Interethnic Tolerance, Demographics, and the Electoral Fate of Non-nationalistic Parties in Post-war Bosnian Municipalities

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(Work in progress)

Summary

- **Take-home message**
- **Motivation**
- **Post-conflict developments**
- **Research questions**
- **A brief introduction to the Bosnian political system**
- **Competing theories**
- **Hypotheses**
- **EITM Approach**
- **Data, models**
- **Results**
- **Conclusion**

Take Home Message

- The level of “inter-ethnic tolerance” is a strong predictor of vote choice for non-nationalistic parties, in local level elections at least in one post-conflict society.
- Its effect is consistent across different model specifications and subsamples.
- Conversely, ethnic fractionalization (polarization) has an erratic behavior as predictor. Need for better data/model.

Motivation

- Post-conflict societies are characterized by intense political competition
- Externally imposed institutions intended to manufacture electoral democracy
- Ethnonationalist political elite prevail
- Most of the theoretical and empirical research is based on national or regional level data, while the municipal level is often overlooked

Post-conflict Developments

- Nearly half of all civil wars are due to post-conflict relapses (Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2008)
  - From civil war to electoral violence:
    - Angola (1992)
    - Burundi (2010)
    - Kosovo (2014)
  - From civil war to stability:
    - Bosnia Herzegovina (1996)
    - Macedonia (2002)
- Large amount of international aid for peacebuilding
  - US has provided over $2 billion in aid (USAID)

Research Questions

- What are the determinants of vote choice for non-nationalistic parties in post conflict societies at the local level?
  - Does the level of interethnic tolerance affect vote choice?

- Does the demographic geography influence vote choice?
  - If so, is social heterogeneity detrimental or beneficial for non-nationalist parties?

Politics in Bosnia

One country



Source: Maphill

Politics in Bosnia

Pre-war ethnic territorial distribution



Source: Wikipedia

Politics in Bosnia

2 Entities, 10 cantons

Politics in Bosnia

142 Municipalities



Source: Wikimedia Commons

Bosnian Political System

- Due to the post-war institutional arrangement, in practice we see two semi-independent part system (each entity)
- Main parties:
- Bosniak

Serb

Croat

Main Non-nationalistic Parties*

* Abbreviated as (NNP) and interchangeably referred as non-ethnic parties also.

Local Elections Outcome (2012)



	Non-nationalist parties
	Bosniak ethnic parties
	Croat ethnic parties
	Serb ethnic parties

Local Elections outcome (2012)



	Non-nationalist parties
	Bosniak ethnic parties
	Croat ethnic parties

Local Elections outcome (2012)



	Non-nationalist parties
	Bosniak ethnic parties

Local Elections outcome (2012)



Non-nationalist parties

Competing Theories

- Supply side: NNP flourish when political competition is *de-ethnified* (e.g. Homogenous districts) (Husley, 2011)
- Demand side: religiosity and right-wing political ideology decrease the probability to vote for NNP (Pickering, 2009)
  - Ethnic distance, resource competition, negative assessments of the political system, and social capital would have no effect

Competing Theories (cont'd)

- Unresolved issues:
  - Supply side theories based on de-ethnification of political competition cannot explain the emergence of pockets of *ethnic authoritarianism*
  - Demand side theories have been tested in homogenous samples (single ethnic group)
  - Disconnection between theory and empirical tests: aggregate level measures, inadequate units of analysis, effect of electoral systems

The Unit of Analysis Problem

Political unit \ Degree of heterogeneity	Mono ethnic district (Homogeneous)	Mixed district (Heterogeneous)
Municipality	Ethnic Authoritarianism	More favorable for non-nationalist parties
Canton	More favorable for non-nationalist parties (Husley 2011)	Ethnified political competition
Entity		(Husley found stronger effect here, though)*
Federal		



HUSLEY

* Mixed Croat districts split more than mono ethnic Bosniak or Croat (!!)

