the most intensive short-term civic education program. For example, individuals who are more dogmatic, mistrustful, inflexible and “psychologically insecure” are less willing

to extend procedural liberties to individuals or groups with who they disagree (Sullivan *et al.* 1982; McCloskey and Brill 1983), and these kinds of deeply-rooted personality characteristics are likely to be relatively impervious to change. Similarly, political and religious conservatism have also been linked consistently to levels of political tolerance, as have attitudes towards out-groups and the potential threats that they may represent (Sullivan *et al.* 1982; Gibson and Duch 1992, 1993; Marcus *et al.* 1995). Only for attitudes about groups and threat perceptions would civic education appear to have a chance for success, but, as Sullivan and Transue (1999, 5) note, threat perceptions contain a large “chronic, dispositional role” as well. And attitudes about racial outgroups, for example those forged in contemporary South Africa, are likely to be deeply rooted in the experiences of living under the apartheid regime, making it difficult to undo a lifetime of socialization in a series of democracy workshops.

Recent developments in the literature, however, suggest that democratic values, and political tolerance in particular, may be more malleable than previously thought. First, a steady stream of findings over the past several decades has shown that more immediate variables such as the individual’s perceptions of current economic conditions, assessments of governmental competence, and political and social participation can affect orientations such as the individual’s “normative commitment to democracy,” and the internalization of democratic values, social and institutional trust, and political efficacy (e.g. Mishler and Rose 1997; Rose and Mishler 1994; Booth and Richards 1998; Dalton 1994; Brehm and Rahn 1997; Evans and Whitefield 1995; Mattes and Theil 1998). The widespread demonstration of such effects has led many to conclude that, although early socialization and social-structural factors play a role in determining democratic attitudes, these factors must be augmented by variables related to adult political experiences. Mishler and Rose (1997, 434), for example, explicitly posit what they call a “lifetime learning model,” where attitudes learned early in life are continuously updated as these “early attitudes and beliefs are reinforced or challenged by subsequent experiences.” Clearly, such a view allows a greater *potential* influence of civic education as another short-term experiential effect on the individual’s level of political tolerance.

Second, a related stream of recent research has challenged the notion that tolerance is a stable or fixed individual-level attitude, arguing instead that individual judgments are highly responsive to political argumentation and efforts at persuasion (Sullivan and Transue 1999; Marcus et al. 1995; Kuklinski et al 1991; Gibson 1998). Using a variety of innovative experimental and quasi-experimental research designs, these studies have shown that tolerance can be quite pliable, changing in predictable ways according to the nature of the information presented to respondents. Kuklinski et al (1991), for example, showed that tolerance responses could differ substantially, depending on whether respondents were encouraged to view a situation through an “emotional” or “cognitive” frame. Similarly, Nelson *et al.* (1997) showed that experimentally emphasizing the frame of “rights of free speech” or the “need for public order” in a given tolerance situation had a significant effect on whether individuals’ attitudes on those dimensions would be brought to bear in formulating their responses. And Gibson (1998), Marcus *et al.* 1995, and Sniderman *et al.* (1996) have used the “counterargument technique” to great effect, showing that tolerance changes considerably after respondents are presented with reasons why they might reconsider their initial view. This work has called into question much of the received wisdom in the field; most importantly, it has shown that, at least in the laboratory or in experimental survey situations, substantial change in tolerance through political persuasion is possible.

The recent linkage of the tolerance literature to persuasion and attitude change research is an important one, and one with clear implications for the analysis of the impact of civic education. Civic education is properly viewed as *an institutionalized mechanism for attempted attitude and value change* in newly democratizing societies. Through means of workshops, community problem-solving activities, voter education drives, and the like, it is hoped that individuals will be persuaded by the messages conveyed to convert towards tolerance and towards the internalization of other democratic orientations. As such, it may be expected that the conditions that facilitate attitude change in general should facilitate attitude change via the mechanism of civic education.

The vast literature on attitude change in psychology and political psychology contains a number of theories specifying alternative routes to persuasion. There is, however, unanimity on one fundamental

point with direct relevance for the analysis here: attitude change does not occur uniformly across populations upon exposure to persuasive messages. That is, we should expect to see *conditional* effects of exposure to messages on the likelihood of change, as certain kinds of messages are more likely to bring about change, and certain kinds of individuals are more receptive to change than others. For example, McGuire's well-known "reception-acceptance" model of attitude change, adapted and extended into political psychology by Zaller (1992), asserts that the *reception* of messages varies directly with the individual's level of interest, motivation, and political awareness, while the individual's *acceptance* of messages varies inversely with those same variables, as highly aware individuals are less likely to accept messages that run counter to their prior attitudes and predispositions. Thus attitude change is most likely to occur among individuals who are moderately aware and interested: less interested and aware individuals are unlikely to receive messages and more engaged individuals are unlikely to accept them.

Other models of attitude change stress the characteristics of the message (Kuklinski and Hurley 1996), the degree of trust placed in the source of the message (Petty and Cacioppo 1984), the intensity of the previously-held attitude (Krosnick and Petty 1995), the degree to which the attitude is embedded in a more complex associative network (Chaiken *et al* 1995; Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock 1991), and many others (Eagley and Chaiken 1993). All of these variables operate as mediating factors, establishing firmly the observation that attitude change occurs only under certain conditions for certain kinds of individuals.

What factors are likely to condition whether individuals receive and accept tolerance messages in the real-world context of civic education? I group these factors into three general categories: factors related to the nature of the civic education experience itself, factors related to the individual's store of political information and general levels of awareness, and factors related to the individual's prior attitudes and values.

As noted above, attitude change depends first on the individual's *reception* of a particular message. In the civic education context, the reception of a tolerance message should depend on the individual's frequency of attending civic education sessions: the more exposures to civic education, the greater the likelihood that political tolerance will have been discussed in enough detail to constitute a

“message” for purposes of persuasion. More importantly, tolerance messages are difficult ones to accept in general. The notion that individuals ought to extend civil liberties to hated and potentially dangerous groups is not only “unnatural” in many ways, but also rooted in fairly abstract conceptions about due process, democratic procedures, reciprocity and political competition. Thus frequent exposures may be needed before tolerance messages begin to be understood. If this is the case, then there may not be monotonic increases in political tolerance as individuals attend more civic education sessions; rather there may be *threshold* effects, such that no change is observed until individuals are exposed repeatedly to pro-tolerance messages.

The *type of instruction* the individual receives in civic education is likely to matter as well. Much research in social psychology suggests that a significant source of attitude change is role-playing behavior, as individuals come to adopt attitudes and cognitions that are consistent with the behaviors that they are acting out (Zimbardo and Leippe 1991, 102-108; Fishbein and Ajzen 1975, chapter 10). It may be expected, therefore, that civic education programs that make use of more active methodologies to instruct participants --- role playing, dramatizations, group decision-making, and the like, to have a greater effect on individual orientations than lecture-based instruction.²

We also expect a series of conditional relationships between civic education, tolerance and certain attitudes and attributes of the individual. Following Zaller (1992), civic education messages will be accepted to the extent that the individual’s psychological and political dispositions are otherwise favorable towards tolerance, *and* the individual is able to make linkages between the messages received in civic education and those prior dispositions. That is, individuals who are able to “contextualize” or integrate the tolerance messages into a supportive system of democratic orientations are more likely to change than individuals whose prior attitudes and values are either anti-democratic or too compartmentalized to allow links from a persuasive message to other pro-democracy attitudes and values

² It is also the case that more participatory methodologies are associated with greater satisfaction with instruction and with the perceived quality of the individuals who conduct the civic education training (Finkel and Stumbras 2000). And although the concept of the “quality” of civic education instruction is somewhat amorphous, it relates

(see also Gibson 1998, 833-834). This suggests that the individual's prior political awareness and motivation should be critical in the attitude change process, as should the extent to which the individuals prior orientations are more or less favorable towards democracy in general.

Political *information* and *interest* are likely to be important conditioning variables in attitude change for several reasons. First, these factors make it more likely that individuals will receive messages from civic education, as more interested and informed individuals may be likely to attend civic education in the first place, and continue to attend after an initial experience. Second, politically aware and knowledgeable individuals will likely have the cognitive skills to *understand* the message from civic education to which they are exposed; even repeated exposures for individuals who lack the cognitive abilities to process them may not be enough to bring about attitude change. And third, politically aware individuals are best equipped to make the necessary associations between the tolerance messages and other supportive values. That is, higher levels of information and interest are likely to lead to greater contextualization of civic education messages, and hence greater acceptance, when individuals' other attitudes incline them to be more tolerant.

