Reality vs. Ideology: An Alternative Explanation of Individual Preferences for Redistribution

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OUTLINE

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- Introduction
- The EITM Framework
- Applying the EITM Framework
- Data and Measurement
- Empirical Results
- Conclusions


INTRODUCTION - PUZZLE

The **PUZZLE** of inequality and redistribution

• Meltzer and Richard model (1981)

Individual preferences for redistribution depend on individual income positions: 2 implications (micro & macro)

- Mixed results from empirical tests (Persson and Tabellini 2000)
- My answer (micro level)
- Utilizing EITM framework
- Not only individual's own income level but also her evaluation of justice with respect to the income distribution of the whole society matter in redistributive preferences
- Justice evaluation is about the difference between what an individual actually observes regarding the income inequality of the society and the just level that she perceives



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INTRODUCTION – LIT REVIEW

 Most recent studies: it is not actual income inequality, but rather how it is perceived that matters

Actual: officially-reported national income inequality Perceived: individual view of the income distribution

• Three problems of this alternative viewpoint:

(1) How should "actual" and "perceived" be defined at the micro level?
(2) Theory underlying: how does the effect of perceived part come about?
(3) How does the difference between actual and perceived inequality matter?

INTRODUCTION – RESEARCH QUESTION

- Why does individual-specific perceived income inequality matter in understanding individual preferences for redistribution?
- How does the difference between what an individual actually observes and perceives about income inequality affect her preferences for redistribution?

THE EITM FRAMEWORK

Three-Step EITM Framework

(Granato et al., 2010)

Step 1: Identify a theoretical concept of human behavior of interest and relate it to a statistical concept.

Step 2: Develop behavioral (formal) and statistical analogues.

Step 3: Unify the theoretical and statistical analogues in testable theory.

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Step 1: relating decision making to discrete choice

Theoretical Concept

Decision making

=> Maximize the utility of supporting redistribution

Applied Statistical Concept

Discrete choice

=> Preferences on redistribution

Step 2: develop behavioral (formal) and applied statistical analogues

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Based on MR (1981) model: let each individual i is purely self-interested under a laissez-faire condition

$$U_i = \left(\frac{C_i}{Y_i}\right)^{\alpha} \tag{1}$$

where C represents the consumption and Y represents the income, and α is a preference parameter ($\alpha \in (0, 1]$). Also, $C_i = (1 - t)Y_i + T_i$, where T is government transfers and $T_i = r(Y^* - Y_i)$. $C_i = Y_i = (1 - t)Y_i + r(Y^* - Y_i)$ Thus, the average income $\overline{Y_i} = (\frac{r}{t+r})Y^*$. We can directly see that $\overline{Y_i}$ is actually constant in the model since it is a function of Y^* . In this case, $U_i = (\frac{Y_i}{\overline{Y_i}})^{\alpha}$, after log transformation:

$$u_i = \alpha y_i - \alpha y_i$$
(2)
where $u_i \equiv \ln U_i, y_i \equiv \ln Y_i$, and $\overline{y_i} \equiv \ln \overline{y_i}$. Since $\overline{Y_i}$ is constant across *i*, thus

$$\boldsymbol{u}_i = \boldsymbol{\theta}_0 + \boldsymbol{\theta} \boldsymbol{y}_i \tag{3}$$

Step 2: develop behavioral (formal) and applied statistical analogues

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- What if i cares about social-interest, whether the society is just?
- Incorporate Jasso's (1999) justice evaluation function

$$J = \ln\left(\frac{A}{C}\right) \tag{4}$$

where A represents personal *actual* earnings and C represents personal *perceived* just earnings.

A > C ⇒ J > 0, over-rewarded;
 A = C ⇒ J = 0, perfectly just;
 A < C ⇒ J < 0, under-rewarded.

Step 2: develop behavioral (formal) and applied statistical analogues

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Justice index of the society

$$JI = E(J) = E\left[\ln\left(\frac{A}{C}\right)\right] = \ln\left[\frac{G(A)}{G(C)}\right]$$
(5)

where $E(X) = (\sum_{n=1}^{N} x_n)/N$ and $G(.) G(X) = (\prod_{n=1}^{N} x_n)^{1/N}$

JI > 0, over-burdened society;
 JI = 0, perfectly just society;
 JI < 0, under-benefited society.