Argument

- Ethnic heterogeneity at the local level creates inter-ethnic tolerance → Contact Hypothesis
- Heterogeneity at higher levels is detrimental to inter-ethnic tolerance → Threat Hypothesis
- "Threat is perceptual; it involves what people think is the outgroup proportion and thus can be easily manipulated by political leaders and the mass media. Contact is experiential; it can reduce individual and collective threat as well as prejudice." (Pettigrew et al. 2010)

Argument (cont'd)

- Individuals living in more heterogeneous municipalities will be more likely to have greater levels of inter-ethnic tolerance, which in turn will increase the likelihood of voting for non-nationalist parties in local elections
- We must not forget that municipal elections are conducted under a plurality system, which makes the argument even more counter-intuitive

Hypotheses

- Tolerance hypothesis (H1): more tolerant individuals will have a greater propensity to vote for NNP
- Contact hypothesis (H2): living in a heterogeneous municipality will increase the probability of voting for a NNP, all else equal
- Advantages of my approach:
  - "Correct" unit of analysis
  - Majoritarian electoral system is a tough test
  - Multiple ethnic groups in sample
  - Recent data

EITM Approach

- **EITM step 1:**
- Intuition: voters would deviate from the expected ethnically motivated voting preference, maximizing their utility regarding inter-ethnic tolerance and context.
  - Behavioral concept: decision making
  - Statistical concept: nominal choice

EITM Approach

- **EITM step 2:**
  - Behavioral analogue: utility maximization
  - Statistical analogue: discrete choice modeling (voting for non-nationalist parties or not)
- **EITM step 3: Unification**

(see next slide)

EITM Approach

- The dependent variable is

$$Y_{ij} = \begin{cases} 1 \text{ if voting for NNPs} \\ 0 \text{ if voting for a nationalist (ethnic) party} \end{cases}$$

We try to model the vote choice if each individual i in each municipality j

Utility model:

There is a latent utility consisting of a systematic and random component

$$U_{ij} = V_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij} \quad (1)$$

A person should choose m if its utility exceeds that of the other alternative

$$U_{ij}^{m} > U_{ij}^{n} \quad (2)$$

EITM Approach

- $Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}X_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$ (3) where
  $\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}Z_j + \delta_{0j}$ (3.1) and
  $\beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11}Z_j + \delta_{1j}$ (3.2) then
  $Y_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}Z_j + \gamma_{10}X_{ij} + \gamma_{11}Z_jX_{ij} + \delta_{0j} + \delta_{1j}X_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$ (4)

- The behavioral model is:

Logit (π_{ij})= F ($\beta_0 + \beta_1$Interethnic tolerance + β_2Serb + β_3Croat + β_4Fractionalization + β_5Eval. Of System + β_6Eval. of Parties + β_7 Age + β_8Education + β_9Income + β_{10}Rural + β_{11}Population + β_{12}GDP)

EITM Approach

- Therefore…
  - Tolerance hypothesis (H1) implies that $\beta_1 > 0$
  - Contact hypothesis (H2) implies that $\beta_4 > 0$

Data

- UNDP Early Warning System survey (2000-2010) – emphasis in waves conducted in 2008
- Municipal socioeconomic data from UNDP and Analitika's Moje Mjesto website
- Fractionalization and polarization at municipal level (FBiH only) were calculated using ethnic distribution data estimated by Bochsler, Schlapfer and Shubiger (2010)
- Suboptimal data (!)
- DV → Vote for non-nationalistic parties
- IVs → Inter-ethnic tolerance
- → Ethnic heterogeneity (municipal level)