As noted above, however, awareness and interest may have curvilinear effects on the likelihood of attitude change. At the highest levels of awareness, individuals who are predisposed to be democratic may already be relatively tolerant, and individuals who are predisposed against tolerance should possess enough countervailing information to resist the new information. Thus we may expect change to be concentrated among individuals with enough prior information and cognitive skills to receive and comprehend tolerance messages, but not enough countervailing information to resist them.

Finally, several attitudes, perceptions, and values should predispose individuals to either accept or reject the tolerance messages in civic education. First, as the discussion thus far has made clear, the individual's prior adherence to other democratic values represents important predispositions to change. If individuals are more democratic in their orientations to begin with --- that is, accept principles such as the

directly to what persuasion researchers refer to as the "credibility of the source" in promoting attitude change: to the extent that instructor quality is high, individuals are likely to internalize messages more readily.

rule of law, the need for political liberty over social order, and believe that individuals can influence the political process --- then they should be less likely to resist tolerance messages, and more able to see the connections between those messages and their other supportive democratic beliefs.

Second, personality factors such as dogmatism or close-mindedness were found by Gibson (1998) to impede efforts at persuasion. In Zaller's terms, dogmatic individuals will be more likely to resist messages that promote tolerance; their inflexible belief system is unlikely to change generally, and also unlikely to change towards a value to which they are predisposed to oppose in the first place.

Further, it may be hypothesized that perceptions related to the immediate political and economic situation of the country will join longer standing predispositions to affect the likelihood of accepting tolerance messages. In situations where individuals have little other experience with democratic institutions and governance, the associations that are made with tolerance messages are likely to be based on individuals' overall satisfaction with the economic and political performance of the democratic system itself. Hence when messages promoting the applied democratic value of tolerance are received, individuals may naturally be more likely to accept or reject those messages based on other associations they currently have with the political system. In the absence of long-standing experiences with democracy, performance ratings are all that many individuals have – especially those with lower levels of prior political information. For this reason perceptions about the system's economic and political performance may represent a powerful conditioning factor that determines the individual's susceptibility to persuasive messages via civic education.

Research Design

The study examines these processes by analyzing the effects of civic education on individuals trained in four U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) civic education programs conducted in the Dominican Republic in the mid to late 1990s, and three programs conducted in South Africa between 1998 and 1999. USAID's Center for Democracy and Governance initiated the evaluation of civic education efforts in the Dominican Republic and Poland in 1996-97, with South Africa added in

mid-1998. The Dominican Republic was selected for several reasons, notably the scope of its civic education efforts since the early 1990s and the relative ease of data collection due to the small size of the country. Equally important, the country was coming out of period of semi-authoritarianism and afforded an excellent opportunity to assess the effects of civic education during a particular kind of political transition (see Hartlyn 1998; Espinal 1996).

South Africa was included in the study in 1998 because USAID had long targeted the country for democracy assistance, and there were a significant number of ongoing civic education programs over the past year in preparation for the June 1999 elections. In addition, the USAID mission in Pretoria took particular interest in the project in order to obtain information about how better to implement civic education and other programs in the future.

Dominican Republic

The first of the programs studied was conducted by a national elections oriented non-governmental organization, *Participación Ciudadana (PC)*. For the 1996 presidential elections, PC created another group, called *La Red de los Observadores Electorales*, to organize and train youth and adults to serve as election observers in 1996 and to conduct a quick count of the vote. The program ran from 1995 to mid-1996, although PC activities continued into 1997, still focused on elections. Of those in the sample 14% of the respondents were exposed to PC and Red training sessions but did not eventually work as election observers.

The second program was conducted by a newly formed non-governmental organization, *Grupo Accion por la Democracia (GAD)*. The program was conducted in two phases, with the first phase dedicated to a general educational program concerning basic political rights and obligations in a democracy, primarily through a lecture format. The second phase brought these people together to hold a series of national and local issues fora to discuss problems and solutions in specific policy areas, such as justice, health, and education. Local government authorities attended these fora as well. The two phases were intended to create a national NGO with a network of local branches outside of Santo Domingo and

to mobilize citizens to participate in these new structures. The program ran from November 1995 to October 1996.

The third program was part of a larger community finance and small business development program for women conducted through women's small business NGO, *Asociación Dominicana para el Desarrollo de la Mujer (ADOPEM)*. The program trained women community leaders in women's rights, democratic values, democracy in the family, and self-esteem, using a classroom/workshop format, and ran from January 1996 to January 1997.

The fourth program studied was conducted by a local NGO affiliated with a local radio station in La Vega, *Radio Santa María (RSM)*. The project trained intermediaries (typically leaders of rural towns) who then conducted civic education in their local communities. The subject matter focused on civic knowledge and values, such as rights and duties in a democracy, the importance of participation, and democracy in the family. RSM ran two consecutive projects, from 1994 to 1995 and from 1995 to December 1996.

In all of the programs in the Dominican Republic except Radio Santa Maria, treatment samples were drawn from lists of participants provided by the implementing organizations. For the Radio Santa Maria program, only lists of the "leaders" or first-stage participants were maintained, and we obtained names of ordinary participants through "snowball" sampling methods from interviewers with the first-stage participants. The number of individuals interviewed from the four programs totaled 1018.

The strategy for obtaining appropriate control samples was to select non-participants at random in each of the regions where the programs were conducted. The sampling began with a national stratified random sample of 50 municipalities, as the PC program operated nation-wide, and GAD operated in all areas except for Santo Domingo, the country's capital. Individuals were selected for inclusion in the sample in proportion to the population of the selected municipality. This control sample was then supplemented with an oversample of individuals in La Vega, where the Radio Santa Maria program operated, and an oversample of women in the four areas where ADOPEM conducted its training. The

number of individuals interviewed for the control groups was 1017. Appendix A-1 summarizes the participant and control samples for each of the four Dominican programs.

The in-country survey was conducted by the *Instituto de Estudios de Población y Desarrollo* (IEPD), the statistical office affiliated with PROFAMILIA. Data were collected from February to April 1998. The response rate for the survey was an excellent 90.5%, with 98% response for the participant sample and 83.7% response for the control group. Due to the lack of appropriate Census-type data, it is impossible to assess definitively the representativeness of the sample, but the age, educational level, and marital status of our control sample closely resemble the levels seen in the 1993 DEMOS survey conducted on behalf of USAID, which at the time represented the last official survey of political values of the Dominican Republic population before the current study.

South Africa

The South African study included three programs that conducted civic education among black and coloured adults. The first was run by the National Institute for Public Interest Law and Research (NIPILAR). NIPILAR is “the lead organization of a Consortium operating at the national level in the field of public interest law, rights education with emphasis on women and children’s rights, as well as the Constitution and Bill of Rights education. The activities aim to promote the 1) respect, practice and fulfillment of human, legal, and civil rights; 2) respect for the rights of women and children and 3) a widespread awareness of human rights and democracy” (USAID/Pretoria Activity Summary 1998). One of the main civic education programs conducted by NIPILAR over the past several years was its Women’s Rights program, designed to promote awareness of the United Nations Women and Children’s Rights Convention.

The second program was operated through the Community Law Centre-Durban (CLC). CLC is part of the Consortium described above, and thus has many of the same goals and activities as NIPILAR. CLC, however, operates almost exclusively within the province of KwaZulu Natal, where NIPILAR does not operate. Its primary activities are to coordinate approximately 30 rural legal advice offices in the

province. The advice offices provide assistance to community members on legal and human rights issues. Democracy and civic education workshops are also conducted through the advice centers.

The third South Africa program was conducted by Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR). LHR is a national organization aiming to increase the awareness of human and democratic rights in South Africa. The organization holds an extensive series of workshops yearly on democracy and human rights issues, with different aspects of democracy receiving particular emphasis in different years. Workshops in the last two years have emphasized the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, and participation in politics, respectively.

The first two groups were selected primarily because of the support that USAID-South Africa has provided for their civic education efforts. LHR was included in the study in order to examine a non-USAID-funded group, and because it is a well-known NGO promoting democracy and human rights in South Africa. LHR also conducted civic education in eight of the nine provinces of South Africa; NIPILAR was also more or less national in focus, while CLC-Durban's area of operation was mainly within one province, KwaZulu Natal.