Step 2: develop behavioral (formal) and applied statistical analogues

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• Income inequality in justice index Atkinson's (1975) measure

$$V(X) = 1 - \left[\frac{G(X)}{E(X)}\right]$$
 (6)

I(X) = 0, no inequality;
 I(X) increases as the inequality increases.

$$G(X) = E(X)[1 - I(X)]$$
 (7)

$$JI = \ln\left[\frac{G(A)}{G(C)}\right] = \ln\left(\frac{E(A)[1 - I(A)]}{E(C)[1 - I(C)]}\right)$$
(8)

Step 2: develop behavioral (formal) and applied statistical analogues

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• Reality vs. ideology in justice index

$$JI = \left[\ln(E(A)) - \ln(E(C))\right] + \left[\ln(1 - I(A)) - \ln(1 - I(C))\right]$$
(9)
= $JI_{mean} + JI_{inequality} = (Observed - Perceived)_{mean} + (Observed - Perceived)_{inequality}$

Observed inequality: income inequality of the society based on actual income distribution an individual observes.
 Perceived inequality: income inequality of the society based on just income

distribution an individual perceives.

*Note: $\ln(1 - I(.))$ increases, inequality decreases; $\ln(1 - I(A)) - \ln(1 - I(C)) > 0$, observed inequality is lower than perceived inequality.


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Step 2: develop behavioral (formal) and applied statistical analogues

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Discrete choice and logistic regression

(Incorporate self- and social-interest)



where P_i = preferences for redistribution – probability of supporting redistribution; ln(E(A))–ln(E(C)) = the difference between observed and perceived mean income; ln(1 - I(A))–ln(1 - I(C)) = the difference between observed and perceived income inequality.

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Step 3: unify and evaluate the analogues

 $P_{i} = \alpha_{0} + \theta Income_{i} + \beta DiffMean_{i} + \gamma DiffInequality_{i} + \epsilon_{i}$ (11)

- *θ* is the effect of individual income on individual preferences for redistribution;
- β is the effect of the difference between observed and perceived mean income of the society on individual preferences for redistribution;
- $\succ \gamma$ is the effect of the difference between observed and perceived income inequality of the society on individual preferences for redistribution.

Step 3: unify and evaluate the analogues

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• **Hypothesis** (based on equation (11)) $\gamma < 0, P_i$ decreases as $\ln(1 - I(A)) - \ln(1 - I(C))$ increases.

Motivated by social-interest, individual evaluates the whole society as either over-burdened or under-benefited. This is based on the difference between the income inequality that she actually observes and the just level that she perceives and is less likely to support redistribution if the real society is more just than perceived.

DATA AND MEASUREMENT

- Cross-sectional data set
- ISSP (International Social Survey Programme) 2009
- Asks each respondent about actual vs. just pay for different occupations:
 - "How much does a (particular occupation) in general

practice actually earn and should earn?"

DATA AND MEASUREMENT



DV: Individual Preferences	Description	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Redist_Poor	support for redistribution regarding the benefits to the poor (1, support; 0, otherwise)	0.799	0.401	0	1
Redist_Tax	regarding the tax on the rich (1, support; 0, otherwise)	0.680	0.467	0	1
IV: Self Interest					
Income	log income	28.511	34.802	0	160
Key IV: Social Interest					
Observed _{inequality}	Calculated based on $I(A) = 1 - \left[\frac{G(A)}{E(A)}\right]$ and $\ln(1 - I(A))$	-1.154	0.946	-5•397	015
Perceived _{inequality}	Calculated based on $I(C) = 1 - \left[\frac{G(C)}{E(C)}\right]$ and $\ln(1 - I(C))$	-0.537	0.573	-3.781	0
Diff inequality	Observed _{inequality} - Perceived _{inequality}	-0.617	0.855	-4.537	2.339

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EMPIRICAL RESULTS – U.S.