Descriptive Stats

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Vote choice	19755	0.2274	0.4192	0	1
Inter-ethnic tolerance	20638	-0.0417	1.9153	-6.117276	1.789864
Bosniak	66810	0.3997	0.4898	0	1
Serb	66810	0.3086	0.4619	0	1
Croat	66810	0.2690	0.4434	0	1
Unkown ethnicity	66810	0.0227	0.1490	0	1
Minority status	66810	0.2128	0.4093	0	1
Returnee status	49995	0.0235	0.1514	0	1
Federation BiH	66810	0.6478	0.4777	0	1
Republika Srspka	66810	0.3265	0.4689	0	1
Brcko district	66810	0.0257	0.1584	0	1
Polarization	41309	0.3907	0.3676	0	0.993946
Fractionalization	41309	0.7948	0.1927	0.422416	1
Rural status	66810	0.4232	0.4941	0	1
Evaluation of the system	58884	0.4363	0.4959	0	1
Evaluation of parties	19619	0.8134	0.9105	0	3
Age	66700	1.0383	0.8495	0	2
Education	66810	1.8903	0.8140	0	3
Income	54455	5.9552	4.5162	0	21
Population (1)	41309	45192.81	39126.94	651	131464
Population (Analitika)	16674	54003.46	32654.98	658	226459
GDP per capita	16674	BAM 5,434.02	BAM 2,701.19	BAM 1,869.32	BAM 29,932.63

Models and Results

	Vote Choice (1)	Vote Choice (2)	Vote Choice (3)	Vote Choice (4)	Vote Choice (5)
Inter-ethnic tolerance	1.616 (14.23)***	1.502 (10.78)***	1.465 (9.15)***	1.465 (9.15)***	1.344 (5.80)***
Serb		0.090 (15.99)***	0.931 (0.30)	0.949 (0.22)	0.976 (0.08)
Croat		0.358 (8.47)***	0.399 (7.12)***	0.398 (7.13)***	0.471 (4.13)***
Polarization			0.557 (3.51)***		
Fractionalization				2.995 (3.55)***	2.815 (2.54)**
Pol. Syst. Evaluation					0.756 (1.74)*
Eval. of parties					0.716 (3.48)***
Age					1.426 (3.94)***
Education					1.460 (3.76)***
Income					1.008 (0.34)
Rural status					0.536 (4.42)***
Population					1.000 (4.38)***
N	3,209	3,209	1,854	1,854	1,199
AIC	1.000	0.877	1.131	1.130	1.072
BIC	-22686.097	-23071.538	-11827.696	-11827.968	-7153.212

* $p<0.1$; ** $p<0.05$; *** $p<0.01$

Note: The estimation method is logistic regression. Odds ratio are reported. Z scores are reported in parentheses

Results (cont'd)

	Vote choice (6)	Vote choice (7)
Inter-ethnic tolerance	1.394 (3.85)***	1.504 (5.45)***
Croat	0.365 (3.64)***	0.295 (4.77)***
Fractionalization	2.257 (1.22)	
Eval. of parties	0.609 (2.19)**	0.657 (2.26)**
Pol. Syst. Evaluation	0.567 (3.94)***	0.476 (6.20)***
Age	1.448 (2.76)***	1.258 (2.03)**
Education	1.431 (2.04)**	1.481 (2.68)***
Income	0.996 (0.08)	0.996 (0.09)
Rural status	0.579 (2.55)**	0.704 (1.95)*
Population	1.000 (3.79)***	
Serb		0.121 (7.57)***
N	552	997
AIC	1.052	0.821
BIC	-2856.816	-6016.255

* $p<0.1$; ** $p<0.05$; *** $p<0.01$

Note: The estimation method is logistic regression. Odds ratio are reported. Z scores are reported in parentheses. Sample includes only waves conducted in 2008

Predicted Effect

An older citizen living in a rural municipality with the lower level of tolerance, other variables average

		95% Conf. Interval	
Pr(y=1|x):	0.0814	[-0.0070,	0.1698]
Pr(y=0|x):	0.9186	[0.8302,	1.0070]

		95% Conf. Interval	
Pr(y=1|x):	0.5503	[0.4486,	0.6520]
Pr(y=0|x):	0.4497	[0.3480,	0.5514]

An older citizen living in a rural municipality with the highest level of tolerance, other variables average

The Effect of Inter-ethnic Tolerance



Note: calculated from model 6 (year 2008)

Results (cont'd)