The three NGOS operate in generally similar fashion with regard to their civic education activities. Representatives from the central offices train a core group of individuals, called "paralegals," in democracy and human rights instruction. These activities, generally known as Training of Trainers (ToT), consume a considerable amount of the group's time and resources. The paralegals then go on to operate offices in villages and towns across country, from which they provide a number of services for individual residents. Some of these services have nothing to do with civic education, for example providing advice on economic development or labor law. However, the paralegals are also expected to conduct community workshops on different aspects of democratic governance and human rights, and these activities are the focus of our study. According to interviews with the groups' staff conducted by

members of our research team, the number of workshops throughout the country are claimed to be in the hundreds yearly by LHR and NIPILAR, reaching many thousands of ordinary citizens.³

As in the Dominican Republic, the treatment group interviews were obtained through sampling lists of civic education participants provided by the three NGOs (either national representatives or the facilitators or paralegals who ran the civic education programs in each of the areas). Participants were selected systematically from the lists whenever addresses and contact information was provided. In regions where no lists of names and addresses existed, the facilitators or paralegals themselves located the requisite number of participants and provided contact information to the South African survey organization, Markinor, which collected the data. The sample of participants is shown in Appendix A-2.

The control group of non-participants in South Africa was designed slightly differently than in the Dominican Republic. Instead of aiming to produce a random sample of the South African black or coloured population, we attempted to introduce more rigorous experimental control at the outset by “mirroring” the participant sample on a number of important demographic dimensions. Interviewers were instructed to conduct an interview with a civic education participant selected according to the procedures just described, and then to conduct an identical interview in the same area with a person who had not participated in civic education. The control group respondent was to be the same race, gender, age group, and educational stratum as the participant. Interviewers were instructed to make a systematic selection of houses, beginning with the third house from the civic education participant who had been interviewed, in order to find an appropriate non-participant for inclusion.

These sampling procedures produced a total of 1550 interviews for the study, with the final data collection conducted between 10 May and 1 June 1999. The questionnaires were translated into Zulu, Xhosa, Tswana, Northern Sotho, Southern Sotho, and Afrikaans so that respondents could be interviewed in the language with which they felt most comfortable. The final sample consisted of: 475 adult participants in civic education, and 475 adult non-participants who were matched on race, gender, age and

³ The research team included myself and Sheryl Stumbras of Management Systems International, Robert Mattes, a public opinion and democracy specialist at IDASA (Institute for Democracy in South Africa), and Dumisani Hlophe,

education with the participant group. 10 individuals from the treatment group were eliminated from the analysis because it became unclear in the course of the interview how many workshops they had attended, or whether they had been exposed to civic education “treatment” at all. Response rates for the survey were not provided.

Measurement of the Dependent Variable: Political Tolerance

The studies followed the basic GSS format for tolerance questions (as opposed to Sullivan’s “least-liked” group method) by testing the respondent’s willingness to extend freedoms of association, participation and speech to individuals from different political groups designated by the researcher. The groups in the Dominican Republic were atheists, communists, and militarists (“those who would suspend elections and install the military into power”), while the groups in South Africa were atheists, racists (“those who assert that blacks are genetically inferior”), and sexists (“those who believe that women are genetically inferior”). The “sexist” group has not regularly been part of the standard tolerance repertoire, but was included in South Africa because of the focus on NIPILAR’s gender awareness program.

For each group, respondents were asked whether such a person should be allowed to speak publicly in your locality; should be allowed to vote, and should be allowed to organize peaceful demonstrations to express his/her point of view. Answers to all questions were on a four-point agree/disagree scale, and an overall scale was created by averaging the responses. In the Dominican Republic, the nine items generated a well-defined scale of tolerance, with the reliability (alpha) being .78. In South Africa, factor analysis of the tolerance items showed that the questions regarding “voting” comprised a separate dimension from tolerance for speaking in public and organizing a peaceful demonstration. I therefore created a tolerance scale from the six non-voting questions (2 questions for the 3 unpopular groups) by averaging the six scores. The reliability of the resulting scale was high (alpha=.87).

Independent Variables

A series of independent variables were included as predictors of political tolerance aside from the individual's experience with civic education. Unfortunately, the surveys did not include direct questions related to either personal dogmatism or perceived threat of the target groups, two factors that have been shown to be strongly associated with tolerance in previous literature (Sullivan and Transue 1999). As partial surrogates for these variables, I used questions related to *openness to compromise* and *support for paternalism (authoritarian leaders)* in the Dominican Republic, and questions related to *openness to other cultures* and *affect for racial out-groups* in South Africa. More details on these questions can be found in the Appendix.

I also included variables that measured other democratic orientations aside from tolerance, including factual *political knowledge*, *political efficacy*, and *support for the value of liberty* (following Gibson *et al* 1992). Evaluations pertaining to the current *economic* situation were included in both countries, and in South Africa additional items were included that related to assessments of the *political performance* of the incumbent authorities, and the individual's *satisfaction with political freedoms* in the current system. Details on these questions can also be found in the Appendix.

I also included a series of demographic and political control variables, including educational attainment, age, income, gender, race, size of community, religiosity (church attendance), political ideology, interest, media exposure, and the number of voluntary organizations to which the individual belongs. Details on these items are also found in the Appendix. These demographic and political variables, in addition to providing a more comprehensive model predicting political tolerance, afford some control for the selection biases that are inherent in the civic education process. We know that civic education programs tend to train certain kinds of individuals more than others, for example, individuals who are already members of voluntary social groups and associations, and individuals who are more politically interested. To the extent that associational memberships and other demographic or political variables are related to political tolerance, failure to include them in the model would attribute more power to civic education than it actually exerts, as some of the "effect" of civic education would really be

the result of civic education programs attracting people who were already more tolerant, or who would be expected to become more tolerant *regardless of their exposure to civic education*. I will discuss the issue of selection bias in more detail as the analysis unfolds.

Results

Bivariate Findings

The first step in examining civic education's propensity to inspire more tolerant attitudes in the Dominican Republic and South Africa is simply to compare the responses for civic education participants with the control group in both countries. Table 1 displays the simple percentage differences in tolerant responses between individuals who were exposed to varying amount of civic education: the percentages for individuals who received no civic education (the control group) are displayed in the first column of results, followed by the percentages for individuals who attended only one or two civic education sessions, and then percentages for those who attended civic education more frequently. A "tolerant" response was indicated when individuals "strongly agreed" or "agreed" that an atheist, militarist, communist, racist or sexist should be allowed to speak in public or organize peaceful demonstrations. As discussed earlier, the "vote" questions were not included in the South African tolerance scale, and hence only the Dominican Republic results for those questions are reported here.

(Table 1 goes here)

As can be seen in the top half of Table 1, the raw differences between tolerant responses for the three civic education groups are moderate in magnitude in the Dominican Republic. Differences of approximately 10 percentage points exist between the tolerant responses of the control group and those with the highest frequency of exposure to civic education. The largest differences are provoked by questions related to communists (14-18 percentage points), with smaller differences on responses towards atheists (8-10 points) and militarists (4-7 points). The gamma statistic in the last column confirms that there is a relatively large association between civic education exposure and tolerance toward communists, with associations of smaller magnitude between civic education and tolerance towards militarists and

atheists. Individuals in the frequent civic education group are significantly more tolerant on the overall scale than individuals in the control group (2.70 versus 2.43), with a corresponding Eta value of .16.

The bottom half of the table shows that civic education significantly influences tolerance in South Africa as well, though the patterns are less pronounced than in the Dominican Republic. The differences between the control group and those exposed frequently to civic education varies from 4 percentage points (allowing a sexist to speak) to 14 percentage points (allowing a racist to speak), with the overall average difference being about 9 points. There are few remarkable differences in the tolerance according to atheists as opposed to racists or sexists, nor does tolerance depend on whether the question concerns speaking in public or organizing peaceful demonstrations. The gammas in South Africa, ranging from zero to .18, confirm the slightly smaller differences between the civic education groups than in the Dominican Republic.

