

haps their particular meanings as well) is *derived*, in that they are meaningful, and perhaps have the meanings they have, only because of the meaningfulness and meanings of mental states.

Neo-Gricean Theories

Since the pioneering work of Grice (1957), the idea that meaning generally depends on intentionality has come to form the core of a sophisticated theory of meaning and communication. (See especially Schiffer 1982; Bennett 1975; Lewis 1969; Cummins 1979.) Neo-Gricean accounts of meaning proceed in two phases. In phase one, what a speaker (or, more generally, a user, a "meaner") means by some particular performance is explained in terms of the speaker's intentions. According to neo-Gricean accounts of meaning, the intentions with which we deploy a representation determine what we mean by it, and the beliefs others (and ourselves, especially at later times) have about our communicative intentions constitute their (or our) understanding of it. Phase two of the neo-Gricean account explains conventional (e.g., linguistic) meaning by appealing to a shared plan—a convention in Lewis' (1969) sense—for the communicative use of a representational type: *R* means *M* because users of *R* are parties to a convention whereby those who deploy it mean *M* by it. In short, representations have meanings only because their users mean various things by them, and meaning something by a representation is a matter of deploying it with the right intentions. Thus, the semantic properties of representations are derived from the intentionality of their users—either directly, or indirectly via the existence of a convention governing their communicative uses.

Could a neo-Gricean theory apply to mental representations as well as to such nonmental representations as linguistic symbols and stop signs? Neo-Griceans hold that meaning ultimately depends on the communicative intentions of communicating agents. A neo-Gricean theory of mental representation, then, would have to hold that someone or something uses mental representations with the intention of communicating something to someone or something. But a person does not use mental

representations with the intention to communicate anything to anyone; indeed, mental representations of the sort standardly featured in the CTC—e.g., a 2½-d sketch or a phonemic representation of a heard utterance—are not used intentionally (or even consciously) at all. Thus, the "communicating agents" required by the theory would have to be subsystems—"sub-personal agents," as Dennett (1978) calls them, or *pro tempore* homunculi (see also Lycan 1981, 1987). These agents would have to have communicative intentions and beliefs in order to mean something by the mental representations they use and in order to enter into conventions governing the communicative uses of those representations.

But this is surely implausible; there is no reason to think that our subpersonal systems (assuming there are such things) *have* beliefs and intentions. Although it is often supposed that subsystems *use* representations in some sense, it is not at all plausible to suppose that they use representations intentionally. Ordinary belief and intention are mysterious enough. We make no explanatory progress by relying on the unexplained and implausible idea that subsystems have communicative intentions and beliefs.¹

Neo-Gricean theories of meaning can be seen as a species of theory that reduces meaning generally to intentionality. Whereas neo-Gricean theories focus on communicative intentions, there is a tradition, going back to Berkeley and including the later Wittgenstein, that holds that the meaning of a representation is a function of its intended use, where this is construed more broadly than communicative use. The same points just made about neo-Gricean theories apply to the genus generally: They are unpromising as theories of mental representation because they require subpersonal agents with intentions to use mental representations. Thus, "intended-use" theories provide us with no help in explaining mental representation.²

Intended-Use Theories without Intentionality

The objection to intended-use theories of mental representation is that they implausibly require subpersonal intentional agents.