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Table 1: Individual Support for the Benefits to the Poor

	(1)	(2)	(3)	
	Difference	Observed	Perceived	
	Redist_Poor	Redist_Poor	Redist_Poor	
Income	- 0.25***	- 0.24***	- 0.24***	
	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)	
$\mathrm{Diff}_{\mathrm{mean}}$	- 0.35**			
	(0.162)			
Diffinequality	- 0.62***			
• •	(0.239)			
Observed _{mean}		- 0.15		
		(0.129)		
Observed _{inequality}		- 0.21		
		(0.210)		
Perceived _{mean}			0.02	
			(0.094)	
Perceivedinequality			0.36*	
1 5			(0.198)	
Constant	1.94***	3.58**	1.89	
	(0.192)	(1.438)	(1.035)	
Observations	701	701	701	
Standard errors in parentheses				
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1				

- Only the difference between the observed and the perceived inequality is statistically significant.
- The likelihood for an individual to support more benefits for the poor decreases by about 60% if the observed income inequality becomes most just from least just compared to her perceived level (i.e., from extremely underbenefited to over-benefited society).

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EMPIRICAL RESULTS – U.S.


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Table 2: Individual Support for the Tax on the Rich


	(1)	(2)	(3)	
	Difference	Observed	Perceived	
	Redist_Tax	Redist_Tax	Redist_Tax	
Income	- 0.08	- 0.08*	- 0.08*	
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	
Diff _{mean}	- 0.08			
	(0.161)			
Diffinequality	- 0.81***			
	(0.242)			
Observed _{mean}		0.32***		
		(0.098)		
Observed _{inequality}		0.12		
		(0.161)		
Perceived _{mean}			0.34***	
			(0.093)	
Perceivedinequality			0.92***	
• •			(0.196)	
Constant	0.57***	-2.89**	-2.558	
	(0.143)	(1.088)	(1.018)	
Observations	701	701	701	
Standard errors in parentheses				
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1				

- Both the difference and the perceived inequality are statistically significant. But the directions are opposite.
- An individual is 40% less likely to support more progressive taxation when her observed income inequality moves from the greatest level to the lowest degree compared to her perceived level.

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
EMPIRICAL RESULTS – U.S.						
	Table 3: Difference between Observed and Perceived Income					
Inequality (at mean) from Individuals at the Top, Middle, and						
		Bottom Income Quintile				
		Difference between Observed and	Number of			
		Perceived Inequality	Observations			
	Top Quintile	-0.832	71			
	Middle Quintile	-0.493	113			

*Note: (1) the smaller the value of the difference between observed and perceived inequality represents a less just (or under-benefited) society, i.e., observed inequality is greater than perceived inequality (2) the income quintile is set based on the 25 categories of income range in the original question from ISSP 2009

-0.623


Bottom Quintile

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*Note: the bottom quintile is the baseline; all are statistically significant except for the second quintile

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*Note: the bottom quintile is the baseline; only the highest quintile is statistically significant

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EMPIRICAL RESULTS – COMPARATIVE

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Table 4: The Effect of Difference between Observed and Perceived Income Inequality in2009 OECD Countries (by Electoral Systems)					
	% change of the probability in response to one standard- deviation increase of the		% change of the probability in response to one standard- deviation increase of the		 The effe mor
	difference between observed		difference between observed		whe
2009 OECD	and perceived inequality	Obs	and perceived inequality	Obs	
	More Benefits for the Poor		Higher Tax on the Rich		dire effe
(PR System)		-		_	con
Switzerland	-85.0*	419	-65.7	419	cou
Austria	-78.9***	425	-47.8**	425	syst
Finland	-58.4**	409	-80.4***	411	-
Turkey	35.7**	584	-41.7***	511	to t
Portugal	89.1**	248	-44.1**	248	maj
(Majoritarian					syst
System)					
Japan	-65.4	200	66.5	199	*Note:
U.K.	-49.8**	353	-7.3	352	
Australia	-46.8**	624	-37.3**	623	(
France	-43.4***	1168	11.0	1174	
U.S.	-41.2***	701	-50.0***	701	
New Zealand	-33.4	352	-22.9	356	
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1					

The size of the effects is generally more noticeable whereas the direction of the effect is less consistent for the countries in PR systems compared to the ones in majoritarian systems.

*Note: this is only part of the result in Table 4

CONCLUSIONS

- (1) Individual preferences for redistribution are motivated by both self- and socialinterest.
- (2) The effect of perceived income inequality by an individual comes from social interest in evaluating social justice with respect to the income distribution.
- (3) It is the difference between observed (actual) and perceived income inequality of an individual that accounts for her preferences for redistribution: individuals are less likely to support redistribution when the observed level is closer to the perceived just level.

(4) Individuals seek balance between self- and social-interest in redistribution.

Thank You!

Questions and Comments?