Interestingly, the results from both countries show that there is very little difference in the tolerant responses between individuals in the control group and individuals who attended only one or two civic education workshops. That is, differences in tolerance emerge only between the control group and individuals who attended three or more civic education sessions. This pattern is confirmed through further analysis, as simple t-tests between the control group and the infrequent civic education group shows few significant differences. This provides initial support for our hypothesis earlier that there may be *threshold effects* for civic education on political tolerance: attending one or two workshops may simply not be enough to effect value change, and repeated exposures to democratic civic instruction may be necessary for any effect whatsoever to occur.

The threshold pattern seen for the Dominican Republic, whereby infrequent exposure to civic education has little effect on tolerance responses, is even more pronounced in South Africa. On most items, there is absolutely no difference between the control group and those who attended only one or two civic education workshops. This pattern was confirmed in further analyses: simple t-tests of the differences between the control group and *all* civic education recipients in South Africa shows no

statistically significant results, and the simple correlations (a linear measure) between the number of workshops the individual attended and tolerant responses similarly showed few significant relationships. Similarly, the overall tolerance scale mean is nearly identical for the control group (2.28) and the infrequent exposure group (2.29); this figure rises to 2.50 for those in the highest exposure group. Thus there is strong preliminary support for the notion that civic education can have some effect on tolerance in both the Dominican Republic and South Africa, but that effects are seen only after individuals are exposed repeatedly to democratic messages.

It is important to emphasize that the results in Table 1 represent only the raw, or unadjusted, differences between tolerant responses of the control and the two civic education groups. That is, they do not take into account any of the possible selection biases related to civic education exposure. As discussed earlier, it is likely that certain kinds of individuals are more likely to receive civic education training than others, for example, individuals who are more politically interested or more highly educated, or who belong to voluntary organizations. It is essential to bring variables reflecting these background factors directly into the analysis to assess more accurately the impact of civic education on political tolerance.

Controls for Selection Effects

Tables 2 and 3 present the results of multivariate analysis of the effects of political tolerance in the Dominican Republic and South Africa, respectively. In order to allow for the possibility of threshold effects, as suggested in Table 1, two dummy variables were constructed to signify whether the respondent had attended one or two civic education workshops, or whether the respondent had attended three or more sessions. In model (1) in both tables, the effects of the civic education dummies are shown, controlling for a series of demographic, psychological, and political variables that may relate to both political tolerance and to the likelihood of exposure to civic education. In model (2) in the tables, additional variables related to democratic values, civic competence, and performance evaluations are included in both countries. The two models distinguish background factors from democratic orientations

and performance evaluations that are more likely to be affected by civic education programs. Thus comparing model (2) to model (1) provides a means for assessing the extent to which civic education affects political tolerance directly, as well as indirectly through its potential effects on other values and orientations.

(Tables 2 and 3 go here)

The results of these analyses indicate that civic education has significant direct effects on political tolerance in both countries, even after observed variables are introduced as controls to take potential selection biases into account. But as in Table 1, these effects exist *only when individuals are exposed to three or more civic education sessions*. In model (1) in Table 1, it can be seen individuals who were exposed to only one or two sessions in the Dominican Republic were no more likely to report tolerant responses than the control group, once other variables in the model are taken into account. By contrast, individuals who attended three or more sessions were, on average, .12 units higher on the tolerance scale than individuals who received no civic education.

The effect of civic education on tolerance can also be expressed in terms of what is known in experimental or quasi-experimental research as the “effect coefficient” or “Cohen’s *d*” (Kiess 1989; Judd and Kenney 1981). In the multiple regression context, *d* is equal to the unstandardized regression coefficient divided by the standard error of estimate, which conveys a sense of how much of an effect a treatment has *in (adjusted) standard deviation terms* on the dependent variable, once the effects of all other control variables are taken into account. Thus the .12 coefficient for the effect of civic education indicates that a three or more session “treatment” of civic education in the Dominican Republic is associated with a .12 standard deviation increase in tolerance.

Model (1) also shows that a substantial amount of the differences in tolerance between civic education groups observed in Table 1 was attributable to background characteristics of civic education participants rather than the programs themselves. Frequent civic education recipients were likely to have characteristics associated with higher tolerance to begin with. That is, civic education recipients were more likely to be more highly educated, younger, more open to compromise, less right wing, less likely to

attend regular religious services, and more attentive to the media than were individuals in the control group. As expected, many of these variables were related to tolerance as well, and these spurious effects accounted for nearly half of the original observed differences between the treatment and control groups. Yet even after these factors were controlled, exposure to civic education still has a significant impact on tolerance, and the effect coefficient of .12 (and the standardized coefficient of .07) ranks it at approximately the same magnitude of importance as urban compared to rural residence, or moving from center-left to right wing in political ideology. This is evidence of a relatively small but substantively meaningful effect of civics instruction on Dominicans' level of political tolerance.⁴

Model (1) in Table 3 shows the analogous analysis conducted for the South African sample. The overall explanatory power of the model is lower than in the Dominican Republic; among the control variables, only education, age, race and the individual's openness to other cultures are significant predictors of tolerance. Yet controlling for these factors, the effect of civic education remains significant, and follows the same threshold pattern seen in model (1) in the Dominican Republic. There are no differences on tolerance between the control group and individuals who attended only one or two workshops, whereas individuals who were exposed to civics workshops more frequently showed significant increases in tolerance over the control group. The average tolerance score for individuals who attended three or more workshops was .20 units higher than the score for individuals in the control group, controlling for all other variables in the model. This translates into an effect coefficient of .24, meaning

⁴ It is possible that, even after including the series of control variables in the models, some unmeasured variable or variable is related to both civic education exposure and political tolerance. This could occur because of the self-selection involved in the civic education process, as individuals who are more likely to be predisposed toward tolerance or other democratic orientations --- over and above what would be expected given the individual's education, age, group memberships, and so forth --- might choose to attend civic education activities more frequently. I estimated models that control for these kinds of self-selection effects in LIMDEP; these "treatment effects" models are described in Greene (1993, 713-714), and Breen (1996). Essentially, OLS will overestimate a treatment effect *if* the errors between the selection equation (in this case the decision to attend a civic education session) and the outcome equation (in this case tolerance) are related due to some unmeasured variable, for example "democratic predisposition" or "individual motivation." The amount of overestimation will be determined by a) the extent to which the errors between the selection and outcome equation are correlated; b) the extent to which the observed explanatory variables are related to both the probability of selection and the outcome variable. The results of the LIMDEP models indicated that the errors between the selection and outcome equations in model (1) were not statistically related; hence it appears that the observed variables introduced as controls were sufficient to take these potentially confounding effects into account.

that a three workshop “treatment” of civic education is associated with a nearly one-quarter (adjusted) standard deviation change in political tolerance. This is an even larger net effect than seen in the Dominican Republic, and one of the largest effects in the South African model overall.⁵

Interestingly, the demographic and political differences between the control group and individuals who attended civic education sessions in South Africa was not nearly as great as that seen in the Dominican Republic. Individuals who attended civic education workshops were only somewhat more highly educated, more politically interested, more active in secondary groups, and more attentive to the media than were individuals in the control group, and (by design) the groups were identical in terms of age, gender, race, and place of residence. And most of these variables were themselves only marginally related to tolerance. Thus the confounding effects of selection bias were more limited in South Africa, and for this reason the magnitude of the effects of civic education in Table 1 and in Table 3 is nearly identical.⁶

Direct and Indirect Effects

Model (2) in Tables 2 and 3 includes additional control variables related to more general democratic values, civic competence, and performance evaluations. Previous research has found a substantial constraining function of more general democratic values on tolerance (Sullivan *et al* 1982; Gibson and Duch 1992; 1993), such that support for more abstract democratic principles such as the value of liberty over social order, or support for the rule of law is more likely to lead to specific applications of political tolerance. Similarly, there is also some evidence that individuals who are more efficacious and knowledgeable about politics may be more willing to extend procedural liberties to unpopular groups (Gibson and Duch 1992), and to the extent that civic education increases these attributes of civic competence, tolerance may increase as well. Finally, in line with the “lifetime learning model,” much

⁵ The larger bivariate effect of civic education in the Dominican Republic compared to South Africa in Table 1 can therefore be attributed to the fact that the control sample in South Africa was more effective than the control sample in the DR at eliminating the pre-existing differences on tolerance between the treatment and control groups.