	Vote choice (8)	Vote choice (9)	Vote choice (10)	Vote choice (11)
Inter-ethnic tolerance	1.364 (6.09)***	1.358 (3.57)***	1.320 (4.87)***	1.283 (2.55)**
Serb	0.160 (8.34)***	0.166 (4.95)***		
Croat	0.400 (4.60)***	0.337 (3.32)***	0.470 (3.62)***	0.372 (2.92)***
Eval. of parties	0.707 (2.39)**	0.570 (2.58)***	0.746 (1.66)*	0.534 (2.46)**
Pol. Syst. Evaluation	0.577 (6.24)***	0.473 (5.29)***	0.655 (4.02)***	0.510 (4.12)***
Age	1.425 (4.20)***	1.365 (2.39)**	1.478 (4.03)***	1.422 (2.38)**
Education	1.608 (5.06)***	1.614 (2.90)***	1.613 (4.38)***	1.713 (2.74)***
Income	1.006 (0.29)	0.999 (0.02)	1.012 (0.50)	0.997 (0.05)
Rural status	0.537 (4.66)***	0.540 (2.93)***	0.497 (4.54)***	0.489 (2.96)***
Fractionalization			2.838 (1.47)	1.938 (0.57)
Population			1.000 (2.54)**	1.000 (2.74)***
N	2,103	989	1,199	552
LR Test	81.71	55.37	49.53	29.45
Prob >= chibar2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

* $p<0.1$; ** $p<0.05$; *** $p<0.01$

Note: The estimation method is XTLOGIT. Odds ratio are reported. Z scores are reported in parentheses. Models (9) and (11) correspond to waves conducted in 2008 only.

Results (Cont'd)

	Vote choice
	(12)
Inter-ethnic tolerance	1.244
	(2.88)***
Croat	0.297
	(4.66)***
Fractionalization	3.870
	(1.50)
Eval. of parties	0.613
	(2.24)**
Pol. Syst. Evaluation	0.562
	(4.30)***
Age	1.668
	(4.27)***
Education	1.776
	(3.72)***
Income	1.028
	(0.88)
Rural status	0.513
	(3.52)***
GDP per capita	1.000
	(0.76)
N	833
LR test vs. logistic regression: chibar2(01)	50.76
Prob>=chibar2	0.0000

* $p<0.1$; ** $p<0.05$; *** $p<0.01$

Note: The estimation method is Mixed Effects logit (MEQRLOGIT). Odds ratio are reported. Z scores are reported in parentheses.

Conclusions

- Inter-ethnic tolerance increases the odds of voting for a non-nationalistic party

- Fractionalization and polarization produce opposite effects when predicting vote choice in logit models
- More questions than answers: best model? The role of economic conditions? Social capital?

Questions? Comments? Skepticism? Attacks?

Thank you

Descriptive Stats (2008)

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Vote choice	1976	0.2444	0.4299	0	1
Inter-Ethnic Tolerance	8234	0.0478	1.9329	-6.11728	1.789864
Bosniak	9194	0.4231	0.4941	0	1
Serb	9194	0.3044	0.4602	0	1
Croat	9194	0.2425	0.4286	0	1
DK	9194	0.0299	0.1704	0	1
Minority status	9194	0.2058	0.4043	0	1
Federation BiH	9194	0.6382	0.4805	0	1
Republika Srpska	9194	0.3201	0.4665	0	1
Brcko District	9194	0.0417	0.1998	0	1
Polarization (RQ)	5817	0.3809	0.3657	0	0.993946
Fractionalization	5817	0.7997	0.1924	0.467546	1
Rural status	9194	0.5072	0.5000	0	1
Evaluation of the system	8066	0.3530	0.4779	0	1
Evaluation of parties	8248	0.7745	0.8996	0	3
Age	9142	1.1018	0.8733	0	2
Education	9194	1.7716	0.7572	0	3
Income	5957	5.3238	3.1784	0	21

Inter-ethnic tolerance index

- 3 sets of 5 questions (one per ethnic group)
- How acceptable would be:
  - To live in the same state with (*ethnic group*)
  - Having (*ethnic group*) as neighbors
  - Your children going to same school with (*ethnic group)* children
  - To have (*ethnic group*) as colleagues
  - One of your relatives getting married to (*ethnic*)
    - Not actual wording. Source: UNDP in Bosnia and Herzegovina