⁶ Models to control for self-selection were also estimated in South Africa, with similar results as were found in the DR. The correlation between the errors of the selection (treatment) equation and outcome equation from model (1)

recent research has shown that perceptions of economic and political performance are related to increases in democratic orientations (Mishler and Rose 1996; Rose, Mishler and Haerpfing 1998). Although civic education is not necessarily designed to influence these kinds of orientations, it may nevertheless be the case that exposure to civics instruction heightens individuals' attention to the current performance of the economy and incumbent authorities (Finkel *et al*, forthcoming). If these variables themselves are then related to tolerance, this would represent an important *indirect* route for civic education to effect attitude change.

The results show that the direct effects of civic education on tolerance far outweigh its indirect influences. In Table 2, it can be seen that the unstandardized effect of attending three or more civic education sessions drops only slightly from .12 to .10. Among the variables added to the model, only political efficacy influences the level of Dominicans' tolerance, while support for liberty, political knowledge, and concern about the national economy are irrelevant predictors. This indicates that the indirect effects of civic education through efficacy, knowledge and values and economic orientations are slight.

The same pattern of results is found in South Africa, as is shown in model (2) of Table 3. The effect of attending three or more civic education workshops falls to .17, compared to its value of .20 in model (1), about a 15% drop once the democratic values, competence measures, and performance evaluations are taken into account. Only two of the measured intervening variables, however, themselves have significant effects on tolerance, thus limiting the potential for the indirect influences of civic education. Individuals who support the more abstract value of liberty in South Africa are more likely to endorse specific applications of tolerance (standardized effect of .10), and individuals who are more politically knowledgeable are more tolerant as well (beta of .09); neither efficacy nor any of performance evaluations show significant effects. Thus the direct effect of civics instruction is by far the more

was statistically insignificant; hence the estimation of the treatment effects in OLS and in the LIMDEP models were almost identical.

important influence of civic education on political tolerance in both the Dominican Republic and South Africa.⁷

The “Persuadability” of Tolerance: The Role of Pedagogical Methods

According to the theories of attitude change discussed previously, persuasion is most likely to occur under certain conditions related to the nature of the individual’s exposure to pro-tolerance messages, and conditions related to attitudes and prior attitudes of the individual. The results thus far reinforce the conditional relationship between civic education and political tolerance. Civic education’s influence on tolerance depends on the frequency of exposure to tolerance messages; three or more sessions are necessary for any effect of civic education to occur. I hypothesized that one further aspect of the civic education experience would be relevant for attitude change: the extent to which participatory teaching methods were used in the instruction. Such methods, where individuals are encouraged to act out tolerance in role playing, problem solving and dramatic-type activities, are likely to stimulate attitude change much more readily than more passive, lecture based methodologies (Zimbardo and Leippe 1991).

To measure the extent of exposure to participatory methods, respondents were asked which of the following methods were used in the programs they attended (breaking into small groups, staging plays or dramatizations, playing games, problem-solving, and simulations or role-playing). In the Dominican Republic respondents were asked further whether respondents had much opportunity to express their own views in the program, and in South Africa whether workshops had included “staging mock trials of legal proceedings,” or “staging mock elections or other kinds of political activities.” There was a moderate amount of collinearity between the frequency of civic education exposure and exposure to participatory teaching methodologies, making it difficult to isolate the effect of each variable. I attempted to reduce the problem by creating a simple dummy variable to signify whether the respondent had been exposed to treatments that used three or more participatory methods in the Dominican Republic, and four or more

⁷ This finding does not mean that civic education has no influence on these intervening variables. Civic education has significant effects on Dominican’s efficacy and knowledge, for example (Finkel et al 1998), and significant effects on South Africans’ institutional knowledge and performance evaluations (Finkel and Stumbras 2000). The

such methods in South Africa, and entered this variable into the model predicting tolerance in both countries.

The results strongly support the hypothesis that participatory teaching methods are more effective at influencing tolerance in South Africa, with a more equivocal finding in the Dominican Republic. Analysis including the “participatory methods” dummy variable showed that, in South Africa, both frequency of exposure to civic education *and* the participatory methods used in the instruction have significant effects on levels of political tolerance. Individuals with frequent exposures to civic education, and exposure to participatory teaching methodologies, increased their tolerance score by .25 over the control group, compared to the value of .17 when considering exposure to civic education alone. In the Dominican Republic, the combination of frequent exposures and active methodologies led to a .14 increase in tolerance, compared to the value of .10 for three or more exposures alone. Thus, the more participatory methods used in instruction, the greater the change in political tolerance in both countries. The magnitude of these changes, however, is not all that substantial beyond the effects of repeated civic education exposures, especially in the Dominican Republic.

The “Persuadability” of Tolerance: The Role of Individual Awareness, Values, and Attitudes

I also hypothesized that, aside from the frequency of exposure and nature of the methodologies utilized in the civic education instruction, certain attributes of the individual would condition the likelihood of attitude change. Specifically, individuals require some cognitive sophistication, political awareness and interest in order to understand tolerance messages at all. Further, individuals who are less psychologically dogmatic, and those who are more supportive of democratic values in general, will be more likely to accept tolerance messages in civic education than individuals who are more close-minded and anti-democratic to begin with. Finally, the more immediate influence of economic and political performance evaluations should also condition the extent of attitude change, as individuals will be more

results in Tables 2 and 3 indicate that there are only weak *indirect* effects from civic education to tolerance because most of these variables do not themselves predict tolerance responses.

likely to accept democratic messages to the extent that they perceive the democratic system to be delivering important economic and political goods.

I test the hypotheses for democratic orientations and performance evaluations by dividing the sample in each country into separate groups corresponding to “high” and “low” values on each of these variables and re-estimating a model predicting tolerance from all significant variables from model (2). In South Africa I included an additional performance variable, assessing the extent to which individuals report that they are satisfied with the political freedoms that they have now compared with the apartheid system.⁸ Thus three different performance measures were available for the South African analysis, measuring economic performance, the actions of the incumbent authorities in handling important problems, and the performance of the system as a whole in guaranteeing individual political freedoms. Unfortunately only one performance measure regarding the economy was available for use in the Dominican Republic data set.

In both countries I use education as a surrogate for the individual’s level of prior political awareness, though the results are identical if I substitute factual political knowledge instead. For both education and political interest, I divided the sample into three categories in order to test the potential for a non-monotonic relationship between political awareness and change in tolerance, as predicted by the reception-acceptance model of attitude change discussed above (Zaller 1992). I divide the sample into those who did not graduate from high school, those who graduated high school, and those who have some additional education beyond the high school degree. For political interest, I chose cutpoints that divided the sample nearly into thirds. I show the results of all of these analyses in Table 4, including the unstandardized coefficient for the effect of attending “three or more” workshops or civic education sessions for each subgroup, as well as the corresponding effect coefficient, Cohen’s *d*.

(Table 4 goes here)

⁸ The satisfaction with freedom variable has an insignificant effect on tolerance if entered into the model of Table 3 and does not alter the effects of other variables in the model.

The results reflect slightly different patterns for the Dominican Republic and South Africa, but demonstrate clear support for the conditional attitude change hypotheses. The tests for education and interest are shown in the top rows of the Table. In both the Dominican Republic and South Africa, there is no effect of civic education among individuals with low levels of education or political interest. Regardless of how often the individual is exposed to civic education, without a certain level of prior awareness, ability or motivation to accept democratic messages, no change in tolerance is likely to occur. In both countries, moreover, the effects of civic education are concentrated among individuals at medium levels of education, with smaller effects among those who have more than a high school education. This indicates that attitude change conforms exactly to the non-monotonic relationship with awareness postulated by the reception-acceptance model; at high levels of education, individuals are more likely to resist accepting messages than individuals with moderate levels of prior information.

This non-monotonic pattern, however, emerges for political interest only in the Dominican Republic. In South Africa, civic education exerts a steadily increasing effect on tolerance as individuals become more interested in politics; the effect of civic education on tolerance among highly interested South Africans is nearly double the overall effect in the sample, reaching a relatively large d value of .43. There is no obvious explanation for the difference in South Africa from the Dominican Republic, though it is the case that, due to the nature of the programs that were included in the study, there are more political elites among highly interested Dominicans who received civic education than there are among the treatment group of highly interested South Africans. Thus in the Dominican Republic there may have been more individuals at high levels of interest whose tolerance judgments were relatively fixed.

There is also substantial evidence in Table 4 for the importance of prior democratic dispositions in facilitating the individual's acceptance of tolerance messages. Individuals who were more open to compromise in the Dominican Republic were more likely to be influenced by civic education than others; similarly in South Africa, individuals who were more open to other cultures showed substantially greater effects from civic education than more ethnocentric individuals. The effects of political efficacy are

nearly identical, as are the effects for support for liberty in the Dominican Republic. In all of these cases, three or more exposures to civic education affected individuals who were more democratically inclined than individuals whose predispositions were less democratically oriented. The sole piece of evidence disconfirming the predisposing effects of prior orientations regards the value of liberty in South Africa, where the effects were more concentrated on individuals with less supportive democratic attitudes.

For the performance evaluations in the last three rows of Table 4, the results are clear and unequivocal: civic education has much stronger effects among individuals with more positive evaluations of the economy, the performance of incumbents and the political system. Among the (few) Dominican Republic respondents who are less concerned about inflation and unemployment, the effect of civic education is four times greater than when economic evaluations are more negative. Among these favorably-disposed individuals, three exposures to civic education brings about a .55 standard deviation change in tolerance, the largest single effect in the study. The corresponding value is .25 in South Africa, and reaches approximately that level for individuals who rate the government's performance highly on handling important problems, and among those more satisfied with the level of political freedom in the country. Individuals with negative performance evaluations, by contrast, show much weaker effects from civic education, with d values ranging from .06 to .12. This is strong evidence that individuals are likely to accept pro-tolerance messages when they perceive the system as delivering on important economic and political goods.

Interestingly, recall that these same variables did not exert a *direct* effect on tolerance in either the Dominican Republic or South Africa. That is, tolerance does not depend directly on the individual's evaluations of economic and political performance. What the results in Table 4 suggest, instead, is that individuals with higher evaluations of the actual performance of a democratic system are more receptive to internalizing new messages about the values that inhere in that system. When such individuals are exposed to tolerance messages, they are able to relate those messages to other favorable associations with democratic institutions or incumbents, and hence more likely to integrate the value of tolerance into their otherwise favorable evaluation of the democratic system. This, of course, is not necessarily an

unconditionally positive result for democratic development, as the facilitative effect of *positive* performance means that the system must deliver on important political and economic goods in order for civic education to “work”; in the very common situation of a newly-emerging democracy that is struggling to generate favorable economic and political outputs, civic education is likely to have less success at instilling democratic values.

Conclusion

This study of the impact of adult civic education on political tolerance in two developing democracies, the Dominican Republic and South Africa, showed that democracy training significantly affected tolerance judgments in both countries. More importantly, the effects of civic education on tolerance in both countries were conditional, depending on the levels of other variables in ways that are consistent with predictions from theories of attitude change and political persuasion. Differences in tolerance judgments between the civic education participants and non-participants were greatest when individuals were exposed to frequent training and training that utilized more active, participatory teaching methodologies. Further, civic education had a greater influence on tolerance among individuals with sufficient cognitive skills and prior political awareness to understand and contextualize tolerance messages, and among those whose prior values and personal dispositions, such as political efficacy and openness to compromise, were more favorable towards democracy. Finally, individuals with higher evaluations of the current economic and political performance of the system were more likely to accept tolerance messages as well; such individuals appeared to link messages concerning the values inherent in democracy with other positive associations about the political system. In short, tolerance can be taught through civic education in newly-democratizing societies, but the learning takes place only under certain conditions for certain kinds of individuals.

The findings have important theoretical implications for our understanding of the development of tolerance and democratic political culture, as well as practical implications for the implementation of civic education programs in emerging democracies. First, they lend additional credence to the growing claim that democratic values can change significantly in response to short-term stimuli. As suggested by

the “lifetime learning model”(Mishler and Rose 1997), democratic orientations --- even ones such as tolerance thought by many to be relatively impervious to change --- may be altered under the right conditions. Within the category of short-term influences on tolerance, in fact, exposure to civic education was found in both the Dominican Republic and South Africa to have a more sizeable *direct* effect than economic judgments or perceptions of current political performance. The findings thus provide an interesting twist to Dalton’s assertion in the East German context that “democratic norms are not learned through formal education and indoctrination but through experience with the democratic process” (1994, 490). Civic education, perhaps by mixing “formal indoctrination” with direct experience with the new democratic regime, has the potential to effect short-term change in even “difficult” democratic norms like tolerance.

At the same time, the conditional nature of the effects of civic education suggests that important limits still exist on the amount of change that is possible in the short term. Not only must individuals be somewhat predisposed towards democratic values in order for civic education to effect changes in tolerance, they must also possess sufficient cognitive skills and political information to understand and tolerance messages and associate them with their predispositions. The pool of individuals who are most susceptible to change ---- those who are moderate to highly aware and equipped with favorable personality and attitudinal attributes --- is likely to be relatively small in many contexts.

Moreover, the facilitative effects of immediate economic and political performance evaluations also mean that civic education’s influence on tolerance is contingent to a considerable degree on the achievements of new democratic systems. Civic education may not always succeed in promoting unconditional or intrinsic support for democratic norms. Put another way, the interaction effects between civic education, tolerance, and performance evaluations observed here imply that civic education acts to “prime” the role of performance judgments on tolerance: among individuals who did not experience civic education, performance ratings are irrelevant for political tolerance, while such evaluations exert a more substantial effect on tolerance among those exposed to multiple civic education treatments. Thus, civic

education, whether intentionally or not, appears to be promoting tolerance judgments that are more contingent on positive outcomes from the political system.

System performance is another limit on the pool of individuals who are potentially susceptible to tolerance messages via civic education. In many contexts the early performance of the economy and incumbent authorities following the onset of a democratic regime is extremely poor (Remmer 1991). Equally important, civic education training may have the unintended consequence of promoting a more instrumental view of democratic values among ordinary citizens. One finding that mitigates this worry, however, is the effect associated with perceived freedoms seen in the South African data, where civic education served to heighten the respondent's linkage between political liberties in the post-apartheid era and the general value of tolerance. This increase in tolerance, though "instrumentally-based" in the sense of being associated with the delivery of a *political* good by the system, accords more with the spirit of civic education as promoting democracy because of its provision of intrinsically desirable liberties and freedoms. Further research is clearly needed to determine whether these same kinds of effects are present for other democratic orientations and values, and whether the "intrinsic" versus "instrumental" aspects of civic education can be more thoroughly disentangled.

The results regarding the frequency and nature of civic education training also have important practical consequences. I have shown that when individuals are trained frequently *and* are trained with active, participatory methodologies, changes in tolerance can be at least of moderate magnitude. But in most cases only a small portion of individuals who receive civic education instruction are exposed to these beneficial pedagogical conditions. For example, only one-third of all civic education recipients in South Africa attended three or more workshops, meaning that two-thirds of the recipients did not cross the initial "threshold" for civic education effects to be seen. Of this number, just over half were trained with at least 4 of the 7 participatory methodologies outlined above. This indicates that, of the entire civic education sample, less than one-fifth were trained both frequently enough to see any effects whatsoever, *and* with a preponderance of teaching methodologies that are most conducive to attitude change.

The more intensive programs in the Dominican Republic were more clearly designed to deliver frequent exposure and participatory methodologies, yet even in that context just over half of civic education recipients were trained three times or more, and two-thirds of them with highly participatory methods --- yielding two-fifths of the civic education sample who were trained frequently and “well.” The results illuminate the difference between the *potential* effect of civic education on changing tolerance and the *actual* effects witnessed in these democratizing contexts. In order to have any significant effect on tolerance (and other political attitudes, see Finkel and Stumbras 2000), civic education must be done often (more than twice), and must be conducted using more participatory training methods. In most instances, though, individuals are not trained in these demonstrably effective ways. Given the severe barriers to the implementation of civic education, ranging from financial constraints, logistical difficulties in reaching potential respondents, and political turmoil in certain areas, this limitation raises serious issues for policy makers regarding the feasibility of utilizing civic education as part of a democratization program in many instances (Carothers 1999).

Finally, the results shed additional light on the burgeoning literature on the “persuadability of tolerance” (Gibson 1998; Nelson *et al* 1997; Sniderman *et al* 1996). I have shown that a real-world example of attempted attitude change conforms to many of the same processes that have been modeled in the laboratory or via combined survey and experimental methods. That is, tolerance judgments can be affected via persuasive argumentation only when the messages are understood and the individual is able to link them with “collateral democratic values” (Gibson and Gouws 1997, 32). The list of collateral values, however, must be expanded to include the individual’s evaluation of the current performance of the political system. Tolerance judgments in the real world do not necessarily depend *directly* on such evaluations, but positive economic and political evaluations do facilitate the acceptance of tolerance messages in civic education. For better or worse, tolerance is more “persuadable” when it is in line with the individual’s more transitory judgments regarding the outcomes produced by the political system.

Clearly, much work remains to be done before the findings presented here --- from seven different programs conducted in two widely different political contexts --- can be generalized.

Improvements in research design and data collection are essential to this task, as there are several significant limitations to establishing definitive causal claims on the basis of the current study. Perhaps the most important limitation here is the lack of a pre-test, where individuals' political tolerance would have been measured *before* they were exposed to civic education training. The analysis here thus did not observe attitude *change* directly, but inferred the change by comparing the responses of control and treatment groups after the fact. Future studies should attempt to include a pre-test when possible; this feature would also allow more rigorous controls so that one plausible alternative explanation to the findings --- that individuals who were trained in civic education programs were already likely higher on tolerance than individuals in the control groups ---- can be ruled out more definitively than is possible with a post-test only design. Moreover, evaluating programs that maintained lists of participants may have biased the results, in that programs that keep lists of participants may differ from other programs, and individuals who are trained and who find their way onto the lists may differ from other participants as well. With larger sample sizes and perhaps more intensive regional sampling methods, participants from a variety of programs may be found and interviewed more easily.

Substantively, there are many unanswered questions as well. It is unclear, for example, which of the facilitative conditions identified here have the most important effects on the civic education-tolerance relationship. It is unclear as well why certain patterns differed between the two countries, notably the monotonic or curvilinear pattern for political interest and the opposing influences of prior adherence to the value of liberty for facilitating attitude change. More generally, the effects of civic education seen here need to be contextualized: are they larger or smaller than those seen for other democratic orientations, and are they larger or smaller than what is effected among younger people with classroom based civic education programs? Do the effects last beyond the short-term or civic education effect more enduring changes in tolerance and other orientations? The answers to these questions are crucial, not only for policy makers interested in more effective implementation of civic education programs in the future, but also for our understanding of the degree to which political culture can be influenced through

formal or informal teachings, and the conditions under which individuals are susceptible to internalizing messages aimed at promoting democratic norms, values, and behaviors.

Appendix

Measurement of Control Variables and Sample Information

Psychological Predispositions

Openness to Compromise (Dominican Republic only). Respondents were asked two questions, each measured on a four point agree-disagree scale: whether “it is dangerous to compromise with one’s enemies,” and “groups that tolerate differences of opinion tend not to survive long.”

Support for Paternalism (Dominican Republic only). Respondents were asked two questions, each measured on a four point agree-disagree scale: “A good president should be like a father – someone to whom you should look to solve your problems,” and “A president needs to maintain order and stability, even if it means ignoring or breaking some laws.”

Openness to Other Cultures (South Africa only). Respondents were asked four questions regarding their views of other cultures, each measured on a four point agree-disagree scale, including “It is easy for you to like people who have different views to your own,” and “you can usually accept people from other cultures, even when they are very different to you.” The four questions were averaged to create a single scale.

Affect towards Racial Out-Groups (South Africa only). Respondents were asked whether they had a favorable or unfavorable opinion of “whites,” “blacks,” and “coloured” groups on a 0-10 scale. I averaged the favorability ratings for “whites” and “coloured” to create the out-group affect measure for black South Africans, and averaged the ratings for “whites” and “blacks” to create the measure for coloured respondents.

Democratic Orientations

Political Knowledge. In the Dominican Republic, I added the number of correct answers out of four questions concerning knowledge of incumbents and the electoral process (“when are the next presidential elections,” who is the mayor of this municipality”). In South Africa I added the number of correct answers out of four questions concerning knowledge of the institutional structure of the government (“how long is the President’s term in office,” “who has the power to decide whether a law is constitutional”).

Political Efficacy. Respondents in the Dominican Republic were asked three questions on efficacy, all asking the respondent to agree or disagree on a four-point scale to a series of questions concerning their views of their influence on the political system. The three questions were: (1) Sometimes politics and government are so complicated that people like me can’t understand what is going on; (2) People like me have no say in what the government does; and (3) There is no point in getting involved in politics because I would have no influence anyway. In South Africa, the first two questions were supplemented with: (1) I feel well prepared for participating in political life; and (2) If I wanted to discuss my political views, I would know where and how to contact elected officials.

Support for the Value of Liberty. Following Gibson *et al* (1992), respondents were asked their support for the value of liberty versus social order on a four point agree-disagree scale: “It is better to live in an orderly society than to allow people so much freedom that they can be disruptive.”

Economic and Political Performance Evaluations

Perceptions of Economic Performance. In the Dominican Republic, there were no direct questions regarding economic performance. I created a surrogate by asking respondents the degree to which they were “concerned” with inflation and the cost of living, and “concerned” with unemployment, reasoning that high levels of concern would likely be associated with more negative perceptions. In South Africa, the performance questions were more direct. Respondents were asked to rate their *personal* economic situation now and compared to what it was under apartheid on a 5-point scale. They were then asked the same questions regarding the *national* economy.

Perceptions of Government Performance (South Africa only). Respondents were asked to rate “how satisfied,” on a four point scale, with “what the well the government is going to prevent crime in your community,” with “what the government is doing to improve healthcare in your community,” and “with the quality of services, such as water and electricity, provided by the municipal government.”

Satisfaction with Political Freedoms (South Africa only). Respondents were asked to “think about the amount of freedom that you now have, like freedom of speech and freedom to join political groups,” and to rate how much more freedom they had than they had under apartheid on a four point scale.

Demographic and other Control Variables

Education. 7 categories ranging from no education to profession training beyond a university degree.

Age. 5 categories, grouped from 18-24, 25-34, 35-49, 50-64, and 65 and older.

Income. 7 grouped categories in the Dominican Republic, 15 grouped categories in South Africa.

Church Attendance. Frequency of attending religious services on a 0-5 scale, 0 being “no religion” to “5” for “every day”.

Dummy variables were created to signify: gender, race, urban residence, and residence of Santo Domingo (the Dominican Republic’s national capital).

Political Ideology (Dominican Republic only). 5-point self-placement question ranging from “left,” “left-center,” “center” “center-right” to “right.” The question was asked in South Africa but few respondents placed themselves on the scale, and those that did placed themselves largely in the center.

Political Interest. In the Dominican Republic, I averaged two questions measuring local and national political interest on a four-point scale from “none” to “much” interest. In South Africa, a question on interest in the “current election campaign” was added, and in that country the response categories ranged from “very little” to “a great deal” of interest on a three-point scale.

Media Exposure. In the Dominican Republic, I averaged two questions on a four-point scale measuring the respondent’s attentiveness to information about politics on “television and radio” and then in “newspapers” (“never” to “every day or almost every day”). In South Africa the radio and television questions were separated, resulting in a three-question scale for attentiveness, with each measured on the same four-point scale as in the Dominican Republic.

Table A-1

**Characteristics of Civic Education and Control Group Samples,
Dominican Republic**

<u>LOCATION</u>	<i>Civic Education Program</i>					<i>Control Group</i>
	Participación Ciudadana	GAD	ADOPEM	Radio Santa Maria (direct) ⁹	Radio Santa Maria (indirect)	
National						
Sampling method	random, from lists	random, from lists ¹⁰				random stratified
N	250	247				695
La Vega						
Sampling method			random, from lists	random, from lists	snowball from RSM-Direct participants	
N			201 ¹¹	152	153	189
San Pedro de Macoris						
Sampling method						random
N						50
San Cristobal						
Sampling method						random
N						50
Herrera						
Sampling method						random
N						50
Sabana Perdida						
Sampling method						random
N						50
TOTALS	250	247	201	152	153	2084

⁹ The Radio Santa Maria project was a training of trainers activity. The implementing organization only maintained lists of the "direct" participants or trainers that it trained. After interviewing the "direct" participants, the interviewers would ask for names of "indirect" participants they had trained who would then be interviewed. This second set constitutes the "indirect" respondents.

¹⁰ The national sample for the GAD program excluded Santo Domingo.

¹¹ The total N of 201 for the ADOPEM program was drawn from San Pedro de Macoris, San Cristobal, Herrera, and Sabana Perdida as well as from La Vega.

Table A-2
Characteristics of Civic Education and Matched Control Group Samples, South Africa

		<i>Civic Education Program</i>			<i>Control</i>
		CLC-Durban	NIPILAR	LHR	<i>Group</i>
	Total N	100	150	225	475
<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>AREA</u>				
Eastern Cape	Mt. Fletcher			14	14
	Qumbu			11	11
				25	25
Free State	Bethlehem			10	10
	Bloemfontein			8	8
	Botshabelo			7	7
	Phuthaditjaba/Witsieshoek		30		30
		30		25	55
Gauteng	Bronkhorstspuit			5	5
	Johannesburg				
	KwaMhlanga/Bronkhorstsp ruit		20		20
	Pretoria			5	5
	Soweto		10		10
	Vaal Area			5	5
	West Rand (Johannesburg)			10	10
		30		25	55
KwaZulu-Natal	Cornfields	25			25
	Durban				
	Eshowe			13	13
	Muden	25			25
	Pinetown			12	12
	River View	25			25
	Sankotshe	25			25
		100		25	125
Mpumalanga	Bosbokrand			10	10
	Dennilton		15		15
	Graskop		15		15
	Leandra			5	5
	Siyabuswa			10	10
		30		25	55
Northern Province	Lebowakgomo		10	8	18
	Nebo		10		10
	Nebo/Sekhukhune			8	8
	Pietersburg		10		10
	Warmbaths			9	9
		30		25	55

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Table 1
Tolerance by Frequency of Civic Education
Dominican Republic and South Africa

	Control Group ^a	Civic Education: 1-2x ^a	Civic Education: 3x or more ^a	Strength of Association ^b
<u>Dominican Republic</u>				
<i>Would allow an atheist to . . .</i>				
Speak in Public	42.9	46.5	52.4	.14**
Vote	52.4	61.5	62.7	.17**
Organize a Peaceful Demonstration	52.5	52.7	60.0	.10**
<i>Would allow a militarist to . . .</i>				
Speak in Public	39.3	37.6	43.4	.05
Vote	41.0	44.8	46.5	.09*
Organize Peaceful Demonstration	48.6	47.0	54.5	.08*
<i>Would allow a communist to . . .</i>				
Speak in Public	51.0	52.7	68.9	.28**
Vote	58.5	59.7	75.0	.24**
Organize Peaceful Demonstration	54.9	58.6	68.4	.28**
<i>Tolerance Scale Score</i>	2.43 ^c	2.50 ^c	2.70 ^c	.16** ^d
Number of Cases	1019	407	611	
<u>South Africa</u>				
<i>Would allow an atheist to . . .</i>				
Speak in Public	38.0	37.7	45.3	.04*
Organize Peaceful Demonstration	43.9	42.2	52.0	.05*
<i>Would allow a racist to . . .</i>				
Speak in Public	32.7	38.8	47.4	.18**
Organize Peaceful Demonstration	41.9	40.3	50.8	.06**
<i>Would allow a sexist to . . .</i>				
Speak in Public	41.1	37.7	44.5	.00
Organize Peaceful Demonstration	39.6	40.3	52.0	.11**
<i>Tolerance Scale Score</i>	2.28 ^c	2.29 ^c	2.50 ^c	.09** ^d
Number of Cases	475	331	134	

Notes

^a Column entries are percent “Agreeing” or “Strongly Agreeing” with tolerant statement

^b Column entries are gamma coefficients unless otherwise noted **p<.05 *p<.10

^c Row entries are scale means (1=least tolerant, 4=most tolerant)

^d Cell entry is eta coefficient

Table 2
The Effect of Civic Education on Political Tolerance,
Dominican Republic

	<u>Model 1</u>		<u>Model 2</u>	
	B	beta	B	beta
<i>Frequency of Civic Education</i>				
One or Two Sessions	.04	.02	.02	.01
Three or More Sessions	.12**	.07	.10**	.06
<i>Democratic Values and Civic Competence</i>				
Support for Liberty			-.02	-.02
Political Efficacy			.12**	.12
Political Knowledge			.02	.04
<i>Economic Evaluations</i>				
Unemployment, Inflation concerns low			-.02	-.01
<i>Psychological Predispositions</i>				
Open to Compromise	.14**	.13	.14**	.13
Low Paternalism	.06**	.05	.05*	.04
<i>Demographic and Political Controls</i>				
Age	.12*	.17	.09	.14
Age Squared	-.02*	-.16	-.01	-.12
Black Respondent	.06	.03	.06	.03
White Respondent	.08	.03	.08	.03
Gender (1=Male)	-.01	-.01	-.04	-.03
Education	.09**	.20	.07**	.17
Income	.01	.02	.01	.01
Church Attendance	-.02**	-.04	-.02*	-.04
Santo Domingo Resident	.14**	.07	.13**	.07
Other Urban District	.09**	.06	.09**	.06
Group Memberships	.07	.01	.04	.01
Political Ideology (Right-Wing)	-.04**	-.06	-.04**	-.06
Political Interest	.01	.00	-.03	-.03
Media Use	.08**	.10	.06**	.08
Constant	1.52		1.46	
R-Squared	.17		.18	
Standard Error of Estimate	.69		.69	
N=2037 (both Models)				

Notes

Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients *p<.10 **p<.05

Table 3
The Effect of Civic Education on Political Tolerance,
South Africa

	<u>Model 1</u>		<u>Model 2</u>	
	B	beta	B	beta
<i>Frequency of Civic Education</i>				
One or Two Workshops	.04	.01	.03	.02
Three or More Workshops	.20**	.08	.17**	.07
<i>Democratic Values and Civic Competence</i>				
Support for Liberty			.09**	.10
Political Efficacy			.06	.05
Political Knowledge			.07**	.09
<i>Economic and Political Evaluations</i>				
Perceived Government Performance			-.06	-.05
Perceived Personal Economic Situation			-.01	-.01
Perceived National Economic Situation			-.04	-.06
<i>Psychological Predispositions</i>				
Open to Other Cultures	.11*	.07	.11**	.06
Positive Affect towards Racial Out-groups	.02	.01	.01	.01
<i>Demographic and Political Controls</i>				
Age	.25*	.33	.20**	.26
Age Squared	-.04*	-.29	-.03	-.23
Race (1=Coloured)	.48**	.17	.46**	.17
Gender (1=Male)	.06	.03	.02	.01
Education	.05*	.08	.03	.05
Income	.01	.00	-.01	-.01
Church Attendance	-.01	-.00	.01	.01
City Resident	.05	.03	.04	.02
Group Memberships	-.15	-.04	-.21*	-.06
Political Interest	-.04	-.03	-.05	-.04
Media Use	.05	.05	.04	.04
Constant	1.87		2.02	
R-Squared	.06		.08	
Standard Error of Estimate	.83		.82	
N=940 (both Models)				

Notes

Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients *p<.10 **p<.05

Table 4
The Effects of Civic Education by Awareness, Psychological Predispositions, and Perceptions of Economic and Political Performance

	<u>Dominican Republic</u>		<u>South Africa</u>	
	<u>Unstandardized^a</u>	<u>Effect Coefficient (d)</u>	<u>Unstandardized^a</u>	<u>Effect Coefficient (d)</u>
<i>Education</i>				
No High School	.04	.06	.13	.17
High School	.18**	.25	.21	.25
Beyond High School	.12	.18	.10	.11
<i>Political Interest</i>				
Low	.05	.08	-.24	-.20
Medium	.17**	.24	.17	.22
High	.03	.04	.39**	.43
<i>Openness to Compromise (DR)/ Other Cultures (SA)</i>				
Low	.08	.11	.03	.04
High	.15**	.23	.21*	.25
<i>Political Efficacy</i>				
Low	.05	.07	.13	.16
High	.13**	.19	.20**	.24
<i>Support for Liberty</i>				
Low	.04	.05	.21	.25
High	.15**	.23	.10	.12
<i>Economic Perceptions</i>				
Poor	.09**	.13	.10	.12
Good	.36**	.55	.20*	.25
<i>Government Performance</i>				
Poor	----		.09	.11
Good	----		.21*	.25
<i>Satisfaction with Freedoms</i>				
Low	----		.05	.06
High	----		.17*	.20

Note

^aColumn entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients *p<.10 **p<.05